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'The Patriarchal Theory'; Some Modes of Explanation of Kinship in the Social
Sciences
Rosalind Coward
This thesis covers aspects of the history of the theorisation of sexuality 
and kinship in the period between 1860 and 1930. The history presented here' 
is selective. It is organised around a problem of contemporary relevance. 
This problem is why it has become difficult to produce a historically 
specific account of sexual organisation in society without falling into 
essentialist notions of sexuality.
The thesis argues that there are two dominant explanations for the 
emergence of this theoretical difficulty. One is that during the period 
under investigation there was consolidated a division of attention between 
various theoretical discourses. Aspects traditionally entailed in any 
consideration of sexuality - kinship, marriage, the family, reproduction,sexual 
instincts - were raised in different ways by different discourses. The 
divisions between these discourses was consolidated in part arouno. this 
division of attention. The other factor influencing our contemporary 
problem is that in so far as sexuality has been treated within the 
social sciences, it has come under a theoretical division between the 
individual and society. Consigned in general to the realm of the 
individual, sex has fallen prey to a dispute between modes of explanation. 
The division is between those explanations which insist on the primacy of 
the individual attributes and those which seek to explain all phenomena 
by reference to the interaction of elements in a given society. The 
thesis argues for the need to transcend the limitations imposed by this 
theoretical division.
The thesis is in two parts. The first traces the'treatment of sexuality 
which came to dominate in the second half of the nineteenth century through 
a particular study of kinship. It reveals both the dominant modes of 
explanation and the themes and preoccupations for which these debates were 
vehicles. These preoccupations reveal how discourses were consolidated 
with different objectives, modes of attention and modes of explanation. 
The second part traces the division of attention within those discourses 
which now have the greatest claim as explanations of sexual relations within 
society, that is between marxism and psychoanalysis. It shows how, and for 
what purpose, certain concepts were mobilised; it discusses whether the 
heritage of concepts drawn from earlier debates limits the advances which can 
be made while remaining within traditional disciplines.
The purpose of this study is to reveal primarily the limiting effect of 
the theoretical division between individual and society on studies of 
sexual division. It aims to show that while this division is operative, 
accounts of sexuality will be dominated by essentialist explanations. It 
argues for breaking down the divisions between existing disciplines, and 
in particular the division between psychoanalysis and some of the social 
sciences.
INTRODUCTION
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INTRODUCTION
When we turn our attention to theoretical discourses, our gaze falls 
on what the discourse itself sees, its visible  This visible, 
Althusser writes in Reading Capital is the relation between objects and 
concepts that the discourse proposes. 'The theoretical problematic of 
a given theoretical discipline' will render visible only those 
objects or problems that occur within its horizons and upon its terrain. 
Only these objects and problems are significant for the theoretical 
discipline, and have a place within its overall structure. Other objects 
and problems are therefore insignificant; they fall into the interstices 
of the structure, they become invisible. 'It is the field of the
problematic that defines and structures the defined excluded from the
(2) field of visibility.' ^ }
A certain relationship of necessity exists between these two 
moments. The invisible is not simply anything whatever outside the 
relationship between objects posited by a discourse, it is within the 
discourse, it is what the light of the discourse scans without picking
up its reflection. 'To see these over-sights, to identify the lacunae
(3)in the fullness of discourse, the blanks in the crowded text',
something more than close attention is needed. What is required is a 
new gaze, an informed gaze, itself not the product of any one individual 
but made possible by changes on the exercise of vision, changes in 
social and political conditions.
Althusser f s 'informed gaze 1 is that of a 'science 1 regarding its 
ideological predecessors. Without making such grandiose claims however 
the metaphor can be extended to encompass the effects of a shift in political 
and theoretical concerns which then reveals blanks in previous theories. 
In recent years, a new form of attention has been turned on social and
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political sciences. It is a gaze arising from the politics of feminism, 
a gaze which has turned to these discourses requiring illumination about 
the social position of women. From this informed gaze there has not shone 
back the required light of illumination, but a light from the lacunae of 
the discourses. Instead of light from the plenitude of these discourses, 
a light has shone back from places where only darkness was suspected. 
What has been exposed are the absences, the questions not asked, and the 
answers not heard in these theoretical discourses.
This thesis is structured around three questions. Why is it that 
the questions asked by feminism have revealed these absences? What are 
the terms in the fullness of some discourses within the social sciences 
which have long hidden the absences? And what are the areas of 
theoretical invisibility which must be made to appear if any discourse is 
to be constructed adequate to the gaze of feminism?
The informed gaze
Contemporary feminism has a strange quality; it always seems to exceed 
its objects. It almost takes its definition from that excess. A 
heterogeneous movement, pragmatic when pragmatic action is required, and 
reformist when reforms are sought, feminism now always means something 
more than a commitment to piecemeal reform to better the lot cf women. 
It is also a commitment to exploring the problems of being a woman in 
contemporary society. That commitment is to non-complacency towards 
these problems. It is rare, if not to say impossible, to find a feminism 
which attributes women's subordinate position to some natural, god-given 
and therefore unchangeable sexual role. Instead, the commitment to 
exploring the ways of being a woman is to understanding these as 
constructions in order that they may be changed. It is a commitment 
involving a double movement: on the one hand there is a desire to under-
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stand how it is that women as a sex are subordinated; on the other 
hand there is a desire to challenge the very idea of natural sex roles. 
The problem is that of understanding the position of women as a sex without 
presuming that being a sex entails forms of natural behaviour and position.
This simultaneous quest for understanding women as a sex, and sexual 
categories as constructions appears contradictory. Surely any attempt 
to talk about women as a sex, distinct from men, automatically entails a 
form of essentialism? It seems to imply that women have a separate 
history and distinctive experiences, radically different from men. A 
suggestion like this would appear to rely on an idea of some radical 
difference between the sexes. It would appear to rule out the possibility 
that sexual division is socially constructed. Yet this apparently 
contradictory position is the one most commonly expressed amongst feminism; 
women have been treated as a sex, but sexual categories are social 
constructions. Most striking about this position is that its apparent 
contradictoriness seems to limit the possibilities for saying much more 
about the problem. It appears to be a compromise formation between two 
modes of explaining sexual division which, if further elaborated, would 
run the risk of falling into the pitfalls of either explanation.
The contradictoriness of this position is however only apparent. 
It results from the impossibility of certain options which are presented 
to us in current ways of thinking about sexual relations. It is the 
fact that the feminist quest wishes to explore between explanations which 
has exposed dominant facets in ways of conceptualising sexuality and 
social relations. The mutual incompatibility of answers about sexual 
relations make the silences of discourses speak; feminism has revealed 
the black holes of theorisations of sexuality. Suddenly for example, 
the unresolved status of the so-called natural within the social sciences 
is revealed. For the dilemma between forms of explanation is produced 
by a particular dogma of social determination. Sex is either the realm
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of natural and instinctual - hence to be accounted for by biology or 
psychology - or sexual relations are thought to be determined by 'social 1 
forms, social here implying technical, demographic and economic instances. 
From either perspective the study of forms of sexual relations themselves 
is frequently put into abeyance even in those discourses which seem to 
make the greatest claim to understand them. Either they can be explained 
by another discipline (an "individual" or natural science), or they are 
uninteresting in themselves, always being the effect of other, more tangible 
social relations, attended to only as examples of the variability of different 
cultures.
A series of excluded concerns comes to light behind this lack of 
resolution in the dispute between forms of explanation of sexual relations. 
How exactly is the 'natural' theorised in the social sciences? How is it 
that sex often belongs to this space? Why is the study of sexuality when 
it appears in the social sciences is frequently subsumed under studies of 
institutionalised (social) forms of sexual regulation, like marriage? Why 
is there no theory of forms of domination and inequality in the dynamic 
of sexual relations? Why is there no understanding of the construction of 
sexual identity or consideration of the distribution of power and status 
which this identity might entail? In short, why are all theoretical 
discussions of sex polarised around a dispute between 'naturalism 1 and 
'culturalism.'
Feminism turns questions about sexual construction to the social and 
political sciences and the glaring light of the invisible shines back at us   
Sociology often answers with a useless tautology - society determines 
social relations in which sexual relations are included. Marxism answers 
with a rigorous determinism, already politically discredited within feminism : 
all forms of social identity, including sexual identity, are determined in 
the last instance by the economic mode of production. Anthropology answers 
with a comforting but bewildering proliferation of evidences against the
5naturalness of any one form of sexual- behaviour. But no general analysis 
of sexual relations is offered. Turning to areas outside the traditional 
social sciences, psychoanalysis appears to offer a detailed account of 
the construction of sexual identity, but it outrages many with its 
apparently universalising claims.
But the gaze which feminism has turned on social and political sciences 
reveals a surprising fact. The principle terms which now preoccupy 
feminism are neither new nor have they been absent in previous theories 
of society. Considerations of sexual division of labour, reproduction, 
the position of women within the family, the family's relation with other 
social institutions, the forms of power entailed in familial and sexual 
relations, the concepts of sex and sexual identity are, in fact, everywhere 
discoverable,,
Distinct disciplines have concerned themselves with discrete elements 
in this series of issues. Sociology for example has had much to say about 
the family. It has been concerned with the relationship between the family 
and other social institutions and practices, especially with a discussion as 
to whether the family changes under the impact of 'modernisation'. It has 
rarely addressed the position of women or the sexual division of labour. 
Questions asked by sociology of data on marriage and the organisation of the 
household have been quite different from those asked by anthropology, which 
has paid detailed attention to the systems of kinship,.
An additional problem is the fact that the objects designated by 
different disciplines, while appearing superficially similar, are in fact 
quite different. The problem of reproduction for example might entail 
entirely different issues if it was posed within anthropology (where it 
might refer simply to biological procreation) or from within sociology 
(where it might refer to the reproduction of society as a totality). 
Yet more confusing is the fact that discourses like psychoanalysis which 
appear to concern themselves with the construction of sexual identity, and
which claim pertinence for cultura-l explanations, seem arbitrarily 
excluded from what is designated, the social sciences. It becomes 
clear that they do not conform to a diffused but universally accepted 
criterion of what constitutes a social science.
The situation however is more than one of just bewildering confusion. 
There is a multitude of contesting definitions, all appearing to ask 
similar questions and occupying roughly similar theoretical spaces, yet 
there appears to be a real level of incompatibility between these 
explanations. Any dogmatic espousal of one form of explanation produces 
a howl of outrage among academic feminism. Attempts to use marxist 
definitions provoke denunciations for neglecting what is specific about 
sexual division and reducing it to other social divisions. To espouse 
definitions culled from anthropology and psychoanalysis is to run the 
risk of applying universal!sing and therefore essentialising definitions» 
Psychoanalysis appears to commit the additional crime of neglecting the 
impact of specific cultures on the individual,. To espouse sociology is 
to invite the criticism that no explanation is being offered other than a 
diffuse causality that a given culture determines the forms of household 
and sexual relationso
The vigilance within feminist theory against reductionism on the one 
hand and essentialism on the other has become severe and violent. The 
vehemence of the divisions between various forms of explanation has often 
left feminism, from whence the questions arose, stone cold. The feeling 
is, if all academic feminism can produce is a fight to the death between 
competing explanations, then perhaps theory is left well alone.
But these divisions are more than just 'professional 1 quibbles, 
offputting though they frequently are to women outside academic feminism. 
No easy distinction can be drawn between the discussion outside and inside 
academic feminism. Academic feminist theory draws its problems from the 
political discussion in the movement; its solutions and ideas filter back
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sometimes fast, sometimes slowly into.general discussion. Political 
tendencies mobilise forms of explanation suitable to their aspirations. 
But one of the most vehement political divisions with the women's movement 
has been fed in a most unfortunate way by the impossibilities and 
incompatibilities found in the traditional social sciences* The endless 
cycle of accusations of 'reductionism' and 'essentialism 1 which flow between 
socialist and radical feminist positions obscures the fact that there is 
often common ground between these two positions, common ground which might 
become explicit with a reconceptualisation of sexual relations. Particularly 
from within socialism, feminists have baulked at the idea of challenging 
'materialist 1 definitions of causality. let it is precisely this sacred cow 
of the social sciences which feminism has begun to undermine. The double 
exigency to look at women as sex but at sex as socially constructed category has 
thrown this hegemonic definition of causality in the social sciences into 
crisis. The hegemonic definition is that there are some practices which are 
determinant, like the economy, and others which are determined, like sexual 
forms, marriage, religion, representational practices. But this can no 
longer pass unquestioned into received wisdom. The problems of the way in 
which sexuality is represented in a whole series of practices, the organisa- 
tion of familial and domestic relations seem to have a tenaciousness far 
in excess of being mere effects of other social practices. The questions 
which feminism asks of the social sciences receive no adequate answer: all 
that has been delivered is a series of confused and contradictory definitions 
and unexamined dogmas »
Sex and the Study of Society
There are good reasons why the questions posed by contemporary feminism
meet with inadequate answers from existing studies of the social. The
reasons are partly an effect of the history of the emergence of distinctive
disciplines in the social sciences. Firstly, there is a division of attention
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between those discourses which, have given a prominent place to the 
examination of aspects of sexual relations. Anthropology, marxism and 
psychoanalysis seek quite different objectives when they mobilise data 
on sexual organisation. Their various forms of attention certainly do 
not add up to a general theory of the construction of sexual division, 
hierarchies and statuses and their relation to other social forms.
However this division of attention was not always the case. At 
the turn of the century, all these disciplines were far more integrally 
connected with one another. Significantly, a major point of debate 
between them was over the place of the family and the organisation of 
sexual relations in society. At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
a dream found frequent expression. That dream was of a genuinely 'human 1 
science, covering all aspects of social and human behaviour. That 
aspiration grew to look more and more like a fantasy as divisions between 
modes of explanation became increasingly violent 0
It is more than a cruel coincidence that warfare between rival modes 
of explanation has broken out over issues not dissimilar to those over 
which some disciplines first fractured. Issues concerning the position 
of women in society, the determination of sexual relations, the social function 
of the family, were to the forefront of debates within the social and 
political sciences at the turn of the century. Old wounds have been 
opened by the requirement of a new approach to sexual relations in society* 
This is not because the objects, 'woman' or 'sexual relations' are new - 
far from it - but because the problem of the theorisation of sexual 
construction, the function of sexual division, the relations of power 
between the sexes, potentially opens to dispute dominant theorisation
of causality in theories of societies. It reveals in fact that 
old wounds were never properly healed. Here are a series of unresolved 
problems, dumped in the emergence of distinct and mutually exclusive modes 
of explanation.
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Sexual relations exist in the social sciences on the border 
between 'nature' and 'society' <, On the one hand, sexual behaviour 
belongs to the individual; on the other sexual regulation like marriage 
is as aspect of the social structure. They are thus the point of contestatior
as to the relation between nature and culture; they are the point where 
the social sciences runs the danger of being compromised by their own 
theoretical divisions of attention,, Sexuality is ascribed to the 
individual and a theoretical distinction is marked between individual 
and society 0 Thus sexual behaviour can be accounted for by those theories 
whose prime focus is the individual; psychology, psychoanalysis 
and biology. Tet because sexuality has an ambiguous status in the social 
sciences, the point of integration between nature and culture, there is 
always the problem that these "individual" sciences will extend their 
definitions to account for the whole of society as well»
The recent success of socio-biology in defining social relations, 
and the grandiose claims of psychoanalysis are witness to the space which 
is sometimes left in contemporary theories of society. Where these 
explanations are resisted, the social sciences counters them with a 
diffuse culturalism - society determines the individual. let this 
position fails to account for cultural relations - sexual regulation, 
representational practice - in a way that recognises their specificity and 
does not reduce them to simple effects of other, social practices. 
However, the agreement on a theoretical division between individual and 
society means that the pertinence of biological and psychological explana- 
tion in the social sciences is unresolved.
Under the exigency of finding adequate explanations for sexual 
divisions, the rigid divisions between modes of explanation is now once 
more challenged; ironically, their incompatibility was decided partly 
over similar issues. For what the enquiry, stimulated by feminism, has 
uncovered are the organising principles by which sexuality is dealt with
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in contemporary social sciences; on the one hand a theoretical division 
between individual and society, and on the other a nebulous notion of 
social determination which attempts to counter the effects of this 
theoretical division. The effect is that explanations mobilising 
entirely different forms of causality can creep in and totalise the whole 
field of the social through the notion of the individual. Is it 
coincidence that women's studies should be ghettoised? Or is this 
separation of the questions of women and sexuality from the body of social 
sciences a recognition that the inadequacies of the social sciences are 
papered over only by the rigourous exclusion of such questions?
The Outline
It is to these theoretical problems that this thesis is addressed. Its 
aim is to examine the history of the division of attention between 
discourses and to detail the triumph of certain modes of explanation 
of sexual relations. The history reveals fascinating phenomena not 
least the coincidence between the objects then studied and those now 
raised by feminist enquiry.
These debates took place in the second half of the nineteenth century 
and focussed initially on evidence of so-called mother-right societies 
where family organisation seemed so different from that of Western 
patriarchal society 0 The first three chapters of this thesis trace the 
emergence of this debate and the themes and preoccupations at its heart. 
In the first chapter the theoretical conditions are traced by which sexual 
regulation became a central object of inquiryo These debates on the 
family were formed in a distinctive conJuneture 0 They were formed, through 
the coincidence of several elements; there was the dissolution of earlier 
forms of political theory, loosely known as the patriarchal theory,. In 
this, it had been argued that the patriarchal family was the eternal and 
unchanging foundation of society, based on sovereign power writ smallo
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This was disputed for a number of coinciding reasons. One was emergent 
evolutionary theory; another was the development of comparative juris- 
prudence which allowed a different approach to history; another was the 
obsessive interest in sexual and familial arrangement emerging under 
the impulse of various social and political reasons. This latter 
stimulated renewed study of ethnographic literature, a study which 
fuelled the attack on assumptions about the universal nature of the 
patriarchal family,,
In chapters two and three,the main themes and preoccupation of the 
ensuing debate are discussed. Together the chapters show the multitude 
of concerns brought to bear on the study of sexual relations. Chapter 
two concentrates on the study of family and sexual relations as bearers 
of speculation on the nature of all forms of alliances between and within 
social groups. Chapter three concentrates on the notion of sexuality 
at the heart of these studies. Taken together, these two chapters aim 
to indicate the way in which a central paradox of the social sciences 
developed. The study of sexual relations was absolutely central yet 
paradoxically a study of sexual relations in their specificity and the 
implications of studies of sexuality from other disciplines were 
systematically excluded. This paradox reveals the consolidation of a 
definite theory of causality in the social sciences. It is a causality 
where certain practices, like marriage and representational practices, 
are claimed as specifically human, yet they are always to be accounted 
for by other aspects of the social formation - technology, the economy etc 0 
Thus what is specifically human is rarely theorised in these accounts and 
remains open to explanations from those sciences which do not correspond 
to the hierarchy of determination advanced within theories of the social.
In chapter four, entitled The Impasse on Kinship, one response within 
social sciences to the early debates is traced. This response is extremely 
limited; it was one moment in the criticism of earlier debates. This
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criticism was compelled by the need to liberate the study of kinship 
from the multitude of concerns of which it had become support and the 
need to deconstruct the simplistic equation engendered by unilinear 
evolutionary accounts. These criticisms were important in the development 
of contemporary anthropology even though they did not represent a consistent 
theoretical position. However their deconstruction of earlier presupposi- 
tions is revealing; it illuminates the consolidation of a theoretical 
distinction between individual and society which was widespread.
For a while, the valid reaction against the search for unilinear 
histories of the origin and function of the family had the effect of making 
virtually impossible any general assessment of the determination of social 
relations. A series of issues were submerged in the retreat from some 
theories of determination. These were the unequal oasis of power between 
the sexes; the ways in which kinship might operate to reproduce or construct 
sexual inequalities; the role of kinship in structuring reproduction. The 
criticisms of evolutionary theory also reveal what was retained in the 
theorisation of sexuality; many assumptions remained unchallenged. The way 
in which power between the sexes was theorised, and the assumption of sexuality 
as heterosexual reproductive instinct are two crucial examples of this. These 
criticisms also give a clear example of the way in which the individual/ 
society division became dominant. For the writers concerned, the division 
was inscribed in the notion of the family. Reacting against the former wild 
hypothesis, they constructed a notion of the procreative family which could 
be conceptually separated from the sociological family. The procreative 
family became the space where the individual interacted with society, in 
other words, it confirmed the tendency to think of the individual as a 
substantive element, made up of behaviours, instincts, desires, needs, which 
was conceptually separated from the structuring of these factors by society.
The final four chapters of the thesis deal with two particular discourses 
marxism and psychoanalysis. These discourses now have the greatest claim on
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our attention for understanding the position of women in society., 
Neither marxism nor psychoanalysis, both of which offered totalising 
explanations for the form taken by social relations, paid attention to 
criticisms of evolutionary hypotheses. This blindness reveals the fact 
that the accounts of the family and sexual relations on which marxism and 
psychoanalysis drew had very definite functions for these theories. They 
were accounts required by other aspects of the theories; they were 
mobilised as theoretical solutions, to integrate elements within the theory<>
Within marxism, the history of the family was mobilised to produce an 
account of economic agency, and thus link various aspects of the social 
formation. Ironically the very centrality occupied by the concept of the 
family made it virtually impossible for marxism to deal with the specificity 
of sexual divisions and its effects. This problem is addressed in the 
chapter, The Woman Question and the Early Marxist Left where the difficulty 
confronting a certain tradition of marxism is discussed: this is the 
difficulty of dealing with the specificity of sexual division in the family» 
The requirement is for the family to function within an overall conception 
of the social totality and its hierarchy; the inadequacies of this model 
become all too apparent confronted with the woman question.
For psychoanalysis, the concept of the family, drawn from the earlier 
debates, was mobilised to theorise the relation between instinct, complex 
and social relations. The effect was that psychoanalysis emerged with a 
commitment to a universalising account of the procreative family and the 
emotions connected with thiso This commitment compromised the more radical 
elements of psychoanalysis' non-essentialist account of sexual relations. 
In so far as psychoanalysis offered an account of social relations, it was 
taken to be describing a complex of emotions resulting from a real nuclear 
family. With such a proposition, non-essentialist notions of sexuality 
could not enter into an account of social forms=>
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The final chapter, Psychoanalysis and Anthropology, implicitly 
draws together some of the strands of the thesis<, It describes the 
conflict between culturalist explanations in the social sciences (embodied 
here by anthropology) and psychoanalysiso It thus describes the hopeless 
polarity between culturalism and universalism. This polarity is caused 
partly because of the theoretical division between individual and society, 
and partly by the dominance of a particular version of determination in 
the social sciences. This chapter reveals how neither positions could 
advance beyond a hopelessly sterile position, even though there was much 
about the psychoanalytic approach which was committed to exploring non- 
essentialist theories of sexuality 0 Finally, the conclusion discusses the 
theoretical problems which have run through the thesis; the polarisation 
between individual and society; the implications of disciplines for one 
another; and the problem of developing non-essentialist theories of 
sexuality*
While the debates traced have been confined to a delimited historical 
period, it is nevertheless claimed that the broad outlines in the treatment 
of sexuality can still be seen. The divisions traced in this thesis still 
structure the possibilities of how we can think about sexual relations , 
The aim of the thesis is to clarify the history of debates about sexuality, 
It seeks to demonstrate how many of the debates now in play are not 
entirely new. The problem and limitations of some of the terms and modes 
of explanation are still therefore relevant. Uncovering these histories 
has a purpose: it stands as a warning that, if any advances are to be 
made in understanding sexual relations in society, dominant ways of thinking 
about sexuality have to be displaced. It is not a matter of supporting one 
discipline against another until everyone realises its advantages; "the 
conceptualisation of sexuality has been structured around some dominant 
presupposititions whose displacing would have radical implications for 
our whole understanding of society 0
CHAPTER OttE
THE DISSOLUTION OP THE PATRIARCHAL THEORY
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Introduction < V^.., \->"' 
During the second half of the nineteenth century the study of the 
family assumed prominence within the social and political sciences. 
Above any other social form, it was thought that the family would reveal 
the history and function of social relations. Where this debate differed 
from its predecessors was in the centrality given to the study of 
comparative data. The study of diverse family organisations would reveal 
original social forms and the history of their development. Contrary to 
appearances, the family was not the subject of this debate but the vehicle 
for wider speculation on the forms of social relations. Yet in spite of 
this, the terms employed in these debates still structure the ways in 
which sexual and familial regulation is now theorised. It was in these 
debates that sociological and anthropological disciplines emerged; it 
was in these debates also that crucial conceptions of the family and 
sexual relations were formed for marxism and psychoanalysis.
In the 1860's comparative jurisprudence became the privileged mode of 
study in which social and political theory was formed. It involved the 
comparative study of ancient legal representations and the legal practices 
of extant non-European civilisations. Henry Maine's Ancient Law,^ ' 
published in 1861 was a crucial text which established this method at the 
heart of studies of social and political forms. Like 'comparative
philology' which had been emergent from the beginning of the nineteenth
(2)
century , comparative jurisprudence was premised on the 'historisation'
of social forms. Maine set out to demonstrate the historical variability 
of legal and social practices, in particular transformations in property 
relations.
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The lynch pin of Maine's argument was however the family; it was to 
be a study of familial forms and their transformations which would reveal 
the dynamic of all social development. Prom his detailed study of the 
ancient law of the Romans, Slavs and Northern Indians, he deduced that 
the patriarchal family was to be understood as the fundamental and 
universal form of human society. This was not a natural grouping but an 
artificial one, a household united by the power and authority of one strong 
father with despotic rights over his subjects. The history of this 
'original' grouping would reveal the history of wider social and political 
groupings and would ultimately explain the development of the nation state.
Maine's Ancient Law was a critical moment in the social sciences. 
It marked the summation of a theory of the patriarchal family which had 
previously been dominant in political theory but it also represented a 
methodological and theoretical approach which provided the conditions 
for the overthrow of the last lingering traces of this political theory. 
Earlier political theory had been concerned with a transhistorical theory 
of society founded through social contract, with the patriarchal family 
as the fundamental social unit. Comparative jurisprudence was concerned 
to demonstrate the historical transformations which social forms, like 
property, had undergone. The effect was to jeopardise the theorisation 
of the patriarchal family as fundamental and universal social unit. 
For at the very moment when Maine advanced his theory of the transformations 
undergone by legal and property forms in the patriarchal family in the 
course of human history, his own methods were applied to subvert his 
hypothesis. Theorists applied Maine's method to long-available data of 
societies which "perversely" organised family and descent .through the 
women, so-called mother-right societies. This application disputed 
Maine's hypothesis of the original forms of social organisation. A new 
possibility had been opened. It became possible to think that very far-
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reaching transformations had occurred in familial organisation, not 
just in legal and property relations. Perhaps the course of human 
development involved very drastic changes, a suggestion affirmed by 
evolutionary theory.
The systemisation of evidences against the universality of the 
patriarchal family provoked a series of violent debates within the social 
sciences. Radically different forms of familial organisations were taken, 
initially, as evidence against Maine's hypothesis of origins; controversy 
broke out over the original social and familial organisations. What is 
curious about this debate, which is not at all self-evident in hindsight, 
is the obsessive central 1ty assumed by a study of familial and sexual 
relations as a clue to general problems of social organisation. This 
centrality had definite theoretical and political conditions of existence 
which will be explored primarily in the second and third chapters of the 
thesis. Let it suffice here to remark that the supersession of the 
patriarchal theory generated questions which dominated the social sciences 
for many subsequent decades. They asked what was the meaning of mother- 
right societies and what light did their existence shed on the nature or 
history of social organisations?
Comparative jurisprudence and the patriarchal theory
The colonies, and in particular the Americas, had long provided European 
philosophers and social theorists with material on different social and 
familial forms. ' Inductive political theory and inductive anthropology, 
culled from travellers' tales and cosmographies, were integrally linked. 
It has even been suggested that the type of society encountered in
expanding colonisation played an important part in speculation as to the
(4) state of presocial man. x ' Many of the writings displayed detailed
knowledge of contemporary 'discoveries', and, despite their too freauent
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characterisation as exclusively political theories, concerned only with 
explanations of the origins of sovereignty and the social, they
frequently turned attention to the state of morals of a particular
(5) 
society. ^ J
Yet the form of theorisation which emerged under what Maine advanced 
as 'comparative jurisprudence' displayed a markedly different series of 
concerns from its predecessors,even from those which had championed the 
patriarchal family as source of social contract. ' There were several 
determinants on the emergence of the sort of social theory advanced by 
Maine. He wrote in the face of the dissolution of theories of the pre- 
social man, in which contemporary 'savages' were frequently taken to be 
examples of that state. What often underlay this political philosophy was 
not only the presumption that a pre-social state of mankind had existed, 
but that some 'barbarous' peoples had not yet emerged from it. Yet such 
a proposition came under increasing pressure. The. researches of Boucher 
de Perthes were finally accepted within paleontology in 1858. He had 
carried out excavations in the Somme valley which seemed to establish 
beyond reasonable contradiction the extraordinary antiquity of mankind, 
and give irrefutable evidence for a general stone age of mankind. Such 
conclusions could only destroy the probability that any group of people 
now extant still lived in pre-social state. In addition, the possibility 
of a confident universal theory of the origins of humanity from one people 
was dissolving under the multiplicity of racial groupings systematically 
registered in the exigencies of European imperialism. A technical and
geographical solution to the problems posed by these differences had been
(7)gaining ascendancy throughout the previous century v 'and it was this which
provided the conditions for com'ronting these as differences.
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Perhaps however the most immediate impulse to the emergence of 
the conditions in which the patriarchal theory of comparative jurisprudence 
was formed was the extension of European rule over large areas of India 
which had been taking place throughout the eighteenth century. One of 
the first consequences of the declaration of formal rule was the discovery 
by the imperaialist regime that the dominant civilisation of the country 
was not only rigidly patriarchal but also dated back to very ancient times. 
Yet this observation was limited to a definite area: northern India. 
For it was in the North that resistance to European rule had been greatest. 
As a result, these northern societies had attracted more attention, 
overshadowing the peaceful matrilineal societies of the south.
The significance of these ancient northern patriarchal civilisations 
was that they offered evidence for the consolidation of 'comparative 
jurisprudence 1 , itself a spin-off from the practical problems of colonial 
administration. Study of the legal structures of these societies was 
taken to shed new light on Roman law, a study which seemed to confirm the 
view that the patriarchal family was the basic unit of ancient society. 
This conclusion was confirmed by the historical study' of the scriptures. 
Here, the writings of the Hebrew Patriarchs of Lower Asia had suggested the 
common origin of Semitic and Aryan society. The theory which could be 
applied to Aryans, Semites and Arabs could now be applied to the Indians. 
The observation
...seemed to justify the belief which had always remained popular 
in Europe, that the primitive state of man had been neither pre- 
social nor nasty and brutish at all; but in the best sense "very 
good". (8)
As many have noted, comparative jurisprudence at this stage was confined
to evidence from the Indo-European stock. The Romans, Hebrews, Slavs
(9)and Hindus made up the bulk of societies studied. J Wot only were the
peoples of the same stock, but at the period under consideration, they
- 20 -
had shared the same pastoral mode of subsistence. However, this 
study of the legal forms of other societies, accompanied as it was by 
'linguistic paleontology' and comparative philology seemed to compensate 
for what was then seen as serious defects in the study of early societies. 
In the first place, it marked the emergence of a 'historical 1 method able 
to reach beyond the documented. Interestingly, it was the very methods 
of the approach which were to destroy its original aims: to prove the 
existence of a human family which was dispersed. For the very comparative 
nature of the work was ultimately to expose the local and technical 
limitations of the patriarchal theory.
The Patriarchal Family
The effect of the evidence derived from comparative jurisprudence, wrote 
Maine, 'is to establish that view of the primeval condition of the human 
race v;hich is known as the Patriarchal Theory'. ' The same social 
structure, based upon the same central institution, the patriarchal 
family could be discerned as the primitive bond of society. That alone 
could account for all other social bonds. Going far beyond previous 
speculations on the patriarchal family as the source of sovereignty, Maine's 
writings were concerned to provide a theory of the original form of society. 
Maine declares that if he were to attempt a succinct outline of the 
'situation in which mankind disclose themselves at the dawn of their 
history', ' he would be satisfied to quote a few verses of Homer's 
Odyssey;
They have neither assemblies for consultation nor theniistes 
(awards from the divinities), but every one exercises 
jurisdiction over his wives and his children, and they pay 
no regard to one another. (12)
These verses'condense in themselves the sum of the hints v/hich are given
us by legal antiquities'.^ They point to the first appearance of mankind
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in perfectly insulated groups, held-together by obedience to the parent 
(father). Law is the parent's word and has not yet been formulated into 
the form in which it is found in the earliest legal evidence. When these 
early legal conceptions are formulated they still 'partake of the mystery
and sponteneity, which must have seemed to characterise a despotic
(14) father's commands !V ' but in so far as they proceed from a sovereign
they presuppose the union of family groups in some wider organisation. 
Speculations on what constitutes this union seemed foredoomed to remain 
as conjecture, yet it is here where 'archaic law renders us one of its
greatest services and fills up a gap which otherwise could only have been
(15) bridged by conjecture.'^ J The service which ancient law is said to
render constitutes the basis both of Maine's theories of ancient society, 
and also the basis of his conclusions on the constitution of modern 
society which made his ideas so central in the development of jurisprudence:
(Ancient law) is full, in all its provinces, of the clearest 
indications that society in primitive times was not what it is 
assumed to be at present, a collection of individuals. In fact, 
and in the view of the men who composed it, it was an aggregation 
of families. The contrast may be most forcibly expressed by 
saying that the unit of an individual society was the Family, of 
a modern society the Individual. (16)
x
These differences lead Maine to formulate his theory on the legal differences 
between ancient and modern society. In ancient society law specifies status, 
in modern law, contracts. By this he implies that in modern society the
relations between legal subjects takes the form of contracts between free
(17) individuals v ' whereas ancient lav/ was concerned to specify the rights and
duties of legal subjects.
This proposition, so important for subsequent political and legal 
histories, was formulated on the basis of Maine's deduction of the primary 
social unit as the patriarchal family. Maine's notion of the patriarchal 
family is not, initially, the defence of a natural patriarchal family as 
was sometimes suggested. The patriarchal family in Maine is a complex,
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strange and artificial system of legal statutes, defining rights, 
inheritance and duties.
In its simplest form the patriarchal theory had represented society 
simply as an enlargement of the primary family. The primary family, the 
father, mother and children under the authority and protection of the 
father gradually expanded as children married extending the family group 
to include more distant relatives. While the first father lived, all 
such groups remained under his authority but on his death, his descendants 
would naturally divide into as many families as he had sons and offspring. 
Each group would resemble the original group absolutely, as a collection 
of persons connected by common descent, living under the authority of 
their common progenitor.
This theory was thought to offer an explanation of the development 
of wider social groupings - of society itself. First it could explain 
the phenomenon of large tribes with overall allegiance to the first 
father and over subsequent generations, the descendants of the first 
father might constitute many tribes and be the population of a large 
country. These ;ribes being united by ties of blood, so the theory ran, 
would readily act together for common purposes. Gradually, as 'civilisation' 
advanced, they would come together to form some central government to 
facilitate action. In this way they would become a nation.
Maine saw no reason to challenge the naturalness of the patriarchal 
family in so far as he saw no reason to dispute the natural authority 
of the patriarch over his wife and children. Yet, he saw this realm of 
natural authority as separate from the organisation of the household. The 
early familial organisation is 'complex, artificial, strange.' The 
crucial basis for cohesion in the group is not the natural rights of father 
as progenitor but the cohesion resulting from his power and authority. 
The patriarchal family,
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is not merely a group of descendants with the first father 
at their head. It is a group of persons living under a 
Patriarch who has over them despotic power and can sell any 
of them, or put them to death; and they are held to be 
related to him and to one another, not so much because of 
their being of his blood as because of their common subjection 
to his power, (l?)
The crucial term in this cohesion is what Maine calls Patria Potestas, 
the power of the father. It is this power which unites the group, not 
the fact of blood relationships; those adopted were as much part of the 
family as those who were in fact blood relations:
We must look on the family as constantly enlarged by the
adoption of strangers into its circle, and we must try to
regard the fiction of adoption as so closely simulating
the reality of kinship, that neither law nor opinion makes
the slightest difference between a real and adoptive connextion. (18)
Maine used evidence of early law and custom to demonstrate the reality of 
the hypothesis of the arbitrary basis to kinship. Ancient Roman law for 
example, does not distinguish between the rights and duties of those bound 
by blood-ties and those adopted into the family; they are both subject to 
the father's law. More importantly, the system of descent, called agnation 
affirms the conclusion that the bonds between the patriarchal group were 
artificial. This agnatic system involves descent and inheritance passing 
exclusively through males, excluding all females; Maine concludes that 
females are deemed not even to be related once they are married and pass 
outside the authority of the primal father. For Maine the system of 
agnation conclusively proves the general existence of the patriarchal 
family under Patria Potestas. Whereas he argues, patriarchal power in its 
pure form is rarely now discovered, agnation or descent exclusively through
males, which implies the former existence of Patria Potestas 'is discoverable
(19) almost everywhere'.
There are three features which seem to confirm Maine's deduction 
of the general existence of the patriarchal family. First the legal 
fiction of the family: it is not a biological unit but a unit which
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creates a fiction of biological unity; secondly, the undisputed 'fact 1 
of the dominance of one strong male; thirdly, the apparently universal 
existence of agnation. The last, on which much of the theory hangs, 
has an obvious explanation according to Maine. If a woman died unmarried, 
she could have no legitimate descendents. If she married, her children 
fell under the Patria Potestas, not of her father, but of her husband,_and 
thus were lost to her own family:
It is obvious that the organisation of primitive societies 
would have been confounded if men had called themselves 
relations of their mother's relations. (20)
With an extraordinary circularity, Maine uses this argument to demonstrate 
the logical nature of agnation - agnation is practiced because it is the 
fictitious relation to the first father which is significant. Any other 
recognition of relationship would confound a system so tightly based on 
the statuses ascribed within the patriarchal family: no one could be 
subject to two such despotic authorities. Yet as he acknowledges, it is 
the widespread existence of agnation, not the widespread existence of
patriarchal authority, which leads him to deduce patriarchal authority.
(21)
.uch a deduction is only rational as was pointed out v ' if in the first
place the sovereign power of the first father is assumed,and this was
precisely one of the unproven aspects of Maine's theories. The power of
the father has to be assumed to explain the existence of agnation and
agnation is used to prove the previous and universal existence of the
power of the fathers. The 'confusion' which Maine suggests would follow
from acknowledging female relationship would be a confusion to a system
of power and authority where the absolute dominance of one patriarch
determines the relations between all other members of the group. Maine is
interested in the patriarchal family as a system of government. He
deduces its universal existence as logically coherent with his ideas on
the functioning of the social group - as subject submitted to sovereign power,
He rejects the possibility of relationship reckoned through females not 
because he disavows the possibility of women as focus of descent and 
inheritance, (a disavowal which became significant in later debates) but 
because it would disrupt a vision of society as a series of concentric 
circles under different forms of the same power: sovereign, patriarchal 
power.
Maine's propositions then were based on several distinct assumptions: 
the dominance and power of one strong male, the complex 'governmental'
nature of early social organisation, the stability of law and as a
(22) corollary of this 'the stability of human nature'. J This 'stability'
(23) lead Maine cautiously to take issue with cultural relativism^ ' although
he hesitated over the universal applicability of his theories:
the difficulty at the present stage of the inquiry, is to 
know where to stop, to say of what races of men it is not 
allowable to lay down that the society in which they are 
united was originally organised on the patriarchal model. (24)
Comparitive jurisprudence and the extended family
Maine's caution was indeed justified, for at the time of writing those 
words, the strongest challenges to the local limitations of the patriarchal 
theory were mounted. These challenges formulated an altogether different 
interpretation of familial relations which will be explored shortly. 
Maine has been characterised as having championed not only the 
primacy but also the naturalness of the patriarchal family. We have 
seen that, on the contrary, Maine actually described the patriarchal 
family as a complex and artificial unit with a governmental function. 
It was aspects of these political assumptions about social group 
which came under attack when non-patriarchal family organisations were 
scrutinised. What became problematic was the historical primacy of the 
patriarchal unit, and the primacy of the complex and governmental over 
the simple and 'organic'. The effect of this problematisation was to
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expose problems in the theorisation of the relation between familial 
forms and the political organisation of society.
There were other aspects of Maine's work however v/hich far from 
being challenged remained crucial to the development of studies of kinship 
and the family. In particular, comparative jurisprudence established a 
form of attention to legal property relations and their determination of 
familial forms. For it was the same movement which produced the comparative 
study of kinship which gave rise to the historical study of forms of property 
relations and their possible variations. Comparative jurisprudence 
suggested that legal forms of property holding had been entirely different 
in previous social organisations. This proposition was very different 
from the assumption to be found in both Locke and Hobbes that at the 
origins of society, the earth belonged to all. For in these earlier 
theories, the assumption had been that the absence of property relations is 
synonymous with a pre-social state. Locke had reacted against the 
idea that property had its origins either in the divine sovereignty of 
church, or the sovereignty of the conquerer. He had propounded a theory 
of work at the origin of all appropriation, and therefore property. 
Appropriation was the effect of the free exercise of individual creativity. 
Such theories had assumed certain transhistorical features in the form of 
holding property. Against this, comparative jurisprudence argued that 
the legal forms of holding property had undergone transformations in the 
course of the development of society. The study of kinship and household 
undertaken by comparative jurisprudence took a very particular form. For 
it appeared in the context of the consolidation of the imperative v/ithin 
social sciences to understand early history as a developmental process 
of technical stages to which correspond a series of 'superstructural' 
elements, like law, property, religion, morality etc.
Maine's study of the patriarchal family was concerned much more with 
a historical study of property than with a simple defence of the 
universality of the patriarchal family. The patriarchal family was of 
such significance for Maine because it furnished an example of a form of 
collective possession. Such attention was primarily directed to the 
early forms of the European family, and these studies were of enormous 
importance in the formation of sociological studies of Western Europe.
Writers like Pustel de Coulanges, Frederick LePlay, Bogisic,
(25)De Lavaleye, and Kovalevsky v ' employed Maine's approach to history
and ancient law, opening up new areas for historical and anthropological
investigation. The effects of these studies remain with us today
(26) 
especially within sociological studies of the family. ' The rural
European extended family was taken by these writers as a model of early 
social organisation. The extended family found among the Slavs, in particular 
in Serbia and Croatia, provided a favourite object of study. These 
families attracted both speculative and political attention, as seen in 
the work of Bogisic. He studied the Slavic family partly as a result 
of a political crisis. Throughout the 1870's the Austro-Hungarian imperial 
regime had attempted to draw up a constitution for family law. The 
decision as to whether to legislate for the urban nuclear family or the 
rural extended family (the zadruga) was a vital political issue. Bogisic 
himself campaigned against the uniformity which the Imperial regime sought 
to impose on the Slavs, predictably the uniformity of the nuclear urban
family/ 27 '
The new constitution justified itself on the grounds that the zadruga
was not the only form of rural family; there was also the form called inokoana, 
which superficially resembled the nuclear family, typical of the European 
towns: i.e. father, mother and children. Hence it could reasonably be 
claimed that the zadruga form was aberrant. Bogisic set himself the task 
of proving the inokosna form had more in common \vith the zadruga forn 
through a study of familial rights and properties.
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First of all he indicated how the zadruga had a patriarch at its 
head. This patriarch appeared to be absolute ruler of the household. 
However, closer inspection showed that the basis for unification of the 
household was the biological family exclusively. The term "zadruga" 
means literally "to/for the comrades". The household was a group united, 
sometimes by being literally brothers with all their wives and dependents, 
or by being work-mates. They all submitted to the authority of the 
patriarch but had equal rights to property and inheritance. The 
patriarch ruled the collectivity as its representative not as proprietor. 
Property was not the father's but the collective's. Alongside this 
'extended family' there appeared to exist the smaller 'biological' family 
of mother, father and children. Yet Bogisic argued that this family, the 
form called inokosna, was simply a variant of the zadruga form. There were 
certain evidences for this. The status of the members of the small household 
was similar in customary law to that of the zadruga members - involving 
rights of inheritance and representation. Furthermore, logically, it could 
easily be seen how there was only a thin dividing line between such 
households; a large grouping could be reduced to a smaller one through 
death, ageing or migration. A smaller unit could easily grow to a large 
one. A survey would fix as static forms what in fact could be quite fluid 
forms. The final proof however was a linguistic one. Bogisic demonstrated 
how the terms zadruga and inokonsa, were almost never used as substantives 
but usually as adjectives. Thus in common usage they were followed by the 
noun, kuca, meaning household. He could therefore conclude that the terms 
were more correctly interpreted as "household with several co-workers" 
(zadruga kuca) and "household with single or few workers" (inokosna kuca).
Bogisic T s work typifies the trajectory of comparative jurisprudence 
especially in its work on the European extended family. Treating customs 
as the equivalent of lav/, it could penetrate behind thoughtless assumptions
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of an identity between familial forms to demonstrate complex and 
differentiated relations of inheritance and rights. The attention to 
rules of inheritance, descent, and property rights constructed a route 
of access to an unwritten history of social groups. The question of 
the family was no longer simply a question of manners and morality, 
however complexly these might have been thought to be determined; it 
became a question of government, legality, rights and statutes. It 
became possible to conclude that the extended family itself was a 
collectivity because this form of family itself seemed to occupy the 
status of a subject of possession:
The family constitutes a constant legal entity who 
possesses the earth, the house and all the moveable 
goods, and in the heart of which there is never any 
reading of succession, (ouverture de succession) (28)
The original French here is illuminating. Legal entity is a translation 
of 'une personne morale' and affirms the way in which legal possession 
is conceived as synonymous with a human subject (une personne) invested 
with 'rights'. Thus a slide is made, assuming that the familial form 
also represents a collectivity, rather than being simply a form of 
property holding which cannot be broken up into individual parts. 
That the zadruga form could operate as a tribe of brothers or men, in 
which women are excluded from authority or participation still eludes 
the attention of those who wish to designate it a collectivity.
A reconceptualisation of the family and society was permitted by the 
simultaneous possibility of a history of the family and of forms of
property. Frederick LePlay, influential in development of sociology,
(29) used such an approach . He used comparative lav/ to indicate
different forms of household. There was the ancient famille-souche
(stem family) ,the patriarchal extended family,and there was the modern
'unstable' family composed of a married couple and their unmarried children,
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It was seen as unstable on the grounds that when the children married, 
they left and formed their own households.
The family has all the less chance of perpetuating
itself, in this industrial society, as it is not
firmly rooted in one house, but rents its accommodation,
changes frequently and adapts it to the varying number
of members. When all the children have left the house of
their parents and the parents die, nothing any longer
remains of this contemporary family. (30)
Social unrest surrounding the Revolution was thought to be exacerbated 
by this instability of family life. Everywhere'moral degeneracy' 
was rife, and LePlay saw this as exacerbated by constitutional reform 
which addressed themselves to the unstable form of the family. What 
was required he argued were policies which addressed themselves to the 
stem-family, legislation which would ensure the return of paternal 
authority in the stable household; here the house remained the property 
of the family and was transmitted from generation to generation:
the plan of reform is summed up in very simple terms: 
to rescue the family from the regime of destruction 
created by the Terror and the first Empire: to give 
back to the father the authority which belongs to him 
amongst all free and prosperous peoples; to put him in 
a position thereby to re-establish, step by step, peace 
with respect and obedience, in private life, in local 
government and the state; finally to indicate to 
contemporaries in the various family organisations, the 
best model furnished by national traditions, and by a 
compara.tive examination European peoples. (3l)
The patriarchal household of the stem-family was the way of ensuring 
peace, respect and obedience; the civil code was dangerous in its 
attempts to deal with the unstable family.
The work of Bogisic and LePlay characterises the impact of 
comparative law within the social sciences: the object of attention 
became the 'household', its sustaining fantasy the universal precedence 
of the collective patriarchal household. But if the methodology 
typified by Maine passed rapidly into studies of society, his conclusions 
as to the nature of kinship came under violent attack.
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The dispossession of the Patriarchal theory
If the dominance of the patriarchal theory for fifty years had owed 
its existence in part to the European imperial regime in N.India, the 
dispossession of this theory was effected for at least some similar 
reasons. Superficially it appeared to owe its decline to the expansion 
of the colonialising movement which marked the century from 1760-1860. 
This expansion entailed the systematic recording of familial 
organisations which at first sight bore no real resemblance to the legal 
and statutory organisations of the patriarchal family. These were 
societies where descent was reckoned either exclusively or predominantly 
through the mother. A child took its name and kin allegience either from 
his mother or her tribe. Moreover in some of these societies, paternity 
was neither reckoned nor considered particularly significant. It would 
be easy to demonstrate that knowledge of such societies had been available 
to Europeans for many years. Many of the H.Indian American groups were 
organised on such lines.Backed up by classical references like Herodotus' 
account of the matriarchal Lycians, there was sufficient evidence of
these societies for Locke to have used them against Pilmer who argued
(32) for the primacy of the patriarchal family. The availability of such
information suggests the need to look elsewhere for the origins of the 
new interest in mother-right societies. Indeed the stimulus to such 
studies .clearly has correspondences with other theoretical and social 
preoccupations of the time which will become clear in subsequent chapters. 
These coincided ?/ith the impact of the expansion of colonialism. British 
administration had been extended over the non-aryan south of India, and 
it was in Frarancore and other parts of the Madras presidency that British 
administration found itself confronted with types of societies which sho\ved 
the profoundest disrespect for patriarchal family organisation.
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This colonial 'problem' focussed attention on a form of family 
organisation which was apparently common throughout South east Asia:
like the Lycians of Herodotus, these perverse people 
called themselves after their mother's names: they 
honoured their mother and neglected their father, in 
society and government, as well as in their homes; their 
administration, their law and their whole mode of life 
rested on the assumption that it was the women and not the 
men in whom reposed the continuity of the family and the 
authority to govern the state. (33)
The family organisation did not in fact correspond to this matriarchal 
inversion of patriarchal structures. But the attention drawn to these 
South-east Asian family forms led to the systematisation of reports of 
similar, non-patriarchal family forms, which had been proliferating 
over previous years. These South-east Asian families had been recorded 
since the days of Tavernier in Borneo, (1676) and Laval in the Maldive 
Islands (167S). As I have already said, there was also evidence that 
this type of family was not confined to one geographical area. Lafitau in 
his highly influential book, Les Moeurs de Sawage Ameriquains comparees
aux moeurs des Premiers temps, had pointed to the prevalence of these forms
(35) amongst the Iroquois Indians. ' But it was Buchanan's account of the
ZTairs of the Malabar coast, written in 1807 which first attracted serious
(36)attention. Here v/as a highly complex social form, of a highly
sophisticated people in the very same country as the family organisation 
which had provided material for the Patriarchal theory.
Buchanan's account was followed by a mass of similar evidence which 
came pouring in during the generation that followed, partly as a result 
of a systematic search through the accounts of the old travellers, but 
mainly through the exploitation of large areas of the world by European 
traders and colonists. Conspicuous amongst these was the 'rediscovery'
of accounts of western and equatorial Africa, collected by Pinkerton in
(37)1808 ? This revival T/vas accompanied by new material mainly from
Southern Africa which arrived in proportion to the increased activities
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(38) 
of colonialists - bureaucrats, missionaries or explorers. ' A mass
of literature on America began to be written, most of which seemed to
(39) 
challenge the patriarchal Theory.
Significant too in the systematisation of attention to this data 
of 'primitive' peoples was the European colonisation of the Pacific peoples. ' 
Here was a chance of studying mankind in truly 'primitive' conditions since 
the pacific peoples, unlike the Americans, had not yet been 'spoilt' by 
their contact with Europeans. Australian family organisation also attracted 
attention; it was argued that there were some groups who observed neither 
paternal nor maternal obligations of kinship as they had been traditionally 
understood.
In the context of such evidence, it is not altogether surprising that 
almost simultaneous to the publication of Maine's Ancient Law, there 
appeared a spate of books arguing either against the patriarchal theory
or in favour of serious attention to the meaning of what was designated
(41)
'mother-right' societies. ' Bachofen's Das Mutter-recht appeared in
1861, McLennan's Primitive Marriage in 1865, Lubbock's Prehistoric Times.1874? 
Tylor's Primitive Culture 1871, Post's The Evolution of Human Marriage 
1875? Morgan's Ancient Society 1877. To place these books in the context 
of imperial expansion and the systematisation of information on other 
populations and societies is not to reduce their appearance to the fact 
of increased information. For whaT is surprising is that evidence which 
had been available for sometime, acquired a new significance. The mode 
of systematising information and the kinds of objects of enquiry have 
forceful correspondences with other themes in discussion at that time and 
with political circumstances, correspondences which will be discussed in 
subsequent chapters 
These books combined to usher in several decades of debate about 
the 'meaning' of marriage forms of different societies. They varied in 
their approach and conclusions. Some, like Morgan's Ancient Society were
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informed by a close and detailed study of 'primitive 1 peoples. Others, 
like Bachofen's Das Mutter-recht, were more in the tradition of the study 
of classical myth and religion. Many were like MacLennan's Prlml tive 
Marriage and Lubbock's Prehistoric Times, that is more or less philosophic 
speculation on the history of human societies, based on close study of 
ancient legal forms and 'voyager' evidence of primitive customs. They 
shared certain common features, however, enough for each of them to be 
recognised as the foundations of anthropology as a discipline.
These features have often been designated under the blanket term of 
evolutionism - a concern with the way in which forms evolve from simple 
to complex. And indeed the period in which these books were written was 
the period which saw the diffusion of Darwin's conclusions for biology 
across a series of other areas of thought. Blistering attacks were 
delivered on Maine's theories precisely because the assumption of a primary,
complex and artificial form of family at the origin of human society seemed
(42) to fly in the face of evolutionary notions. x ' Quite apart from the
evidence of mother-right societies, Maine's complex family could only 
appear as a wild flight of fantasy from a Darwinian perspective:
... the family held together by Power, with blood relationship 
recognised in it only to be ignored - no relationship at all 
through women acknowledged, no relationship through males 
acknowledged except in males subject to their father's Power and 
between those subject to that Power, a relationship equally close 
whether they are related by blood or not - the Power too, 
extending to life and death and sale, and grown up sons meekly 
submitting to it - propounded to us as the first form of the 
family, might as well be deemed - apart from the evidence - a 
mere fantastic imagination. (43)
The problem with Maine's proposition is the bizarre complexity it 
proposes for primordial social organisation. The emergence of the complex 
from the simple is surely an idea borne out by facts from the 'many fields 
of nature':
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No-one could believe in the Ornithorynchus as the germinal type 
of animal life. But the family of Maine's theory is almost as 
curious a complex of types as is the Ornithorynchus. Its head 
is head partly by being the begetter, and partly as being the 
owner of its members; so that the cementing principle is 
neither kinship nor property, but a jumble of ~he two. Kinship 
is not excluded, for in theory - that is, partly in fact, and 
partly by a fiction - the family is made up of the father's 
descendants and he is the representative of the family, not its 
owner; and on the other hand he has over the member of it, and 
over all that pertains to it, an uncontrolled and unlimited power 
of disposal. Then it may almost be said to be based on fictions. 
By a fiction, the wife, the mother of the family so far as its 
members are begotten, is not the wife of her lord, but his daughter, 
and sister of her own children. The children begotten are, in fact, 
property of the father, and, by a fiction, cease to be his children 
if he sells them. By a further fiction, additional children, who 
become in the full sense members of the family, may be acquired 
by him by purchase, and be to him even as sons and daughters of 
his blood. (44)
In the context of biological evolution such assumptions of legal forms and 
fictions, complex relations of power and subjection, assuming a political 
organisation at the origin of human society are unthinkable. 'Can anyone
believe excepting for convincing reasons, that such a group as this was
(45) elementary and primordial?' v ' And with the proliferation of studies of
non-patriarchal societies even evidence was now hard to come by.
This attack on the artificial, complex and political nature of 
patriarchal theory characterises the dismissal of Maine's originary 
hypotheses from the perspective of evolutionary hypotheses. The coincidence 
of Darwinian theory, the culmination of the 'historisation' or early mankind, 
and the systematisation of evidence of non-patriarchal organisations all 
lent support to the overthrow of Maine's theories. But the term 'evolutionism' 
is far too general to give any adequate account of the attack on the 
patriarchal theory. It does not cover the very different forms of causality 
and explanation mobilised: it does not therefore show adequately what was 
at issue in the overthrow of the patriarchal theory. The writers differed 
about the basis on which a society could be designated simple or complex.
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For example, was it a designation based on sexual morality or technical 
competence? They differed about how to make comparisons between different 
societies and what criteria were appropriate to make these comparisons, 
for example, race, psychological characteristics or technological developments 
Finally they offered very different arguments about how the complex evolves 
from the simple. However at this stage most did share a general 
acceptance that some non-European societies could be taken as evidence of 
the early history of human society,and used the term 'primitive' to designate 
these societies in a way that was synonymous with 'simple'. The identity 
between these writers is more correctly represented as a series of shared 
concerns, some of which differ from Maine only in interpretation. Foremost 
in these is an approach to history. Comparative jurisprudence had 
established that social and symbolic practices could explain something of 
society in its entirety - perhaps its history, perhaps its internal dynamic. 
The evolutionists insisted that what symbols-customs, rituals, language,etc- 
expressed was their history. From behind these practices it would be 
possible to bring to light the origins and history of certain institutions. 
It was for the philosopher or ethnologist to seek behind symbolism to 
theorise this history. That various phenomena should be treated as 
survivals invites the simultaneous questions: what caused them to arise 
and what caused them to survive? The attack on the patriarchal theory 
was spearheaded by two preoccupations; the history of kinship forms and 
their determination.
Primitive Matriarchy
In many ways, Bachofen's Das Mutter-recht (Mother-right) signals the 
inadequacies of characterising the attack on the patriarchal theory as 
simply evolutionist. Bachofen did indeed put forward a theory of the 
gradual evolution of forms of human marriage and sexual regulation, but his
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theories were untouched by the influence of "biological" theories of 
evolution. Where Bachofen differed from his predecessors was not so much 
in proposing the gradual evolution from one historical epoch to another, 
but in the centrality which he attributed to transitions in the form of 
marriage and sexual regulations.
Bachofen combined a detailed scrutiny of the classics with evidence 
from so-called primitive societies to produce a hypothesis on early forms 
of sexual regulation which was in complete and utter contradiction to the 
patriarchal theory. Prom both these sources, Bachofen glimpsed signs of 
a hidden history, that of historical struggle between the sexes. First of 
all, there was evidence that there had once been a stage where women had 
occupied a position in society which men now occupy. This could be gleaned 
from 'historical' accounts in the classics - the ubiquitous Lycians 
described by Herodotus, and the Ancient Britons mentioned by Caesar. 
Secondly Bachofen argued that classical literature and myth could be 
treated as a form of evidence, both because they were written within a 
historical context and therefore described actual customs but also because 
texts could be interpreted as revealing certain hidden preoccupations.
Prom this perspective, Bachofen advanced an analysis of Aeschylus 
which was to leave a lasting legacy in studies both of classical history 
and literature. ' He suggested that in Aeschylus' Eumenides we are 
in fact confronted by a struggle between two orders - the older rule of 
mother-right versus the new rule of father-right. In the story, King 
Agamemnon, husband of Clytemnestra, sacrifices his daugher Iphigenis. on 
the order of the oracle to favour his journey against Troy. Clytemenstra, 
distressed by the murder of her daughter, takes a lover. When Agamenon 
returns after many years, the lovers murder him. Her son, Orestes, 
avenges his father's murder and at the instigation of Athene and Apollo 
murders Clytemenstra and her lover. He is then pursued by the furies 
who Bachofen takes to represent the old or maternal law. Orestes is
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defended when he comes to judgement by Athene and Apollo representing the 
new paternal order. Athene had no mother in mythology but was born from 
Jupiter's head. ' Indeed for Bachofen the mythology of the triumph of 
Jupiter and the Olympian gods over the Titans is further evidence of the 
preoccupation of the struggle between two orders* For Bachofen both the 
traces of this struggle and the severity of the patriarchal order are 
evidence to the violent suppression of an older maternal order.
Bachofen takes his hypothesis to be confirmed by practices among 
contemporary 'primitives'. For example, he turns his attention to the 
practice of the couvade, destined to become a point of obsessive interest 
in the following debates. This practice involved the simulation by the 
father of certain features of pregnancy during the time of the mother 
giving birth. These ranged from lying-in, the father taking to his bed, 
to more extreme demonstrations of the pain of labour. Again Bachofen 
thought that these practices, like the greek myths were symbolic of a 
struggle which had once upon a time taken place in human history, bearing 
witness to a transition from mother-right to father-right. He interpreted 
the couvade as the father taking symbolic possession of the offspring, a 
ritual act designed to deprive the mother of her former, absolute rights 
over the child.
What all these practices shared was that they were 'manifestations 
of primordial thinking'. Treating contemporary 'primitive' forms as 
similar to those revealed in early histories gave purchase on these strange 
customs: they could be treated as survivals, more than spontaneous and 
impenetrable productions of strange peoples, but symbols to be deciphered:
The forms of family organisation prevailing in times known 
to us are not original forms but the consequences of earlier 
stages. Considered alone, they disclose only themselves, not 
their causality; they are isolated data, elements of knowledge 
at most but not understanding* The strictness of the Roman 
patriarchal system points to an earlier system that had to be 
combatted and suppressed. (my emphasis). (48)
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Symbolic foims, myths, are to be analysed, to be penetrated, to find 
their real meaning. The problem is to uncover what has been suppressed, 
to follow the distortions of history and to trace the elements of primitive 
thought which could not be eradicated from mythology. The historical 
problem was to establish a causality for the present system.
For Bachofen, the traces in the mythologies pointed consistently 
to one conclusion, which could not be eradicated from mythology. All 
bore incontrovertible witness to a stage where societies had been 
governed by principles the exact opposite of our own:
Age old customs, the reckoning of time according to nights, 
the choice of night as time for battle, for taking counsel, 
for meeting out justice and for practicing cult rites, show 
that we are dealing not with abstract philosophical ideas of 
a later era but with the reality of an original mode of 
life. (49)
These times of absolute inversion Bachofen gleans from symbolism in 
ancient myths: the prevalence of the left-handed over the right-handed, 
the moon over the sun, of earth over a fecundating sea, of the dead over 
the living, of mourning over rejoicing; In many of the myths these 
characteristics are explicitly associated with women, for example 
Proserpine the Queen of the night, who struggles for her daughter against 
the principles of daytime. The primacy of all these can only mean one 
thing; they 'are necessary characteristics of a matriarchal age'. 
Mythology, religion and primitive customs all
join to form a single picture and lead to the 
conclusion that mother-right is not confined to any 
particular people but marks a cultural stage. In view 
of the universal qualities of human nature, this cultural 
stage cannot be restricted to any particular ethnic 
family. (50 )
He is lead by these signs to posit a universal phase of mother-right belonging 
to a cultural period prior to that of the patriarchal system. This stage only 
began to disappear after the victorious development of the paternal system.
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The two different principles of social organisation can be 
characterised as the maternal-tellurian and the paternal-uranian 
The maternal principle accures to woman's capacity to give birth and 
the consequence of maternal love. It is material: the fact that the
child is simply a physical extension of the mother makes the mother
(51) partake in 'the undifferentiated unity of the mass'. J It is univer-
salistic: 'Every woman's womb, the moral image of the earth-mother Demeter 
will give brothers and sisters until the day when the development of the
paternal system dissolves the undifferentiated unity of mass and introduces
(52)a principle of articulations'. v ' It is religious: 'At all times, woman
has exerted a great influence on men and the education and culture of
nations due to woman's inclination towards the supernatural and the divine,
(53) the irrational and the miraculous'. ' Finally, it is sensuous and
physical; 'The mother's connection with the child is based on material
relation. It is accessible to sense perception and remains always a
(54) natural truth.' It is the child's physical relation with the mother
which connects her sensuously rather than intellectually with her
surroundings. In a word 'matriarchal existence is regulated naturalism,
(55)its thinking is material, its development predominantly physical.'
To specify a relationship with tli3 mother does not require abstract 
reasoning. It is a 'natural truth'. But to specify a relation with the 
father is of an entirely different order. It involves abstract reasoning 
and classification to say 'this child, towards which I feel no sensuous 
connection, is mine'.
But the father as begetter presents an entirely different 
aspect. Standing in no visible relation to the child, he 
can never,even in the marital relation, cast off a certain 
fictive character. Belonging to the offspring only through 
the mediation of the mother, he always appears as the remoter 
potency'. (56)
In Das Mutter-recht, the conclusion is drawn that any systematic 
recognition of paternity entails an advance in the capacities of thought:
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in place of sensual perception and lack of differentiation, there is 
instead the triumph of the spirit and the intellect. The triumph of 
paternity brings with it liberation of the spirit from the manifestations 
of nature, a sublimation of human existence over the laws of material 
life. It is this "triumph of paternity" which gives to mankind his 
specific quality. Por all beasts, the maternal principle is in operation. 
Jb'or mankind alone there is the advance in spiritual and intellectual life 
based on the recognition of paternity.
While the principle of motherhood is common to all spheres 
of tellurian life, man, by the preponderant position he 
accords to the begetting potency emerges from this relation 
and becomes conscious of his higher calling. Spiritual life 
rides over corporeal existence. (57)
Recognition of paternity liberates mankind's higher aspirations, that is, 
spiritual or intellectual aspirations based on the possibility of 
differentiation and identity which overcomes the sensuous.
The imagery which Bachofen uncovers in classical and ancient mythology, 
so radically different from the patriarchal imagery of Bachofen's own 
milieu is attributed to this fundamental difference; the difference between 
principles of social organisation accruing to the sexes. T1 at such 
oppositions might have their roots in aspects of social organisation 
other than sexual characteristics is never considered by Bachofen.
But what possible explanation could be offered for the apparently 
indisputable existence of the exact inversion of our society; an inversion 
based on sexual inversion. How is a state of women's dominance over men ever 
to be accounted for? Por Bachofen there were two interrelated explanations. 
Firstly, that paternity was not recognised pointed to the fact that it 
could not have been possible to recognise it, hence his suggestion of a 
stage of primitive promiscuity, or unregulated sexual connections. Secondly, 
something must have given women, the weaker sex, an advantage over the men 
which could elevate them to a position of -dominance; here he suggested
their religious natures which gave them power over men, hence the 
establishment of a primitive gynaeocracy.
For Bachofen only the impossibility of knowing paternity would have 
prevented men from establishing their 'rights' to their offspring. Thus 
the earliest stage of the human species called by Bachofen, hetaerism, must 
have been a state characterised by unregulated sexual connections. 
?or such a state - prohibiting paternal rights and degrading 
women - would account for the emergence and success of mother-rule. It 
would be women who would oppose the state of primitive promiscuity, degraded 
as they would be. In this schema the sexes have pre-given interests; only 
men would have active pleasure and interest in maintaining such a state. 
On the other hand, women's natural 'religiousness' would offer according 
to Bachofen a plausible explanation for how mankind emerged from this
'offensive'state. Indeed this deep sense of the religious which Bachofen
(58) sees as an integral motive in human history^ ' is taken in Das Mutter-recht,
to be the founding impulse of civilisation, civilisation founded on 
matriarchal rule:
The relation which stands at the origin of all culture, 
of every virtue, of every nobler aspect of existence, 
is that between mother and child; it operates in a world 
of violence as the divine principle of love, of union, of 
peace. Raising her young, the woman learns earlier than the 
man to extend her loving care beyond the limits of her ego to 
another creature, and to direct whatever gift of invention she 
possesses to the preservation and improvement of the other's 
existence. Woman at this stage is the repository of all 
culture, of all benevolence of all devotion, of all concern 
for the living and grief for the dead. (59)
The emergence of human from animal is seen as the triumph of morality and 
transmission of tradition. It is achieved by the extension of loving as a 
physical connection to another being who is sensuously involved. The real 
triumph however is the love based on intellectual appreciation of a 
biological bond, the love of a father for his child which will be the 
prototype for the altruism at the basis of civilisation. Only the human
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is capable of caring for something which is not itself. Maternal love 
is a beginning, since the child could almost be said to be part of the 
mother. Paternal love is able to care for a being which is radically other, 
it is the form of love which defines allegience r such as the family, state 
and nation. Such an affective bond is the prototype for human societies.
Bachofen's work was strangely neglected at first, even though the 
debate as to the possibility of a mother-right society was soon in full 
swing. Given the 'romanticist' presuppositions of Bachofen's thought, 
this neglect may not at first seem wholly extraordinary. After all, 
Das Mutter-recht was based on unquestioned assumptions of different sexual 
characteristics, embodied in the different feelings for their offspring 
by the parents. It assumed that a symbolism in total opposition to that 
of Bachofen's own culture was based on a sexual inversion and none other. 
Indeed, in that context he assumed that the symbolism of myths reflected 
in some way principles outside those symbolic practices, that is, moon 
symbolism versus sun symbolism would represent a real struggle between the 
principles represented by those symbols going on somewhere outside the 
myth.
But as we will see, 'literary' though Bachofen's approach was, he shared 
much with the approach which was to set in motion the systematic study 
of 'primitive' societies, and in particular the concentration on early
sexual customs.
THAMES POLY !>;CHNIC
LIBRAr < 
"Survivals" FOR REFERENCE USE QM-tf
J.P.McLennan writing at exactly the same time as Bachofen, though unbeknown to 
him, also has as his aim to destroy the argument which placed government by 
the father at the dawn of human history. He too suggested an evolutionary 
process whereby the patriarchal family was seen as the outcome of a long 
journey through many transitions of human sexual relations.
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McLennan's source of information was, like Maine's that of legal 
codes and practices. But he also added the study of 'races in their 
primitive condition'.^ '
The chief sources of information regarding the early history 
of civil society are, first the study of races in their 
primitive condition; and second, the study of the symbols 
employed by advanced nations in the constitution or exercise 
of civil rights. Prom these studies pursued together, we 
obtain to a large extent the power of classifying social 
phenomena as more or less archaic, and thus of connecting 
and arranging in their order the stages of human 
advancement. (6l)
His aim in Ancient Society is to explain the connections and the stages 
in human advancement. His primary object is "legal symbolism", that is the 
'symbolic forms of the higher layers of civilisation', or customs and 
practices inscribed by the law of the land, such as the customs of the 
father 'giving away' his daughter in marriage. Prom an evolutionary 
perspective, these practices can be related to those of 'primitive cultures' 
to form a picture of early practices of marriage even within our own 
culture:
we can trace everywhere, disguised under a variety of symbolic 
forms in the higher layers of civilisation, the rude modes of 
life and forms of law with which the examination of the lower 
cultures make us familier. (62)
Like both ilaine and Bachofen, in their different ways, the argument is 
that 'custom' and law could be interpreted. They would reveal a hidden 
history; 'the symbolism of law in the light of knowledge of primitive 
life, is the best key to unwritten history.' This reconstruction 
of an unwritten history would combine with studies of contemporary primitives 
to give a fine interpretative skill. Like Bachofen's, it was a 
preoccupation with making intelligible the real histories and functions 
behind the symbolic forms:
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It has been said that myth, like quicksand, can never
provide a firm foothold. This reproach applies not to
myth itself but only to the way in which it has been
handled. Multiform and shifting in its outward manifestations,
myth nevertheless follows fixed laws, and can provide as
definite and secure results as any other source of historic
knowledge. Product of a cultural period in which life
had not yet broken away from the harmony of nature, it shares
with nature that unconscious lawfulness which is always
lacking in the works of free reflection. Everywhere there
is system, everywhere cohesion; in every detail the expression
of a fundamental law whose abundant manifestations demonstrate
its inner truth and natural necessity 1 . (64)
What is quite clear in both is that forms of representation, be they
legal or mythological, are to be taken as vehicles for decipherment of
a particular history. They are what Tylor was calling elsewhere 'survivals'^ ^
revealing either a past event or a past function which has survived into
contemporary times.
For McLennan, gleaning from the records of travellers, one custom 
above all other stood out as the key explanation of the connections and 
stages of progress in human civilisation. As with Bachofen this key is 
concerned with marriage and sexual relations. For McLennan the remarkable
clue is the practice of marriage by capture. He writes, 'there is no
(66) 
symbol more remarkable than that of capttire in marriage ceremonies.'^
It should be noticed that by this particular notion of the symbol, as 
representing a hidden or unwritten history, McLennan is able to unify 
several practices under the term of 'the symbolism of marriage by capture' 0 
He could include in this symbol not only the custom sometimes encountered 
of mock capture of the bride by the bridegroom at the wedding, but also the 
payment of dowry, and indeed the contemporary custom of the bride being 
given away by the father. Perhaps most significantly, McLennan also 
included in this list, the almost general custom of prohibitions on 
marriage between close relatives and its concommitant practice of marrying 
outside your own group. He termed this practice of marrying outside the 
close kin group, 'exogamy' a term which has remained as crucial in the 
development of anthropology. All these customs add up for McLennan to
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evidence for a time when women had been literally captured, and it is this 
which he took to be a clue to the whole history of sexual and therefore 
social organisation.
A. whole series of practices around marriage, both in contemporary 
European society and in evidence from what he took to be primitive 
societies, could be united as expressing a common past. Prom this common 
past, marriage by capture, presumptions about the state of early society 
could be elaborated. An extraordinary practice like capturing wives had 
to have some material cause. McLennan suggested that in early human groups 
the capture of women from other, perhaps inimical groups was necessitated 
by the scarcity of women. He hypothesised, in order to support this, that 
the practice of female infanticide, of which there were a few extant reports, 
had been widely practiced at the origins of human life.
To account for this practice, McLennan suggests that early society 
was characterised by a state of permanent warfare between neighbouring 
groups. Drawing on an unquestioned assumption about the weakness of 
women, he suggests that the presence of women would be a source of 
vulnerability so that in spite of women's later usefulness, tribes might 
practice female infanticide. When the time came, the same tribe would 
be forced to capture wives from other tribes. That the lack of women and 
the need to capture them from other tribes might prove a greater source of 
vulnerability and conflict than the tribefe own offspring is a point of 
illogicality that McLennan does not feel the need to address. The 
improvidence of 'savages' is after all too well known to need explanation;
To form an adequate notion of the extent to which tribes might by 
means of infanticide, deprive themselves of their women, we 
have only to bear in mind the multitude of facts which testify 
to the thoughtlessness and improvidence of men during the 
childish stage of the human mind. (6?)
This lack of foresight would lead to the murder of female children v/hich 
would cause an imbalance in numbers and enforce marriage by capture. Thus 
the 'strange' practices of 'primitives' or customary survivals such as 
incest-prohibition in our own culture could be explained as derivations
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from this early state of human society. Gradually as more permanent 
alliances between groups were formed, the need for female infanticide 
and therefore marriage by capture disappeared, but the habit, so deeply 
ingrained, remained. The first development from marriage by capture took 
the form of marriage by purchase where with the growth of private property, 
it became possible to buy a wife rather than capture one. Secondly, 
exogamy was inscribed as a political practice as a means of alliance with 
other groups.
For McLennan,the clue furnished by these various marriage practices 
was a clue to the whole history of the development of sexual regulation, 
and hence in a movement characteristic of all these writers, society in 
general. For the clue of marriage by capture was accompanied by other 
strange hints of early social forms: mother-right societies. Like 
Bachofen, McLennan focussed on the scattered evidence of these societies 
as phenomena of immense significance in the history of human development. 
Unlike Bachofen, however, he did not presume that descent through the 
mother presupposed power invested in women as mothers. Joined with the 
hypotheses formed on evidence of marriage by capture they seemed to 
provide a complete account of the earliest forms of human organisation.
Descent reckoned through the mother could mean only one thing, 
according to McLennan. It pointed to a stage of human existence where 
paternity v/as both unknown and unknowable. Such a form of reckoning 
descent would only be admitted if there was no other way of guaranteeing 
parenthood, that is paternity. Kinship reckoned through fathers would 
only become a system when paternity could be guaranteed. For what possible 
interest, so ran the argument, could fathers have in offspring which were 
not genetically their own stock? These factors pointed to the necessary 
deduction of a state of sexual and proprietorial communism. Eow could an 
offspring not know its father unless the practice of marriage relations were 
so loose that no certainty could be guaranteed? There were neither ideas
of monogamy (the only state that could guarantee paternity) nor of 
individual property, (a state which would have lead to the taking of 
individual wives). Prom this McLellan deduces that kinship and family 
alliances were relatively late appearing on the scene. The first social 
bonds were those of fraternity and common interests, 'ideas of kinship
must have grown like all other ideas related to matters primarily cognisable
(68) 
only by the senses. 1 ^ Completely independent from Bachofen, we again
encounter the proposition of knowledge and thought as a crucial factor in 
the 'advance'of human society. Bonds with the mother are a sensual truth. 
If then a relation with the mother is knowable through the senses, the 
deduction of consanguinity with brothers and sisters could be thought to be 
a simple matter. Hence early social bonds were fraternal.
Yet precisely this simplicity, when coupled with the practice of 
exogamy, surviving from the necessity to capture wives, led to a 
contradiction, which would explain the emergence of modern "homogeneous" 
society. This term should perhaps be explained. In Primitive Marriage 
a distinction is marked between societies which are exogamous and 
societies which are what McLennan calls endogamous. By this distinction, 
he attempts to differentiate between groups which marry members of the 
same group (endogamous) and those which marry outsj.de it (exogamous). 
Incorrectly he took our own society to be endogamous, that is, marriage 
takes place within the whole group, only observing the 'biological' 
prohibitions on incest. ' The endogamous state he takes to be the 
'natural 1 state of mankind, a state upset by demographic considerations 
such as the numerical imbalance between the sexes. He sees the endogamous 
as a "homogeneous" form of social organisation. This natural state is 
only restored with the advance of civilisation, where the family is 
gradually recognised as the basic social unity. That a society which 
is exogamous and matrilineal is thought to be heterogeneous is both
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revealing and significant. For a group which practiced both of these, 
the tribe would apparently be tormented by having 'foreigners in the 
midst of the clan'. In this logic, given the basic bond a£ the 
fraternal bond, the capture of wives would introduce foreign blood, but 
worse, descent through the female would mean that her children would be 
foreigners to the father as well, because they would belong to a different 
descent group.
For McLennan it was partly these contradictions provoked by exogamy, 
which would underly the emergence of the procreative family. But the 
problem of heterogeneity would not be resolved until, with the development 
of wealth and private property, the men would necessarily come to think of 
their wives as property. Only in such a situation could rigid monogamy 
be enforced but once it was, there would be sufficient a guarantee 
of paternity for descent through the males to be established.
McLennan's writing marks a systematisation of a series of 
preoccupations with the history of marriage institutions. It already has 
the characteristics of subsequent debates. Transitions in marriage 
relations are taken as in some way informative about the general state 
of social development and the form of social alliances. It attempts to 
combine theories of the transitions between familial institutions and 
' Dolitical' institutions in order to demonstrate what was the essential 
nature of these alliances and institutions. McLennan makes definite 
propositions on this subject: basic social bonds are fraternal, arising 
from comradely feelings based on locality. Early society is a history 
of constant warfare whose dynamic will set in motion the history of 
marriage customs.
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Technical stages and human sexual relations
If McLennan's outline of the emergence of civilisation concentrates on 
one single aspect of social development, human marriage, as the clue to 
all human development, the same criticism cannot be made of Lewis Henry 
Morgan. Yet the history of the evolution of the sexual regulations and 
marriage forms typical of Western society is again a central focus. Again 
this history is invested with the significance of the illumination it 
can bring to the first forms of social bonds. Morgan addressed these 
questions through an extensive empirical knowledge of a non-European 
society and for this reason, his writings were to exercise a major 
influence on anthropological preoccupation.
Morgan's evolutionary account included a schema of technical, and 
political transformations as well as 'ethical' transformations. He outlined 
a history of humanity, passing through various levels of social organisation, 
ranging from 'barbarism' to 'civilisation' passing through savagery. 
These he took to be determined by the technical capacity of any given group, 
that is, the level of the'arts of subsistence'. Ancient Society aims to 
explore the relation between these technical stages and the development of 
various social institutions. These he calls the growth of private property, 
the growth of the family and the growth of the idea of government. The 
history of these institutions reveals a close, but not necessary correlation 
with one another, and in particular with the advance in technical developments 
Private property, for instance, 'is closely connected with the increase 
in inventions and discoveries, and with the improvement of social 
institutions which mark the several ethnic periods of human progress'.^' '
It has already been mentioned in this chapter that transitions in the 
technical capacities of a given society had become a dominant mode of 
explaining all human development in the social sciences. In Morgan's
hands this form of explanation is again dominant but slightly transformed. 
Now there is also the influence of Darwinian evolutionary theories, 
directing attention to the possibility that natural selection might play 
a significant part in the history of social institutions. There is also 
the centrality which had been attributed to the specific history of sexual 
organisations as a history. Mcran does not attribute to the 'arts of 
subsistance 1 any status of determination, but tries to investigate the 
interrelation between various strands in historical research.
Ancient Society is unashamedly evolutionary, describing 'the progress 
of mankind from the bottom of the scale to the status of civilisation.' 
Speculation on this progress is combined with detailed accounts of the 
social organisations studied by Morgan among the American Indians. Their 
social, political and sexual organisations could be studied like the 
evidence thrown up for geography or paleontology like successive strata 
which have developed or are developing at a different rate from our own:
Like the successive geological formations, the tribes of 
mankind may be arranged, according to their relative conditions, 
into successive strata. When thus arranged they reveal with 
some degree of certainty the entire range of human progress 
from savagery to civilisation. (72)
Thus,those forms of social and sexual organisation differing from that 
of Western 'patriarchal' society with its biological family -unit are 
taken to be frozen or transitional forms of society more primitive than 
Western society. Different social formations such as matrilineal societies 
are treated either as very primitive versions of our own society or in the 
process of transforming into the same form of organisation as our own.
Moran linked the organisation of sexual relations to the 'ethnical' 
stages in the progress of humanity, yet the history of sexual relations 
also is given its own specific dynamic. Reconstruction of this history 
reveals not only the development of morality but also the forms of early 
bonds between groups. Morgan insists that human life in its most savage and 
elementary forms was characterised by the promiscuous horde, being "in 
the nature of a compact on the part of several males for the joint
subsistence of the group,and for the defense of their common wives against
(73) the violence of society'. Gradually social organisation becomes
more differentiated, the most archaic form of social organisation is 
the division of society into classes on the basis of sex. This archaic 
form contains within it the seeds of the gentile social organisation, 
Morgan's most significant term in theorising the relation between 
familial and wider social affiliations. With this archaic classification 
there begins to emerge the earliest form of the family, the so-called 
consanguine family "founded on the intermarriage of brothers'and sisters 
in a group". ' Under it, all consanguined, near and remote, fall 
within some one of the following relationships; namely; parent, child, 
grandparent, grandchild, brother and sister. Gradually the panaluan 
family would emerge, that is intermarriage between collateral brothers 
and sisters, gradually excluding actual brothers and sisters from inter- 
marriage. Thus all cousins of one sex would be "married" to all cousins 
of the opposite sex. A parallel development would begin to occur here. 
The sexual classification of society would gradually be transformed into 
a more sophisticated version of this, the gentile organisation. This 
organisation would involve affiliation to a descent group, with a common 
gentile name. And as the system of panaluan marriage would prohibit 
recognition of paternity, the universal precedence of the matrilineal 
gens could be confidently asserted. This panaluan family would be 
replaced by the non-monogamous pairing family. This in turn would be 
followed by the patriarchal family where one patriarch would possess 
several wives. Finally, the monogamous patriarchal family would 
triumphantly emerge.
Morgan's hypothesis of this history of the triumphant emergence of 
the biological family was based on two things. First of all a detailed
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examination of the complex system of prohibitions and regulations 
characterising Iroqoius social organisation. Secondly, he interpreted 
certain elements in these social organisations as expressing residual 
forms of previous social organisations. This attention to 'survivals' 
so common throughout the period is given a special direction by Morgan. 
In Systems of Consanguinity and Affinity (187?) Morgan concentrated on 
the terminology of kinship, a concern which comes to dominate much 
subsequent anthropological writing. Morgan studied systems of kinship 
terminology amongst the Iroq-uois Indians (though not confined to them) 
where a subject would call not only his/her mother's husband, 'father' but 
also would use the term 'father' for all his/her mother's brothers as well. 
Indeed the term was frequently extended to all male kin. Correspondingly, 
the word for 'mother' had a far wider application than in our own society, 
where it denotes simply the woman who gives birth to the child. ]?rom 
these practices it was possible to derive support for the hypothesis of a 
primitive stage of group marriage. Had a stage of group marriage 
prevailed, many men in the tribe would have been in the position of 
putative father since genetic paternity could not be guaranteed. Morgan's 
entire reconstruction of a history of kinship is only possible starting 
from the following assumption; that systems of kinship classification are 
built on the biological facts of parenthood and reproduction. Thus Morgan 
can deduce that the terminology is the same because a group of men all stand 
in an identical relationship of putative fatherhood. The term for 'father' 
is taken as referring to putative biological paternity, therefore it 
becomes possible to suggest a state where this biological paternity ?ras 
uncertain, a state where the terminology referred to a real state of 
affairs, and in which our term father would be exactly equivalent to a 
similar term in another society. Such assumptions did not go long 
unquestioned. Malinowski for example attacked Morgan for his illogical
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deduction that kinship relations (and therefore classifications) were
founded by reference simply to that relation resulting from sexual
(75) intercourse. ' In addition, Morgan could be critisised for his
unquestioning assumption that "fatherhood" had the same resonances within 
other cultures;
The really fundamental error, however, lies in Morgan's 
assumption that a native term translated 'father 1 is synonymous 
in the native mind with f procreator'. He cannot conceive that 
a Hawaian could ever have called the maternal uncle 'father' 
unless at one time the uncle cohabited with his sister and was 
thus a possible procreator of her children. But this is to 
misunderstand the evidence, which does not teach us that the 
mother's brother is called father but that both mother's 
brother and father are designated by a common term not 
strictly corresponding to any in our language. ("76)
This criticism extends to take in Morgan's evasions when his interpretation 
is confronted with the term mother. That Hawaians also designate several 
women, 'mothers' is accounted for by Morgan as these women being mothers 
by marriage relations. He shirks the logical suggestion that an infant 
would think it had several mothers - an evasion which further discredited 
the credibility of the original argument. Yet despite these criticisms, 
Morgan'=? use of kinship classification was established in the heart of 
anthropological studies. The distinction that he drew between classificatory 
systems and descriptive systems, like our own where kinship terminology 
corresponded to the facts of procreative relations was an accepted 
distinction within studies of kinship for some tine. It shows the 
extent to which the procreative referent was thought to underly histories 
of the family - a referent which could gradually express itself as humanity 
progressed.
The gradual emergence of monogamy and the incest prohibitions 
characteristic of our society, is given a singular determinant by Morgan. 
This concerns primarily the workings of natural selection:
The organisation into classes upon sex, and the subsequent 
higher organisation, into gentes upon kin, must be regarded 
as the result of great social movements worked out unconsciously 
through natural selection. (77)
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Here Morgan mobilises the Darwinian notion of natural selection to account 
for the way in which certain practices of organising sexual relations 
gave some groups an advantage which ensured their survival. He deduces 
that the achievements of societies who practice incest prohibitions on all 
close biological relations is not entirely unconnected with the fact that 
these groupings are in some way stronger and healthier, more fitted for 
survival and adaptation. Those societies which practice only primitive 
forms of classification are subject to biological in-breeding and 
therefore according to Morgan, weaker and more liable to extermination.
Morgan does not conflate the growth of the idea of monogamy and the 
growth of the institution of private property. But he emphasises that 
the establishment of private property as a regular institution of 
civilisation, was crucially dependent on the triumph of monogamy. The 
scenario runs like this: under the influence of the unconscious workings 
of inbreeding, those groups which came to practice forms of prohibition 
survived more adequately than those which had unregulated mating. The 
monogamous family, recognising as father, the real progenitor, emerged 
as the end-product of the ever-increasing complexification of alliances 
and prohibitions within a group. Meanwhile the idea of private property 
had been making headway, but could only become established when the
'principle of the inheritance of the property in the children of its owner
(78)
was established.'^ This resulted in the coincidence of strict monogamy
with private property: the father took the most logical means at his
disposal to guarantee that his property was inherited by his genetic offspring,
and genetic offspring could only be verified through the strictest monogamy:
Independently of the movement which culminated in the 
patriarchal family of the Hebrew and Latin types, property 
as it increased in variety and amount, exercised a steady 
and constantly augmenting influence in the direction of 
monogamy...With the establishment of the inheritance of 
property in the children of its owner came the first possibility 
of a strict monogamian family...As finally constituted, this 
family assured the paternity of the children, substituted the 
individual ownership of real as well as personal property for 
joint ownership and exclusive inheritance by children in the 
place of agnatic inheritance. (79)
- 56 -
There is no primary cause in this history of the monogamous family and 
private property. Development is uneven and, although certain forms of 
social and sexual organisation are mutually dependent, their joint 
emergence is not the result of any necessary or teleological development. 
However, it is assumed that the enforcement of strict monogamy, the dominance 
of the father and the transmission of property through the biological father 
to his sons are mutually dependent forms of social organisation. It is 
assumed that once paternity can be guaranteed, this incontrovertable 
knowledge of who your children are, will necessarily be accompanied by 
the desire to pass property and name on to these genetic offspring.
Morgan's history of the family is premised on the idea that no 
'rational 1 society might organise descent, kinship and inheritance through 
the female line. A natural psychological instinct for and interest in, 
paternity is assumed. A man would both wish to recognise his offspring 
and wish to transmit his property to these offspring. There is an idea 
at play of natural rights, embodied in the notion of the procreative 
family. What is produced by the hands, property, belongs to the body and 
genetic offspring are seen as extensions of the body. It is not surprising 
with such presuppositions that Morgan should have taken biological 
consanguinity to underly all systems of kinship.
But to make these observations does not exhaust the concerns of 
Morgan's writing or the impact of his work. For his concern with the 
primacy of matrilineal descent, taken to be the necessary consequence of 
ignorance of procreation, is also a concern with the foundations of 
social alliance in primitive society.
The patriarchal theory had proposed a relation between state and 
family as a homogeneous relationship. Maine had assumed that both the 
early patriarchal family, and later 'political' society represented 
forms of government in which groups of individuals were subject to 
sovereign authority. Morgan's interest in the primacy of -natrilinearity 
and the separate histories of family and the political level, is to
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demonstrate the qualitatively different nature of forms of social 
organisation at different historical stages.
For Morgan the term 'political 1 is not to be used for all societies 
regardless of their level of development and their relations of production. 
Political organisation only occurs according to Morgan in societies v/here 
a division of labour is in force, necessitated by the existence of private 
property. This form of organisation is to be distinguished from 
societies organised predominantly through relationships between persons: 
all forms of government can be reduced according to Morgan to one or 
other of these forms of organisation:
The first, in the order of time, is founded upon persons, 
and upon relations purely personal, and may be distinguished 
as a society (societas). (80)
The basic unit of this organisation is the gens, that is a body of 
consanguine! designated as descening from the same common ancestor - a 
group which share a gentile name. Prom his study of the Iroquois 
Morgan suggested that this initial grouping would,in becoming more 
complex,form 'phratries', 'tribes' and 'confederacies of tribes'. This 
organisation would be essentially democratic, where property is held in 
common by consanguinei. Arising from different factors, there is the 
second basic form of government, the political plan:
The second is founded upon territory and property, and may 
be distinguished as a state (civitas). The township or 
ward, circumscribed by metes and bounds, with the property 
it contains, is the basis or unit of the latter, and political 
society is the result. Political society is organised upon 
territorial areas and deals with property as well as persons 
through territorial relations. (81)
The transition from one form of social organisation to another is 
closely connected with the history of the family. We have already 
noticed Morgan's theory of the gradual emergence of various classifications 
by which biological in-breeding was removed as a possibility. This 
development involved first classification based on sex, then increasir-I^-
complicated categories of marriagability within the gens. The transition 
from mother-right to father-right had its own history within the history of 
the gens, and its own determinants. These determinants are a combination 
of psychologistic assumptions about paternal interests and a history of the 
accumulation of wealth with the development of agriculture and the 
concommitant emergence of private property:
With property accumulating in masses and assuming permanent 
forms, and with an increased proportion of it held by 
individual ownership, descent in the female line was certain 
of overthrow, and substitution of the male line equally 
assured. Such a change would leave inheritance of the 
gens as before, but it would place children in the gens of 
their father, and at the head of agnatic kindred. (82)
Such a form of inheritance would begin to structure the possibility 
of transition from primitive communism, with its distribution of 
surplus between all members of gens, to inheritance of private property. 
Inheritance through the father would make possible accumulation of 
wealth by a strong male line. Thus the patrilineal monogamous family 
would emerge through the coincidence of the workings of unconscious 
natural selection with the development of the technical capacity of a 
given group.
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Conclusion
This chapter has traced the way in which the dissolution of 'the 
patriarchal theory' was none other than the dissolution of an assumed 
homogeneity between the forms of power in the state and the family. In 
this dissolution there emerged a new configuration of concerns, relating 
to the regulation of sexual relations. It became possible to produce a 
history of sexual relations as a form of social regulation before social 
institutions as such. In recognising the primacy of sociality but in 
pushing back social rules, even as far back as the animal kingdom, the 
terrain was changed as to what constituted 'the social'. The social forms 
in which sexual reproduction was accomplished, its history and exigencies 
and prohibitions became possible sources of explanation of the nature of 
the social group itself. Forms of government could no longer 
unproblematically be thought to be the logical extension of natural forms.
Many of the questions remained the same as those asked by Maine: 
what is the relation between familial organisation, the forms of power 
exercised within the family, and the political organisation of society? 
But a series of additional concerns have -merged. The regulation of 
mating and reproduction, the rights of parenthood, the transmission of 
name, identity and goods, all came to be areas whose integration with 
the political level of society was by no means clear cut. Sexuality and 
the organisation of reproduction had become a point of speculation as to the 
transformation from animal to human, opening a whole new area of 
contestation. The supposed homogeneity between the form of power in the 
family and the state, proposed by Maine, was broken open and in the 
ensuing study of sexual forms, there appeared a space where the struggle 
to become human was played out. Could it possibly be, for example, that 
the monogamous family, recognising biological paternity, is the end-product
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of a long history? Perhaps the first social groups had not recognised 
any sexual regulation. In this space questions can be asked as to how 
sexual regulation was achieved, what were its conditions, what were its 
relations to other social practices. In the following chapter the themes 
and preoccupations which determined the form taken by this discussion will 
be traced.
CHAPTER TWO
BACHOFEN TO BRIFFAULT: THE MEANING OF MOTHER-RIGHT
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Introduction
The preceding chapter dealt with the response of a limited number of 
theorists to the patriarchal theory. These writers are frequently 
represented as the founding parents of anthropological studies of kinship* 
It is not so frequently recognised, however, that their writings were part 
of a mass of literature orchestrated around the issues of the patriarchal 
theory and the meaning of mother-right. Debates stimulated by the fore- 
grounding of mother-right societies extended over a period of approximately 
sixty years, stretching between the publication of Bachofen's Das Mutter- 
recht in 1861 until the appearance of what Malinowski called the swan-song 
of mother-right hypotheses, Robert Briffault's The Mothers in 1927.
The discipline which we now recognise as anthropology emerged in the 
context of these debates. But they were by no means confined to the study 
of other societies for its own sake,, Political philosophy, sociology, 
marxism, psychoanalysis and sex psychology were all involved in these 
debates. It was partly in the context of these debates that the division 
of attention which so characterises the contemporary divisions between 
disciplines was formed. This was because, as the previous chapter has begun 
to explore, the study of sexual relations was not the subject of these 
debates; it was the bearer of a whole series of preoccupations and questions 
addressed to the functioning and history of social institutions in general. 
The following two chapters are organised around two major elements which 
gave these debates their distinctive character. They demonstrate how very 
particular conceptions of family, kinship and sexuality were formed as the 
effect of other considerations. On the one hand there was the study of 
kinship and familial relations directed to revealing the nature of social 
coherence, that is a consideration of forms of 'political 1 coherence. On 
the other hand, there was a contestation between natural and social in 
which theories of sex become crucial. The division of these two elements
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is relatively arbitrary, arising through considerations of the thesis. 
It is clear however that both these elements brought terms and modes of 
explanation to the study of familial and sexual relations that make 
problematic contemporary reconceptualisation.
The overwhelming evidence of mother-right societies
In 1880 Maxim Kovalevsky gave a series of lectures in Sweden summarising
the state of the debate on the origin of the family and property.
( 2 ) 
Maine's patriarchal theory was dismissed as 'sustained by fantasy 1 and
this had been exposed by the contributions of Bachofen and McLennan. The 
initial lack in the new theory of mother-right of a 'minute description 
of the relations of kinship and the forms of marriage in the original
epoch of human sociability 1 had soon been rectified by detailed
(4)
empirical studies. All this work gave overwhelming evidence against
Maine and suggested entirely new ways of thinking about the origins of 
sociality:
To the initiative of this intellectual elite, we are 
indebted for the most remarkable discovery effected in 
our times in sociological research* It shows that the 
individual family constituted in the way we now find it by 
marriage and consanguinity is never found at the origin 
of human sociability. In its place we establish the 
matriarchal family, recognising no other ties than those 
uniting the infant to its mother and its relatives on 
its mother's side a (5)
It seemed it was no longer worth anyone's while to take seriously the 
patriarchal theory.
In 1883, Maine himself everywhere refuted, once more turned his 
attention to the patriarchal theory. His defense shows clearly how the 
terms in which familial and social relations had been reconceptualised. 
First of all he admitted that the evidence for mother-right societies seemed 
overwhelming; '.. the group consisting of the descendants through women, of 
a single ancestress still survives, and its outline niay still be marked out 
if it is worth anybody's while to trace it.' ^ ' But did this grudging
63
admittance necessarily destroy the pertinence of the patriarchal theory? 
Did the existence of such societies really imply either the 'fact' of 
primitive promiscuity or the primacy of mother-right societies? By no 
means, answers Maine. Such hypotheses should be treated with extreme 
suspicion, since they seem to fly in the face of 'human nature'. -he 
physiological family must surely always have exited in some form, and this 
would necessarily mean that paternity would, in some way, be recognised. 
After all, he declares,'a human being can no more, physiologically, be the 
child of two fathers than of two mothers, and the children of the same man,
no less than of the same woman, must always have something in their nature
(7) 
which distinguished them from every other group of human beings,'
Ignoring these 'facts' reveals the glaring faults of the mother-right
hypotheses, quite apart from their universalising claims, being 'open to
(8) 
considerable objection as universal theories of the genesis of society.'
The 'graver criticisms' relate to the neglect of the structures which must 
accrue to the procreative family. For they put into abeyance notions of 
male Power and sexual jealousy:
the theory /of Morgan & McLennan/ takes for granted the 
abeyance, through long ages, of the mightiest of all 
passions, a passion which man shares with all the higLar 
animals, sexual jealousy,, (9)
If, as he assumes, these passions underly the contemporary family, how came 
they to be put aside at the earliest stages of mankind's existence? If 
mother-right theories recognise that procreative fathers will claim their 
'rights' as soon as paternity can be recognised, how can it be assumed that 
men will not feel these inclinations to dominate and possess from the 
earliest stage? Nothing, he asserts, could be more unsatisfactory in the 
writings of McLennan and Morgan than their account of the recognition of 
paternity. 'Morgan seems almost to suppose that it was introduced by 
popular vote. McLennan expressly suggests that it arose from a custom of 
putative fathers giving presents to putative children.' ^ ' But the truth
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is, he argues, that 'a great natural force must always have acted, and 
must still be acting on those aberrant forms of society, tending always to 
make the most powerful portion of each community arrange itself in groups 
which admit the recognition of fatherhood, and the indulgence of parental 
instincts.'
Maine can count himself lucky that by and large his principal
assumptions in the patriarchal theory had subsequently been corroborated
(12) by Darwin's work. If 'Jurisprudence unassisted by other sciences'
had not initially been competent to understand what originally prompted 
men to hold together in family union, Maine could now congratulate himself 
that biology had delivered unexpected assistance:
This anticipation of aid to be expected from biological 
science has been fulfilled, and it is remarkable that, 
while the greatest luminary of ancient science invented 
or adopted the Patriarchal theory, the greatest name in 
the science of our day is associated with it» (1 3)
That both Aristotle and Darwin should advance versions of the patriarchal 
theory is good enough for Maine. After all, writing in the Descent of Man, 
Darwin had suggested sexual jealousy, male dominance and parental love, 
at the origins of human social life:
We may conclude from what we know of the passions of 
all male quadrupeds that promiscuous intercourse in a 
state of nature is extremely improbable.. If we look far 
enough back in the stream of time, it is exceedingly 
improbable that primeval men and women lived promiscuously 
together. Judging from the social habits of man as he 
now exists and from most savages being polygamists, the most 
probable view is that primeval man aboriginally lived in 
small communities each with as many wives as he could 
support or obtain, whom he jealously guarded against all 
other men..o In primeval times men... would probably 
have lived as polygamists or temporarily as monogamists... 
They would not at that period have lost one of the 
strongest of all passions common to all the lower animals, 
the love of their young offspring. (14)
With such confirmation, Maine's attention to mother-right societies need 
only be scant. Where they do exist,their explanation was quite simple: 
either they were the result of sexual imbalance caused by population factors;
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or, as Darwin had suggested, some groups, having advanced in intellectual 
powers, were'retrograded in their instincts'. In either of these 
explanations, the problem is not one of the facts of different familial 
organisation and their meanings but a problem of knowledge. Mankind had 
simply lost the ability to recognise paternity. The structure of male 
power, sexual jealousy and parental love could never have been in abeyance,.
Hypotheses of mother-right as a general stage at the origin of humanity 
were impossible for Maine because they propose convoluted accounts of the 
emergence of human society. He insisted that there must be coherence 
between various social institutions; the state is organised along 
patriarchal principles, so it must have emerged from families organised 
in this way. Why on earth he argues should society originate with the 
large horde, transmogrify into smaller groups only to aggregate slowly 
back to the large group?
There is a theoretical distance between the outline of the patriarchal 
theory in Maine's Ancient Law in 1361 and his defense of the precedence of 
the patriarchal family in 1883=> It is the distance between a detailed 
comparative analysis of legal systems where the primacy of the patriarchal 
family is assumed in order to speculate on political and legal history, and 
a subsequent defense of patriarchal primacy in terms of biological and 
psychological evidence. Maine is still preoccupied with the questions of 
political theory; for example, what is the relation between forms of 
dominance within the state and the family; or which social form takes 
precedence, the large or small unit? However the effect of the challenge 
concentrated in the championing of the primacy of mother-right and the 
considerations which this provoked, is that Maine defended his 'artificial 
and complex' notion of the family explicitly in terms of its psychological 
probability. These terms are sustained by reference to evidences drawn 
from the natural sciences - evidences of sexual jealousy and male domination 
supposedly found in the animal kingdom. The distance between Maine's two
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arguments marks the emergence of a space in which a new configuration of 
concepts has been formed. Many of the questions addressed to the study of 
the family are unaltered, arising from considerations of political theory, 
"but the terms and conditions in which this takes place have changed.
The regulation of sexual relations
The new conceptual space in which sexual and familial relations came to be 
theorised is one characterised by the absolute centrality assumed by the 
regulation of sexual relations as the clue to social relations. Many have 
characterised the debate which preoccupied the social sciences in the 
second half of the nineteenth century as 'social evolutionism'. In 
particular, the treatment of sexual relations has been seen in this
context. Various writers have remarked on the preoccupation with early
(1 5 \ 
sexual forms as the effect of Victorian moral prejudice. ' 'There had
to be some form of speculation about the earliest stages of this development 
but its general lines were clear since the terminal points were fixed - the 
female ape and the Victorian lady.'^ This characterisation assumes 
that the schema of social evolution constructed for marriage customs was 
based on an equation between 'primitive' and the 'opposite of Western 
civilisation'. It is almost a platitude now to recognise a mode of 
evolutionary speculation where the end-points were fixed: advanced 
industrial society based on the monogamous patriarchal family as the 
final outcome and, in all probability, its absolute inverse at the origins 
of society. It is also common to point to the overthrow of the patriarchal 
theory as coinciding with the tendency to treat 'simple* societies as 
primitive or original forms of society, through which all humanity had 
passed or would pass: 'Among the tribes... a true family life has hardly 
yet arisen. It may be said to be in the course cf formation; the conscious- 
ness of kinship exists but it has not yet become fully organised as we
(17) understand it.'
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'Evolutionism 1 is however an insufficient characterisation of these 
debates. There was no simple homogeneous application of "biological laws 
to social laws, nor any simple inversion of 'Victorian morality'. For one 
thing, biological categories were themselves contested: those which were 
accepted within the social sciences were as a result of other factors. 
This will be dealt with in the subsequent chapter. Nor does the idea of 
inversion adequately explain why it was sexual relations which were inverted, 
Such characterisations are nisleadingo They tell us little about the 
precise form which 'evolutionary' theories took within the study of the 
family. They tell us nothing about the divisions within the debates about 
terms, modes of explanation and different ideas about causality. Moreover 
these characterisations obscure the fact that anti-evolutionary theorists 
were also involved from quite an early stage in these debates about familial 
forms. Summary characterisations drive too firm a wedge between the 
'evolutionists' and the 'anti-evolutionists' and obscures the fact that 
many subsequent positions in different discourses were formed in these 
debates.
In fact, these debates about sexual regulation and its social meaning 
had very definite theoretical and political conditions of existence. One 
element was indeed the systematise.tion of evolutionary speculation. The 
effect of this was to establish an interest in different social forms as 
possible stages in a unilineal historical transition. Perhaps those 
societies which exhibited such peculiarities as matrilineal descent or non- 
monogamy were the earliest forms of social grouping, a form through which all 
humanity had once passed; '..  in the main, the development of higher and 
better ideas as to marriage, relationships, law and religion etc. has
followed in its earlier stages a very similar course in the most distinct
(18) 
races of man.' Evolutionary theory, partially influenced by Darwinian
idea.s of the transition from animal to man, produced a form of attertion to 
social institutions as possible stages on a unilinear history. It produced
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a different attention to 'origins'.
Yet 'evolutionary 1 theory was really only one element in a more 
general process of 'historisation' of studies of human society which
had beg-on to emerge well before Darwin, at the beginning of the eighteenth
(1 9) century. x ^' This involved the possibility of historicising the unwritten,
through the simultaneous treatment of extant societies as 'primitive', 
and through a treatment of cultural practices and customs as expressing a 
history. What had begun to emerge was a 'diachronic' analysis of culture 
which involved treating representations and practices as effects of a 
history. Symbols, rituals, customs like marriage, began to be understood 
as expressing a hidden history, bearing in their contemporary forms the 
traces of bygone forms and practices. The aim of ethnology, from this 
perspective, would be to trace the history of a custom or symbolic practice 
to its origin; this would also exhaust its explanation. It was in this 
context that Morgan's treatment of kinship terminology became so central, 
Even 'so small and apparently insignificant a feature as the classing of 
the sister-in-law with the sister has been found to lead back to a definite 
social condition arising out of the regulation of marriage and sexual 
relations. ' This ability to ask questions of the history of customs
simultaneously a question of determination. What explanations could 
there be for the particular forms which customs take? Once customs and 
representations were no longer seen as expressing their own inner essence, 
then the question of how they were determined needed to be answered:
If sociology is to become a science fit to rank with the
other sciences, it must like them be rigorously deter-
ministic. Social phenomena do not come into being of
themselves. The proposition that we class two relatives
together in nomenclature because the relationship is
similar is, if it stands alone nothing but a form of
words. It is incumbent on those who believe in the
psychological similarity of social phenomena to show in
what the supposed similarity consists and how it lias
come about - in other words, how it has been determined...
in so far as such similarities exist in the case of
relationships, they have been determined by social relations, (21)
These elements however do not explain why it was sexual organisation, 
rather than any other kind of organisation, which assumed such importance 
in outlining this history of the human species.
Two factors were important here<, On the one hand, there was the 
theoretical impulse from natural history. On the other, there was the 
impulse from social and political factors of that period, factors which 
had brought the consideration of sexual relations to the forefront of a 
number of social issues. The first impulse, that of natural history, will 
be dealt with in the following chapter. Here it suffices to remark on 
the impact of ideas from natural history which was far more specific than 
that of a nebulous impact producing social evolutionism. There was an 
apparent coincidence of objects studied - mating in natural history, 
marriage in the social sciences which permitted the 'historisation 1 of 
sexual regulationso It became possible to speculate on forms of transition 
of sexual behaviour. And what was constructed here was a new area of 
theoretical contestation - the natural - in which animals are the natural, 
and marriage regulations, the human. In this apparent coincidence of 
objectj it becomes possible to ask; is there continuity between the 
sexual behaviour of animals and humans? Finally are these the significant 
differences between the animal and the human?
A second factor which impelled sexuality to the centre of the social 
debate relates to social and political forces in the nineteenth century <> 
To account for these at all sufficiently would require a different account 
from that attempted in this thesis. But it should be noted that, contrary
to the image of the nineteenth century as a period where sexuality was
(22)
silenced, *the debate about sexuality exploded', Jeffrey Weeks in an
important study of nineteenth century sexuality in England has argued that 
even the silences about sexuality mark the way it became the secret, at 
the heart of a whole number of discourses, medicine, education, social 
statistics, etc. He writes:
From the end of the eighteenth century with the debate 
over population and the hyperbreeding of the poor, sexuality 
pervades the social consciousness: from the widespread 
discussions of the birthrate, deathrate, life-expectancy, 
fertility in the statistical forays of the century to the 
urgent controversies over public health, housing, birth 
control and prostitution. The reports of the great 
Parliamentary commissions, which in the 1830's and 40's 
investigated working conditions in the factories and 
mines, were saturated with an obsessive concern with the 
sexuality of the working class, the social other, displacing 
in the end an acute social crisis from the area of exploita- 
tion and class conflict where it could not be coped with, 
into the framework of a more amenable and discussible area 
of 'morality'. (23)
The explosion of the debate over sexuality was also an explosion 
of 'actions' towards the area of sexual behaviour. Culminating in a 
series of social policies in the 1880 T s the second half of the nineteenth
century had been witness to increasing state intervention in the organisation
(24) 
of the social field. These political interventions provoked much
violent controversy over the advantages or not of state invention, another 
political factor which was to prioritise the debate over the relation between 
state (political) regulation and familial organisation. Finally the period 
covered by these debates was also the period where feminism began to emerge 
as an organised political force. Its effect was to produce violent 
controversy about the nature of sexual regulations and sexual behaviour, 
a factor which cannot have been coincidental in this becoming an important 
object of interrogation in the social sciences.
The political and the familial; what is the nature of social bonds?
What these various elements produced was a new space of contestation for
social theory. Different, often antagonistic explanations were advanced.
For some, the coincidence with natural history, constructed a place for
theorising the instinctual in social relations. For others, there was
an insistence on sexual regulation, even of the Tiost 'primitive' forms,
as the factor constituting social relations. Any form of sexual regulation
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could be taken as evidence of 'a fact of general order that even the
most superficial observers of savage and barbarous life have been
(2c)
constrained to mention it.' All aspects of sexual regulation -
mother-right societies, exogamy, incest prohibitions - all 'lead us to 
suppose that at the very origins of societies sexual relations, far from 
being abandoned to the arbitrary must have been submitted to certain 
exigencies of custom and religion, to certain prescriptions of a moral 
order.' (26)
It is clear that much of the speculation provoked by the simultaneous 
search for a unilinear history of familial relations, and the concentration 
on sexual regulation, is concerned with understanding the nature of social 
bonds. The particular form the debate took reveals that the homogeneity 
assumed by Maine between the political organisation of society and the 
family has been broken. The disruption of the assumed homogeneity between 
the political organisation of society and the family constructed a realm 
of speculation on the bonds that held together the primitive social group. 
What, for example, were the bonds between procreation, the family and wider 
social groups? Did social bonds emerge in the clan or the individual 
family? In this context writers were fascinated by various phenomenon 
which appeared to perform tho function of guaranteeing social cohesion. 
Totemism was one such phenomenon where a group appeared to be united by 
their common allegiance to a plant or animal symbol. The fascination 
with incest prohibition and exogamy is equally part of this consideration 
of the bonds which constitute sociality. The sexual regulations clearly 
served some "function" of social regulation quite outside the series of 
concentric circles of sovereign power postulated by the patriarchal theory. 
Lang, writing in Social Origins asked a series of questions which 
encapsulated the political preoccupations of these debates:
Was marriage originally non-existent? Was promiscuity
at first the rule, and if so what were the origins, motives,
and methods of the most archaic prohibitions on primitive
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license? Did man live in 'hordes' and did he bisect
each horde into exogainous and intermarrying moieties,
and if he did, what was his motive? Are the groups
and kindred commonly styled toteinic earlier or later than
the division into a pair of phratries? Do the totem kins
represent the results of an early form of exogamous custom
or are they additions to or consciously arranged sub-divisions
of the two exogamous moieties? Is a phase of 'group
marriage' proved by the terms for human relationships
employed by many backward races and by survivals in
manners and customs? (27)
At issue here are understandings of sexual regulations as the earliest 
form of social regulation and understandings of the interaction between  -- 
sexual and other 'political 1 bondings. The question behind the questions 
is one of what these practices tell of the way in which the human lives 
in society, in particular what constitutes the specifically human. 
A series of themes can be isolated which seem to be central to the 
discussions of kinship at this time. These are: whether mother-right 
referred to the political domination of women; what role the 'facts' 
of procreation, particularly the role of paternity played in determining 
kinship forms; and the part played by individual property rights. These 
themes by no means exhaust the form taken by the debates about kinship. 
They do however reveal clearly some of the issues which studies of kinship 
were made to bear, and begin to explain how definite modes of conceptuali- 
sation came to dominate.
From mother-right to matrilineal descent
<,»o matrilineal descent was at one time interpreted to 
mean that women govern not merely the family but the 
primitive equivalent of the state. Possibly there is 
not a single theoretical problem on which modern 
anthropologists are so thoroughly in accord as with 
respect to the utter worthlessness of that inference,, (28)
One of the most surprising elements in the dissolution of the patriarchal 
theory was that the hypotheses of those who had attacked it, were even 
more quickly dispensed with. Bachofen, McLennan and Morgan all to some 
extent saw an inversion of father-right societies at the dawn of human
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history. The inversion was sometimes theorised as absolute: not only 
primitive promiscuity but power and descent invested in the mothers 
rather than the fathers. The notion of mother-right initially advanced 
could be summarised as implying not only descent through the mother, but 
also residence in the mother's home and the political dominance of women:
Mother-right stands for kinship as traced through the 
mothers being matrilineal in so far as the children 
derive their family name from her,matrilocal so far as they 
are brought up in her home and among her people, and matri- 
potestal so far as they are under the legal control of her 
people and of herself. (29)
Very few writers however supported the idea of absolute sexual 
inversion. Virtually no-one adhered to Bachofen's vision of all-powerful 
women, his Amazons, struggling to defend mother-righto Instantaneously 
writers were arguing against the likelihood that a state ever existed under 
the control of 'the weaker sex' 0 Surely, they argued, men dominate as a sex in 
patriarchal societies because they are the stronger sex?
o . o communities in which women have exercised the supreme 
power are rare and exceptional, if indeed they ever existed. 
We do not find in history, as a matter of fact, that women 
do assert their rights and savage women would, I think, be 
peculiarly unlikely to uphold their dignity in the manner 
supposed. (^O)
Everywhere evidence could be produced that 'authority' in the sense of 
political or public power was in fact still held by the men, if not the 
biological father, at least the mother's brother:
The term 'matriarchal' was an improvement on earlier 
definitions, but takes too much for granted that women 
govern the family* It is true that in these communities 
women enjoy greater status than in barbaric patriarchal 
life, but the actual power is rather in the hands of their 
brothers and uncles on the mother's side. On the whole 
the terms 'maternal 1 and 'paternal' seem preferable.
When it came to the consideration of mother-right societies, power, 
domination and sovereignty could be separated from descent and inheritance:
The famous matriarchal theory was as exaggerated in 
its early forms as was the patriarchal. It is now 
coming to be recognised that it is simply the tracing
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of descent through the mother and giving the children 
her name, though there were a few cases where inheritance 
of property has later come under the rule, some of these 
being due to sex. (32)
The questioning of sexual inversion exposed how the notion of 'rights' was 
thought and it is significant that the term mother-right gave way gradually 
to a series of differentiated terms: matrilineal (taking the mother's 
name and group for descent purposes) or matrifocal (residing in the home 
of the mother's kin). Any suggestion that descent group and lineage 
were equivalent to political rights and authority should be minimalised:
All then that can properly be meant by saying that a 
patriarchal tribe follows male and a matriarchal tribe 
follows female kinship is that their social arrangements, 
such as membership of family and clan, succession and 
inheritance are framed on one line rather than another. (33)
Distaste for the possibility of an early stage of matriarchal rule was 
motivated by several rather different tendencies, not all reducible to 
Victorian horror at such a 'perverted' state of affairs. After all, if 
the idea was so unacceptable, how came it to enjoy such vogue in the 
first place?
The reaction was, in all probability motivated by the conjuncture of 
several strands of thought and research. They reveal important factors 
both about the way empirical data was classified and how kinship relations 
and power were conceptualised. The problem over the term mother-right 
reveals the notion of rights which had previously been at play. In the 
patriarchal theory, 'rights' had clearly meant not only legal and political 
rights but also rights of possession and control over property and family 
(wife and offspring). It was this presumed coherence between the forms 
of authority exercised by the state over its subjects and those exercised 
by the patriarchs over their families which allowed the hypothesis to be 
formed of the homogeneity between the family, the state and the nation. 
Yet what is constantly raised against the idea of mother-right societies 
is the fact that nowhere, in the study of primitive society, was to be
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found the systematic exclusion of men from political and governmental 
forms as is found in the societies from whence these studies emanated. 
Neither could these investigators discover anywhere societies where 
women governed the state as 'representatives' of the nien in the same way 
that middle class men represented women in nineteenth century Western 
society. For these theorists and investigators, rights imply political 
rights, property rights and inter-subjective capacities of authority and 
control. Therefore women's widespread exclusion from political power 
and lack of capacities of inter subjective domination was taken to -imply 
that the relationship between familial and political relations should 
be reconceptualised. Women nowhere seemed to have the same 'rights' as 
men. It is this which contributes to the disruption of the homogeneity 
assumed by Maine between different social units. Now, there begins to 
be an insistence that descent, inheritance and authority can be separated.
But the picture is not a clear one involving the discovery of exclusion 
of women from power, followed by a reconceptualisation of rights and power. 
The apparent universal exclusion of women from the political and governmental 
positions in society implies women's lack of social significance only if 
rights are conceptualised exclusively in terms typical of western political 
theory. Women's exclusion from the political realm might mean other 
things in other cultures, where power is exercised in different forms  
Then, as now, particular forms of classifying data, and colonial administra- 
tion assumed that forms of power were the same as in Western Europe,, It 
was the notion of "rights" at play which determined how the evidence was 
treated. Rattray describing his investigations among the matrilineal 
Ashanti, gives a poignant account of discovering the immense social 
significance of the 'Queen Mother':
I have asked the old men and old women why I did not 
know all this - I have spent many years among the Ashanti 0 
The answer is always the same: "The white man never 
asked us this; you have dealings with and recognise
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only the men; we supposed the European considered 
women of no account, and we know you do not recognise 
them as we have always done. (>4)
The example indicates how both researchers and the colonial administration 
neglected and therefore undermined the ways in which women were significant 
in public life.
It should also be remembered that from the 1880's onwards the effect 
of feminism in Europe had been initially to consolidate definitions (at 
least within the law) of women having radically different spheres of 
influence. The feminist campaigns against the exclusion of women from pro-* 
fessions and franchise had been resisted by producing legal definitions
of men and women which excluded women from the rights of citizenship:
(35) they were not persons. Citizenship was for certain men; it entailed
political and governmental influence. For women there was to be governance 
of the domestic sphere. Western society, at the time of these arguments, 
was producing a definition of political rights based on sex as much as 
property, a notion of political rights of representation which coincided 
with the general social dominance of men» This model was by no means 
instantly applicable to other societies whose social and political structures 
did not correspond to our own. Yet this idea of rights as invested in a 
person respecting property and familial relations affected the way in which 
other societies were theorised. Representation at the political and 
governmental level was taken to be synonymous with intersubjective 
capacities of authority. In such a context, to point to women's exclusion 
from the political level was to declare them without social influence. 
It was the effect of this declaration which allowed the disruption of 
Maine's assumed homogeneity between political and familial forms. It now 
became possible to separate out the various strands of social organisations 
and suggest that they had different historieso
While the different strands of social organisation were separated 
by this reconceptualisation, it is interesting to notice what happens to the
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notion of power. Because the idea was rejected of societies inverted 
in all ways - sexual, and political - it became possible to talk of male 
supremacy in new ways. It ceased to be simply the assumed basis of 
political power and became a force theorised in psychologistic and 
biological terms, separated from the political forms of society. Never- 
theless, these psychologistic and biological accounts drew on the notion 
of power from political theory, a notion implying intersubjective domination 
whose effect is the obedience of subjects.
The animal family
The theorisation of familial organisation in its specificity, permitted by 
the disruption of assumed coherence between political and familial relations, 
saw an increasing use of evidence drawn from natural history. In opening 
up consideration of sexual regulation, it was now possible to theorise the 
'human 1 , which was neither animal nor fully civilised, that is, politically 
regulated. The fact that animals too demonstrated a certain systematicity 
in the organisation of their familial life seemed to invite comparison 
between them and humans. If the bonds which constitute sociality could not 
be demonstrated as political, perhaps they could be understood by reference 
to the animal kingdom.
The 'evidence' drawn from natural history was at the forefront of the 
attack on theories of mother-right societies. Writers began to argue 
for the unchangeability of the 'natural' procreative unit. Highly 
influential in this argument was Edward Westermarck who referred to the 
natural and unchanging unit, the family, applicable to animals and humans 
as 'nothing else than a more or less durable connection between male and 
female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of 
the offspring.' Maine's idea of the artificial political family may 
have been thoroughly discredited but arguments like Westermarck's began if 
anything to gain ascendency. They championed the idea of the natural
procreative unit under patriarchal protection. Starke in The Primitive
(37) Family. w '' Tylor in Anthropology. w ' Lang and Atkinson in Social
Origins and Primal Law. Crawley in The Mystic Rose * all supported 
this position. As often as not, they appealed to an account of the life 
of the primates, and Darwin's account of patriarchal sexual jealousy among 
animals * They first disputed the primacy of unregulated mating at the 
origin of society, that is theories of primitive promiscuity. Secondly, 
matriarchy could be rejected in favour of the primary family group under 
male protection. 'A reaction has set in 1 , remarked Tylor, before which
the theory of primitive promiscuity which had gained so much antiiropo logical
(41) acceptance, 'is very likely to be transformed or pass away altogether.'
Tylor argued for the basic animal-like family organisation at the origin 
of social life. From this perspective, mother-right or a universal stage 
of the social and political dominance of women could be totally discounted; 
why should such an unlikely inversion occur at the moment of transition 
from ape to man? No, the meaning of mother-right or matrilineal societies 
had to be looked for elsewhere. That 'elsewhere' was in the function of 
descent and affiliation as social as well as biological institutions*
The social function of elements in kinship
The disputation of matriarchy, regardless of the perspective from which 
it was carried out, brought certain concerns to the heart of studies of 
kinship. Increasingly, considerations of kinship moved away from an idea 
of kinship as an artificial bond coherent with political power. The power 
of the patriarch could no longer be seen as the explanation of the cohesion 
of social groups. Kinship was to be broken down into a series of unrelated 
parts: relations of power between groups, descent of name, descent of 
blood-ties, sexual connections and the relations of all these to the 
procreative family,,
The effect of the rejection of theories of matriarchy was not
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homogeneous. For the anti-evolutionists it was ono element contributing 
to the separation between objects of enquiry which had previously been 
run together. Thus the assumption that lineage and descent necessarily 
entail power was gradually deconstructed.
Descent need not necessarily entail 'rights'; it could be seen 
as the series of social rules which regulate the social 
position of offspring according to that of its parents. (42)
There are different practices and institutions within society and each may 
entail different obligations:
in order to use the word descent in a definite sense it is 
always necessary to add what social group is meant. For 
it is possible that membership in the local group is 
determined by the father, membership of the phratry by the 
mother, and membership of the clan by neither of them. The 
facts of descent do not seem to play a very important role 
and are not suitable to be chosen as the most important feature 
of kinship. The facts of inheritance also have not very much 
influence on kinship. (43)
Even within speculative evolutionary anthopology, however, a similar 
trajectory was opened out. It had become necessary to specify various 
strands which made up kinship - the procreative family, descent, inheritance, 
social allegiance - and explain the interrelations between these various 
elements. The interrogation of simplistic inversions of the patriarchal 
theory was premised on definite theoretical assumptions. These involved 
a series of questions which studies of kinship were thought to answer: to 
what extent did the procreative family underly social organisation; if it 
didn't what were kinship relations based on; what were the relative roles 
of "biological" and social determinants? If the biological unit was 
disputed, what was the social function of kinship alliances? What was 
their relations with other social institutions and practices?
By opening out the question of sexual regulation as an area of speculation 
on the form of social bonds, the question of causality had become central. 
At issue was the relation between the various aspects of family and kinship 
if no necessary correspondence between political and familial organisation 
could be assumed. The question had become one of the social functions of
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the various aspects of the regulation of sexual relations. For the 
evolutionists the questions could be solved by asking what social 
determinants caused one family structure to change, into another,. Those 
who rejected the idea of unilineal transformation were left with similar 
questions. If one form, mother-right, had not evolved into another, 
there was still a problem of explaining different forms of social arrange- 
ment. Even if patrilineal and matrilineal familial arrangements simply 
existed as alternatives to one another, why should such different forms 
arise? The debates which followed the dissolution of the patriarchal 
theory thus tended to be dominated by a series of themes: the role of the 
procreative family; the problem of paternity; familial property; the func- 
tion of sexual regulation. These themes reveal the concerns carried by 
studies of kinship.
The facts of procreation
The role of paternity and the procreative family were obsessive themes in 
the discussion of familial forms« The -questions started with whether or 
not mother-right societies could be explained by primitive ignorance of 
the role of the father in the act of procreation. It was rare for any 
writer to take an extreme position though the suggestion of a total state 
of ignorance among the 'primitives' was not absent: 'The history of mankind
as far as we can trace it. 00 exhibits the slow and gradual encroachments of
(44) knowledge on the confines of almost boundless ignorance.' Even if
theorists dismissed the suggestion of the infantile ignorance of the human 
race, almost without exception, the relation between the 'facts' of paternity 
and the social arrangement of kinship was interrogated.
It will be remembered that Bachofen had argued that the ability to 
understand the facts of procreation constituted an intellectual advance for 
humanity. This was because a social order (father-right) could be built
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on intellectual and altruistic love. Father-right represented the 
triumph of the intellectual or spiritual attributes (masculine) over the 
sensual and material attributes shared with the animals (feminine). Few 
writers took such a purely philosophical position as Bachofen but aspects 
of his arguments recur with surprising frequency:
The history of the advance of culture in these lower 
stages is a slow succession of steps by which a society 
organised on the classificatory basis of kinship gradually 
breaks away from that basis to build up a new system 
corresponding to a more accurate appreciation of (the) 
facts. (45)
Recognition of paternity, in these arguments is not an instinct but an 
intellectual appreciation: 'Kinship is a fact - the idea about this physical 
fact must have grown like any other idea.' ^ As late as 1927, Robert 
Briffault in The Mothers extols a general advance in the intellectual 
capacities of humanity. Using a schema very similar to Bachofen, he 
attributes this advance in intellectual capacity to masculine achievements 
even though he argues that it is female altruism at the basis of social 
achievement:
The process which has raised civilised humanity above 
savagery is fundamentally an intellectual process 0 . 0 
Those achievements which constitute what...we term 
civilisation, have taken place in societies organised 
on patriarchal principles, they are for the most part, 
the work of men. Women have very little direct 
share in them. (4?)
Hot many writers followed Bachofen in the division of history into the 
dominance of animal (maternal) and intellectual (male) capacities. There 
are however significant resonances across a whole series of developments 
to warrant attention. In Chapter Seven, for example, it is interesting 
to find Freud working with a similar conception translated into an account 
of the development of the individual's capacity for thought. It becomes 
even more pronounced in the structuralist development of psychoanalytic 
ideas although as early as the 1920's writers had drawn attention to the 
profound similarities between Bachofen and Freud. ' 
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In general, speculation on the status of paternity in primitive 
society was not explicitly concerned with the advance of human knowledge 
but took the form of speculation on 'primitive' sexual mores. Perhaps 
ignorance of paternity and the facts of procreation should be seen as the 
product of a state where paternity could not be known rather than bearing 
witness to the extreme ignorance of primitives. For those who disputed the 
eternal nature of the procreative unit, this was indeed a favoured 
explanation. Early society must have been characterised by extreme 
moral laxity or complex forms of group marriage so that Schonten's 
pronouncement could be corroborated: 'Maternity is always certain, 
paternity always uncertain.' ^ ' Indeed only some such explanation could 
account for the transmission of group allegiance, name and property through 
the mother's line:
It is inconceivable that anything but the want of 
certainty on that point could have long prevented the 
acknowledgement of kinship through males, in such 
cases we shall be able to conclude that such certainty 
had formerly been wanting - that more or less 
promiscuous intercourse between the sexes formerly 
prevailed. (50)
Donald McLennan's The Patriarchal Theory endorsed this view while summarising 
arguments against the patriarchal theory:
That relationship happened to be reflected upon when 
the fact of paternity was obscure and uncertain seems 
to be the only possible explanation of kinship being 
in any case counted through women only; and it seems 
to be the only possible explanation of kinship being any- 
where developed into a system, that where it so developed 
the fact of paternity continued long to be obscure or 
uncertain. (5l)
That descent group would automatically be reckoned through the biological 
father if known is not in question. What possible advantage would there 
be reckoning descent through frail women?
But when reflection, which had previously established 
a system of kinship through the weaker parents, had 
shown that there was kinship through the stronger, we 
need not doubt that means would in general be found of 
ensuring the recognition of this kinship. And once
recognised, it would almost as a matter of course, become 
forthwith the more important of the two. (52)
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The McLennans' position is a stark version of one form of attention to 
paternity. Kinship had a biological referent. Where biological paternity 
was unknown, biological maternity would be all important. A male would 
claim his rights to his genetic offspring as soon as facts of procreation 
were known and monogamy could guarantee the chil'd paternity,,
But this stark proposition was also soon under attack. Day by day, 
more ethnographic data was becoming available which, unlike the earlier 
'voyage 1 literature, asked certain questions of its data. These questions, 
predictably, were primarily about the nature of sexual regulation and 
descent groups. The turn of the century saw a startling increase in the 
number of ethnographic expeditions, and some of the most influential reports 
came back from ethnologists, dealing with matrilineal societies. It 
was quickly being registered that not all matrilineal societies professed 
ignorance of the role of the father in procreation. Certain, matrilineal 
societies seemed fully acquainted with the facts of procreation.
Mother-right then is found not merely where paternity is 
uncertain but also where it is practically certain. 
Father-right on the other hand is found not merely 
where paternity is certain but also where it is uncertain 
and even where the legal father is known not to have 
begotten the children. Nay,the institution of father- 
right often requires provision for, and very generally 
permits, the procreation by other men of children for the 
nominal father. (54)
Confronted with these problems, other explanations for mother-right societies 
had to be sought; neither"primitive ignorance" nor group marriage corresponded 
adequately with the forms of evidence. 'It follows that the uncertainty of 
paternity cannot be historically the reason for the reckoning of descent 
exclusively through the mother. Some other reason must be found.' 
These 'other reasons' saw the emergence of concern with the social category 
of paternity, and with the relation between social categories and the 
facts of procreation.
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Sex and social organisation
Interestingly, the proposition of a primitive state of sexual ignorance
was retained long after the relation between the state of knowledge of
procreation and the form of family procreation had been rendered problematic<,
(56) Frazer's Totemism and Exogamy ' bears witness to why this proposition
was retained. It shows how studies of sexual knowledge and sexual 
arrangement were studies of how social groups held together. Totemism and 
Exogamy is a monument of evolutionary theory confronted with the non- 
corres-pondence between ignorance of paternity and mother-right societies<> 
It retains preoccupations characteristic of evolutionary theory by a 
double movemento The proposition that there was once a state of 'ignorance 
of procreation 1 was retained,though its consequences need not necessarily 
be descent through the mother. Its effects were also sought elsewhere, in 
other institutions and other practices. At the same time mother-right and 
father-right were theorised as absolutely distinct and internally homogeneous 
formations which could be explained by their 'social' function.
Totemism and Exogamy offered itself as a definitive examination of 
so-called primitive religion. 'Totemism' had become a focus of study in 
this period, bearing a series of similar concerns to those around the 
study of sexual regulation. 'Totemism' too was taken as an expression 
of group and therefore social bonds - a source of interrogating the nature
of social allegiance and coherence. Frazer treats a series of what might
(57) be considered discrete phenomenon under the designation 'totemism',
and attempts to explain them in relation to dominant preoccupations within
ethnology,,
Totemism, Frazer argues,functions as the source of group coherence, 
and it has its roots in primitive theories of childbirth. The Central 
Australians can be taken as exemplifying how totem groups emerge. The mode 
of determining the totem of tribe members 'rests on primitive theories of 
conception'o Ignorant of 'the true causes of childbirth', they imagine
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that a child only enters into a woman at the moment when she first 
feels it stirring in her womb. The problem is how to account for the 
fact that it enters her womb at that particular moment: this is easily 
solved, 'necessarily it has come from outside and therefore from something 
which the woman herself may have seen or felt immediately before she knew
(CQ\
herself to be with child. 1 ^ It was ignorance of the male role in 
procreation which resulted in totemism, being the primitive explanation for 
conception. In the absence of procreative categories, totemism becomes a 
mode of producing descent groups and allegiances entirely dependent on the 
mother's pregnant phantasies ':
We conclude, then, that the ultimate source of totemism 
is a savage ignorance of the physical process by which men 
and animals reproduce their kinds; in particular, it is 
an ignorance of the part played by the male in the generation 
of offspring. Surprising as such ignorance may seem to the 
civilised mind, a little reflection will probably convince 
us that, if mankind has indeed evolved from lower forms of 
animal life, there must have been a period in the history 
of our race when ignorance of paternity was universal among 
men. The part played by the mother in the production of 
offspring is obvious to the senses but cannot be perceived 
even by the animals; but the part played by the father is far 
less obvious and indeed is a matter of inference only not of 
perception. (60)
Fra: er asserts that totemism cannot be thought of as the obverse of exogamy 
and in some way inseparable from it. They are historically distinct. 
'Conceptional totemism 1 is a very early form of social grouping, 
resulting from ignorance of paternity, itself an effect of unregulated 
sexual intercourse. Exogamy however has other origins - origins in a 
"bastard imitation of science", preventing the possibility of inbreeding. 
This much he claims, Morgan had already correctly ascertained, and further 
asserts that the impulse towards incest must have been very great indeed.
But while these structures may be radically different in their origin 
and function, it is the coincidence of the requirements of exogamy and 
totemism which could be mobilised as an explanation for the universal 
precedence of descent through the female rather than the male line. For,
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first of all, uncertainty of paternity and its concomitant social form - 
totemism - would be premised on loose marriage alliances. Alliance would 
be given by the totemic group. Meanwhile, however, exogamy as a basic 
structure preventing incest begins to arise quite early in human history*
According to Frazer, the most primitive form of exogamy is a two class
(62) 
system, the division of a tribe or group into two basic, exogamous, groups,,
If there was descent through the male line, then the son would belong to 
the father's totemic group and not the mother's. If this was the case, then 
the son would not be barred from incest with his mother, since he would not 
belong to the same totem group and it is only members of the same totem group 
who are barred from sexual intercourse. Only if there is descent through 
the mother and her totem will incest between the mother and son be 
prohibited, and this is the form of incest which Frazer assumes is most 
likely to evoke horror.
Frazer's position, steeped in all the errors of speculative evolutionism, 
combines the preoccupations with primitive theories of conception and with 
mother-right. Typically he places the problem of paternity and knowledge 
as a determining factor in social and sexual organisation,, But he does 
not presuppose a unilateral correspondence between this ignorance and 
mother-right. Father-right he asserts is an option from the earliest 
moments of human history; it is however a social system with no necessary 
biological referent. It would be possible for example to account for the 
emergency father-right by the widespread custom of bride capture. This 
he argues would tend to generate an ideology of the wife as possession. 
Then as a 'natural' consequence, it would be a small step to conceiving 
of her offspring as possessionso However, in general Frazer adheres to the 
universal precedence of mother-right over father-right, and suggests that 
other motives for the transition must be sought. The solution which Frazer 
finds for this transition is again typical of the preoccupations of this
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period. He suggests that it is the development of private property 
which provides the necessary motor for the transition from mother-right to 
father-right. This speculation on the 'facts' of procreation in the 
determination of kinship forms begins to reveal some of the issues which 
the study of kinship were made to bear. The hypotheses of a state of 
primitive promiscuity and a state of group marriage, far from simple 
inversions of Victorian moral prejudices, were constructs resulting from 
a distinct series of preoccupations. The radical differences of familiaJ 
organisation which mother-right societies seemed to present were initially 
brought under concerns with the mental development of the human race. Was 
it perhaps the intellectual appreciation of the 'facts of procreation' - 
originally obscured - which both marked mankind out from the animals and, 
to some extent, accounted for transitions in human development? Around 
this trajectory clustered a number of different emphases or traditions; we 
have so far seen those of the idea of sexually differentiated principles in 
human history, and that of instinctual renunciation - the abandonment of the 
sensual for the intellectual -
Against this preoccupation with the intellectual advance of mankind, an 
alternative series of concerns emerged around the consideration of the facts 
of procreation, concerns exemplified in Frazer's muddled amalgamation of 
the two strands. The rejection of correspondence between states of sexual 
ignorance and mother-right societies resulted in the formulation of the 
quest for the'social' function of kinship forms. A dominant consideration 
here was that of the role of the history of private property. A brief 
examination of this will again reveal both how kinship was the focus of 
problems on the nature of the social and how certain modes of explanation 
came to dominate.
Paternity and Private Property 
While ethnographic evidence was making it difficult to hold onto any necessary
connection between ignorance of paternity and mother-right societies, 
paternal rights were far from abandoned in accounts of the evolution of 
femilial forms. Writers frequently returned to an idea partially explored 
by McLennan and Morgan, the idea of a sentimental and economic active for 
the overthrow of mother-right. There are two related reasons for this. 
One is that there is a conflation between individual and paternal rights, 
and the other is that given this conflation, speculation on the emergence 
of paternal rights was taken as a source of speculation on the emergence of 
individual property rights.
In so far as an explanation was required by evolutionary theory for the 
transition from mother-right to father-right, almost without exception it 
was agreed to be the effect of the accumulation of property-
The chief agency in effecting the transition from 
mother-kin to father-kin would appear to have been 
a general increase in material prosperity bringing 
with it a large accession of private property to indivi- 
duals. For it is when a man has much to bequeath to his 
heirs that ho becomes sensible of the natural inequity, 
as it now appears to him, of a system of kinship which 
obliges hir to transmit all his goods to his sister's 
children and none to his own. Hence it is with the 
great development of private property that devices 
for shifting descent from the female to the male line 
most commonly originates. (63)
What is assumed here is the natural authority of the male and the 
'rights' connected with blood ties. Once property begins to be accumulated, 
authority will be undermined since property will pass into the hands of 
the mother's kin. Inheritance of name and descent group through the 
mother is no real challenge to this male authority compared with the 
terrible indignity which a man suffers seeing his property pass, not to 
his genetic offspring, but to his wife's family. Primitive Property. 
summarising various theories, agrees that there is no necessary connection 
between ignorance of paternity and mother-right. There was however a 
consistent notive for the overthrew of n;other-right societies. This was
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the habit, deeply offensive to Western sensibilities, of inheritance 
through the mother's line, An illustration'still more abhorrent to 
our feelings'of the alien character of the father is given by 
Mr. J. G. Calbreath as occurring within his cwn experience among the 
Tahl-tan of British Columbia.
"Kinship" he says "so far as marriage or inheritance of 
property goes, is with the mother exclusively; and the 
father is not considered a relative by blood. At 
his death his children inherit none of his property, 
which all goes to the relatives on his mother's side. 
Even though a man's father or his children may be 
starving, they would get none of his property at 
his death"o Quoted by Dawson, Annual report of the 
Geological Survey Canada 188?) (64)
The possibility that children would be the beneficiaries of wealth- 
transmitted from their mother's brother is completely neglected. The 
woman as locus of transmission of property is totally suppressed; the 
all-important bond is that between the father and his biological offspring. 
Thus the awful prospect of a father deprived of the right to pass the fruits 
of his labour to the fruits of his loins, must constitute a 'sentimental 
and economic motive for the overthrow of mother-right'. (65)
In the progress of culture property of one kind cr 
another began to be accumulated... The children of a man 
who owned property would during his life-time share in 
its advantages. On the occasion of his death religion 
required much of it to be abandoned to the deceased. 
Under mother-right the children had the mortification 
to see what remained pass away from them, to their 
father's relations (ie his sister)- (66)
A natural psychological drive of paternity to ensure inheritance cf 
property by genetic offspring is assumed here. This will become the 
predominant explanation for the development of patriarchy and the 'defeat 
of women 1 , particularly in popularising accounts of anthropology. The 
ideas were formative for Havelock Ellis 1 account of human sexual development:
It was undoubtedly on the rock cf property that the 
status of women and the organisation on which it rested 
mother-right/ usually splito At first property was 
distributed at death among the members of an ever-lessening 
circle of kindred. As a man's possessions became more
- 90 -
extensive, and also as paternity tended to become
more certain, it began to appear unreasonable that
his children should be disinherited, (6?)
The psychologistic form of explanation, hidden in many of the writings 
becomes explicit in some accounts of the development of familial forms. 
Bertrand Russell mobilises it as one element in the development of human 
morality - the element which led to the enforcement of female virtue and 
morality:
As soon as the physiological fact of paternity is 
recognised, a quite new element enters into paternal 
feeling, an element which has led almost everywhere 
to the creation of patriarchal societies. As soon 
as a father recognises that the child is, as the 
Bible says, his 'seed', his sentiment towards the 
child is reinforced by two factors, the love of 
power and the desire to survive deatho (68)
What was it, then, that was at stake in insisting on this motivation 
in evolutionary accounts of the family? Closer examination reveals that 
this motivation was a crucial element in both the theorisation of the 
earliest forms of property holding and in the violent divisions as to 
whether collective possession preceded individual possession.
There were almost as many theories on the first forms of property as 
there were writers on the subject. Some thought property arose from 
warfare and practices of conquest; others from a gradual but spontaneous 
growth of individualism by which the individual gradually differentiated 
himself (always himself) from the group. Where many of the writers agreed 
however was on the coincidence between transitions in family f.orm and 
transitions in forms of property holding:
According to some authorities, the word family itself 
means property. "'The true meaning of familia is 
property; it designates the field, the house, the 
money, the slaves. As for oiros, it clearly 
presents to the mind no other idea than property or 
domicile." 9 (69)
For many the procreative family, with its requirements of inheritance by 
genetic offspring was synonymous with individual property interests.
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When the transition from a hunting state to a 
pestoral and agricultural state is finally 
accomplished, moveable property takes on a 
familial if not individual character. (70)
It is this which explains why theories of paternal rights retained 
a crucial importance. For the way in which procreative family forms came 
to be recognised was taken as a vital element in the account of the history 
of property and social relations,, The sentimental and economic motive for 
the overthrow of mother-right and the establishment of patriarchy was seen 
by some as the process by which the collectivity or clan gradually breaks 
down into individual, that is procreative, units. It is the history of the 
triumph of individual interests over the collectivity:
The moral direction of this slow transformation is 
evident; it proceeds from a communism more or less 
extensive to individualism; from the clan, where all 
is solidarity, to the family and the individual, having 
their own interests, which are as distinct as possible 
from those other families and other individuals. Each 
one has endeavoured to get for himself as large a share 
as possible of that which was formerly held in common; 
each man has aimed at obtaining a more and more exclusive 
right over property, wife and children. From these 
appetites, more economic than ethereal have at length 
proceeded the patriarchal family, monogamy, and familial 
property, and later individual property. (?l)
What is interesting about such schemas is the extent to which the 
organisation of patriarchal familial relations, 'exclusive possession of 
wife and children 1 is related to ownership of property. So much so is 
this the case, that some of the theories even include the individual 
appropriation of women from out of the morass of 'sexual communism' as a 
vital and formative element in the acquisition of individualistic appetites. 
Thus practices like wife capture and its supposed modification, wife
purchase, are seen as practices which would instil a sense of private
(72)
ownership. One writer insisted that patriarchy emerged as a result
of practices which subjected women and lead to their being considered as 
forms of movable property - ra.pe and bridge capture. Female 'inferiority' 
could therefore be explained by marriage - an institution designed by men 
to bring women into subjection.
The whole hypothesis of a state of 'sexual communism 1 , not just 
property in common, but wives in common too, points to the extent family 
rights and property rights were taken to be part of the same history; so 
much so that, for the evolutionary schemas, property was the privileged 
explanation of the forces which led to the dissolution of mother-right 
societies. Kovelevsky summarised the dominant explanations with an account 
of the multiple determinants on the transition frcmmother-right to father- 
right :
This evolution was accomplished under three different 
pressures. By the factor of a spontaneous transition - 
the increasingly stable bonds established between partners. 
Then comes the creation of a definite power attributed to 
the husband who, in the beginning will exercise the role 
of protector for the woman, previously devolved upon the 
brother. Finally the totally recent authority of the 
father over his children will give the foundations for 
the edifice of the new patriarchal family 0 (73)
But despite the interdependence of these factors, it is the accumulation 
of private property which provides the motor for recognition of paternity 
and this paternity is not necessarily a biological fact, but a social 
recognition through marriage:
The husband was only recognised by the law as father 
of all the children created by the wife on the day when 
private property was perfectly instituted. The wife 
belonged to him by right of property and with her, all 
the fruit of her entrails. (74)
Paternal rights, then are taken to be synonymous with individual property 
'rights', that is, they involved a subject of possession with the capacity to 
calculate and dispose of the labour power of others and to dispense with 
property to genetic offspring.
We can draw some conclusions from the centrality of paternity in these 
discussions. Primarily, explanations of the emergence of the paternal, 
that is, procreative, family were explanations for the emergence of 
individual property rights 0 These arguments about the emergence of 
individual property rights worked on certain conditions. First individual 
interests were conflated with the procreative family with transmission from
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father to genetic offspring. Secondly because of the theory of work 
at the origin of private property, it became possible to 'sex 1 property 
assuming a natural division of labour between the sexes. Men created it, 
therefore property was masculine. Finally, there is an assumption of an 
essential male psychology which seeks power through genetic self-perpetua- 
tion. It is this which in many accounts is the motor for the break up 
of former collective society into individual units.
The unchanging form of the procreative family; other explanations of 
mother-right
If a history of the emergence of the patriarchal family was the bearer of 
a number of considerations, what can be said of those proponents of the 
eternal nature of the procreative family, usually under paternal dominance? 
And what was the relations between the apparently antagonistic positions: 
the eternal procreative family on the one hand and the primacy of primitive 
promiscuity or mother-right on the other?
The opponents of the theory of universal transition from mother-right 
to father-right, the supporters of the uninterrupted development of the 
procreative unit, were not exempt from problems raised by the issues of 
paternity. Just as the conflation of ignorance of paternity with mother- 
right was increasingly untenable for some groups, the evidence of some 
societies neglecting paternity was also inescapable for the propounders 
of the natural procreative unit. But the solutions found to this problem 
were not entirely different from the solutions found by their opponents to 
their own problems. In both strands of thought we find a notion of kinship 
as a social function. And that social function is also predominantly 
theorised as an effect of economic considerations.
After an initial unwillingness to acknowledge the widespread evidence 
for the neglect of fatherhood in some societies, the upholders of the 
unchanging procreative family explained mother-right as a structural solution
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to contradictions within property and territorial relations,,
Tylor was among the first to refute the significance of a state of 
ignorance of paternity:
o.othe human race is by some conjectured to have existed 
at first in this state of pristine ignorance, before 
they reasoned out the fact that they were related to their 
fathers as well as their mothers. To this theory of a 
legist a zoologist would probably reply that mutual 
recognition and* kindnsss between male and female parents 
and their offspring appear too far down in the animal 
world for rudimentary ideas of paternity to be accounted 
a human discovery. As for peoples with the range of 
our knowledge, not only are ideas of parentage, much the 
same the world over,but, so far as can be ascertained, all 
languages have words denoting kinsfolk both in male and 
female lines, which implies that kinship in both^ lines is 
taken account of. (75)
Tylor defends the primacy of the patriarchal family unit specifying that he 
simply means by this, membership of family, clan succession and inheritance 
through the father's line. Evidence for this is to be drawn from zoology 
with its account of the life of the primates:
So familiar to us are patriarchal family institutions, 
that they need only be referred to as belonging to 
common knowledge. Prom their well-known features, their 
principle of formation is seen to be due to the relative 
position of the parents. The father as defender or 
leader has control over the family, formed of the wife 
he has taken and their children, so that descent from him 
tends to become the main tie of kinship, and inheritance of 
his property and succession to his authority is guided along 
the male lines 0 (76)
While Tylor hotly disputed that the matriarchal system might be a simple 
inversion of this family system, he also rejects the contention that the 
maternal family might be an effect of moral laxity or 'sexual communism';
'the matriarchal family system is one framed for order not disorder'
(77)(my emphasis)» The maternal system is a practical solution to a
practical problem, just as exogamy is:
..o the two great regulations of early civilisation,
matriarchy and exogamy, have nothing about them fantastic
or outrageous, absurd, but are the practical outcome of
the practical purposes of people like-minded with ourselves. (78)
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The practical problem which the maternal family is said to solve is caused 
by a double movement. First there is the requirement for exogamy which 
according to Tylor has nothing to do with the prevention of incest for 
either sentimental or moral reasons, or for a practical reason like 
natural selection. For him, the reason for exogamy is entirely political; 
it is the regulation of relations between groups; 'the reason for exogamy
is not moral but political... the purpose of systematic intermarriage between
(79) clans is to bind them, together in peace and alliance.' Second, however,
the circumstances under which this form of political alliance takes place 
become more and more problematic as civilisation advances. Populations 
become more dense and settled, they develop more delimited property and 
territory: 'families and clans have more defined property and interests'. 
The effect of these material circumstances is to raise most serious 
questions for the manner in which intermarriage takes place. In these 
circumstances the wife can either remain in her own home (matrifocal 
residence) or remove to her husband's (patrifocal residence). Of the 
first,Tylor can se^ the evident advantages. The bride's parents would not 
lose their daughter's assistance and they would likely benefit from 
additional helpers,their grandchildren.
From this perspective, there may be advantages to the maternal 
system, but there are also some very pressing reasons for preferring 
paternal over maternal family systems. For, going as it does against the 
'natural' procreative unit, the maternal system would be under severe stress:
The instinctive attraction which shapes the paternal 
family among the higher mammals continually reasserts 
itself, while the maternal husband emancipates himself 
from his inferior position whenever the social pressure 
is removed and he can become a paternal husband. (8l)
The practice of bride-capture is taken as evidence of the husband's resistance to 
matrifocal residence, and the practice of payment to the bride's father is 
even more compelling evidence of the emergence of an amicable solution to 
the requirements of a paternal husband. They represent, 'the various modes
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of overcoming resistance of the family to being despoiled of their 
daughters.' '
There are several factors at play producing Tylor's explanation. A 
procreative referent is assumed underlying mankind's sexual behaviour. 
Exogamy is assumed to have a political function. Descent is seen as an 
effect of power in which power is associated with the ownership of property 
and persons. Kinship alliances are an expression not only of political 
alliances but are an expression of power, understood in terms of property 
rights. The biological tie is restored not because it is this which kinship 
expresses, but because it is the unit from which everything starts. 
Therefore, until it finds some way of expression, it will place other 
institutions under strain. The movement of civilisation is towards a 
satisfaction of this biological fact without abandoning the political and 
social advantages provided by wider methods of political alliance,,
Tylor's is a clear statement of a position on the maternal family 
which was to have wide currency. For example, any number of 'practical' 
explanations for mother-right became possible once its universality and 
universal precedence had been dispensed with. Starke in The Primitive 
Family again defended the biological unit as primary, but advanced another 
practical reason for matrilinearity. Inevitably the cohesive power of 
families would resist losing rather than acquiring members. This 
unwillingness would coincide with the independent, roaming habits of men 
in early societies:
Since men are more independent they are also less 
stationary. They can no longer attract women to 
themselves and are therefore attracted by them. 
Under such cases, there is nothing astonishing in 
the fact that children are named after the mother's 
tribe or clan, which is the case in all the instances.. e 
of people among whom the husband has to settle down 
with his father in law. (83)
Here habits of taking the mother's name and inheritance passing through the 
women's line are given quite mundane explanations. They result frcm the
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fact that the place of residence is all important in forming the most 
lasting affections and loyalties. Here, all inheritance preferences 
are conscious decisions motivated by emotional attachments:
Owing to the faculty of memory, childhood and youth 
involve a young man in such a web of associations 
that he finds it hard to detach himself from thenu 
The man, who, when married, has lived as a stranger of 
another clings to the impressions of his former home, 
and his earlier household companions become his heirs. 
But the brother who has wandered elsewhere stands in 
a more remote relation to his sister than do the 
sisters and the children living with her in the 
parental home, and he is therefore excluded from 
inheritance. (84)
Westermarck, the most systematic upholder of the fundamental nature of
the procreative unit also favoured the place of residence as an influence
on systems of descent. But for Westermarck,there is a problem with Starcke's
notion of inheritance: 'If father and son stayed together, then inheritance
(85) and succession would go naturally from one to another 1 . If this
natural bond would outweigh the effective bonds of childhood, then some 
other reason for the son's allegiance to the matrifocal home must be 
sought. This might be the magical quality sometimes attributed to names 
by 'primitive' peoples. Thus the practice of recognising someone of the 
same name as a close relative (even though there may be no relationship) 
points to a power invested in names. Westermarck can therefore conclude 
that it is indeed the practice of matrifocal residence which would produce 
matrilineal inheritance but that this would be dictated not by preference 
of affections but because of the practice of taking the name of a residence 
group.
We are confronted with a common tendency, across the various antagonistic 
interpretations of the history of the family, to treat kinship as an effect
of other social functions, instead of or as well as a procreative referent.
(86) An article entitled 'No Paternity' which appeared in Man, in 1918
summarised the implications of this tendency which had emerged so much 
around the problem of paternity. neglect of paternity could have several
reasons. It could be the result of an ignorance contingent on a
state of sexual communism; or, and this is the author's preferred solution,
it could be that,
the natives do know the truth or have known it (perhaps 
not all of them), but that a dogma contradicting such 
knowledge has been established by the animistic philosophy, 
and has succeeded in repressing it and even, in many cases, 
expelling it from consciousness. (8?)
Arguing against logical thought as the only basis to knowledge it can be 
shown that these societies do understand the relation between mating and 
childbirth. The doctrine of 'no paternity' could be the result of 
repression for a definite function, and animistic explanations of child- 
birth seem like displacements of-some original element. Two possible 
motives for this repression can instantly be supplied. One could be to 
ensure that maternal descent is strictly upheld. The matrilineal 
Trobrianders, studied by Malinowski, have
an obvious motive for the denial of male co-operation in
the generation of children, namely the strictness of the
matrimonial system. The system requires that the husband
of a woman shall be in no way related to her children, and
that is precisely what the doctrine of no paternity secures. (88)
The other motive might be a defense of the "extreme licentiousness of 
primitive peoples". The 'truth' would be 'in conflict with native habits 
and impulses. Hence among the Northern tribes of Australia...missionaries 
found that incredulity as to the physiology of childbirth hindered an 
improvement of morals.' What is of interest is not the content of 
these formulations (both of which are illogical), but what is designated 
'the problem' and its solut.ion. The problem is disavowal of paternity: the 
explanations are the social interests which might cause the repression of 
this fact.
Paternity and Political Divisions
¥e have seen how the discussion of the recognition of paternity and the
procreative family in fact condensed general preoccupations about the nature
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of the sexual and social regulation of the early human group. The 
division between those who argued for the thorough-going transformation 
of the human family, from sexual communism to patriarchal monogamy, and 
those who argued for the unchanging nature of the paternal family in fact 
grew more vitriolic, transforming itself by the 1920's into a recognisable 
issue. Briffault, writing in the Frankfurt school's journal, 
summarised the issues which had divided anthropology. An enormous 
amount of discussion and controversy, he declared, had taken place with 
reference to the origin of the family. The divisions had resulted over 
divisions about the nature of the original form of human association:
In harmony with the sentiments centring around its 
importance as 'the foundation of society', the group (ie the 
family) has commonly been regarded as representing the 
original foundation of human association also that is, as 
the first form of social group. One of the conclusions 
to which the extent and analysis of ethnographical knowledge 
during the period of its active growth led such students as 
 ylor, Morgan, McLennan, Robertson Smith, Frazer, Letourneau, 
Kohler was that the family group does not exist in lower 
cultures. More recently many writers in social anthropology, 
such as Westermarck, Malinowski, Lowie,Kohler and others 
have however devoted their activities to interpreting 
ethnographical facts so as to retain the conception that the 
paternal family has been from the first the foundation and 
nucleus of social organisation. (91)
Briffault goes on to suggest that there is much more at stake than simply 
an argument over the extent of regulation of the first human groups; it 
is the interpretation of social history in its entirety. What elements 
are accepted as "givens" in the development of civilisation? If certain 
elements like monogamy and acquisitiveness are accepted as "givens" what 
does this mean about the possibility of change?
Upon the view taken concerning depends the conception 
of the entire course of social history and of the 
factors which have been at work through the process. 
If it be supposed that the family in much the same form 
as it is now found in Christian European society, has 
existed from the first, or from a very early stage of 
social history, it must then be postulated that all the 
social phenomena, relations and institutions which are 
indissolubly connected with that form of social group 
are likewise coeval with social origins, (92)
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If existing social forms are taken as unchanging, then all extant 
social forms of political, economic and social power can be thought 
to be originary:
The principle of private property giving a man individual 
rights over his wife and children, and setting a precedent 
for all other forms of personal ownership must be regarded 
as having been fully developed from the beginning. The 
principle of authority, giving the male head of the family 
power over his wife, transforming her on marriage from her 
home to his, and bestowing upon him the like possessive 
claims over his children, must be supposed to have been 
established in the most primitive societies and to have 
been ready to blossom out into all other forms of 
authoritarian power. (93)
What is at stake here is that original social formations are seen as 
'individualistic 1 groupings, consisting of heads of the family in which 
every male member has rights of property and authority to defend. By 
virtue of the principle of patriarchal authority, society would be a 
collection of these units under the dominance of one or more patriarchs., 
Such a position rules out the possibility that the existing distribution 
of power and authority is the end-product of a definite history and is 
therefore transitory:
The social historian who holds the view that paternal 
families existed from the first and const_tuted the 
foundation of human society will not have to enquire 
into the origin of the above principles. He will not 
be concerned with tracing the evolution of marriage 
institutions, of systems of sexual morality, of 
sentiments of pudicity,which are intended to safeguard 
them. It will be superfluous for him to study the 
rise of individual economic power. He will have no 
difficulty in accounting for the authority of the 
state or its representatives. For all the elements of 
a fully individualistic economic society, similar in 
all essentials to those of Western civilisation will be 
by his hypothesis, present aborigine* (94)
According to Briffault the assumption of the unchanging nature of the 
paternal family is considerably more than simply an assertion of the 
inescapability of the procreative unit, it is a defence of the status quo.
It is interesting in this context to listen to Westermarck's bewilder-
(qc) ment contronted with a very similar attack on his work. Westermarck 1 s
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ideas on the paternal family are attacked here as a product of Victorian 
prejudice; in suggesting that monogamy prevailed amongst our earliest 
ancestors,
he was able to provide nineteenth century civilisation 
with an absolute that justified in perpetuity one of its main institutions. The family thus became an institution that radicals could no longer assail. No 
evolution in society could eradicate it. Neither could 
monogamy be attacked since it was rooted in man's primeval past, and was part of what Westermarck calls the "monogamous instinct".. 0 His doctrines supplied a 
need of the time, a protection against...doctrines that threatened middle class supremacy in the field of ethics 
and economics... they became at once part of the cultural defense of the era. (96)
Westermarck in response can only offer indignation; his 'scientific' approach 
surely cannot be accused of ideological bias?
Again, Dr. Briffault's and Mr. Calverton's allegations that I have attempted to support certain moral doctrines 
where I should have aimed at scientific truth alone, 
cannot be substantiated by a single line in my book. drew my conclusions from the material which I had collected without any preconceived opinion, and when I had formed a provisional theory I endeavoured to take heed of every fact that seemed to contradict. The method I learned from Darwin's Life and Letters ..<> (9?)
Clearly by this stage in the debate, a great deal was at stake in these 
divergences; Briffault summed up the differences as a radical and 
incompatible division between conceptions of 'social history and the scope, 
principles and methods of social sciences'. Those who uphold the 
original nature of the paternal family in fact view every phenomenon in the 
light of that original hypothesis» This struggle over the original nature 
of the human group became important in political theory. The socialist 
tradition in general threw its weight behind the hypothesis of radical 
transformations in familial organisation - a commitment which will be 
explored more fully in Chapters five and six. Socialist imagery of the 
period was full of democratic 'maternal' communism in opposition to 
individualistic patriarchal capitalism. While positions on the originary 
form of society were not exclusively found with their corresponding 
political position, that they should have been adopted so ferociously
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indicates two interesting features. On the one hand it confirms that 
kinship studies were still very much within the terms of reference of 
political theory. They were addressed often to solve problems of the 
articulation of various instances of society and to make general statements 
about the forms of relations between humans in groups. That the family 
should have been such a central problem .shows clearly that the family 
had become central and sensitive object of political concern. Secondly, 
it indicates how the original form which groups took had become crucial to 
saying something about their essential form. Even for those who argued 
fiercely for the transitoriness of familial relations, the aim was to 
establish that these relations were transitory 0
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Conclusion
Violent divisions between forms of explanation obscures common aspects in 
these early debates about kinship. It obscures, for example, th^ fact 
that both sides thought that the original form and subsequent development 
of kinship would reveal the nature of social and political alliances 
themselves. However much the significance of the procreative family 
was disputed, it was agreed that elements within kinship - a,s distinct 
from the procreative family - were explicable by their function for other 
social or political exigencies of a given human group,,
In this agreement, an agreement which even the anti-evolutionists 
sometimes shared, there begins a period of systematic blindness to the 
specificity of sexual regulations. This blindness is paradoxical since 
these studies seem to treat not much else. But various hidden assumptions 
are made which resulted in dominant interpretations of kinship, First 
there is an agreement that alliances made through kinship, for example 
marriage, have only one function. This function will be the same within 
and across all cultures. It is as if marriage had an essence which could 
be abstracted from all cultures; divisions simply concerned what the 
history or function of that practice was. Secondly, because of this 
assumption, sexual regulation becomes one of 'the determined' aspects of 
social forms. It becomes an element of the 'cultural' level of society, 
here referring to systems of beliefs, language, artistic practice,religion 
etc. It is separated conceptually from the real 'material' elements of 
society - the economy, property relations, the division of labour, and in 
many instances becomes reducible to these aspects. It is in this context 
that property relations became a privileged moment of explanations of 
kinship relationso
The aim of characterising these debates thus is not to suggest that 
kinship relations are perhaps determinant social forms, (as did various 
theorists reacting to early forms of reductionism). ^ ' Here the aim is
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simply to draw attention to how a dominant form of theorisation emerged 
which in fact evaded dealing with the specificity of its own subject.
In the following chapter an account will be offered about how and 
why this non-theorisation of the specificity of a 'cultural 1 level was 
a problem. For it will demonstrate how sexual relations at the heart 
of kinship studies were hegemonised by definitions drawn from other 
disciplines. These definitions inscribed a notion of the natural which 
has compromised attempts to theorise the specific form of cultural relations.,
CHAPTEK THREE
SEX ANTAGONISM: THEORIES OP SEX IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
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Introduction
The previous chapter traced how discussions revolved around a study of 
kinship as a social practice. It is a practice which is assumed to be 
based on the regulation of sexual reproduction. It is clear that in so 
far as these theories deal with sex, it is as an element in reproduction; 
either an element which instinctively belongs to the function of 
reproduction or which has to be forced towards it. A major determinant 
on this emphasis was the influence of theories from 'natural history' 
though not in the ways usually assumed.
The theorisation of reproduction owed much to biological arguments, 
even in those writers who did not explicitly espouse'the. man among the 
other animals'^ ' argument. But to simply point to the centrality of 
of explanations from natural history obscures what were the particular 
definitions of sex and sexed reproduction, how they were contested, and 
the differential effects of these definitions depending on their 
coincidence with other aspects of ethnological and social theory. A 
very distinctive configuration of elements did come to dominate in 
explanations of sexed reproduction in relation to human culture.and its 
institutions, and an element in this configuration was the influence of 
natural history. The influence however was not that which is usually 
supposed. The major impact was the influence of the Darwinian notion 
of sexual selection rather than natural selection. This entered into 
combination with a rigid conception of the absolute quality of sexual 
division and with a particular notion of social determination already 
present within the social sciences. The result has been a notion of 
sexual reproduction which has long dominated the social sciences, and 
which was not fully displaced even in the critique of evolutionary theory,
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Natural Selection and Sexual Selection
In Darwin's theory of natural selection, there is little of the 
teleological character imprinted on evolutionist theories by such writers 
as Herbert Spencer. Natural selection, according to Darwin involves the 
formation and variation of the species in relation to their environment:
This preservation of favourable individual differences 
and variations, and the destruction of those which are 
injurious I have called Natural selection, or the Survival 
of the Fittest. (2)
There is however, no necessity to the form or course which evolution 
will take as a result of this variability:
Several writers have misapprehended or objected to the 
term Natural Selection. Some have even imagined that, 
natural selection induces variability, whereas it implies 
only the preservation of such variations as arise and are 
beneficial to the beings under its conditions of life. (3)
It should be recognised that what is proposed here is not a theory of 
the necessity of evolution along any given direction. It is simply the 
method by which species and sub-species multiply and undergo mutations 
in relation to their environment. Indeed the lack of teleology has 
occasionally worried commentators:
many critics have held that this is not scientific because 
the expression 'survival of the fittest' makes no predictions 
except 'what survives is fit', and so is tautologous, or an 
empty repetition of words. For example, if we ask, 'which 
are the fittest?' one answer might be 'those that survive' so 
that 'survival of the fittest' means only 'survival of the 
survivors'. (4)
The purpose of Darwin's theories was not to propose a science based on 
predictability but rather to displace notions of the species as immutable 
entities.
While there is nothing in the theory of natural selection to justify 
a teleological theory of evolution, hence no real theoretical basis for 
Darwin's appropriation by ethnocentric social evolutionists, this does not
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mean that the theory is without substance. It involves certain very 
distinctive and mutually dependent propositions, which can be summarised 
as follows. All organisms must reproduce. All organisms exhibit 
hereditary variations. Hereditary variations differ in their effect 
on reproduction. Therefore variations with favourable effects on 
reproduction will succeed, those with unfavourable effects will fail, and 
organisms will change.
In all these propositions, one element is crucial. This is 
reproduction as the means of variation of the species. Moreover it is 
sexed reproduction which, in the 'higher' organisms, is the mechanism 
of variation. Darwin assumes sexual division as the necessary element 
by which sexed reproduction takes place. 'Sexual selection'is in fact 
named as a principal motor of selection within species, entailing as it 
does, competition between individuals of the same species in order to 
kill a rival or attract the opposite sex. Hence it is the principal 
motor for the survival of the fittest,
This form of selection depends, not on a struggle for 
existence in relation to other organic beings or to 
external conditions, but on a struggle between the 
individuals of one sex, generally the males for the 
possession of the other sex. (5)
The great variation between the colour and the structure of the sexes 
within a species can be accounted for as the effect of sexual selection. 
It involves the exaggerated growth of secondary sexual characteristics, 
such as plumage etc, which are used to attract the opposite sex during 
courtship displays:
when the male and female of any animal have the same general 
habits of life, but differ in structure, colour and ornament, 
such differences have been mainly caused by sexual selection: 
that is, by individual males having had, in successive 
generations, some advantages over other males in their weapons, 
means of defense or charms, which they have transmitted to their 
male offspring alone. Yet I would not wish to attribute all 
sexual differences to this agency: for we see in domestic animals 
peculiarities arising and becoming attached to the male sex, which 
apparently have not been augmented through selection by man. (o)
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Sexual selection is not however the only source of variation as far as 
Darwin is concerned. A species varies by the modification of the offspring 
in relation to its parents, but this variation is sometimes connected with 
modifications in relation to environment, sometimes with the nature of 
the organism and not as a result of variation through sexed reproduction.
Some naturalists have maintained that all variations are 
connected with the act of sexual reproduction; but this 
is certainly an error; for I have given in another work 
a long list of...plants which have suddenly produced a single 
bud with a new and sometimes widely different character from 
that of the other buds on the same plant...we clearly see that 
the nature of the conditions is of subordinate importance in 
comparison with the nature of the organism in determining each 
particular form of variation. (?)
But while the form of variation to a large extent is given by the 
constitution of the organism, the primary motor for adaptation to 
environment, is through sexed reproduction by which mutation is made 
possible. Making this mechanism crucial, Darwin assumes sexual division, 
an assumption which fuelled debate among his contemporaries for a variety 
of raasons. Why, argued one, should the female take the place of the
fs)environment as she appears to do in the case of sexual selection. ^ '
Wallace too objected to the free choice which sexual selection seemed to
(9) attribute to female aesthetic sensibilities. v ' No, the dullness of the
female should be attributed to the need for inconspicuousness during 
incubation, whereas male splendour is 'due to the general laws of growth 
and development 1 , it being 'unnecessary to call to our aid so hypothetical 
a cause as the cumulative action of female preference.' ^ '
This constitutional account argues that exaggerated sexual difference 
are not the result of struggling against rivals, rather 'something within 
the animal determines that the male should lead and the female follow in 
the evolution of new breeds. 1 There must be something distinctive 
about the male and female cells; the female cell ensures the constancy
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of the species whereas the male reproductive cell has acquired a peculiar 
and distinctive capacity for mutation. What all these theories were 
concerned with was an explanation for the origin of sexual division and 
difference, which is simply assumed in Darwin's theories as an absolute, 
natural, distinction with a particular function in relation to a general 
structure of natural selection.
G-eddes and Thompson in the Evolution of Sex explicitly raise 
the problem of the origin of sexual division. Apart from evolutionist 
biology being in its infancy, they isolate a very real suppression of 
this question, a suppression motivated perhaps by an unscientific acceptance 
of the 'delights' of extreme sexual difference:
Darwin was, indeed, himself characteristically silent in 
regard to the origin of sex, as well as many other 'big 
lifts' in the organic series. Many however, have from time 
to time pointed out that the existence of male and female was 
a good thing. Thus We i smarm finds in sexual reproduction the 
chief if not the sole source of progressive change. Be that as 
it may at present, it is evident that a certain preoccupation 
may somewhat obscure the question of how male and female have 
in reality come to be. (12)
These debates point to the fact that Darwin's notion of sexual 
characteristics and their function did not go undisputed. 'Biological' 
explanations were not fixed, immutable categories with definite content; 
they were contested, even within the biological sciences.
However, as 'biological' theories of sex appeared in theories of 
kinship, they often appeared as ultimate explanations, beyond the realm of 
contestation and not subject to internal criticism. Thus in considerations 
of marriage and kinship, the assumed quality of sexual division constantly 
reappears. Sexual reproduction was premised on absolute sexual division 
and taken to be the activity on which other social structures operated. 
This can be seen more clearly by a consideration of the two related aspects 
of Darwinian theory - natural selection and sexual selection. The impact
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of these theories and the form which they took in studies of kinship 
can be seen to be dependent on their coincidence with other aspects o 
social theory.
The prohibition of incest
A cursory glance at debates on kinship at the turn of the century might 
reveal an overwhelming interest in the structures governing who one may 
or may not marry. Furthermore one might be forgiven for thinking that 
it was as a solution to this question as to the prohibition of incest that 
Darwinian theories were primarily brought to bear. But a closer study 
of the theories of incest-avoidance serves to demonstrate that Darwinian 
notions of natural selection did not affect kinship debates in any unilateral 
way. There were too many other elements at play in these debates for them 
to be hegemonised by one particular version of Darwin - elements corresponding 
to other discourses within and outside ethnology itself. Moreover, where 
Darwinian theories were taken up, it was by no means in a homogeneous 
fashion.
Morgan \^as one of the first to systematise the notion of natural 
selection in relation to anthropological evidence. He used it as a possible 
explanation for the emergence of the biological family and the complicated 
rules on marriage found in all human groups. For him, exogamy occurred 
as the result of a practical knowledge, acquired by human society in its 
varied progress from primitive promiscuity:
It is explainable and only explainable in its origin as a 
reformatory movement to break up the intermarriage of blood 
relatives and particularly of brothers and sisters by compelling 
them to marry out of the tribe who were constituted such as a 
band of consanguinei. It will be seen at once that with the 
prohibition of intermarriage in the tribe this result was 
finally and permanently effected. By this organisation the 
cohabitation of brothers and sisters was permanently abolished 
since they were necessarily of the same tribe whether descent 
was in the male or female line...It struck at the roots of
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promiscuous intercourse by abolishing its worst features, 
and thus became a powerful movement towards the ultimate 
realisation of marriage between single pairs and the family 
state. (13)
It will be remembered that Morgan talked of natural selection, entailing 
the survival of those peoples who practiced incest-avoidance whose brain- 
capacity was thereby greatly increased. Tylor too, accepted this solution; 
exogamy was adopted to avoid the observed ill-effects of inbreeding.
Arguments about the ill-effects of inbreeding had been met with an 
immediate barrage of criticism. In 1875, A.H.Huth had written in 
The Marriage of Hear Kin^ ' that avoidance of incest was nothing to do 
with conscious or unconscious knowledge of the ill-effects of inbreeding . 
This was primarily because there were no such effects: 'the statistics 
on which so much reliance has been placed, as a proof of the harmfulness of 
consanguineous marriage, are, when not absolutely false, miserably 
misleading and defective.' No evidence from animals, which as species 
were in-breeding groups, nor humans, of which there were many who practised 
cross-cousin marriage, suggested any direct connection between degeneracy 
and in-breeding. In fact, Huth is more concerned to prove the disasterous 
effects of marriage outside the racial group, giving 'evidence' of 
sterility and degeneracy amongst the "mulattos".
Various ethnologists supported the dismissal of the degeneracy/incest 
equation. In 1927, Briff ault was still having to argue that 'attempts to 
substantiate the belief that inbreeding is harmful have resulted in complete 
failure'. ' Lord Raglan, too, in Jocasta's Grime (1929) was still 
contesting these ideas, arguing that none of the tribes which practice 
consanguineous marriage could be proved to be less healthy or mentally 
advanced than those which practiced a rigorous taboo in both lines of 
descent:
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In no case has disease or debility resulted from inbreeding... 
There are no stronger upholders of the incest taboo than those 
very Australian tribes who believe the child has no physical 
connection with the father. (l?)
The positions from which natural selection was taken as a valid explanation 
for marriage prohibition were varied. Westermarck suggested an 
instinctual aversion to incest, in the service of a bastard imitation 
of science. This was attacked by many, including Frazer who berated 
Westermarck for an unadulterated application of Darwin without considering
(is)the things which make men, men. ^ ' Yet having argued that an 
instinctual aversion would in fact be witness to the instinct having once 
been very strong, Frazer himself then goes on to agree in an extraordinarily 
patronising fashion that exogamy may well correspond to an unconscious 
mimicry of science:
egregiously wrong as they were in theory, they appear to have 
been fundamentally right in practice. What they abhorred 
was really evil, and what they preferred was really good. 
Perhaps we may call their curious system an unconscious mimicry 
of science. The end which it accomplished was wise though the 
thoughts of the men who invented it were foolish. In acting as 
they did, these poor savages blindly obeyed the impulse of the 
great evolutionary forces which in the physical world are 
constantly educing higher out of lower forms of existence and 
in the moral world civilisation out of savagery. If that is so, 
exogamy has been an instrument in the hands of that unknown 
power, that masked wizard of history who by some mysterious 
process, some subtle alchemy, so often transmutes in the 
crucible of suffering the dross of folly and evil into the 
fine gold of wisdom and good. (19)
What is interesting about this preoccupation is that it combines a 
biological account with what has subsequently been designated a functional 
account. Marriage prohibitions are in the service of some other force, 
in this case the force which accidently prevents biological inbreeding. 
In terms of how marriage is theorised, the form of explanation is not 
so very different from that which saw marriage regulations as having a 
political function, that of consolidating relations between groups. The 
point was that unquestioned as the axis by which these structures could work
was sexual reproduction premised on absolute sexual division and expressed
in marriage.
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Side by side with this combination of Darwinian theory and 
functional explanations, there existed another rather different 
interpretation of incest-avoidance,that characterised by Durkheim. 
Here incest avoidance was related to primitive modes of thought, in 
particular religious thought which itself arose from social structures. 
For Durkheim the clue to incest avoidance lay in another taboo practiced 
by some savages, the isolation of menstrual women. Both are to be 
understood as a prohibition against spilling and therefore seeing the blood 
of your own totem group. This would amount to an act of cannibalism. In 
England, Jocasta's Grime was written from a broadly similar perspective. 
What irritated Lord Raglan as much as theories of natural selection 
underlying exogamy, was the functionalism which this often accompanied. 
Functional explanations of religion which assumed either a residual or 
historical expressivity, or the mystification of other social practices 
were hopeless. They assumed criteria of thought and action totally alien 
to our own society. Firstly, why should rituals arise as a commemoration 
of a real historical event:
It would be impossible to find in England a sane man or even 
mad man who would plunge an arrow into his eye in order to 
commemorate the Battle of Hastings, yet this is the kind of 
thing which the savage is supposed to spend his life doing. (2l)
Secondly there is no reason why religious practices and superstitions 
should arise from political and economic functions. Are we to believe that,
If the law as to dog licenses continues in force, people 
will come to believe that to take out a dog license is an 
infallible means of securing the favour of the Deity or 
defeating the machinations of the evil one, and that a dog 
for which there is no license in force will inevitably die 
of distemper. (22)
The whole system of explanation of incest-prohibition combining natural 
selection and functionalism offends Raglan. Why should certain practices 
and beliefs, like marriage and religion, always be explained by reference 
to some other, 'material' function:
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The chief tenet held by the followers of this system and one 
which makes the scientific study of social origins and 
developments impossible, is that any one who can invent 
a plausible excuse for a silly custom has not only justified 
but completely explained that custom. (23)
Raglan's solution to incest-avoidance is not similar to Durkheim's. He claims, 
it is motivated by religious superstition which dictates that it is 
harmful to have sexual intercourse with anyone who lives on the same side 
of the stream as yourself. This apparently "irrational" conclusion is 
premised on Raglan's insistence that religious forms of thought and 
superstitions do themselves construct social practices and are not 
necessarily the effect of other material social practices. It was 
motivated by a rigourous rejection of "rationalist" explanations which are 
in fact simply an imposition of Western rationality.
Differences in theories of incest-avoidance serve to demonstrate 
that there was no simple way in which Darwinian notions became the dominant 
form of explanation of these practices. Themes.of incest-avoidance touched 
on, and contributed to, too many other discourses and considerations 
outside social sciences for any explanation to go uncontested. For the same 
reason, where Darwinian ideas of natural'^election were mobilised as 
explanations, they were by no means simply mobilised to bolster reactionary 
political arguments about primitive and advanced races.
At one level, stressing hereditary and species, the theory of natural 
selection fuelled growing racialist doctrines which took races as sub- 
divisions of the human species, some being designated as more advanced than 
others. But the application of the theory of natural selection to the 
phenomena of incest-avoidance created a whole series of contradictions. 
There was for example a contradiction between that interpretation which 
stressed the necessity for groups (eg. an exogamous tribe)to marry outside 
themselves, and racialist arguments which stressed the imperative for the 
race to remain pure. The racialist tendency was further complicated with
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the consolidation of eugenicist arguments which stressed the damaging 
effects of hereditary, and in many cases argued that only the 'healthy' 
should breed. ' As with racialist arguments, the eugenicists tended 
to see breeding outside the group more damaging than a healthy, vigorous 
in-breeding stock. What is interesting about these contradictions is the 
confusions over the terms of family, social group and race. Morgan took 
the crudely ethnocentric view that Western society is advanced because 
the taboo-on-incest operated there exercises the most effective bar on in- 
breeding. For the theorists who were more subtle, the problem of defining 
where an exogamous social group ended and a species began proved to be 
rather difficult.
The extent to which eugenicist arguments were present in political 
debates of this period is only just beginning to be fully appreciated. It 
is clear however that intervention in family practices and sexuality was 
considered a highly important object of social regulation and this applies 
both for the left and the right. surprisingly then theories of 
the effects of breeding and hereditary were not to pass in any uncontested 
way into usage in social sciences.
only were eugenicist and racialist arguments crucially interested 
in, and contributed to debates as to the marriage regulations of cultural 
groups, but the question of incest-avoidance was one which was also at the 
centre of some violent social controversies of that period. Problems of 
extreme poverty and urban overcrowding finally began to assert themselves 
in the latter half of the nineteenth century. The image which seems to 
have haunted the literature on housing reform and provoked extreme horror 
in the middle-classes was the spectre of incest among the working classes. 
It is interesting to see that the terms in which various reports on the 
immorality entailed in overcrowding has distinct resonances with some of the 
debates referred to in these chapters. Reports referred to 'promiscuous
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C25 ) (26) herding'^ ' 'relapses to the wild man'^ , 'the promiscuous ways in
(27)
which families herd together', ' and 'families styed together in the
(28) promiscuous intimacy of cattle.'^ ' The horror of this 'moral
degradation' was a strong element both in the development of social policy 
on housing and on the development of philanthropic activities.
Finally, the same period in question was also witness to a struggle
over the redefinition of incest laws. Historically, incest had been 'an
(29) ecclesiastical not a criminal offense'. ' Incest in other words was a
sin, and the church prohibited sexual intercourse between persons related 
either by blood or by marriage (affinity). Since the Reformation marriage 
with a deceased wife's sister or with a deceased husband's brother had been 
illegal. An act of Queen Mary's had legalised marriage with the deceased 
husband's brother but not with a deceased wife's sister. In 1835 a bill had 
been brought in the House of Lords to legalise this form of marriage and for 
the next seventy years this was a hotly contended issue. Jeffrey Weeks 
has suggested that this debate bore witness to tensions between residual 
kinship forms and the construction of new domestic relations throughout the 
nineteenth century;
there was in force in England from the Restoration 
to the early twentieth century a system of marriage 
that approved cousin marriage and discouraged marriage 
to affines (that is, inter alia, the deceased wife's 
sister). The established system conceived of marriage 
as an act of incorporation which maintained social status, 
it kept the family name from being lost and the family 
property from being distributed. The other system stressed 
that alliances could be maintained by remarriage and could 
be used to improve social standing. Inevitable conflicts 
developed. The law upheld the first system as long as the 
aristocracy were supreme. The ban against marriage to a 
deceased wife's sister was rescinded in 1907, another sign 
that the middle class had come into their own. (30)
The debate on the subject stimulated violent controversies; innumerable 
tracts appeared and even an association called the Marriage Law Defense 
Union came into existence to prevent the law from being passed. When the
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law was finally passed in 1907, it was followed the next year by the 
Punishment of Incest Act, a law changing the status of incest from that 
of a sin to that of a crime. A study of the process of the creation of 
this law has suggested that the primary influences in this change were 
concern over 'working class morality', the offensive of the social purity 
movement, and the protection of minors - not as has sometimes been thought, 
the influence of eugenic arguments. The central!ty of theories of incest 
avoidance had clear correspondences with several important contemporary 
issues. Such a correspondence should alert us to the unlikelihood of any 
crude interpretation of natural selection passing unquestioned into the 
discourses of social sciences.
This caution is further confirmed when we see that notions of natural 
selection and hereditary were sometimes taken up in the cause of progressive 
arguments, especially in the case of relations between the sexes. 
Charlotte Gillman Perkins, the American feminist was by no means alone when 
she mobilised theories of natural selection to argue for the liberation of 
women. She argues that the two elements of Darwin's theory are distinct; 
natural selection develops race characteristics, sexual selection develops 
sexual characteristics. Sexual selection is the means by which reproduction, 
and therefore variation occurs. But women, she argues, have been cut off 
from the real environment, the economic world of work, and have been forced 
to develop sexual characteristics alone. Because of the enforced 
dependency of women on men man becomes the economic environment of women. 
The only characteristic that women are able to develop is sexual differences 
which they have done to 'morbid excess 1 :
...it can be shown that sex distinction in the human race is 
so excessive as not only to offend injuriously its own purpose 
but to check and pervert the progress of the race, it becomes 
a matter for most serious consideration. Nothing could be more 
inevitable however, under our socio-economic relations. By the 
economic dependence of the human female upon the male, the 
balance of forces is altered. (32)
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Yet despite the necessary caution for approaching the effect of 
Darwinian theory on theories of kinship, Charlotte Gillman's ideas do 
confirm that his idea did enter social sciences in one relatively 
uncontested way. Despite the divergences over the applicability of 
theories of natural selection to specifically human institutions, there was 
formed a distinctive configuration where functionalism was combined with a 
selective appropriation of Darwinian concepts. This occurred through the 
way in which marriage sometimes came to be treated as a means of variation 
of the species and thereby came to be synonymous with sex. In this merger, 
which involved a slide between notions of mating and marriage, a definite 
notion of marriage was formed. Marriage was sometimes taken as the point 
at which societies without political organisation adapted to their 
environment. Environment, here, consisted not only of geographical 
elements, but of the various economic social institutions which mark a 
given culture.
Sex determination
One strand was particularly strong in effecting an elision between 
marriage and mating, and producing marriage as a means of adaptation. 
This was the theme of population which appeared in debates about 
marriage functions in a definite form, that of sex determination. The 
issue of population was one which had acquired enormous currency, both 
politically and intellectually under the impulse of what has been called 
the development of neo-Malthusianism. Many of the problems raised by 
 the conditions of the poor 1 debate, the urban overcrowding, unemployment 
and the terrible conditions under which many working class people lived, 
were seen in certain quarters to be scluable through limitation of the 
population. Increasingly this became the eugenicist strand in British 
politics not just advocating limitation of the population, but selective
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limitation which sought to deny the possibility of reproduction to 
'degenerates'. ' Population exigencies appeared as widely accepted 
explanations of the function of marriage. They appeared to advance an 
idea that mating and marriage functioned to replenish the population 
numerically to the equilibrium which could be supported by a given environment 
Again and again marriage was theorised as having the aim of uniting sexually 
divided creatures for the purpose of reproduction, not just of themselves but 
of the equilibrium of a given population. For Maine such an assumption had 
been a good reason for cynicism about primitive promiscuity. Primitive 
promiscuity could never have provided efficient structures for replenishment 
of numbers,
An eminent living physiologist who visited the West Indies 
before the abolition of slavery, well remembers the efforts 
of the Planters to form the negroes into families,as the 
promiscuity into which they were liable to fall produced 
infertility, and fertility had become important to the 
slave owner through the prohibition of the slave trade. 
It should be added that, independently of the pathological 
evils, the same infecundity would follow if the promiscuity 
arose from a considerable inferiority of the number of women 
to men. It is only under very unusual circumstances that a 
small number of women would give birth to offspring equalling 
numerically the whole parent generation, male and female. (34)
Similar statements could be multiplied. By turning a blind ^ye to the 
disastrous effects of colonisation, it could be argued that it was the 
marriage customs of 'natives' which failed to keep up population numbers. 
This was further evidence against the primitive promiscuity hypothesis:
The arguments which have brought about this result are 
that uncultured man, whose present organisation of family 
and tribe scarcely avails under favourable circumstances 
to keep up their numbers, was unlikely in past ages to have 
existed and increased in a still less organised state. (35)
Such speculation emerged in a very particular political conjuncture. 
Population, under the impulse of Malthusian arguments, had become a central 
political object of interrogation. Eugenicist arguments raised the 
question of systematic intervention on the populace to control numbers
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and ultimately type of citizen. Demographic studies provided information 
as to conditions and numbers of the populace. The issue had further urgency 
for an imperialist regime which was confronted not just with the annihilation 
of colonised populations, like the annihilation of the Tasmanians, but the 
gradual attrition of native populations which even for an imperialising 
regime was not good business. Pitt-Rivers in The Clash of Cultures and 
the Contact of the Races makes these concerns explicit and shows how they 
interacted with debates about the function of marriage regulation. His 
concern is with the tragically declining population of Melanesia. Having
made it clear from the start that no such soft 'humanist objection should
(36) 1 ^be raised as to why superior races should not wipe out inferior
he nevertheless recognised that even imperialist interests are not served
by destroying the native workforce - a sense of good business and
ethnological interest which produces a text typical of the phase of
(37) 
"indirect rule" of the colonies. '
But the (native) problem, so long as it remains a problem, 
has two sides to it. There is the problem of realising the 
white man's interests in a black country... and there is the 
blackman's problem, the problem of maintaining his own 
existence, identity and welfare. (38)
(39) Pitt-Rivers' position was notoriously reactionary. He is
influenced by 'insights' into 'the native problem' like Dudley Kidd's 
Kafir Socialism. His political aim is to quiet 'native discontent' 
before socialist solutions might be adopted. His solution however is 
more interesting; it argues for less interference in native customs and 
practices. In particular the interference of missionaries in the marriage 
customs and morality of the natives is seen as a source of destruction. 
The interference with native habits of clothing have made the natives 
susceptible to all kinds of diseases which previously escaped them. 
Particularly pernicious is the interference in 'native morality' and here 
Pitt-Kivers sees the discoveries of 'functional anthropology' to be
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particularly illuminating for the imperial regime. He argues that sexual 
customs have evolved in order to maintain a population equilibrium. Any 
interference in marriage customs will destroy that equilibrium and it is 
this which is taken as principle cause in the decline of the populations.
Pitt-Eivers proposes a theory of sex-determination, a study of the 
influence of the ratios of the sexes on the forms of sexual organisation. 
He proposes a study of the differential survival rate of the sexes beyond 
birth on the ground that a surplus of adult females over adult males is a 
condition necessary to the reproduction of the population in its entirety. 
The ratio between the sexes is liable to be upset by a variety of factors 
such as differential mortality and survival rate of the two sexes.
In general, he argues, there is a tendency for females to outnumber 
males, unless the population is declining. In a stable situation mankind 
will naturally tend towards polygamy; monogamy and polyandry would only be 
practiced in response to some disequilibrium in the sex ratio. It is 
suggested that a group will increase until it reaches the margin of 
subsistence. But where there is interference with 'morality 1 and native 
customs, sexual organisation is prevented from registering demographic 
changes. It is here that the specific interpretation of marriage as a 
response to environmental pressures, finds itself on common ground with 
much of the writing under consideration:
sex...by being the means of variation of organic life, 
enables the organism to withstand changed environmental 
conditions. (41)
Sex Antagonism
The function of marriage appeared within speculative ethnology in
a quite distinctive way. Sexual division was absolute. It generated a
whole series of antagonistic interests and activities. Darwin's quite
limited propositions are here far exceeded. No longer is sexed reproduction
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simply a mechanism of variation. It becomes a principle entailing 
different functions, activities and interests of the sexes. It becomes 
under the impulsion of the romantic influence a theory of different spheres 
of influence, different principles in the formation of culture. Sexual 
division is transformed from an assumed but arbitrary category into a 
meaningful and symbolic division, pregnant with cultural antithesis. 
The mode in which the sexes are theorised as interest groups, varies 
considerably within different theories, but there is virtually no writer 
of this period who systematically challenges the very idea. It appears 
explicitly in the idea of sex antagonism as a motor of history, implicitly 
in the contest over descent groups for control of reproduction in 
evolutionary theories, and finally as an effect of theorisation of division 
of labour along sexual lines.
In particular the theorisation of the accumulation of private property 
as a primary cause in the emergence of patriarchal families had the effect 
of constructing the sexes as antagonistic interest groups. Where the 
accumulation of private property is given as the motive for the transition 
from one exclusive line of descent to another, the motive rests not dust on 
the deduction of the deprivation of the father under mother-right but on 
an idea of a necessary antagonism between the sexes. This is a consequence of 
positing a necessary transition from one stage to another which is premised 
on a struggle for control of reproduction through control of descent group. 
This was indeed one of the points of attack which the anti-evolutionists 
brought to bear against general theories of transition:
It is not easy to see why a traditionally sanctioned 
inheritance rule should suddenly rouse antagonism since 
a man is as likely to benefit as suffer by inheriting 
from a maternal uncle rather than from his father. (42)
Ranging from Bachofen's Amazons defending their right to control descent 
groups, through to Engels arguing for the relation between the patriarchal
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family and private property, the transition to father-right was a transition 
theorised as resulting from an antagonism of interest groups. It arose from 
the desire of the fathers to perpetuate their identity through descent of 
name and property.
In some writing this implicit assumption of sex antagonism became an 
explicit theory. In the Mystic Rose^ a fundamental antagonism between 
the sexes is taken to be a constitutive factor in social organisations. In 
particular Crawley ! s book was concerned to explore the integration between 
sexual relationships and religious beliefs. The history of psychological 
processes was to be taken as the history of religious consciousness. Various 
customs, practices and beliefs could be understood as reflecting a mutual 
fear and suspicion between the sexes, a fear of the otherness of the other 
sex in sexual inter-course. Crawley ignores the dominant ways of thinking 
about the determination of social institutions, that is by economic forces; 
instead he suggests that the psychological responses to sex and sexual 
intercourse can rightly be considered as integral in the determination 
of various beliefs and activities. There is a rigid and absolute division 
between the sexes, who are also equally united and solid against the 
opposite sex. Sexual antagonism and therefore fear are thought to generate 
a number of elaborate marriage customs and rituals designed to assuage or 
work through the problem of antagonism and difference. Many marriage 
customs can be cited as indicating the sexual solidarity which points to 
a latent fear and antagonism;
There are a large class of marriage customs which in the
first place bring out very clearly sexual solidarity; the
women.. .make marriage an opportunity for showing their
mutual sympathy with each other as women, and they take the
side of the bride in her bashfulness or resistance, as if the
occasion were a test case between the two sexes as indeed it is. (44)
Crawley interprets the marriage ceremony as a public working through of 
the dangers which each sex presents to the other. The public expression
- 124 -
of harmony is a mode of neutralising antagonism by an expression of a 
contrary intention:
.. .women cling together at marriage till the last moment. 
These phenomena also show how marriage ceremonies have 
inherent in them, as binding the pair together, or neutralising 
each other's dangerous influence, the intention and power to 
make their life harmonious and sympathetic. (45)
The antagonism springs chief ly from the same sources as all sexual taboos, 
from women's sexual modesty and shyness. This shyness is particularly 
acute confronted with the possibility of sexual intercourse and the 
 subjection 1 which it will entail;
...these customs are one of the best guides to the ideas 
of sexual taboo in their relation to the marriage ritual. 
We see here one of the chief factors in sexual taboo, 
women's shyness, timidity and modesty, accentuated by the 
physiological sensibility which resists physical subjugation 
chiefly in connection with the act of sexual intercourse. (46)
Marriage ceremonies then are the neutralising of difference and potential 
antagonism. That the difference is premised on a notion of women's 
fundamental sexual timidity is too glaring to be worth mentioning. What 
is perhaps more interesting is the way in which the idea of sexual 
anxiety is used as an explanation of religious symbolism.
Grawley's explicit integration of psychological elements into an 
account of the origin of social institutions is unusual, but the assumption 
of the sexes as interest groups is not. It has two principle forms of 
expression; that which attributed to the sexes biological or reproductive 
interests, and that which theorised interests as arising out of the 
division of labour. The first was consolidated under the impulsion from 
Darwinian accounts of man amongst the other animals.
I have already shown the way in which Darwinian arguments were used to 
place sexual division as absolute, serving procreation, and the means by which 
the species effected variations in relation to the environment. Drawing no 
distinction between the function of marriage and mating, Westermarck for
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example transforms Darwinian sexual selection into an account of the 
different characteristics of the human male and female and their different 
interests in the process of mating and reproduction. He is slightly- 
hesitant in his use of terms male and female but, in general, dominant 
definitions from contemporary biology can be unproblematically accepted: 
male is active, female is passive; the interest of the male is to 
disseminate his seed widely; the interest of the female is to secure care 
and protection for her young.
Speaking of the male and female reproductive cells of 
plants, Professor Sachs remarks that, wherever we are 
able to observe an external difference between the two, 
the male cell behaves actively in the union, the female 
passively...
The rule holds good for the human race, the man generally 
playing the more active, the woman the more passive part 
in courtship. (4?)
Marriage customs can be interpreted in terms of their services for sexual 
selection. All behaviour should be understood as having an instinctual 
basis, instincts rooted in sexual behaviour always in the service of 
reproduction. Typical beauty for example by which partners are selected 
should be understood in terms of the exaggeration of secondary sexual 
characteristics, things like body hair on men. These are the exaggerated 
sexual attributes by which animals make their sexual display to attract 
the opposite sex. Equally, incest avoidance has its roots in instinctual 
aversion, an aversion springing from the lack of interest created by 
familiarity and the stimulation pertaining to strangeness and difference.
Instinctual aversion was not widely accepted as an explanation of 
incest avoidance, it being generally thought that incest taboo served some 
social or political function. Havelock Ellis however agreed that incest 
avoidance was tied up with the general system of sexual preferences but 
that this did not have to be premised on an instinctual avoidance. It 
was simply that desire was aroused more readily by strangers;
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.. the normal failure of the pairing instinct to manifest 
itself in the case of brothers and sisters or of boys and 
girls brought up together from infancy is merely negative 
phenomenon due to the inevitable absence under those 
circumstances of the conditions which evoke the pairing 
impulse. Courtship is the process by which powerful 
sensory stimuli proceeding from a person of the opposite 
sex gradually produce the physiological state of tumescence, 
and its psychic concommitant of love and desire, more or less 
necessary for mating to be effected. But between those who 
have been brought up together from childhood all the sensory 
stimuli of vision, hearing and touch have been dulled by use, 
trained to the calm level of affection and deprived of their 
potency to arouse erethistic excitement which produces sexual 
tumescence. (48)
Not many accounts of human marriage regulations were so rigorously 
'zoological' as Westermarck's. However, the absolute division between 
the functions of the sexes both biologically and within culture was 
quite the opposite. Again and again we find references to the different 
functions of the sexes determined by their role in the act of sexual 
reproduction. It is these different functions which generate mutual 
antagonism;
Social evolution, which has its origin in the association 
and co-operation of the sexes, has accentuated the fundamental 
opposition between their respective aims and interests. That 
antagonism is rooted in the profound biological differences 
between the function of the reproductive instinct in each - 
periodic rearing of offspring in one sex; maximum dissemination 
of the breed in the other. (49)
The theme of sexual antagonism and sexual interests is rarely absent 
in these philosophical speculations on the early stages of human organisation 
Occasionally, the implicit assumptions of the debates erupts on the surface
in what might be called 'hysterical' texts, like Walter Heape's Sex
Antagonism (1913) and The Dominant Sex by Mathias and Mathilde Vaerting. ~~ ;
Hysterical, because these texts are not exactly representative of the 
mainstream of the debate, they nevertheless cohere the various preoccupations 
of these debates. Both start from the assumption that the history of social 
institutions is an effect of the violent struggle between the sexes. Both 
have their origins in political considerations, and therefore show up quite
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clearly how the themes of sexual antagonism and conflict were fuelled by 
the political climate of feminism and the reaction to it.
Heape's book attempts this history across the evidence and debates 
within anthropology, discussing totemism, exogamy, ignorance of paternity 
and the function of marriage. What the study of these factors can 
illuminate is 'the discontent in one form or another which is rife among 
us'. ' Daily, 'it becomes more evident that...what has for long smoldered
as a grievance cannot any longer be restrained from bursting out into
(51) 
active antagonism'. ' What can the sources to this discontent be?
There are three, say Heape, 'Racial antagonism, Class antagonism and Sex
(52)
Antagonism'. The first is unavoidable 'because of our great possessions'.
The second, class antagonism 'has ever been common with us as it has been 
with all civilised peoples: ...although drastic change in the relation of 
class to class seems once more immanent, changes of this kind are no new 
thing, and we may have confidence that so long as the people of the
country are patriotic, class readjustment is not necessarily a national
(53)
evil but rather a sign of the vigour of the people'. But the third,
sex antagonism,is the most fateful and spells doom for the human race:
Sex antagonism is a family war and as family strife leads 
to the most bitter of all quarrels, so this war threatens to 
lead to enmity which may last for many years and work untold 
evil on the nation.' (54)
It is the tactics cf the suffragists which have caused this dread. They
have confronted society with, 'strife as selfish, as brutal, as bitter and
(55)
as unrestrained as that shown in any class war between men alone.' v '
As a result of this confrontation 'man's opinion of woman has definitely 
been modified'. His attitude towards her 'as an integral part of society 
can never be the same again'. Women of the contemporary women's 
movement have shown themselves to be reverting to a 'primitive condition', 
closely in accord with savage women.
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This primitive condition, Heape argues can be seen in the institutions 
of savage society, totemism and exogamy, and these, like everything in
Heape's schema, can be accounted for by 'biological' modes of explanation;
(57)
'Every cultural form can be accounted for by biology.' And, the
essential aspect of biology as it is understood here is the irreducibility 
of the difference between the sexes, whose different biological instincts, 
'reducible to their sexuality' can explain everything. Armed with this 
understanding, Heape can supplement the analysis of social institutions 
such as advanced by Prazer. Totemism and exogamy, it should be quite
apparent are the product of the male and female mind. Totemism is the
(58) 
product of 'the sick fantasies of pregnant women' ' and represents the
suppression of the male role in procreation. Exogamy however has all the 
characteristics of male supremacy;
the scarcity of women, their capture, the religious sentiment 
regarding menstruous blood, and the instinctive aversion to 
sexual intercourse with those who have lived close together 
from youth; all are based on the idea of male supremacy. (59)
This supremacy is rooted in the idea of the male getting for himself as 
many and as varied women as possible. Exogamy is conceived of as a 
structure of power oy which men achieve this, an achievement corresponding 
with the need to disseminate their seed as widely as possible. As a primitive 
male habit, exogamy with its emphasis on sensual stimulation, 'would 
certainly itself preceed any superstitious, fanciful ideas evolved by the 
female'. Exogamy therefore preceeds totemism as a form of social 
organisation, since totenism is simply the product of pregnant women's 
sick fantasies. But the coexistence of totanism and exogamy point to 
a compromise having been formed between the sexes. Totemism eagerly 
seizes on the habit of exogamy to evolve laws which would consolidate the 
interests of the family, that is, women.
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...it cannot be denied that while sexual passions and sexual 
gratification are of far more moment to the Male, the idea 
of the family in its turn (is) an essentially female sentiment. 
The former incalculates and stimulates roving freedom which is 
the characteristic of the Male, the latter consolidates the 
family and for the first time establishes the female as an 
essential part of the social structure. (61)
Whereas sex struggles in the past were fought in the interests of the 
family and reproduction, the contemporary sex struggles is waged only by 
a minority and against the family, hence its terrible danger for society.
The contemporary women's movement is a war waged by a minority, spinsters,
(62)
'the waste products of our female population'. ' The reason why they are
waste products is that they have foregone the only contribution which women 
make to society, that is their function as reproducers, 'for on no matter 
wholly divorced from maternity and the rearing of children has the woman 
ever succeeded in establishing herself permanently as of essential, of 
irreplaceable, value to society.'^ ' Moreover, human beings so 
completely dominated by their biological functions are geared to those 
biological functions. Women according to Heape absorb nourishment in a 
way which is geared towards reproduction. To neglect reproductive functions 
and to pursue mental stimulation is a fateful path for women to tread. It 
can only result in degeneracy and the pathological condition so typical of 
the suffragettes,
degeneration in its turn is associated with disuse; the 
risks run by elderly spinsters who consistently indulge in 
violent and unrestrained excitement is a real one. Here is 
another example of the influence exerted by the generative 
system on the other organs of the body, of the law which 
compels due observance of the demands made by that system in 
order to acquire balance and maintain stability, and of the 
pathological condition which results from disregard of that law. (64)
It is an attribute of just how pervasive these ideas were that a book like 
this was not just laughed aside. Instead it was actually given serious 
consideration by some influential conservative ethnologists. Sir Janes 
Prazer even acknowledges Heape as having suggested the relation between 
totemism and women's 'sick fantasies'.
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In much less extreme texts than Sex Antagonism the supposition of 
women as an interest group is constantly reappearing. We have already 
seen how this is partly accounted for by biological explanations, the 
function of the sexes in the act of reproduction. But the supposition of 
interest groups was no less prevalent where interests are theorised as the 
effect of work, in particular the division of labour. Within this context, 
endless texts mentioned the different roles which the sexes played in the 
various modes of production, and the effect of this on the relative position 
of the sexes.
This separation of the sexes within the limits of the tribe,
necessary in the interests of morality, was upheld and
promoted by a differentiation of pursuits and by property. (66)
If the possibility of matriarchy had disappeared, the debate on the 
relative positions of the sexes gained new impetus mainly under the pressure 
of the theorisation of the division of labour. Where some argued like Marx 
and Lafargue, that 'property in its origin was confined to a single sex, 1 
others suggested that women had invented agriculture while the men spent 
their days in animal-like warfare and hunting. Women's predominance 
in these areas might then explain their apparently high status in other 
societies. Endless books were written on the situation of women in 
primitive societies a concern which preceeded the particular configuration 
of kinship studies which I am now discussing. What was at stake now was 
the need to establish a certain homo logy between the technical mode of 
production, forms of property and the position of women. The disagreements 
on the subject were violent and irreconcilable:
Diametrically opposite views are current among the educated laity 
regarding women's place in primitive society. On the one hand, she 
is conceived as little better than a slave or beast of burden, 
condemned to perform the hardest drudgery, bought as a commodity, 
and without redress against her master's brutalities. But those 
who read of tribes reckoning descent through the mother and have 
imbibed the shop worn anthropological doctrines of half a century 
ago are likely to view primitive women as undisputed mistress of 
the family if not communal life as well. (67)
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At one extreme there was Herbert Spencer's assessment of 'the abject
condition of women' among the savages who exhibit an 'entire absence of
(68) the higher sentiment that accompanies the relations between the sexes 1 .
But even liberals like Hobhouse, Wheeler and Ginsberg^ ' who made no such 
ethnocentric judgement about the morality of 'savages' saw no problem with 
taking 'the status of women' debate as a starting point for a statistical 
assessment of the correspondence between technical modes of production and 
social institutions. These writers refuse to deduce any necessary history 
or development from the existence of a particular institution. Different 
institutions of marriage may exist, but their causality is hidden. What 
is proposed is a cautious process of deducing the history of civilisation 
by a statistical method. This will establish patterns of correspondence 
between material institutions and social practices, for example between 
hunting or agricultural societies and the morals, law, religion and the 
position of women. To this end a table is proposed whereby various 
practices are attributed certain scores. For marriage by capture for 
example, there is a negative score of -1 I
In a rare instance, we are confronted with a book, The Dominant Sex 
by Mathias and Mathilde Vaerting, which starts from the assumption of the 
absolute division between the sexes but begins to deconstruct the terrain 
on which the debate is constructed. History they argue is indeed the 
product of the struggle between the sexes. The course of history has 
been traced by the swinging of a pendulum between 'men's state dominance' 
and 'women's state dominance'. But the characteristic of these states 
is that not only will the dominant sex rigorously oppress its opposite 
but it also attempts to obliterate any evidence of the other sex's former 
dominance. Such is the motive behind the ethnologists' systematic 
suppression of the data of mother-right societies, a suppression of'the 
accounts of matters which fail to harmonise vrLth current views concerning 
sex discrimination.'^ '
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Even a progressive like Morgan was impelled by a systematic blindness, 
characteristic of the spirit of his own age. This led to his defense of 
a -uniform evolutionary pattern of society advancing towards monogamy and 
paternal dominance. For the Vaertings, this is an impossible combination 
of features. If a society is under paternal dominance, 
it can never have genuine monogamy but only 'duplex morality' or double 
standards. A genuinely monogamous society could only be premised on 
equality between the sexes.
The Dominant Sex starts from the political problem of how this 
genuine equality can be achieved. One of the first steps towards this is 
seen as the exposure of the ways in which male bias influences ways of 
thinking about masculinity and femininity especially in anthropological 
literature:
The psychical trends that appear both in men and in 
women when one sex dominates the other, are universally 
human and not specifically masculine or feminine. (71;
Writers who assume the 'giveness' of the interests of sexed groups have been 
mislead by the ideology of men's State Dominance. For under male dominance, 
women are forced by the division of labour into a subordinate and inferior 
position:
We regard it as incontestable that the first division of 
labour was that between a dominant sex and a subordinate sex. 
Herein is perhaps to be found the origin of all division of labour., 
The division of labour between the sexes originates in this way 
that the dominant sex tries to stabilise its power and to secure 
greater freedom for itself by providing food for the subordinate 
sex. (72)
Thus so-called sexual characteristics have nothing to do with innateness. 
Either sex can acquire the characteristics of the weaker sex, including 
physique. Fattyness for example will always be a sign of the oppressed sex, 
as it is a characteristic associated with domestic labour;
The cause of this difference between the sexes in the matter 
of bodily form when monosexual dominance prevails is unquestionably 
to be found in the sexual division of labour. The tendency to 
fatty deposits always affects the subordinate sex. (73)
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What is more, sexual domination takes certain forms. It involves for 
example, taking the subordinate sex as predominantly sexual beings. In this 
respect the Yaertings, themselves marxists, criticise the marxist tradition
which too readily assumes a natural sexual division of labour instituted 
by the function of reproduction. It is quite wrong to assume that the 
first division of labour was between man and women for the procreation of 
children. There is nothing innate to the positions of subordination and 
domination and the physical and mental characteristics which accompany these 
states.
The Dominant Sex, is formulated on precisely the same terrain as 
Sex Antagonism but asking questions of the material which begin to 
deconstruct the terrain itself. It argues that the struggle between the 
sexes has characterised human history, yet it also argues that there is 
nothing necessary about those sexual characteristics or the interests of 
the sexes. There are simply the interests of the dominant group. Yet 
the latter half of the proposition leaves no room for the former; if the 
sexes as such do not exist then how can they constitute themselves as a 
dominant sex? The book is strange and contradictory because it fails to 
see its own impossible position. It is also hugely revealing. It shows 
clearly the way in which the theorisation of the relation between the 
sexes that entered accounts of social institutions; it attempts to expose 
the problems of these accounts, but in accepting the original premise 
of a historic conflict, it remains unable to dismember the naturalness 
of 'the sexes r .
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Conclusion
This chapter has begun to argue that distinctive theories of sexual 
reproduction were dominant in these debates on the family. Partly this 
was an effect of ideas from natural history. However it was partly 
determined by other notions of sexual division and social determination 
already prevalent within the social sciences. The study of sexual 
regulation increasingly looked like the study of the regulation of sexual 
reproduction by social exigencies. As a result the old problem of 
philosophy, that of nature versus culture begins to be thought in a 
distinctive way.
Sexual relations were taken to be based on sexual instincts shared 
with the animals. Animals mated and produced offspring. Yet institutions 
of marriage appeared to reveal fundamental differences. Everywhere there 
was evidence of order, regulation, the mobilisation of sexual relations for 
specific social functions - adaptation to the environment, formation of 
political alliances, consolidation of property or whatever. It is in this 
context that the fascination with 'classificatory' relations of kinship 
must be understood. Decidedly human, requiring instinctual renunciation, 
the object on which they function is mating, an instinct shared with the 
animals. Marriage relations begin to be theorised as the critical moment 
between nature and culture;
Society is founded not on the union of the sexes but on what 
is a widely different thing, its prohibition, its limitation. 
The herd says to primitive man not 'thou shalt marry 1 , but, 
save under the strictest limitations for the common good, ! thou 
shalt not marry.' (74)
That marriage relations should be situated as the moment between 
nature and culture left their status ;mbiguous, and therefore their 
theorisation open to contesting definitions. On the one hand the apparent 
coincidence of mating and marriage seemed to excuse the use of explanations
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from the natural sciences. If mating followed certain exigencies within 
the animal kingdom; perhaps mankind's complex laws were simply a human 
variation of this. On the other hand, as distinctly human attributes 
involving prohibitions and systems quite unlike anything found among the 
animals, they seemed to invite explanation in purely social terms. What 
specifically human function did they fulfill - the formation of political 
alliances, the consolidation of property arrangements, the governance 
and stability of certain groups? If explanations purely in zoological 
or biological terms missed what was specifically human, explanations in 
purely social terms ironically affirmed a space of 'naturalness'. This 
was the instinctual attraction of the opposite sexes for the purpose of 
procreation - on which society operates its more 'complex' relations. 
Increasingly culturalist explanations affirm a space for the theorisation 
of the 'instinctual'; increasingly biological arguments leave a space for 
the theorisation of culture. Each potentially can be compromised by the 
modes of explanation offered by the other.
What these developments bear witness to is, in fact, an affirmation 
of human sexual relations as distinctively cultural, perhaps the 
specifically human cultural relation. Simultaneously however this 
distinctiveness is theorised in such a way that its distinctiveness is 
assumed rather than explored. The sexual instinct is relatively unproblematic 
for these studies of marriage; it is an instinct mobilised by society for 
social reasons. Hence the explanation of marriage relations is increasingly 
in terms of their function for other social relations, those relations 
which have assumed the significant place in the account of social 
development - technology, the economy, property relations.
In the account of the theories of sex in sexual regulations, it is 
clear that sex has very distinctive meanings. It means a rigid notion
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of sexual division and a rigid notion of the instinct of reproduction. 
Even though such ideas may have been contested within biology itself 
and within emergent psychology they passed unquestioned into studies 
of familial relations. This fact shows clearly how the implicit agreement 
to treat marriage relations, initiating family and kinship, as cultural 
relations, resulted in a systematic blindness to the implications of 
studies of sexuality from other areas.
CHAPTER FOUR
THE IMPASSE ON KINSHIP
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Introduction
In the previous three chapters, it has been shown how debates about the
family and kinship were the bearers of a multitude of preoccupations about
social relations. To the forefront was a search for unilinear accounts 
of human history in its entirety which was partially influenced by evolutionary 
theory. It meant that the study of kinship was weighed down with a number 
of other theoretical considerations, about, for example, the forms taken by 
political alliances or the debate about essential differences between human 
and animal organisation. The work was cut out for the critics of evolutionary 
theory to deconstruct the tangle of assumptions and hypotheses which had come 
to surround the study of kinship and the family.
Some anthropologists like to present the emergence of criticisms of 
unilinear accounts of human history as the voice of reason emerging from 
the mists of 'speculative error 1 . But criticisms of evolutionary hypotheses 
gain momentum neither as an outright rejection of the terms of the evolutionary 
debates, nor as discourses which bore no relation to them. Rather, the 
criticisms were formed in the very space where evolutionary theory began to 
deconstruct itself.
It might perhaps be asked why those arguments which have so far been 
traced, necessarily began to deconstruct themselves. The reasons are 
implicit in the previous chapters and can be summarised in the following 
way. Comparative data assumed an increasing importance; from the moment 
of the disruption of the patriarchal theory, studies of the family turned 
around a wealth of comparative data on forms of marriage and sexual relation- 
ships. Both from bhe perspective of constructing a unilineal history and 
from the perspective of assessing the social function of kinship relations, 
the emphasis is on the differences between forms of organising what is 
assumed to be essentially the same institution, that is the institution of 
sexual reproduction. Are there only differences or is there some identity 
between the multiplicity of rules discovered? For the evolutionists the
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aim was to find this identity in a unilinear history or function of the 
institution of sexual reproduction. Yet at the same time, dominant 
explanations of determination made it difficult to specify what this 
assumed central institution was. For as we have seen, there was an 
insistence that sexual regulation was specifically cultural, perhaps the 
element on which culture was based, yet this regulation was increasingly 
to be explained by reference to other social practices. Sexual regulation, 
though claimed as a distinct cultural practice was theorised as fulfilling 
a function for other social relations.
The double requirement of the distinctness of human society, distinctive 
through its regulation of sexuality, and a simultaneous emphasis on 
comparative data, placed evolutionary theory under strain. A speculative 
philosophy concerned with the distinctiveness of mankind in opposition to 
the animals, but increasingly founding itself on minutely detailed empirical 
knowledge found it difficult to maintain itself. Its reliance on 'empirical' 
data opened all its postulates to contradiction,) For every example of one 
practice, its exact opposite could be found. It became a philosophy which 
argued for the distinctiveness of human culture but always sought to explain 
'culture' by other aspects of the social. Certain elements of social 
formation had assumed the position of determinants, for example technical 
developments, the distribution of labour, property relations; other 
aspects such as rituals, symbols, language, now sexual regulation, were 
to be explained by reference to these other determinants.
As the ensuing chapter will show, some aspects of the discipline which 
we know as anthropology emerged in the space of this internal deconstruct ion. 
Some theorists found a temporary solution to this double requirement of 
empiricism and the distinctiveness of human culture in the idea of each 
society as an expressive totality. The amalgam of all social practices 
express through their function the equilibrium of any given society.
Paradoxically the refusal of general accounts of the specific functioning
- 139 -
of the cultural level laid anthropology open to explanations from other 
discourses. The notion of expressive totality lays itself open "to 
precisely the question of the determination of that expressive totality a 
question answered by appeal to those other refused disciplines, biology, 
demography, marxism and psychology.
The following chapter will concentrate on one moment in the rejection 
of evolutionary theories,, It is not an attempt to give an exhaustive 
account of the formation of modern anthropology but is a partial account 
of the solutions found by some writers to these problems. The reasons why 
this focus has been adopted is because the solutions do represent some 
general problems and common solutions in the social sciences. Primarily 
they exemplify the following things; they show how impossible are the 
evolutionary arguments about the family and sexual organisation of society, 
criticisms which remain pertinent for contemporary theoretical developments. 
However these arguments simultaneously demonstrate how many of the earlier 
assumptions about sexual relations were retained, in particular the hierarchy 
of determinations which mean that there was a failure to deal with the 
operations of sexual organisation. Finally they demonstrate the 
systematisation of a theoretical division between individual and society, 
in which sex is synonymous with the family and individual. It is around 
this division that some of the more sterile divisions between discourses 
has come to be orchestrated and which is a major stumbling block in 
contemporary attempts to theorise sexual relations. The solutions adopted 
within these arguments show how many of the questions now pursued by 
feminism dropped out of theoretical investigation,
The false problems from anthropological tradition
In 1930, writing in Man, Malinowski turned his attention to what he called
'the impasse on kinship'. ' The article marked the culmination of a
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growing critique of the general speculation which had so far dominated
the discussion of kinship,, This criticism had been accompanied by the
(2)emergence of anthropology as a distinctive discipline ^ ' and the widespread
acceptance of empirical fieIdwork as the dominant means by which 'primitive' 
societies were to be discussed.
Malinowski declared that 'kinship is the most difficult subject of 
social anthropology'. Its study however had now reached an impasse 
because, 'it has been approached in a fundamentally wrong way 1 . ' The 
way out of this impasse however seemed to be in sight for Malinowski. It 
lay in a tendency, slowly emerging on both sides of the Atlantic, In 
England it was represented by writers like Radcliffe-Brown and Brenda 
Seligmann; in America by writers like Kroeber and Lowie, Malinowski 
heralds the way forward envisioned by these writers because of their 'full 
recognition of the importance of the family, and by the application of what 
is now called the functional method of anthropology - a method which consists 
above all in the analysis of primitive institutions as they work at present 
rather than in the reconstruction of a hypothetical past.'
For Malinowski, the impasse in studies of kinship is self-evident: it
t-iis really due to the inheritance of false problems from anthropological 
tradition.' There are two principle debates which encapsulate the 
false problems: on the one hand, there is the sterile debate as to whether 
kinship had 'collective' or 'individual' origins, that is, whether kinship 
is based on the clan or the family* On the other hand there are the 
false problems generated by ? the obsession' with classificatory systems 
of kinship. Both these debates raise false problems because they fail to 
grasp the full complexity of the social group, and the way in which statuses 
and relationships are distributed within a given group 0
As far as Malinowski is concerned both these problems have arisen 
because of a dominant preoccupation with providing a monocausal account of 
the history, and therefore the origin, of kinship. In opposition to this,
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he claimed that nothing can be grasped about the nature of kinship without 
approaching it from the standpoint of the present. What do these kinship 
systems do now? The inadequacy of the earlier approach is demonstrated by 
the study of kinship terminology where these terms were frequently taken 
as 'survivals' of past forms, an effect of looking only at the history of 
kinship relations. Instead, the anthropologist should consider what kinship 
means to the natives now and through this understand how it functions in any 
given society» Only then can a picture be built of the relations between 
the family, the clan and the tribe, not as isolated, but as interrelated 
institutionso Malinowski's proposals for understanding these relations 
was rather particular and will be considered later in this chapter-, 
Before moving on to the specific solutions to this impasse on kinship 
however it is useful to consider what were the elements in this mounting 
critique of previous studies of kinshipo
Briefly, these elements can be summarised in the following way* There 
was a deconstruction of simple unilinear evolutionist accounts of human 
history 0 It produced a growing scepticism over the possibility of any 
single 'history 1 of the family or any single explanation of what determines 
familial forms. The deconstruction was fuelled partly by the contestation 
over the applicability of evolutionary theory to human societies, and in 
particular by a political reconsideration of notions of primitivity. It 
was also fuelled by a consolidation of field-work which was carried out 
under the dominance of an ethic of comparative studies and which was 
accompanied by an increasing insistence on the truthfulness of empirical 
data» Finally,the deconstruction of unilinear histories of an institution 
like the family was partly an effect of the retreat from general accounts of 
'cultural' forms 0
It has already been indicated how kinship increasingly came to be taken 
as a system of cultural relationships whose function could be explained by 
other aspects of the social structure or by history. Accounts of kinship
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increasingly came to require accounts of other elements of the social rather 
than general accounts of the functioning of cultural structures* Anti- 
evolutionism rejected monocausal determination, and this approach to culture 
in fact coincided with an insistence on cultural specificity and difference,
Contesting Causalities: the critique of evolutionary theories
The critique of evolutionist and general theories of the history of kinship
had several aspects* It was spearheaded by a growing distrust for theories
(?)of a 'unique form of cultural beginnings' and an emphasis on cultural
differences and complexities,, The criticism of the use made of evolutionist 
doctrines for accounts of social institutions was partly fuelled by a general 
critique of such appropriations across political philosophy and the social 
sciences* Darwinism and Politics by Ritchie was typical of the mounting 
discontent with the appropriation of some aspects of Darwinian theory for a
(s)defense of political conservatism. ' The prime objects of attack were
(9)Herbert Spencer and Henry Maine, whose book ropular Government absorbed
a version of 'the survival of the fittest' for a defence of unregulated 
economic competition and restriction of the franchise* The uneven and 
contradictory nature of social development could be stressed in opposition to 
Maine's appropriation which argued for progress through competition and lack of 
regulation. In order to do this, Ritchie takes the example of the status 
of women. Far from indicating unequivocal progress, Ritchie interprets 
elements of the social position of some women as indications of 'deteriora- 
ting' social conditions* For him, working on ideological assumptions about 
women, the fact that women are drawn into the labour market and bear the 
double burden of home and industrial work, is evidence of the deterioration 
of their social condition. This, he takes to be confirmed by the attention 
xriven by even the most conservative writers to the so-called 'woman question', 
the pressing 'problem' of female labour and its dire consequences for the 
family and traditional morality o
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The main reservation about simple transpositions of evolutionary 
accounts to human society was their failure to consider the nature of the 
social: the complex of culture, art and language by which a society 
transmits its history and traditions to the ensuing generations. To suggest 
that one generation simply transmits physiological and biological character- 
istics is clearly problematic when it comes to the transmission of 
specifically cultural rules and traditions. For Ritchie it is precisely 
the capacity of ' social inheritance 1 which gives mankind its great advantage 
over the animals.
If the neglect of these aspects was problematic within political and 
social theory, it was even more so for anthropological studies of 'primitive' 
societies. If nothing else the emphasis on complicated systems of kinship 
arrangement undermined the possibility that any extant cultures were really 
1 primitive' . The drift of the work which I have already discussed was 
towards a rather nebulous notion of culture as a structure made up of 
complex, interacting and mutually dependent parts, a direction anticipated 
by Tylor's designation of culture as 'that complex whole which includes 
knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and any other capabilities and 
habits acquired by man as a member of society. 1
Representational practices and sexual regulation had become the two 
great pillars of that totality designated culture; crucial, but always 
theorised by reference to other social practices. But however undertheorised, 
all writers stressed this distinct realm, a distinction which rendered 
problematic accounts drawn from the animal kingdom. Notions of hereditary 
and transmission drawn from evolutionary accounts had no room for a notion 
of transmission adequate to this conception of culture 0 Simplistic 
appropriations of evolutionary theory could therefore be dismissed as 
pseudo-scientific dogma:
If every people of the globe had a culture history 
wholly different from that of every other, the historian's 
task would still be to record these singularities and make 
the best of them; and in contributing his share to the
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sum total of knowledge he would suffer no loss to 
his scientific dignity from the unmalleability of 
his material. Without therefore at the outset renouncing 
the search for laws of social evolution we will emphati- 
cally declare our independence of that pseudo-scientific 
dogmatism which insists on formulating all phenomena 
after the fashion that has proved serviceable in a 
diminutive corner of the field of human knowledge. 
Uninfluenced by any bias for or against historical 
regularities, we shall attempt to determine what are 
the facts and what has been their actual sequence,, (11)
Even amongst these peoples thought to be the most 'primitive 1 , such 
as the Australian aborigines, a complex system of marriage regulations 
seemed to emphasise the insurmountable difference between mankind and the 
animals, whereby 'intellectuality' rendered mankind subject to tradition 
and culture. Any theory then which assumed that the primitive past of 
mankind was self-evident from contemporary 'primitives' was clearly blind 
to the evidence. Such an assumption must be attributed to the contemporary 
intellectual prejudices.
One major effect in the critique of unilinear histories of the family, 
and the concomitant emphasis on the radical differences between cultures 
was a widespread agreement that existing notions of causality would have to 
be revised. There was even the menace that the emphasis on the absolute 
complexity of all cultures, however primitive they might appear, had 
undermined the possibility of ever producing a general theory of causality:
It is natural to suppose that like phenomena must have 
like causes and accordingly it would become the 
ethnologist's duty to determine these: a priori they 
might be supposed to lie in racial affinities, or the 
similarity of geographical environment, or some other 
fundamental condition shared by the cultures compared. 
Practically however*.» it is not so easy to isolate 
such determinants amidst the tremendous complexities of 
cultural data and to demonstrate they are the significant 
factors. Indeed some ethnologists have abandoned all 
hope of ever unravelling them» (12)
In the debates which the previous chapters outlined, it was thought in 
general that like phenomena did have like causes and that it was the duty of 
ethnology and social sciences to ascertain this unilinear cause. The expansion 
of fieldwork and the insistence on cultural differences consolidated a shift
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in notions of causality in studies in kinship. There was no longer an 
unqualified affirmative to the question; do all like phenomena have the 
same determinants?
Franz Boas, so influential in the development of American anthropology 
spearheaded the attack on monocausal explanations of kinship insisting that 
different kinship organisations should be treated as the result of different 
circumstances :
To us the assumption of a unique form of cultural 
beginnings does not seem plausible. Setting aside 
the question of what form of social life may have 
existed at the time when our ancestors first 
developed speech and the use of tools, we find 
everywhere phenomena that point to very early 
differentiations from which even the simplest 
cultural forms have developed. Language and art 
are perhaps the best proof of this contention. 
Even if we should accept.. » the unity of the origin 
of human speech or... the conscious invention of 
language for the purpose of communication, we must 
concede that in the early development of language 
fundamental categories of grammar and lexicography 
have arisen that cannot be reduced to common principles, 
excepting those general forms that are determined 
logically or by the fact of language as a general 
means of connnunicationo (13)
Not only did Boas insist on treating cultures in their differences, 
but he was equally unwilling to ascribe to like phenomena like causes:
It is of very rare occurrence that the existence of
like causes for similar inventions can be proved, as
the elements affecting the human mind are so complicated;
and their influence is so utterly unknown, that an attempt
to find like causes must fail, or be a vague hypothesis, (H)
At issue here is a questioning of causality: for some the effect was a 
general crisis as to the possibility of monocausal explanations; for others 
it involved a reconsideration of the various contesting explanations, which
had long existed. Lowie at the beginning of Primitive Society notes 'a 
problem of causal relations' suggesting that although the problem of 
history can never escape the student of cultural forms, the kinds of 
explanation sought for the appearance of similar forms in diverse cultures 
must be subject to contestation. The interpretation of 'cultural
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resemblances. .. between people of diverse stock' he argues commonly 
narrows to a choice between two alternatives:
Either they are due to like causes, whether these 
can be determined or not; or they are the result 
of borrowing. A predilection for one or the 
other explanation has lain at the bottom of much 
ethnological discussion in the past; and at present 
influential schools both in England and in continental 
Europe clamorously insist that all cultural parallels 
are due to diffusion from a single centre. (1?)
Lowie points here to the increasing strength of diffusionist explanations. 
The diffusionist response was to insist that like phenomena do not tear 
witness to a unilinear history which is common to all societies. Instead 
they insist en the influence cf borrowing and interaction; one society 
will adopt the customs and practices cf another through a process of 
diffusion. Boas no more adhered to a simplistic account of diffusion than 
Lionocausal histories . But employing the concept of 'selective borrowing' 
he demonstrated how the Raven cycle in Canadian mythology originated in 
the Northern part cf British Columbia and thence travelled southwards. The 
farther one proceeds from the point of origin, so the arguments run, the 
smaller is the elaboration of the cycle until it finally tails away. This 
particular combination of legendary adventures would hardly be confined to 
a narrow coastal strip if it was the product of a universal law of myth- 
making; nor would there be a progressive diminution of complexity if it 
were not a case of transmission to districts farther and farther away from
its source.
Diffusionist theory insists that all cultures do not have the same
origin and history. Different races and different cultures may have
entirely different histories and only develop the same custom through mutual
contact. The strength of such a theory, as Lowie remarks, lies in the
(1 8)
 abundance of evidence for it'. There is an irony in the diffusionist
account, stressing as it does racial and cultural differences, where unity 
and similarity is given only by contingency. It nevertheless presupposes
basic psychological unity to the human species. T'nis unity is constructed
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in the assumption that human beings do in fact make the same responses 
confronted with the same practices. The unity which is presupposed is not 
that of the necessary unfolding of given human characteristics and behaviours 
as presupposed in evolutionary accounts, but is the assumption of psycho- 
logical unity. The significance of the diffusionist account is not its 
novelty nor its widespread acceptance because, at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it was neither new nor widely accepted. The fact 
that Lowie argues against diffusionist doctrines at the opening of 
Primitive Society marks not so much their dominance as the extent to which 
unilinear histories have disappeared. He suggests that there is still 
perhaps a place for a theory of independent development whose general 
outline might be traced: there is no reason for excluding the possibility 
of independent development in the study of social organisation.
Briefly, then, the critique of unilinear histories can be seen to have 
several aspects, by no means reducible to anthropology's fantasy of itself 
as scientificity triumphing over the intellectual prejudices of a past era. 
There were the problems of the applicability of evolutionary doctrines to 
'cultural forms'; there was the emphasis on complexity, and difference, 
backed up by extensive and detailed fieldwork; and there was the theoretical 
concomitant of this, the challenge to the causality presupposed by evolutionary 
doctrines, that is the causality of a necessary teleology by which all human 
beings unfold the same characteristics and forms of social behaviour. 
This challenge to the causality ultimately presupposed by a unilinear history 
of culture was also characterised by a general suspension of any hypothesis 
of ultimate determination. This suspension of theories of ultimate 
determination and concentration on difference and complexity in fact 
concealed a nebulous but widespread adherence to the hierarchy by which some 
practices are thought to determine others. Nevertheless, the suspension 
of explicit theories of ultimate determination, left the way open for 
anthropological studies to be constantly 'claimed' by those theories which
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held more rigorous notions of determination: marxism, psychology and 
biology.
If a simplistic characterisation of the critique of unilinear 
histories of kinship as the effect of contemporary intellectual prejudices 
is rejected, the terms in which the attack was carried out on the 'speculative 
errors' generated by the assumption of a unified history of the development 
of human society must be examined closely. There were three principal 
areas in which this clearing of the ground took place: the debate over the 
position of women; the question of property; and the study of kinship,
The status of women
Chapter three indicated how debates over the status of women in society 
formed a central part of hypotheses of the evolution of society. Even if 
commentators disagreed as to what constituted the 'highest' position of 
women, for a long time aspects concerning women's role and behaviour in
i
society had been thought to be indicative of aspects of that society in 
general. There were a number of preconceptions to be cleared away by 
the serious student of 'primitive societies'. These preconceptions had 
passed into popular versions of primitive society. On the one hand, 
conservative philosophers took the position of women in early society to 
be little better than a slave or beast of burden, condemned to hard labour, 
bought as a commodity with no redress against her husband's brutality. 
Only Western civilisation had managed to elevate women to their proper 
place, outside production and politics-. For socialists, evidence of 
matrilineal societies tended to be interpreted as evidence that primitive 
women were undisputed mistresses both of the family and society in general. 
The dominance of maternal principles was taken as synonymous with communism,, 
Both conceptions, 'fall ludicrously wide of the mark', for as Lowie .and the 
critics of evolutionary speculation point out, 'there is so much variability
in the relations of woman to society that any general statement must be
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taken with caution 1 . ^ The notes of caution to be sounded are various 
but amount to a serious challenge to the assumption of any necessary 
connection between the mode of production of any given society and the 
status of women0
The first note of caution related to the whole problem of how to 
talk about status, since status is ascribed in any given society in a 
number of different ways; 'the treatment of woman is one thing, her legal
status another, her opportunities for public activity still another, while
(21the character and extent of her labours belong again to -a distinct category. ' v
Only confusion can result from mixing what might be empirical coincidence 
between these theoretically distinct realmso Commentators on the status of 
women should be warned against taking any of these levels singly as sufficient 
evidence of the status of women in any given society,,
Lowie insists on the theoretical separability of these aspects of the 
position of women, although his grounds for doing so are no less androcentric 
than some of his predecessors in so far as he poses the problem as one of 
how men 'treat' women:
The harem beauty is not compelled to perform the 
drudgery of a menial, yet her position is not 
consistent with our ideals of human dignity, and 
the same applies in only slightly lesser degree to 
the European lady of quality in the age of chivalry. 
In a very different environment the Toda women, 
while well-treated, rank as inferior and are excluded 
from the ritualistic observances that occupy the 
foremost place in Toda culture... On the other hand, the 
Andaman Island woman is virtually on a plane of equality 
with her husband, though a somewhat larger share of the 
work may fall upon her shoulders. (22)
Other notes of caution are those which this thesis has already traced, 
for example the false assumption that descent reckoned through the mother 
implies a higher social status for women. Moreover niatrilocal residence, 
which had increasingly come to the fore as an explanation for matri lineal 
descent, no niore implies a female political power than does matrilineal 
descent itself: 'the immediate result of matrilocal residence is not
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(23)feminine superiority but only the superiority of the wife's kin.' v '
Perhaps most significantly however, the reassessment of the assumptions 
of unilinear histories challenges the schema by which women's status is 
attributed to economic factors. Lowie notes the 'exaggerated part' which 
economic factors have come to play in interpretations of the position of 
women in primitive societies. There appear to be fundamental problems 
however with any simple equation of the status of women with the technical 
mode of production, for example: 'the Amur River fishermen, the Chinese 
agriculturalists, the Turkic horsemen and cattle-breeders, and the Ostyak
reindeer nomads,all share essentially the same conception of the female
(24) 
sex.' ' For Lowie, Hobhouse's correlations seem to be supported by
reasonable empirical evidence. Hobhouse had asserted that 'the percentage
of cases in which woman occupies a low rung in the social scale is 73
(25) among cultivators of the soil, but rises to 87^5 among pastoral tribes.'
This 'fact' is explained as a facet of the masculine control of the 
domestication of animals, an 'observation' which Lowie seeks to extend to
agriculture societies, since, he asserts, 'plough-culture' is also linked
(26)
with 'masculine effort'. Hobhouse constructed his model of the status
(27) of women on an extraordinarily ethnocentric statistical method so that
this so-called evidence is at best treated with caution. Lowie agrees 
there is some evidence of correlation, but he is also aware of the real 
problems with such assertions, even if he does not extend his critique as 
far as to how certain practices are classified as expressing the low status
of women.
Lowie f s reservations are twofold. On the one hand, there is the 
likelihood that certain practices are diffused and retained through 
conservatism rather than necessarily corresponding to the technical mode 
of production. Moreover, there are too many examples which contradict the 
correlation: among the Hottentot pastoral life goes amicably hand in hand 
with sexual equality, while among the neighbouring Bantu where the women till
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the soil they occupy a lower position. These facts are 'certainly 
favourable neither to the doctrine that economic activity automatically
raises women's status, nor to the theory that pastoral life as such
(28) prejudices her status'. v ' A consideration of economic data fails to
establish a particularly close correlation between them and women's position:
In horticultural communities of Melanesia and South 
America where women hoe the plots their prestige 
is less than in such hunting tribes as the Vedda 
or Andamman islanders. Pastoral life has not 
degraded the Hottentot woman. Everywhere the 
influence of intertribal cultural relations is 
shown to have been enormous. (29)
Lowie concludes that no real conclusion can be drawn as to the correspondence 
between the status of women and the mode of production - too many variations 
occur which seem to have their roots in 'customary law', religion and forms 
of the division of labour,* Concluding, still in ideological terms, he 
confidently asserts that so-called primitive societies do not consistently 
treat their women badly.
Primitive Property
If evolutionary speculation had produced untenable hypotheses as to what
the social position of women might tell about the state of social organisation,
it had produced no less unsubstantiated hypotheses on the role of property in
primitive society. It was the duty of the anthropologist to demystify some
of these crude assumptions:
Those who set out with the evolutionary dogma 
that every social condition now found in civilisation 
must have developed from some condition far removed 
from it through a series of transitional stages, will 
consistently embrace the hypothesis that the property 
sense so highly developed with us was wholly or 
largely wanting in primitive society, that it must 
have evolved from its direct antithesis, communism in 
goods of every kind. This assumption is demonstrably 
false. (30)
As with the position of women in primitive society, detailed studies of 
primitive society which abandoned the preconceptions of unilinear histories,
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demonstrate the nonsense of assuming any necessary correlation between
technical modes of production and forms of property.
Lowie isolates several aspects which point to the need to reconceptualise 
property relations and primitive society. First of all, he argues,both 
communally held property and individual rights over certain goods etc., can 
be found coexisting in societies like that of the American Indians. The 
existence of forms of communal ownership cannot be thought to imply either 
communism or to indicate any uniformity of social organisation, for example 
the clan or 'sib 1 presumed by Morgan:
A review of the systems of land tenure.. establishes 
beyond doubt the reality that primitive joint ownership 
which so strongly impressed Sir Henry Maine. But it 
is by no means a fact that the co-proprietors always consti- 
tute a social unit of the same type. Communal ownership, 
apart from the general tribal area, we have encountered 
only in that highly special case where a father-sib is 
localised and becomes coextensive with the commune. Far 
more frequently proprietary privileges are shared by 
corporations of another type, groups of blood kindred, (31 )
Lowie goes on to point out that these groupings apparently of collective 
ownership in fact are themselves structured around rights of access and 
inheritance. These are often sex-specific and the exclusion of certain 
groups from access and control of property according to ideological functions 
serves as a warning against any simplistic designation of communal property 0 
This warning is substantiated by the fact that there are also different 
kinds of property, not all entailing the same rights and statuses. There 
are differences between movable and immovable property; the differences 
between these and chattels, human and otherwise; there are forms of 
incorporeal property, such as copyright and control of sacred or religious 
paraphernalia; and there are often differences between hereditary and 
acquired property. All these forms, Lowie argues, can be held differently 
even within the same society. Land tenure, for example, might be between 
a fraternal clan, but movable goods might descend through one particular 
descent group; an .individual might be entitled to goods she/he has
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acquireda Only one sex might inherit one form of goods, or within 
collectively held land, there might be definite forms of individual 
possession, given by customary rights or springing from individual 
acquisition.
Certain assumed correspondences fall away, confronted with the 
deconstruction of the terms under consideration. Firstly, there is no 
clear correspondence between technical forms of social organisation, such 
as hunting, and forms of property-holding. Individual rights and statuses 
are often determined by customary law which may vary greatly between cultures. 
Secondly, the role played by any particular group in production does not 
necessarily determine what their rights will be to hold property. For 
example, that women take an active role in production does not rule out 
the possibility that they may appear in marriage law themselves as chattels. 
Finally, political democracy cannot be confused with economic communism. 
Morgan was wrong to assume that the political democracy of Indian clan 
organisation is built on economic communism. The close examination of the 
Indian tribes reveals that collective and individualistic rights of possession 
are co-existent, yet the tribe structure is characterised by an advanced 
political democracy.,
None of these clarifications are intended by Lowie to belittle the 
crucial importance which forms of holding property play in the construction 
of social organisations:
Notions of property tinge every phase of social life, 
Marriage is in part consummated by the transfer of 
commodities and the woman acquired as a mate may herself 
be regarded as chattel, a conception that reacts on 
her status in the family 0 Polygamy was seen to depend 
on the husband's fortune; and at least among the Wahuma 
temporary polyandry results from the lack of property 
for the purchase of the individual spouse 0
He argues both that the transmission of property has been a potent factor 
in the creation of clan organisation and that wealth lies at the basis of the 
development of ranks and castes. Nevertheless, this critique destroys the 
possibility of constructing an evolutionary account of forms of holding
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property which itself would account for the development of kinship 
relationso It points to the fact that kin groupings themselves form 
part of the customary law by which property rights are often decided. 
This emphasis on the comparative nature of property relations and the 
emphasis on different forms, particularly within any given society, neglects 
the question of what relation these forms of property holding have to 
power and control. It is an account which neglects questions of the 
process of production, the forms in which it is initiated and controlled 
and the effect of this on social statuses and rights* It nevertheless 
points to speculative errors which are the legacy of evolutionary theory.
Kinship
The final major element in the rejection of unilinear histories is the 
reconsideration of kinship,. The end-product of this reconsideration was 
that kinship studies were hegemonised by a particular mode of explanation. 
In its initial moment however, the reconsideration represented itself 
simply as a long-overdue clarification of a state of theoretical confusion,, 
One of the favourites to disappear first was speculation over which
form of descent had universal precedence, mother or father-right. Such
(33) speculation is 'now gracing the refuse heaps of anthropological theory'.
Every one of the basic points in an argument for the unilinear development 
of kinship could be dismissed as contrary to ethnological evidence. Not 
only is monogamy common among the so-called rudest tribes but even in the 
case where this is not so, then nothing is proved of the necessity for
matrilineal descent; 'Biological paternity is one thing, sociological
(34) fatherhoodanother.' Briffault's The Mothers, was the swan song of
theories which still maintained the evolution from unregulated mating.
Malinowski closed the case on it as a work of 'brilliantly speculative
(35) erroneousness'.
While there may be some correlation between rules of inheritance and
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rules of descent, this is by no means a necessary correlation,, In 
general it may be true that in a matrilineal society, there will be 
matrilineal inheritance (that is to the mother's brother's family) and 
in a patrilineal society inheritance will pass from father to sons, but 
there are too many exceptions to be ignored:
There are matronymic tribes like the Crow and Hidatsa 
where some kinds of property are transmitted matri- 
lineally others patrilineally; there are patronymic 
tribes like Warrumunga among whom the legacy goes to 
the maternal uncles and daughters, husbands of the 
deceased, that is to his mother's moiety not his own. (36)
Finally the necessity that patrilineal descent should be established as soon 
as property begins to be accumulated is proved to be totally fallacious:
A number of historically known cases show there is no
automatic necessity. For example, the Navaho of
Northern Arizona profited by the introduction of sheep
into the South-¥est some time in the seventeenth
century so as to develop into a prosperous pastoral
people, yet in spite of their thriving flocks tended
by the men, they have remained obstinately matrilineal, (37)
Nothing other than the arbitrary imposition of an evolutionary schema 
of history onto this evidence could produce a necessary relation between 
the accumulation of property and father-right societies. This schema would 
be able to account for these societies as being in a state of transition 
but it would be imposing a schema which did not start from the facts: 
As Kroeber pointed out, starting from the facts 'would insist on first
depicting things as they are and then inferring generalisations secondarily
("58) if at all, instead of plunging at once into a search for principles.'
Kinship - heterogeneous elements
The rethinking of kinship, and in particular the rethinking of work on 
the classificatory systems of kinship took place in the context of an 
emphasis on 'kinship' as a series of heterogeneous relationships with 
distinct social functions. Kinship was broken down into a series of 
discrete functions, a move spearheaded by the attack on the idea that 
classificatory systems of kinship have procreative referents:
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It is only recently that it has come to be realised 
that the presence among social institutions of a people 
of this system of relationship termed, not too happily 
classificatory, does not imply the existence of classes 
of relatives with identity of kinship functions 
corresponding to identity of terminology. Analysis of 
the duties and obligations of a man to these various 
relatives who he addresses by the same term has revealed 
a distinct gradation, as it were, those in respect of 
near relatives being the most onerous and important, but 
lessening, shading off in intensity as the relationship 
bond becomes weaker,, (39)
Attention to the social functions of kinship led to a dismissal of the 
'monstrous' mistakes which characterised Morgan's interpretation of the 
classificatory system as the petrified remains of a previous social 
organisation:
It is almost ludicrous with what naivete Morgan 
assumes throughout his writings that the terminologies 
of kinship invariably lag one whole "stage of develop- 
ment" - neither more nor less - behind the sociological 
status in which they are found; and yet that they 
mirror the past sociological status perfectly. The 
mere logical circularity of the argument is appalling. (40)
Lowie is yet more dismissive of the blind alley along which the theories of 
the classifactory system have led anthropologists. Evidence of common 
terms, 'does not teach us that the mother's brother is called father
but that both mother's brother and father are designated by a common term
(41) 
not strictly corresponding to any in our language.' For Lowie, as for
other critics of the evolutionary hypothesis, the explanations are simple.
In the Hawaian system, studied by Morgan, kinship terminology, 'represents
(42)the stratification of blood kindred by generations.' This conclusion
can be applied generally, a conclusion given by concentrating on the 
immediate function of kinship: 'There is no reason for assuming that the 
natives ever meant to imply more than a social status when applying kinship 
terms.' ^ 43 '
This separation of kinship terminology and kinship relations from 
any necessary procreative referent was fundamentally premised on the 
insistence that any institution or practice which exists now, must have a
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place and function within the entire extant social system. Various 
areas could not be separated out as having distinct and isolated histories, 
they had to be understood as having an immediate function. Social forms 
which had previously been treated in isolation - the clan, the procreative 
family, affiliation and inheritance - had to be approached now as inter- 
related and having an immediate function. All these elements could 
sometimes be seen at play in the same society:
The modern or functional anthropologist proposes.... to
understand what kinship really means to the native; he
wishes to grasp how terminologies of kinship are used
and what they express; he wishes to see clearly the
relations between the family, the clan, and the tribe.
But the more he studies all these elements of the problem
and their inter-relation, the more clearly he realises
that we have to do here not with a number of isolated
entities but with parts of an organically connected whole,, (44)
The 'organically connected whole 1 is a social structure made of a number 
of inter-related entities,, Qnce recognised as this, what had been 
previously treated as atomised units at various stages of development, 
could now be seen as units functioning together to create an overall unity:
'while the family exists in many societies alone, the clan never replaces
(45) it, but is found as an additional institution. 1
It is quite clear that any theorisation will have to deal with this 
inter-relation of the various modes of reckoning alliance:
Again, though certain tribes use kinship terms in a 
wider sense they also use them in a narrower sense 
denoting actual members of the family. Or again, 
there is no such thing as pure mother-right or father- 
right, only a legal over-emphasis on one side of kinship 
accompanied very often by a strong emotional, at times 
even customary reaction against this over-emphasis<, 
And in all communities whatever the legal system might be both 
lines are de facto counted and influence the legal, economic 
and religious and emotional life of the individual. It is 
nothing short of nonsensical to perform this sort of 
illegitimate primitive surgery, to cut the organically 
connected elements asunder, and 'explain' them by placing 
the fragments on a diagram of imaginary development. (46)
The problem for anthropology then becomes one of finding out how the various 
institutions are related to one another, and how they function in relation
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to any given society as a totality: 'The real problem is to find out 
how they are related to one another, and how they function, that is, what
part they play respectively within the society,what social needs they
(47) 
satisfy and what influence they exert.'
From diachrony to synchrony: complex relations and the elementary family 
The shift from considering institutions in isolation to considering them as 
part of an immediate and functioning structure established a synchronic 
rather than diachronic approach to the social structure. The shift meant 
that the quest for a unilineal relationship between procreative family and 
complex kinship relations would be abandoned once and for all. But as 
this chapter will argue, the procreative family was in fact reinstated in 
this move, reinstated with a new importance.
Wild speculation about the history of the family and kinship 
arrangements was suspended; the aim of anthropology increasingly was to 
study social institutions and practices as elements interacting in a 
structure; increasingly, its object was minutely detailed accounts of 
distinct social units. These developments amount to a rigorous separation 
of strands which had often been run together,. The separation was imminent 
in some of the earlier debates traced in this thesis; here however it was 
systematised.
First of all, kinship and descent should be distinguished. Kinship 
implies a series of statuses and their interrelationship according to a 
variety of rules and principles; it distinguishes groups of kin from 
those defined as non-kin 0 Descent should be taken as the formation of a 
unit, designated as consanguinary related kin. Not all kin are included 
in a descent group. Moreover descent and inheritance do not necessarily 
follow the same lines. Authority, descent and inheritance are by no means 
confined to the same group<> Recognition of a descent group or shared 
lineage does not imply anything about the state of obligations between an
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individual and a social group. Finally the existence of the procreative 
family does not necessarily tell us anything about the complex of social 
statuses decreed by other practices, including kinship relations*
Biologically every community must rest on the family - 
the grouping comprising a married couple and their 
children. But biological and social necessity need not 
coincide. It does not follow that the biological family 
must exist as a unit differentiated from the rest of the 
society aggregate of which it forms part. The matter is 
not one for a priori argument but of empirical fact. (48)
In this context, a clarification of certain terms takes place. 
Relations of affiliation and obligation which in general had been run 
together, were now conceptually separated. As early as 1912, Malinowski 
had been insistent that kinship should be recognised as a series of 
heterogeneous modes of constructing relationships between various individuals, 
Relations of consanguinity, descent and inheritance should be conceptually 
separated. He gave this insistence a very particular colouring but it 
was an insistence characteristic of the critique of evolutionary accounts 
of kinship.
Consanguinity... is a set of relations involved by the 
collective ideas under which the facts of procreation are 
viewjd in a given society..  It may be said therefore 
that consanguinity is not always considered as the 
essence of kinship 0 If we now wish to determine what 
are the common features of the different ideas which 
in different societies define kinship the only answer is 
that the said ideas affirm in one way or another a very 
close, intimate tie between offspring and parents. These 
ideas may refer to physiological facts (consanguinity as 
found in the major part of human societies); or they may 
base kinship on the performance of a quite conventional 
ceremony (Todas, Banks Islanders); or they may affirm a 
very close tie between parent and child, on the base of 
some religious or magical belief... (49)
It follows from this that the general idea of kinship cannot be construed 
in terms of any of these special sets of ideas. In each culture ideas of 
kinship can be quite different and are socially recognised in a variety of 
ways.
Beyond parental kinship, there are according to Malinowski, a whole 
series of other ideas connected with kinship; given by 'the legal, moral
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and customary ideas by which a society exercises its normative power in 
reference to the said relation.' ^ ' These legal, moral and customary 
ideas can be broken down further into relations of descent and inheritance
within kinship:
There is also a series of social rules which regulate the 
social position of the offspring according to that of its 
parents. This group of rules might appropriately be 
called descent in the social sense of this word. In the 
Australian societies eg the membership of different 
social groups - as the local group, the totemic clan, 
the phratry, the class - is determined by the membership 
of one of the parents of the given individual. And 
many authors speak of tribes with paternal and maternal 
descent. It must be born in mind, nevertheless, that 
in order to use the word descent in a definite sense it 
is always necessary to add what social group is meant. 
For it is possible that membership in the local group is 
determined by the father, membership of the phratry by 
the mother, and membership of the clan by neither of 
them. The facts of descent do not seem to play a very 
important feature of kinship 0 The facts of inheritance 
also have not very much influence on kinship,, (5l)
Leaving aside Malinowski's hierarchy of significant elements, his position 
is typical in its emphasis on the differential positions by which the 
individual is bound in relation to others in any given society 0
The question became one of how to specify the various practices 
operating on the individual to define his/her social place. A series 
of practices, it was argued, would define the position any individual 
would occupy. There would be allegiances arising from the procreative 
unit, allegiances arising from descent group, from marriage, indeed a 
whole series of obligations according to generation, sex and status 
would have to be acknowledged as important in determining the social 
relations of any given individual in any given society 0
The insistence on the multiple obligations in which an individual 
is caught was accompanied by a simultaneous challenge to some of the previous 
assumptions as to the relation between the clan, .and political society. 
Lowie in The Origin of the State moves against Morgan's suggestion that 
kinship based societies and political societies (that is, with state
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apparatuses) are radically different. Instead he insists that even 
in societies where clan affiliation is to the forefront, there are often 
units of society organised on different bases. There is often evidence 
of territorial organisation existing simultaneous to clan organisation.
Thus the challenge to the conception of isolated and mutually- 
exclusive nature of social institutions is replaced by a notion of society 
made up of complex, inter-acting elements. A segment cut through an 
extant society would reveal not its successive geological strata, as 
Tylor had suggested, but a network of dependencies in which all elements 
are mutually interdependent and vital. No practice, in other words, can 
be understood except by reference to its relation to the sum total of all 
other social practices.
Two features are striking in this theoretical development. One is 
the move towards society as an expressive totality. Societies can only 
be treated in their specificity yet an account of all practices in their 
interaction adds up to 'the social', and each aspect of the social expresses 
something of that society as a totality. The second feature is that in 
this initial move against unilineal accounts of kinship structure, the 
procreative family in fact occupied a significant conceptual role, and 
to some extent gave a specific colouring to the development of structural 
functionalism.
To some extent, the procreative family was just taken for granted. 
The reduction of its significance and the reconsideration of the inter- 
relation between social and political practices provided the conditions by 
which social institutions could be conceptualised as elements interacting 
in a structure. It was no longer necessary to pre-suppose a coherent 
function or history for kinship and procreative family» The biological 
family had to be taken for granted in order that wild speculation about 
the history of the family could be suspended. Procreation and parental 
care exist - this does not exhaust what can be said about the numerous and
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complex ways in which social position and identity is constructed. 
In the writers under investigation the apparent suspension of 
speculation on the procreative family did not mean that it disappeared as 
an object of investigation. These writers are not presented as typifying 
the anthropological trajectory. However, their treatment of the procreative 
family and the effect of this treatment on the conceptualisation of sexuality 
is representative of general tendencies within the social sciences. They 
demonstrate how the procreative family was assumed through the theoretical 
division between individual and society. This also reveals how sexuality 
was ascribed to the side of the individual, an ascription which has affirmed 
essentialist theories of sex.
The initial situation
The family, writes Brenda Seligmann, never exists in isolation but always 
appears crossed by other social units, such as the clan or territorial 
groupings. However that the 'facts' or procreation could be presupposed 
does not mean that the concept had no further place in the study of social 
relations. Allegiances and structures found in this 'primitive family' 
(Seligmann), or 'initial situation' (Kalinowski) or 'elementary family 1 
(Radcliffe-Brown) could sometimes be taken as a model for other social 
relations.
'The initial situation of kinship' writes Malinowski 'is a compound of
biological and cultural elements, or rather...it consists of the facts of
(52) individual procreation culturally re-interpreted, ' While much of the
wild speculation on the history of the family could be abandoned, it was 
accepted that the obligations, emotions and structures found within the 
procreative unit were theoretically separable from relations formed at a 
wider social level: 'every human teing starts his sociological career
within the small family grcup... and whatever kinship might become later on
(53) in life it is always individual kinship at first.' The initial
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situation is however always deeply modified by the particular cultural 
configuration in which it arises. There are only ever the broad outlines 
of the initial situation; from the outset it is 'deeply modified by such 
elements as maternal or paternal counting of kinship, matrilocal and
patrilocal residence, the relative position of the husband and wife in a
(54) community, length of lactation, types of seclusion and taboos.'
For Malinowski the inter-relation between the initial situation, in 
its broadest outlines, and the wider social relations which inflect it, 
express the two fundamental functions of kinship in society - the 'individual 1 
and the 'communal' function. The wider or 'communal' functions can either 
be a consolidation or a distortion of the relationships found in 'individual 
kinship 1 (that is, the initial situation). The communal aspect is a 
function of allegiances within the group as a totality; sometimes it 
distorts relations of the initial situation with its complex series of 
relationships and obligations. The particular way in which an individual 
comes to enter the culture is through the internalisation of the collective
representations by which the wider group represents itself - an 'interpreta-
(55) tion of facts by the collective mind', a collective psychological
int erpretati on.
This insistance on the mode in which the wider relationships are 
internalised points to the importance with which the basic family is being 
invested. In spite of the insistence on cultural differences, it is the 
initial situation which is taken as the moment through which cultural 
relations are internalised. Thus the study of the initial situation, far 
from being trite and insignificant, is seen as a rich field of sociological 
investigation, and a field on which the anthropologist and the modern 
psychologist meet in common interest. This position is particularly 
revealing in the context of this thesis. It shows how one effect of the 
rigid insistence on a synchronic analysis - the analysis of the mutually 
interdependent elements and functions of a social structure - was to leave
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the way open to psychologistic, sometimes biological explanation of the 
causality of social structures.
When Malinowski makes the claim that: 'Parenthood is the starting
(56) point for most other sociological relationships 1 he lays the way
open to accounts about what constitutes the essential relationship of 
parenthood, however much he may say this initial situation is already 
prestructured. In particular it inscribes a division between the 
individual and the social. The individual is theorised as the 'given', 
the characteristics of the human, which are theorised as pre-social and 
essential; this is exactly a dominant division within psychology, which
is a mode of explanation favoured by Malinowski.
(57) Brenda Seligmann's widely acclaimed article 'Incest and Descent 1
pursued the direction suggested by this division into the communal and 
individual functions of kinship,, She uses psychoanalytic terms to account 
for the way in which incest prohibitions have grown up in the elementary 
family. She suggests that sexual rivalry and jealousy in the procreative
unit is such as to necessitate regulations by which generational authority
(58) is preserved. These structures of prohibition and regulation, she
argues, are then taken over by the communal aspect of kinship which extends 
and refines the regulations in the interests of social order and stability. 
It must be obvious, she writes, that
If there is any general law underlying all marriage
prohibitions, it must be founded on human emotions
and reactions; it must be biologically sound and
have a social value so great as to have become a
human institution: that is to say its ubiquity must
be due to the fact that it has proved so useful to
mankind that those peoples who have not adopted it
have fallen out of the struggle for existence and
have either ceased to exist or have any importance. (59)
There was a specifically psychological colouring to the writings of 
Seligmann and Malinowski, which will be of more central concern in the 
chapter dealing with the relationship between psychoanalysis and anthropology,
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There are nevertheless certain ways in which their tolerance for 
'psychological' explanations is characteristic of the space left open 
by the particular form which structural functionalism developed. There 
is the suggestion for example that the basically 'human 1 is a substantive 
realm, made up of emotions, sentiments and behavioural responses which can 
be accounted for and abstracted from the social relations in which they 
appear.
There is division between individual and society which was formed 
critically around the decision between 'initial situation' (that is basic 
family) and social regulations. In other words a slippage between 
individual and 'basic family' took place, and 'individual' was increasingly 
assigned to the realm of psychology. This designation of an individual 
and initial situation, given in the procreative family, entailed a series 
of conceptual slippages, around the notion of sexuality. Sexual regulation 
came to be thought as something internalised in the initial situation - 
thus the initial situation was constructed as an exchange between the 
instinctual and the social, constructing sexuality on the side of the 
individual rather than a social form, with its own history,.
In this way, the minimum common features of marriage relations - 
degrees of prohibited and preferential marriage (incest-taboo and exogamy) 
come to be thought as the definite area of regulation of the instinctual. 
Yet the determination of these instinctual regulations is thought to 
pertain to accounts of the 'instinctual', 'individual', 'human' etc. 
Within accounts of the structures and functions of social relations, these 
elementary structures can only be noted - their explanation can be taken 
care of by other disciplines:
It is not the function of the ethnologist but of the 
biologist and psychologist to explain why man has 
so deep-rooted a horror of incest, though personally 
I accept Hobhouse's view that the sentiment is 
instinctive. The student of society merely has 
to reckon with the fact that the dread of incest 
limits the biologically possible number of unions.
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He must further register the different ways in which 
different communities conceive the incest rule. For 
while parents and child, brother and sister, are 
universally barred from mating many tribes favour and 
all but prescribe marriages between certain more 
remote kindred. This is to say, while the aversion 
to marriage within the group of the closest relatives 
may be instinctive, the extension of the sentiment 
beyond the restricted circle is conventional, some 
tribes drawing the line far more rigorously than others. 
For example the Blackfoot of Montana not only discountenance 
the marriage of cousins but look askance at any union within 
the local band because there is always the suspicion that 
some close blood relationship may have been overlooked. (60)
Here, the suspension of general accounts of sexual regulation leaves the 
way open, as Lowie correctly notes, for accounts to be drawn from elsewhere - 
biology and psychology. Almost imperceptibly 'sexuality 1 has become the 
realm of the instinctual and individual outside the social whereas 
marriage is firmly entrenched in the social - it is a means by which 
groups make alliances with each other.
Anthropology here suspends consideration of the sexual - either as 
instinct or historical form. It concerns itself only with the effects 
of sexual regulation, and leaves a space - the instinctual - which is 
theorised as qualitatively different but the proper subject of investigation 
for other disciplir ?s. Thus a theoretical division within social sciences 
is inscribed in the heart of these tendencies within anthropology, a division 
between individual - instinctual, emotional, behavioural - and the 
collective - social, economic, political. The family becomes - the 
domestic institution -par excellence, theoretically distinguishable from 
so-called wider social relations like the clan:
.It dominates the early life of the individual; it controls 
domestic co-operation; it is the stage of the earliest 
parental cares and education. The clan on the other hand, 
is never a domestic institution. Bonds of clanship 
develop much later in life and though they develop out of 
the primary kinship of the family, this development 
is submitted to the one-sided distortion of matrilineal 
or patrilineal legal emphasis, and it functions in an 
entirely different sphere of interests: legal, economic 
and above all ceremonial. Once the functional distinction 
is made between the two modes of grouping, the family and 
the clan, most of the spurious problems and fictitious 
explanations dissolve into the speculative mists out of which 
they were born. (6l)
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It is partly an effect of the way in which the family is treated 
that reinforces this hopeless dilemma in the heart of the social sciences, 
a dilemma which is still difficult to overcome, since accounts of social 
relations are constantly confronted with substantive accounts of the 
individual, theorised as if this initial situation could be abstracted 
from the social relations in which it occurs.
The extent of the problem can perhaps be grasped by just considering 
the effects in these studies of the social even at this early stage. 
Radcliffe Brown advances the position that relations in the initial family 
can be the model for wider social relations:
The principle of social structure with which we are 
here concerned is therefore one by which the solidarity 
and unity of the family (elementary and compound) is 
utilised in order to define a more extended system of 
kinship, (62)
Seligmann suggests that clan and tribe relations took their specific 
form from the model of the relations within the primitive family. She 
gives the example that relations of super and sub-ordination between 
generations in wider social relations can be attributed to infantile 
dependency and parental authority.
The circularity of the argument should be apparent. Why should 
it be assumed that generational divisions entailing domination by the 
elders is the effect of 'natural' relations of domination between 
parents and children? The domination of a dependent group is by no 
means a given of all human relations. Indeed such domination where it 
occurs could well be argued to arise from other forms of domination in 
society at large. Yet Seligmann assumes that parental relations can be 
abstracted from the society in which they occur and then applied to that 
society as an 'explanation' of relations between social groups. Thus far 
from leaving a neutral space within an account of the social structure, 
the effect of such arguments is in the first place to construct an 
artificial division by the construction of conceptual differences; secondly
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to draw on disciplines whose account of the 'initial' situation has been 
developed again by abstracting a hypothesised state, outside social 
regulations. This example is extreme and may not appear a fair 
representation of structural functionalist accounts of social formations. 
It nevertheless attempts to outline some of the problems accruing the 
conceptual separation of 'initial' family situation and 'wider social 
relations'* Even if this separation is made and nothing is said about 
this initial situation, the positing of its existence as a conceptually 
separate space, constructs a space for 'the instinctual', the given, 
the individual response as somehow outside society.
The notion of social structure which is beginning to emerge is 
quite distinctive; certain questions were either suspended or thought 
to find their explanation elsewhere. A distinctive configuration of 
theoretical proposition emerges which cannot be divorced from the way in 
which the 'family' came to be thought. To summarise: there is the 
insistence on approaching culture as a horizontal segment, in which all 
parts are assumed to have a complex but necessary interrelation. There 
was a cautious suspension of the necessity to deduce any sequence between 
procreative unit and wider social groupings. Yet this suspension was 
also an affirmation. It constructed the procreative unit as a conceptually 
different space from society, hence other disciplines could be asked for 
causal explanations for the relationships found there. Moreover the 
procreative unit, or parental family, could be theorised as the meams by 
which so called wider social relations are internalised. While anthropology 
itself need not be asked to comment on the individual of the initial situation, 
it could usefully listen to these explanations of instinctual or sentimental 
attachments. These in turn could provide the explanation for other social 
relations; kinship for example might be seen as an extension of the relations 
and functions of the initial situation: 'kinship presents several facets
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corresponding to the various phases or stages of its development within 
the life history of the individual...kinship could be studied as a 
biographical approach. ' ^'
A critical problem with this theoretical division is that it 
affirmed essentialist notions of sexuality, a point which will be developed 
more fully in the concluding chapter, Sez and Social Relations. Briefly, 
the way in which this happened, was in two ways. On the one hand, the 
confinement of sez to the realm of the individual tended to mean it was 
theorised by those disciplines which are founded on forms of essentialising 
arguments, for ezample biology or psychology. On the other hand, the 
social sciences guarded themselves against radical criticisms of the notion 
of the individual, such as were implicit in psychoanalytic theory, thereby 
favouring theorisation of the individual in terms of instincts, behaviour, 
fundamental character, or whatever.
Expressive totalities
Having isolated the way in which the treatment of the family confirmed a
theoretical division between individual and society it is now necessary
to look at what is the overall conception of society. The social structure
is theorised in these accounts as a functioning social structure; individual
parts cannot be understood in isolation but must be understood as having an
integral and functional relationship to one another. No understanding of
one aspect of society can be produced without looking at all other aspects.
All the aspects add up to the totality of that particular society, and each
part taken in isolation expresses something of that totality. Such
theoretical propositions developed, laden with assumptions which have
added to the difficulty of theorising sexuality,, kinship and social relations:
...to understand any kinship system it is necessary to 
carry out an analysis in terms of social structure and 
social function. The components of social structures 
are human beings; and a structure is an arrangement of 
persons in relations institutionally defined and regulated.
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The social function of any feature of a system is its 
relation to the structure and its continuance and 
stability, not its relation to the biological needs of 
individuals. The analysis of any particular system 
cannot be effectively carried out except in the light 
of the knowledge we obtain by systematic comparison of 
diverse systems. (64)
There are several points worth noting about this account. It claims 
that it is theoretically possible to designate a social totality. The 
means by which the totality can be ascertained is by a detailed comparative 
study with other societies. The aim of that theoretical investigation is 
to demonstrate the function of social practices, understood as an effect of 
their relation to all other elements in that totality. The total social 
structure is understood as 'an arrangement of persons in relations 
institutionally defined and regulated 1 ; in other words, social structure 
is theorised as a series of relationships between human agents. The 
point of regulation of the places ascribed to these human individuals is 
to ensure the continuance and stability of that society as a totality. 
Thus, in the example under consideration, kinship is seen as a social 
structure whose function is determined by its relation to all other elements 
of the social structure. It is the means by which the individual is 
ascribed places within society by which the continuance and stability of 
that society are guaranteed. To exhaust the possible criticisms of
structural functionalism would go beyond the scope of this thesis. Its
(65) limitations have long been recorded. The problems raised here are
limited to those which are pertinent for understanding the problems in 
theorisation of sexuality from this particular perspective.
The most immediate problem relates to the endeavour to account for 
society as an expressive totality. The implication is that at any point 
a segment could be drawn through society and everything which is seen 
there will express something essential about that particular society. It 
assumes therefore there are general principles by which the society is 
articulated. Each aspect of the society will in itself express something
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of the overall interrelations which make up the social totality. This 
is going a good deal further than saying that any social practice or 
institution has definite social conditions of existence. Such a theory 
does not exclude the possibility of transitions from one general principle 
to another, but what tends to be implied is that transitions would consist 
in transitions from one general principle to another. In these accounts 
the articulating principle is rarely specified since general theories 
of the determination of the social formation are refused. Thus the 
conception would largely entail the idea of transition from one state of 
stability to another; the function of the interrelating social elements 
would then be to reproduce the state of stability.
This notion of an expressive totality does not conceive of practices 
constructing agents in contradictory and antagonistic positions. Nor does 
it allow for the fact that practices, although arising in determinate 
social conditions, need not express an essential general principle of 
the social structure. In theories of expressive totality, kinship 
was seen primarily as a mechanism by which places are ascribed to human 
agents in a functioning social structure. It becomes an agency of 
reproduction of the general principle of the social totality. In general 
the possibility that kinship itself might be a practice by which antagonistic 
statuses and sexual relations were constructed was not pursued. Kinship 
relations clearly do produce men and women, and different generations, in 
differential, deferential and often antagonistic relations. In these 
theories however this suggestion is marginalised in order to emphasise an 
underlying social order which is expressed through kinship relations.
A second limitation is exposed in Radcliffe-Brown's suggestion that 
a structure is an arrangement of persons institutionally defined. This 
says much more than society is made up of individuals. It is the effect 
of a definite theoretical position: society is primarily human relations. 
It marginalises the suggestion made by marxism that relations between
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humanly constructed institutions may not be relations between human 
agents, but rather that the relationship between institutions may well 
determine the available positions for individuals within a given society. 
The definition of society as institutionally defined relations between 
persons is a particular problem in that it allows the theoretical distinction 
individual/society to run rife. The individual as I have already remarked 
can be abstracted from the society and theorised as a substantive unit 
of emotions, instincts and sentiments, even if many anthropologists did 
not pursue this explicitly. It leaves open the possibility that social 
structures might ultimately be explained by primary emotions or behaviour.
This theoretical space combined with another aspect of the structural 
functionalist trajectory to produce a social science which was for a 
while peculiarly unsuited to make any general analysis of cultural forms 
yet left itself open to explanations from other disciplines. On the one 
hand was the theoretical division between individual/society; on the 
other was a rigorous refusal of any explicit general theory of the deter- 
mination of social relations. Whereas marxist theory might claim 
determination of cultural forms by the relations of production, the initial 
criticism of evolutionary theory was vehement in its rejection of any 
such generalised claim.
While many of the criticisms of the thoughtless equations produced 
by general theories of determination may still be considered valid, the 
refusal of any explicit general theory of social relations has resulted in 
very real problems, many of which anthropology itself soon recognised. 
Not least in these problems is that determination is in fact rarely refused; 
it is simply implicit. Hidden causalities all too readily creep in - in 
which psychological and biological explanations for sexual behaviour is 
one example. In the context of the refusal of general theories of the 
determination of such forms, spontaneous notions of power and domination 
and the distribution of inequalities frequently arise. Inequalities and
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the distribution of status are attributed to different forms of 'customary 
law', and differences between societies can only be recorded, never 
explained. This is clearly to be a problem for anthropology's relation 
to political theory. Whereas comparative data from other societies had 
had an honourable tradition in political sciences which used it to indicate 
the determination of different representation and customary forms by 
different factors of material life, the rigorous insistence on difference 
was to leave the way open to a hopeless spontaneism of difference. While 
not exactly recognised as a political problem, reservations about the 
apparent suspension of causal explanations were articulated quite early 
even within anthropology.
Comparative sterility
(6?) Kroeber reviewing Primitive Society in the American Anthropologist in 1920
takes the opportunity to review the state of the discipline of anthropology, 
on the grounds that Lowie's book is a perfect example of the state of 
American anthropology some fifty years after the monumental impact of 
Morgan's Ancient Society. Its method 'is the ethnographic one. That is, 
it is descriptive instead of primarily interpretative. It is historical 
in the sense that it insists on first depicting things as they are then
inferring generalisation, secondarily if at all, instead of plunging at
(68) 
once into a search for principles.'
The approach is one that describes; it does not interpret. It takes 
each unique event stressing difference and not 'the common likeness that 
may seem to run through events'. The work creates a double impression. 
Firstly, there is the 'endless diversity of institutions' and secondly, 'the 
uniformity of human motives'. The end result is a sense of the 
immense multiplicity of cultural phenomena, and more than a suggestion that 
nothing can be done to interpret these phenomena.
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Kroeber does not dispute that the evolution of this methodology 
in anthropology is to some extent the inevitable end-product of the logic 
of demystification which the study of primitive societies had been pursuing 
against the wild speculations of evolutionary theory. After all, he
writes, 'honesty is the primary virtue and Lowie's soberness is a long
(71) advance on Morgan's brilliant illusions. 1 But there are some
serious reservations to be raised about the direction taken by this work. 
There are no causal explanations advanced and the end-product is what 
Kroeber felicitiously refers to as 'comparative sterility':
though the method is sound, and the only one that 
the ethnologist has found justifiable yet to the worker 
in remote fields of science, and to the man of general 
intellectual interests, its products must appear 
rather sterile. There is little output that can be 
applied in other sciences. There is scarcely anything 
that psychology, which underlies anthropology can take 
hold of and utilise. There are, in short, no causal 
explanations. (72)
Here the theoretical shift which has taken place in the formation of 
anthropology becomes apparent. Firstly, there is agreement that the 
only justifiable study of other cultures will be the detailed and 
exhaustive study of all aspects of that culture; secondly, it is agreed 
that anthropology is about human relations and that the 'human' should be 
explained by substantive accounts drawn from the 'sciences' of the body 
and the mind. Finally, no a priori causal explanations can be offered; 
for Kroeber there is a certain hopelessness about this trajectory, though 
it may well be inevitable:
It may be nothing but the result of a sane scientific 
method in a historical field. But it seems important 
that ethnologists should recognise the situation. As 
long as we continue offering the world only reconstructions 
of specific detail, and consistently show a negativistic 
attitude towards broader conclusions the world will find 
very little profit in ethnology. People do want to 
know why. (73)
There is an uncanny resemblance between Kroeber's reservations and those 
expressed by critics of contemporary attempts to deconstruct general
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(74) theories. It does point to a still unresolved antagonism between
the requirement for general, usually 'materialist 1 , explanations of human 
culture to which comparative studies of cultures have been frequently 
susceptible, and a discipline which refused any explicit adherence to 
a theory of determination,,
Kroeber's account of the state of the discipline is however also 
a mythology; it is the representation which this trajectory also sought 
to give itself. For as the already-discussed tendency towards psycho- 
logism and biologism shows (a tendency which becomes explicit in the 
development of the culture and personality school of anthropology) it is 
not causality in general which is being suspended but rather particular 
forms of causality. What is refused is the unilinear history of any 
social institution and in particular theories of determination by the 
economy. Yet, ironically, the aggressive form taken by this rejection 
conceals the fact that these arguments retained the nebulous hierarchy 
of determination, discussed earlier. In this, certain practices occupy 
the role of determining, others the role of being determined.
The peculiar combination of the apparent suspension of general 
theories of determination, combined with very definite propositions as to 
the structural relation between elements in a social totality, produces 
a very distinctive theoretical configuration. On the one side is an 
insistence that societies express in all their parts the general principles 
by which the totality is articulated as a totality; on the other side is 
an insistence that all societies exist as radically distinct from one 
another and general theories of social determination should be suspended.
There is an interesting paradox in this development. It takes for 
granted that its specific object of investigation is a culture yet those 
elements which have been designated the cultural level - beliefs, representa- 
tions, sexual regulations, etc. - are rarely studied as specific and 
systematic activities. These studies are left to be dealt with by other
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disciplines, those dealing with the individual where these practices 
are properly thought to belong.
Conclusion
This chapter has focussed on one form of response to the debates covered 
in the previous chapters. This response has been favoured because it 
illuminates what criticisms can be made of earlier premises, criticisms 
which still remain pertinent. Yet this chapter has also argued that 
these criticisms are typical of a development within the social sciences 
which has hindered the production of non-essentialising theories of 
sexuality.
The form taken by cultural relativism and the insistence on empiricism 
rendered these arguments problematic for studying sex in anything other than 
essentialist terms. This is because sex was consigned to the realm of 
the individual, and therefore fell under a theoretical division between 
individual and society. In this, those practices which are deemed to 
come under the individual - that is, behaviour, sexual behaviour, instincts, 
needs,- are excluded from systematic study within the social sciences. 
Yet a distinctive space is left for them to be theorised as a substantive 
and essential realm which will be illuminated by biology or psychology. 
The effect of the individual/society division and the particular model 
of social structure evolved had definite consequences. Social divisions, 
antagonisms, and change disappeared as objects of enquiry. Where 
relations of power and domination were considered, they were often thought 
in the same terms as previously, that is as relations of intersubjective 
domination. Because they are thought to arise spontaneously, from the 
individual as it were, they evade theorisation. The possibility of studying 
sexual relations as constructed, with definite histories producing divisions 
and conflicts, virtually disappears.
The second part of this thesis will examine two theories which now
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have the greatest claim on our attention for providing an account of 
sexual relations in society, marxism and psychoanalysis. These 
theories are important for two reasons. On the one hand, marxism 
confronts the problem of the social construction of division and conflict 
while psychoanalysis attempts to elaborate a non-essentialist account of 
sexuality. Yet both these theories can be demonstrated to be inadequate 
when an account of sexuality in forms of domination between men and women 
is required. It will be argued that this inadequacy is partly dependent 
on the fact that both disciplines relied heavily on the terms outlined 
in the earlier chapters. It is also partly dependent on the internal 
exigencies of each discipline.
CHAPTER FIVE
THE CONCEPT OP THE FAMILY IF MARXIST THEORY
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Introduction
The following two chapters have two principle aims. One is to argue 
that the family played an important role within marxist theory rather 
than being undertheorised. The notion of the family, partly formed 
through the influence of the debates traced earlier in the thesis, partly 
through other influences from political theory, was crucially linked with 
the theorisation of classes, interests and agency of possession. The 
second aim is to demonstrate that this very centrality has ironically been 
a major stumbling block to understanding the family from the perspective 
of the social sexual division.
In the previous chapter it was argued that in the rejection of 
evolutionist doctrines and some of their theoretical premises, some forms 
of interrogation of the family and the position of women became virtually 
impossible. The form taken by cultural relativism in these critiques 
rendered them problematic for developing general theories as to the social 
position of women. Social divisions, antagonisms and change disappeared 
as objects of enquiry in the development of ideas of social structure. 
Yet where relations of domination were considered they were often thought 
in the same terms as previously, that is as relations of intersubjective 
domination. Because these were thought to arise spontaneously or 
naturally, they were, to some extent, ex'empt from theorisation.
Surely such criticism could never be levelled at marxist thought, 
a factor which would appear to constitute its appeal? Unlike those 
theories considered in the previous chapter, marxist theories have 
attempted to deliver a rigourously deterministic account of social relations 
and divisions. According to marxist thought, divisions and antagonisms 
within the social structure do not just arise spontaneously; they have 
definite historical conditions of existence and can therefore be overcome.
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It is for these reasons that marxism has had a constant engagement 
with feminism. Not only has equality between the sexes been an integral 
aspect of the explicit beliefs of socialism, but within the theoretical 
works there has been a commitment to understanding the origins and forms 
of domination and subordination between the sexes. The following 
examination is of the form taken by the understanding of the family within 
marxism. It will demonstrate how the specific dynamic of sexual relations 
both inside and outside the family was neglected precisely because of the 
theoretical centrality of this concept.
The family in the theories of the social totality
The theorisation of the family was especially important in the development 
of marxist political theory around the turn of the century. It provided an 
account of the relationship between 'civil' society and the political level 
of society (the state) in a class divided society.
The conceptualisation of the family was formed partly under the 
influence of German political theory, partly under the influence of the 
debates outlined earlier. Both these influences will be discussed in more 
detail later. 7/e will see how evolutionary ethnology provided the grounds 
through which a society without formal political regulation could be 
theorised - a society which was nevertheless regulated and not on the point 
of disintegration. This was important within marxism because the political 
level of society was considered to be an effect of class society and not 
the guardian of natural order.
The input from evolutionary accounts of the family was joined to other 
factors within marxist theory. The outcome was that a history of the family 
was seen as providing an account of how the mass was gradually individualised 
with the development of private property. Previous economic histories had 
often been characterised by the myth of the acquisitive individual through
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whom production was initiated and who constituted the natural possessor 
of private property. Against this subject, marxist theory produced the 
family as the economic subject of the bourgeoisie. The history of the 
family furnished an account of how bourgeois society had come into being, 
and the relation between bourgeois society and the state.
These brief outlines (which will be substantiated) begin to indicate 
the functions which the concept of the family was to have in marxist theory. 
It was mobilised as an agency of possession; for, although Marx criticised 
the content of previous theories he was never able to fully abandon the 
requirement for an economic subject theorised in human terms. Secondly, 
it was the concept by which various aspects of the social formation could 
be theoretically unified.
Finally the relations between the sexes in the family were sometimes 
taken by marxists as the model for other forms of social divisions. Women's 
subordination was the first subordination; others were built on this 
domination. Thus models of domination within marxist theory were frequently 
theorised along the lines of the intersubjective domination which had 
characterised earlier theories of the patriarchal family.
The centrality of the concept of the family can be demonstrated by 
considering the enormous impact of Engel's The Origins of the Family, 
Private Property and the State^ ' on the first generation of marxist 
politicians. In a lecture delivered in 1919, Lenin asked the following 
questions fundamental he claimed for developing a communist strategy: 
'what is the state, how did it arise and what fundamentally should be the
attitude to the state of the party of the working class, which is fighting
(2^for the complete overthrow of capitalism - the Communist Party?'^ ' To
answer these questions, he recommended that students should 'turn for help
to Engels' book, The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State': (3)
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This "book says that every state in which private ownership 
of the land and means of production exists in which capital 
dominates, however democratic it may be, is a capitalist 
state, a machine used by the capitalists to keep the working 
class and the poor peasants in subjection; while universal 
suffrage, a Constituent Assembly, parliament are merely a form, 
a sort of promissory note, which does not alter the essence of 
the matter. (4)
The quotation demonstrates the immense political significance attributed 
to Engels 1 book which overtly takes the history of the family as its main 
focus. Lenin relies upon Engels' claim that the history of the family has 
revealed the relationship between the state and private property. Lenin 
argues that for as long as private property exists, the state can never 
represent the interests of the working class, for the state has precisely 
arisen in order to regulate the interests of private property.
This is a marzist political position which is frequently encountered. 
The questions which it raises are: what is this 'private property'; what 
is the agency which possesses it; how is the agency of possession related 
to the state that the state should necessarily represent its interest? 
These questions are answered in -he Origins, Lenin asserts; such an 
assertion demonstrates clearly how the family was a concept by which a wider 
sociological picture was formed of the interaction between various elements 
of the social formation. More than just dealing with the position of women 
in society, Engels' text was frequently taken as a general statement of 
marzist philosophy by which political priorities could be formulated.
The study of the family assumed such an importance within marxism 
because it was developed by Engels in one of the texts where a more general 
account of the workings of the social formation was formulated. The early 
works of Marx himself had been concerned with developing a political and 
social theory but these works were not widely known to the first generation
of marxlst intellectuals and activists. Their main inspiration was Marx's
(5) political economy, Das Capital. x Many marxists, however, sought to
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supplement the analysis offered in Das Capital with wider, more directly 
political analyses of the interrelation between all aspects of the social 
formation. Thus the dominant influences on early marxist political 
thought were simultaneously Marx's Das Capital on the one hand, and, on the 
other, the more sociological works of Engels - The Anti-Duhring (l8?8), 
The Origins (1884) and Ludwig Feuerbach (1888).
That Marx's political economy seemed to lack an overall philosophical 
and social theory was a fact often bewailed, and it was generally claimed 
that Engels 1 writings, with their broader concerns, provided the basis of 
marxist social and political theory. Karl Kautsky wrote, 'Judging by 
the influence that Anti-Duhring had upon me... no other book can have 
contributed so much to the understanding of marxism' and 'Marx's Capital
is the more powerful work certainly. But it was only through Anti-Duhring
(6) that we learnt to understand Capital and read it properly 1 . Ryazanov
noted how 'the younger generation which began its activity during the 
second half of the seventies learned what was scientific socialism, what 
were its philosophical principles what was its method' mainly through 
Engels. 'For the dissemination of Marxism as a special method and a 
special system, no book except Capital itself has done as much as Anti-Duhring,
All the young Marxists who entered the public arena during the eighties -
(?)Bernstein, Karl Kautsky, Plekhanov - were brought up on this book.'^ 
In 1920, Max Adler (later leader of the Austrian social democratic party) 
remarked that Engels' work contained that general philosophical theory whose 
absence had been so often lamented in Marx's writ in;;;;. Adler went on to 
suggest that the reasons for this absence in Marx's own writings was 
that he had no time to develop such a theory having spent his whole life 
on Capital. The peculiar significance of Engels for the development and 
formation of marxism, lies 'in the way in which he liberated LIarx ! s
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sociological work from the special economic form in which it first appeared 
and placed it in the larger framework: of a general conception of society,
enlarging Marxist thought... into a world-view by his prodigious development
(8)
of its method, and his effort to relate it to the modern natural sciences'.
It has been suggested that Engels' influence can be attributed to the 
fact his writings were firmly situated within the evolutionist current which 
had gained intellectual ascendency. Colletti, for example, attributes 
Engels' significance to the requirements of the intellectual climate for 
general explanations and cultural theories:
The urgency and significance of these questions may be 
better grasped if one reflects upon the cultural and 
philosophical climate of the time. Zautsky, Plekhanov, 
Bernstein, Heinrich Cunow and others had grown up into a 
world profoundly different from that of Marx. In Germany 
the star of Hegel and the classical German philosophy had 
long since set. Kautsky and Bernstein were formed in a 
cultural milieu dominated by Darwinism,... The cultural 
mentality common to this whole generation behind it many 
differences, reposed upon a definite taste for great cosmic 
syntheses and world-views; and the key to the latter was 
always a simple unifying principle, an explanation embracing 
everything from the most elementary biological level right up 
to the level of human history. (9)
The account given in previous chapters of the intellectual milieu mil 
be sufficient to indicate the superficial nature of this assessment. 
Evolutionary theories had no single impact nor can 'Darwinian'be an 
adequate designation of the concerns of Engels' writings. The interest 
in general histories of human societies existed in the context of interest 
in explanations of origins and functions of a whole series of disparate 
social elements. Evolutionism was but one account of the way in which 
social institutions and beliefs could be demonstrated to have a unified 
history or functions. It was this unifying feature which was significant 
for the development of marxist political theory. It suggested a way in 
which society as a totality could be conceptualised. Hence, it offered a 
way of specifying political priorities in order to transform that social 
totality.
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What is especially interesting about these wider accounts is the 
extent to which the family is frequently the central object of interrogation. 
Both Cunow and Kautsky, leading politicians in the German social democratic 
movement, actively participated in the debates outlined in the first three 
chapters. They contributed to debates over the historical primacy of 
mother-right or father-right; Kautsky's article ! The Origins of Marriage 
and the family', argued before Engels, for the historical primacy of 
mother-right and its importance for theories of communism, suggesting the 
integral link between patriarchy and private property. ' Cunow made 
detailed studies of ethnographic literature, contributing to studies of the 
family. ' Both later took issue with Engels' outline in The Origins,
disputing the 'naturalness 1 which Engels assumed to underlie sexual
(12) division of labour. Marx, Engels, and Bebel were all deeply influenced
by the ethnographic debates on the history of the family. For these 
writers, the literature on the family was seen as vital for understanding 
the workings of society, hence for formulating a political position.
(riven what has been said in earlier chapters it is hardly surprising 
to find marxist theory implicated in these debates. Studies of the history 
of the family were the bearers of speculation on the nature and form of alliances 
between groups. The family was frequently taken as the key elements which 
would explain the history and the function of the interrelation between social 
institutions. Perhaps this centrality would also explain a factor which has 
often puzzled commentators on the history of marxism. For these commentators 
have often been worried by the fact that some of the early marxists were 
involved in population politics and eugenics programmes. It seems insufficient 
to attribute this to a climate of political concerns. Rather it would seem 
that the importance which the family had assumed in all social theories, 
including marxism, made it an important, perhaps the important object of
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intervention. Given the fact that the family was frequently taken as the 
lynch pin of social relations, it should "be hardly surprising that social 
theorists should have assessed that changes in family structures would 
be solutions to wider social problems.
Yet this centrality within marxist thought also requires explanation. 
For at another level, marxist theory, particularly embodied in the later 
economic writings of Marx himself, challenges any theories which negate the 
overriding importance of the economic contradictions of bourgeois society. 
These later writings are geared towards accounts of bourgeois social relations. 
They stress the overarching importance of the structural economic contradictions 
between classes and the determination by economic structures on the fonn 
taken by social relations.
Basing itself on these later writings, there is a tradition within 
marxism which insists that the marxism which concerns itself with histories 
of the family and with the family as an agency of possession are based on an 
early 'humanist 1 theoretical position which was subsequently disclaimed even
(rOby Marx himself. " A marxist account of the capitalist mode of production, 
they argue, does not require that the agency of possession should be 
personified; an account of the capitalist mode of production should be an 
account of the economic relations of exchange, circulation and distribution, 
with the relations of production in other words.
Yet this position disavows the fact that the status of agency of 
possession does not have one consistent theoretical interpretation within 
marxism; marxist scholars will doubtless continue to pit one reading against 
the other, since both cases can be made with equal validity. However, the 
contestation between the 'humanist' and 'the anti-humanist' readings of I.Iarx 
evades the issues which these two chapters attempt to raise. I am trying 
to argue that there was a tradition within ILarxist thought where the family
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was crucially important to an overall theorisation of social relations. 
This was of especial importance for those who attempted to develop a 
feminist perspective within marxism. The tradition where the family was 
a crucial concept was also the tradition where feminist issues were given 
some importance, for example within the early stages of European social 
democratic parties. What is of interest is how this concept of the family 
arose, what functions it fulfilled in relation to overall marxlst theory, 
and what its limitations were when it came to considering the family from 
the perspective of sexual division.
It is for this reason that the remainder of this chapter traces a 
genealogy in the marxist treatment of the family which could perhaps be 
disrupted by the anti-humanist readings of Marx. The genealogy is traced 
here to indicate how the concept of the family functioned in relation to 
other concepts within marxist theory when it was brought forward as a crucial 
explanatory concept. It is hoped also that this genealogy will demonstrate 
that the concept of the family has been much more important than has 
previously been recognised, particularly in the formulation of political 
priorities, and this is a major reason why feminist issues have not been 
properly raised.
The family, civil society and the state
"The political state cannot exist without the natural basis of the family 
and the artificial basis of civil society". (14)
Marx's early writings advanced a notion of the family in order to contest 
the abstract idealism of the Hegelian conception of the relation between the 
family, civil society and the state. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel had 
described the modern state as riven with contradiction, a description with 
which Marx agreed. But for Marx and Hegel the causes and effects of these
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contradictions are completely different. For Hegel, the State is
a potential means of unification of conflict in society that is conflict
(15) 
at the level of the family and civil society. ' It is therefore the
means by which the conflict of individual interest is overcome. The 
task of the modern state for Hegel is to restore the 'wholeness 1 of the 
ancient state, where the individual was profoundly integrated into the 
community without having surrendered the principle of subjective freedom. 
The hope for the unificatory nature of the state was unlike contractualist 
theories of the State which had preceeded it. Locke for example had 
argued that the state represented a form of agreement by which the 
antagonisms of private interest were governed but to the benefit of each. 
This theory however admitted the antagonism of private interest at the very 
basis of the social order, what Locke called 'natural society'. Marx- 
supported Hegel against this for his correct emphasis on the contradictory 
relation between the state and civil society. The state appears as an 
abstraction from civil society and as separated from that society.
Having agreed thus far however Marx and Hegel part company. Hegel's 
perception of the state was part of his general philosophy. All stages of 
historical development are stages in the self-production of the subject in 
history. Thus the various instances of-a particular moment proceed from 
the universal idea. In this case the State is a higher form in the self- 
production of the subject, transcending the previous stage. Thus the 
family and civil society which appear at first sight to be the preconditions 
for the emergence of the state, in Hegel's philosophy are in fact emanations 
from the state; 'the state is on the one hand external necessity, on the 
other imminent end'. The problem is a philosophical one. Hegel appears 
to describe the state as emerging from its precondition, the family and 
civil society. In fact logically in his arguments the family and civil
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society have to be seen as the effect or result of the self-development 
of the Idea rather than as the material conditions out of which the state 
emerges. For Marx, the family and civil society are the preconditions of 
the state; they are the true agents. For Hegel and speculative philosophy, 
the reverse is the case. When the Idea is made the subject of history, 
'the real subjects - civil society, the family ... are all transformed 
into Unreal objective moments of the Idea referring to different things.'^ ' 
Thus in Hegel the subject of history is the mind; historical phases are 
but instances of the mind unfolding itself pregressively;
The real idea is mind, which sundering itself into the 
two real spheres of its concept, the family and civil 
society, enters upon its finite phase ... the division 
of the state into family and civil society is ideal (l?)
Because the state is the higher form of the idea, the division of society 
into family and civil society is a necessary stage in the unfolding of the 
idea.
According to Marx1 this is an inversion of the reality. It is the 
history of the family and civil society which produces the state;
They are the driving force. According to Hegel however, they 
are produced by the real idea; it is not the course of their 
own life that joins them together to produce the state, but the 
life of the idea which has distinguished them from itself, (is)
The political state cannot exist, according to Marx'without the natural 
basis of the family and the artificial basis of civil society. These are 
its sine qua non; and yet the condition is posited (i.e. by Hegel) as 
the conditioned, the determinator as the determined, the producer as the
(TO}
product.' v ' Hegel's philosophy then can be deemed to be upside down, an 
effect not just of idealist philosophy, (which assumes that the idea determines 
the real) but of the fact that idealist philosophy reflects the inversion of 
reality in this society.
What is at stake for Marx in this disputation with idealist philosophy 
is to establish that the state is indeed a higher form but it is a form by
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which a riven and contradictory society is regulated. The state has its 
origins in the real material histories of the family and civil society. 
The point is to shift the account of the division of society, from an 
idealist notion of the necessary unfolding of the mind, to an account of 
division and contradiction which itself produces the necessity for the state 
as the means of regulating the potential chaos of conflicting interests.
For Marx, the crucial term in the history of these divisions is the history 
of private property. The conflict which Hegel sees in the heart of modern 
society is in fact class conflict, class conflict, premised on the division 
of labour, and as Marx says in The German Ideology, 'The various stages of 
development in the division of labour are just so many different forms of 
ownership, that is the existing stage of the division of labour determines 
also the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the 
material instrument and product of labour.'^ '
The antagonism which Hegel has uncovered is in fact the conflict 
between wealth and private property, and to start an analysis from the 
empirical family and civil society, rather than starting from the abstract 
idea, would be to discover the emergence of the state as a direct consequence 
of the division of labour and differential access to social wealth. It would 
be to discover what starts with the family as 'simple social relations' 
becomes a complex society riven by the division of labour and different access 
to the means of production. The emergence of the state will be seen to be 
 the constitution of private property'. The "loftiest" political 
principles are in fact those of private property. Thus the state arise as 
the space where the interests of private property are inscribed in the abstract 
against the contradictions and antagonisms generated by individual interests.
Hegel recognises the state as an abstraction but he fails to recognise 
the cause of this. The only way in which a society fragmented into competing
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private interests can achieve community is by the abstraction from or 
dissociation from the contending private interests. The resultant 
general interest is formal in nature and obtained by abstracting from 
reality, but the basis and content of such a 'political society' inevitably 
remains civil society with all its economic divisions. Beneath the 
abstract society (the state) real enstrangement persists. Because the 
'general interest' has been reached by neglecting or transcending individual 
interests, the latter nevertheless persist as the content of the state - 
as the unequal economic reality now sanctioned by the state;
One obtains man as an equal of other men, man as a member 
of his species and of the human community only by ignoring 
him as he is in really existing society (sic) and treating 
him as the citizen of an ethereal community. One obtains 
the citizen only by abstracting from the bourgeois. (2l)
This argument as to the nature of the state is made by Marx in 
relation to primogeniture, an example which demonstrates how the concept 
of the family is operating. Because Hegel sees the family as a natural 
basis, "the natural ethic", he sees the family as essential to the state 
and serving the state without self-serving. Marx, on the contrary, sees 
the nily as precisely that place where the fragmentation of modern society 
occurs; it is the place of private interests, hence any reference to the 
sanctity of the family hypocritically ignores the economic reality of that
institution;
...Hegel judged the class of landed property to be capable of 
adaptation to 'political position' because of its 'basis in 
family life'. He has himself declared that 'love' is the basis, 
the principle and spirit informing family life. We now see that 
the class which is based on family life is deprived of the basis 
of family life, it is deprived of love as the real and thus effective 
determining principle. It is the illusion of family life, family 
life in its most spineless form. At the point of its highest 
development the principle of private property contradicts the 
principle of family life. Family life therefore comes into its 
own as the life of the family, the life of love only in civil 
society, and not in the class 'whose ethical life is natural' that 
is the class of family life. This latter represents the barbarism 
of private property as opposed to family life. (22)
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Whereas Hegel sees the family holding private property as 'the natural 
ethic', Marx argues that private property renders 'the family' an illusion.
Marx demonstrates here a swivel of meaning around the notion of 'the 
family'. The family as Hegel implies it - representing love and self- 
sacrifice - is an illusion. For Marx, in a society where private property 
exists, there can be no such thing. This society requires abstract 
regulation and this will render the ideological concept of the family as 
loving meaningless, as the example of primogeniture is supposed to demonstrate 
The bond of the family is nothing other than a bond of property. Equally 
loved children cannot share in the wealth. It is entailed antomically to 
the eldest son and therefore baldly represents the march of individual 
property interests;
In reality primogeniture is a consequence of private property in 
the strict sense, private property petrifies, private property 
quand meme at the point of its greatest autonomy and sharpest 
definition' (23)
Primogeniture is seen as the superlative fozm of private property. The 
state recognises primogeniture and thereby demonstrates how the state 
represents the interests of private capital without representing the 
interests of human subjects;
What power does the political state exercise over private 
property through primogeniture? It isolates it from society 
and the family by bringing it to a peak of independence. What 
then is the power of the political state over private property? 
It is the power of private property itself, its essence brought 
into existence. What remains to the state as opposed to this 
essence? The illusion that it determines where it is in fact 
determined. No doubt it breaks the will of the family and society, 
but only to make way for the will of private property purified of 
family and society and to acknowledge the existence of this private 
property as the highest reality of the political state, as the 
highest ethical reality. (24)
A complicated relation is proposed here between family, state and private 
property. The state represents the interests of private property not the 
interests of the family. Families as such (implying apparently ideologies 
of love and mutual affection) are illusions. They are only recognised by 
the state in so far as their structures are economic structures. Yet it is
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precisely the history of the family and the emergence of private property 
which will explain the emergence of the state. That the state should not 
recognise families Tout only economic structures practiced by families 
creates the illusion that perhaps the family is an effect of the state. But 
no, the state has precisely arisen as a result of the antagonisms generated 
by the interests of private property.
We begin to see more clearly what is at stake in this contestation 
with Hegel around the notions of state and family. Marx seeks to establish 
class contradiction at the basis of the antagonisms of 'modern society', and 
furthermore to indicate the operations of the political state as the 
regulation of these private interests. The contestation over the notion 
of the family is in order to separate the concepts of family?civil society, 
and the state into a vertically chain to construct them as a history. It 
is not a question of the inevitability of these forms but of their material 
history.
The works of Marx and Engels continues to develop these questions. The
(25) German Ideology and then sections of the Grundrisse^ begin to deal with
that vertical account of the development of contemporary capitalist social 
relations and thereby to deconstruct the forms in which capitalism appears. 
While ilarx, in the Grundrisse and Capital increasingly devotes his time to 
a detailed analysis of the economic operations of contemporary capitalist 
society, the necessity for a historical account of the emergence of these 
forms is never lost. It remained for Engels however to rework the earlier 
philosophical manuscripts under the influence of ethnological debates, into 
a general sociological treatise on an outline of human history.
In the German Ideology Marx and Engels begin to outline what this 
material history of the family, civil society and the state would consist of. 
Again the object of attack is 'the german ideology' of the family, against 
which Marx and Engels seek to establish the 'empirical history of the family'
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It is in the family, they argue, that social divisions arise, and the 
history of the family reveals the accumulation of wealth and the division 
If labour which gradually transforms the 'sole simple' relations of the 
family of the primitive group.
Refusing to start from the abstract "religious" suppositions of 
german philosophy, the materialist history takes as its starting point 'real
individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which
(26)the live'. ' Mankind is distinguished from the animals as soon as
production commences and what human beings are coincides with what they 
produce and how they produce, that is the mode of production. The 
internal state of the nation depends on the stage of development reached 
by production; 'how far the productive forces of a nation are developed
is shown most manifestly by the degree to which the division of labour
(27) has been carried'. ' Yet division of labour in this account is not
spontaneous, arising out of natural and god-given differences. It is 
an effect of differential property relations. The various stages of the 
development of the division of labour are just so many different forms of 
ownership; 'the existing stage in the division of laljur determines also
the relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material
(28)instrument and product of labour.'
At this stage Marx and Engels assume that the first and most primitive 
form of ownership is tribal ownership 'corresponding' to an undeveloped 
stage of production and absence of division of labour. The only division
of labour is very elementary, 'confined to a further extension of the
(29) 
natural division of labour existing in the family'.^ ' The history of
the development of division of labour and different forms of ownership is 
the development from the "simple" relations of the family in the tribe with 
its 'natural' division of labour between the sexes to the comples forms of 
division and ownership as production develops:
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The social structure therefore is limited to an extension of 
the family, patriarchal family chieftans, below them members 
of the tribe, finally slaves. The slavery latent in the 
family only develops gradually with the increase in population 
the growth of wants, and with the extension of external 
relations, both of war and barter.' (30)
In this account, divisions of labour arise through the application 
of specifically human attributes, that is, labour. In order to make 
history, man must be able to live and the first historical act therefore 
is the production of material life itself to satisfy those needs. The 
satisfaction of the first need leads to new needs: '(the action of 
satisfying and the instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) 
leads to new needs'. ' The final yet simultaneous element which enters 
historical development is that men live in social relations, that is, the 
family and this becomes more complex as population increases:
men who daily remake their own life begin to make other men, 
to propagate their kind: the relation between man and woman, 
parents and children, the family (32)
The family is the first form of social relationship. Increased population 
and changes in production create more complex social relations which 
converts the family itself into a subordinate social relation. These are 
the simultaneous conditions which are the motor of history; the 
production of life, 'both of one's own labour and of fresh life in
procreation.' This is a double movement; 'on the one hand as a
/^
natural, on the other as a social relationship.'
There are several deep-rooted assumptions as to the nature of the 
family and its relation to society at this stage. The family is assumed 
to be the procreative unit. In addition, there is the supposition of a
natural division of labour based on the natural division between the sexes,
(35)
an assumption revealed in recent feminist writings. x ' At this stage
patriarchy is taken to be the natural or original familial relation, an
later to be transformed by Morgan's historical schema. Finally,
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there is the assumption of the "latent slavery" of the patriarchal family. 
It is theorised here as a mode of subordination on which subsequent 
proprietorial rights are based. Thus there is a certain slippage between 
natural rights - taken to be the power of the patriarch - and proprietorial 
rights:
This latent slavery in the family, though still very crude, 
is the first property but even at this early stage it
corresponds perfectly to the definition of modern economists 
who call it the power of disposing of the labour power of others. 
Division of labour and private property are moreover, identical 
expressions; in the one the same thing is affirmed with reference 
to activity is affirmed in the other with reference to the product 
of the activity. (36)
By assuming that the family is a productive unit under the power of a 
patriarch, Marx and Engels are able to construct a model of proprietorial 
rights - the capacity to dispose of the labour power of others. Because of 
the model of the patriarchal family, this capacity is also theorised as 
authority and control. At this stage, the model on which the conception of
the early family is based is not entirely dissimilar from Maine's, assuming
(37) the naturalness of patriarchy. As Judith Ennew has pointed out, the
motor of historical development is nothing more than the intensification
of population, a fact which indicates the significance with which the family
is attributed in arguing against idealist philosophy.
The implication, then is that the initial motor of transition is 
an increasing population. Further transitions are accounted for in 
terms of increased specialisation of functions and its concommitant social 
division of labour. This not only is made possible by, but increases the 
further possibilities of, producing a surplus over and above what is needed 
to maintain the individual and the community of which he (sic) is part. 
The existence of both the surplus and the social division of labour makes 
possible exchange. Initially however both production and exchange have as 
their object merely use. It is as a result of the relations which people
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enter into through specialisation of labour that this is changed. 
Exchange develops as the specialisation of labour is progressively clarified 
and sophisticated until the invention of money and with it commodity 
production and exchange, provides a basis for previously unimaginable 
procedures, in particular capital accumulation.
Increasingly the writings of Marx come to be concerned with a detailed 
description of the workings of the specifically capitalist mode of production: 
the structures entailed by exchange, capital accumulation and commodity 
production. In Grundrisse and Capital the division of labour is theorised 
as giving rise to an antagonism resulting from the contradiction between 
control of, and separation from the means of production. Separation involves 
the separation of the workers from the means of production, usually by 
means of legal property and effective possession through the agency of 
ownership. Effective possession is the agency with the capacity to control 
the means of production, that is to set them in motion, to finance enterprises 
and to control decision making bodies. These two structures are however 
combined in a distinctive mode. The worker is always combined with the 
means of production through the wage form in which labour power is converted 
into a commodity. In addition, possession is not only the capacity to 
control and to exclude others from its use. The means of production are 
also possessed in the forms of commodities. Labour power is purchased in 
the form of commodities. Labour power is purchased in the form of wages 
and the production process takes the form of the production of commodities 
by means of other commodities, that is by the means of production and labour 
power. It is the division of labour within this schema which constitutes 
the class relations of capitalism.
Proponents of the epistemological break version of marxist thought^ ' 
would probably argue that it is the description of these abstract structures 
of' capitalist relations of production v/hich become all-important for the
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development of marxist thought. It would be difficult however to 
ignore the fact that the early preoccupations with the history and the 
function of the family did not just disappear in the later writings. For 
one thing the family continues to function as an implicit concept in Marx's 
Has Capital; on the one hand he refers to the wage being set by the cost 
of reproduction of the labourer and family; at other times he discusses 
the increase of female labour as destroying this reproductive unit, bringing 
more labourers into the labour process and thereby facilitating the increase 
in the production of surplus value. Thus although Marx often appears to 
talk about the abstract nature of relations of production, his actual 
analysis often requires concepts of ideological social relations. 
Moreover, there was an explicit continuance of concern with the family 
as crucial social concept within the marxist tradition.
During 1879-82, Marx himself carried out extensive research on the 
ethnographic writings on the family; his object was to research different 
modes of production and he concentrated on the debates generated by 
comparative jurisprudence over different forms of property holdings. He 
was particularly concerned with studies of the so-called peasant collectives, 
studies of the zadruga household, and Morgan's accounts of the primitive
gens. The research, Krader records in his edition of Marx's Ethnological
(39) rotebooks v is 'increasingly concrete' and increasingly concerned with the
evolution of civil society, with the interests of economic classes and their 
opposition, the evolution of the peasant collective institutions, the 
relations of the family and civil society, the state and society, the division 
of social labour etc.'^ ' It was on Marx's ethnological research that 
Engels drew heavily in writing The Origins of the Family, Private Property and 
the State. Both Marx's research and Engels' development of this research 
show how the theme of transitions in the family is crucially linked to 
other theoretical objectives in Marxist thought. Both these writings show
- 198 -
that the interest in the family of Marx's early philosophical writings, 
although changed by the encounter with ethnography, remained fundamentally 
similar. The detailed study of The Origins ',vhich follows attempts to 
outline a particular theoretical configuration around the concept of the 
family which developed within marxism. It is outlined because it was this 
configuration which tended to dominate both debates and politics addressed 
to the woman question. Thus the discussion of the concept within The Origins 
will demonstrate the conditions which rendered marxism paradoxically weak in 
dealing with the specificity of sexual division.
The Origins of the Pamily, Private Properly and the State. 
Published in 1884, Engels' The Origins offered itself modestly as simply 
fulfilling the bequest of Marx. It was simply an ordering of the ideas 
reached by Marx in his extensive reading of ethnographic material; it was 
'a meagre -substitute for what my departed friend no longer had
time to do.'^41 '
Yet as I have already suggested the impact of the book was of far 
wider significance than these modest claims would suggest. On the one hand 
it was a systematisation of Marx's previous thought on the relation between 
the state, the family and private property. As such it was received as an 
easy and comprehensible summary of the Marxist philosophy of the state and 
private property. On the other hand, it did also specifically address the
question of the position of women in society, and from a socialist standpoint.
(42)Together with Bebel's Woman under socialism^ it was important in
articulating a position on 'the woman question' which transformed the question 
from one entailing individualist solutions to one necessitating socialist 
solutions. Clare Zetkin, Alexandra Kollontai and numerous other socialist 
women recorded the profound influence which Engels' text had on their ov/n 
formulation of the woman question. As such Engels 1 text deserves detailed
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consideration for it reveals above all, the political theory by which 
the woman question became such a problematic area in marxism while at the 
same time being absolutely central to it.
The Origins offers to supplement the materialist account of history 
advanced by Marx with Morgan's account of the pre-history of the human 
species; 'Morgan in his own way had discovered afresh in America the 
material conception of history discovered by Marx forty years ago, and
in his comparison of barbarism and civilisation, it had led him...
(43) to the same conclusions as Marx.' Morgan's researches were taken
as penetrating beyond written records to prehistory making it possible to 
solve some of the most puzzling riddles of Greek, Roman and German history. 
It is this elaboration of the pre-historic, the pre-recorded history of the 
human race which is to be added to the discoveries of historical materialism. 
There are two questions to be asked of Marx and Engels' violent adherence 
to Morgan's historical schema. The first is what tenets of .Ancient History 
were taken as demonstrating the fundamental historical materialist method? 
The second is what elements of Morgan's schema caused Engels' partisan support 
of Morgan's as against all other versions of pre-history?
The first can be dealt with briefly since it is already well covered in 
commentaries on Engels' text. Ancient Society advances a notion of the 
progressive evolution of society which passes through a series of technical 
transformations, passing through three dominant epochs, savagery, barbarism 
and civilisation. Morgan is taken to be arguing in support of 'the 
materialist conception' that 'the determining factor in history is, in the 
final instance, the production and reproduction of immediate life'. ' 
Against the primacy of the idea and consciousness, labour and the processes 
by which the human species reproduces itself are brought to the fore. Tv/o 
points can be made in passing. Firstly, although this statement is often 
claimed to be a statement of the historical materialist methodology, its
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blandness in fact evades any precise specification of the relations 
of causality and determination between social elements in 'historical 
materialism'. Secondly, the description refers to reproduction as a purely 
procreative function. There is not the slightest hint in the following 
quotation of the idea of reproduction as the reproduction of the social 
totality. The production and reproduction of immediate life;
is of a two-fold character: on the one side, the production 
of the means of existence, of food, clothing and shelter 
and the tools necessary for that production; on the other 
side, the production of human beings themselves, the propagation 
of the species. The social organisation under which the people 
of a particular historical epoch and a particular country live is 
determined by both kinds of production: by the stage of development 
of labour on the one hand and the family on the other. (45)
Some^ have taken this statement as opening the way to a separate 
materialist history of the family though as any examination of The Origins 
will reveal, the history of the family proposed there has little to offer 
a feminist perspective. More generally it can be said of both these 
propositions that at best they offer a bland statement that history 
delivers a record of the production and reproduction of human life. However 
this tells us little of the particularity of the forms of determination and 
causality proposed by those theories.
Because of the vagueness of this statement as to what is entailed in 
the historical materialist method and the way in which Morgan is said to 
uphold it, I would argue that of much more interest is the second question: 
why the partisan championing of Morgan? It is this which reveals the 
theoretical function of the family for Engels.
The matriarchal gens
In the preface to the fourth edition, Engels outlines what is at stake for 
him in supporting Morgan in his disagreement with McLennan. There are two 
points on which the authors radically disagree. Firstly, Morgan disputed
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McLennan's classification of tribes as. divided into exogamous and 
endogamous groupings.^ '' Secondly there is McLennan's refusal to entertain 
the possibility of group marriage. McLennan refused the deduction made by 
Morgan from the non-correspondence between systems of consanguinity and the 
procreative family, the deduction that social relations did once correspond 
to the designations which now remain. McLennan insisted on a series of 
possible original forms resulting from population exigencies.
Morgan's position is fed by his insistence on the historical and 
universal primacy of the maternal exogamous gens, out of which the paternal 
gens only later emerged. The peculiar significance of Morgan for Engels 
lies in this claim of the universal and historical primacy of the 
matriarchal gens;
The rediscovery of the primitive matriarchal gens as the 
earlier stage of the patriarchal gens of civilised peoples 
has the same importance for anthropology as Darwin's theory 
of evolution has for biology and Marx's theory of surplus value 
for political economy. It enabled Morgan to outline for the 
first time a history of the family in which for the present so 
far as the material now available permits at least the classic 
stages of development in their main outline are now determined. 
That this opens a new epoch in the treatment of primitive history 
must be clear to everyone. The matriarchal gens has become the 
pivot on which the whole science turns; since its discovery we 
know where to look and what to look for in our research, and how 
to arrange our results. (48)
Why is it that the hypothesis of the matriarchal gens should show 'where 
to look and what to look for in our research and how to arrange the results.'? 
Why should such a hypothesis be so important for an account of society which 
was to influence the development of marxist political theory?
The matriarchal gens is a significant hypothesis for the reason 
that it is an account of a society based neither on the supposed supra- 
individual abstract regulation which characterises the state and the political 
level, nor on the supposed 'individualism'of the family. It is thus an 
account of social relations before the emergence of class society, where
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the primacy of the regulated collectivity is stressed over individualism 
or unregulated promiscuity. The account of the dissolution of first the 
matriarchal gens, then the patriarchal gens is a complex one. In Engels' 
hands, it entails not only the history of the monogamous family but also 
the transformation of modes of production and the history of the division of 
labour. These histories are given a necessary interrelation which is 
absent in Morgan. In the construction of a rigorous theory of causality, 
"the family" comes to bear a great deal of weight.
The significance of stressing the primacy of the maternal collectivity
becomes clear in Engels' dismissal of theories of an initial stage of
(49) 
unregulated promiscuity. These wrongly interpreted the evidence of
group marriage for evidence of a state of no marriage and pure promiscuity. 
Such evidence drawn from the animal kingdom can be rendered suspect; this 
being true also for theories of primitive jealousy. Something more was 
required of primitive man to become human: a condition of sociability 
entailing mutual toleration and freedom from jealousy. This 'was the 
first condition for the formation of those larger permanent groups in which 
alone animals could become man,' Engels insists on group marriage at
the origins of human life. It shows the absence of any feeling of
(51) jealousy which 'develops relatively late') and the absence of the morality
which later becomes customary, such as the prohibition of incest. Prohibition
fcp)
of incest can be considered as 'a very valuable' irv-ention x '; it is a 
response to the unconsciously discerned advantages resulting from natural 
selection.
There can be no question that the tribes among whom inbreeding 
was restricted ...were bound to develop more quickly and more 
fully than those among whom marriage between brothers and sisters 
remained the rule and the law. (53)
The first social form then for Engels is the collective household
practicing group marriage. Its existence proves both absence of jealousy and
the existence of primitive communism. Husbands and wives are possessed
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collectively and the only form of sexual prohibition is that between 
generations. While collective possession to some extent remains in force, 
gradually more extensive forms of incest prohibition begin to be practiced. 
A prohibition which emerges between siblings with the same mother is 
gradually extended to all collateral brothers and sisters. Siblings become 
organised into separate sexed groupings, each group being united by their 
claim of a female ancestor. Female lineage is seen as inevitable since 
fatherhood is unknowable. This is the matriarchal gens, a group recognising
common ancestry but not differentiated into the individual or pairing
(54) family. It is significant because it reveals a social bond without
individualised possession, providing us 'with an unsuspected wealth of
information about the fundamental features of social constitution in
(55) primitive times, before the introduction of the state.' ^  ' If this is
the fundamental arrangement of the social constitution, how then did 
individual possession arise; how did the pairing marriage emerge; and 
why did the state arise if none of these forms are fundamental to society 
itself? To unravel the strands in the history of these relations is 
offered as an understanding of their contemporary function and a 
demonstration of their transitoriness.
The emergence of the pairing family
Initially pairing marriage arises partly as a result of ever increasing 
marriage restrictions contingent on the workings of natural selection, 
partly as a result of the action of women who seek to raise themselves 
from the degraded position in group marriage. It is suggested that with 
growing populations, group marriage became more oppressive for women who, 
unlike the men, became motivated to press for more restricted marriages. 
In order for this change to became widespread, however, new social forces 
had to emerge and these were the effect of transitions in the mode of
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production. Formerly food had to be won afresh every day. But with the 
domestication of annuals and the development of agriculture, long term 
supplies, even possibly a surplus of provision can be created.
At this stage, wealth belongs to the gens but it instantly begins 
to transform social relationships. Slavery for example becomes a viable 
form of social relation. Whereas conquered tribes previously were either 
killed or incorporated, now the existence of slaves is seen as a source of 
increased production. This is because the family did not increase as 
quickly as the cattle; thus more people were required to look: after them. 
Here arises the possibility of the 'individual 1 family: the possibility 
that an 'individual 1 family may be able to acquire adequate labour outside 
its relation to the gens. Marx registering the significance of slavery in 
the emergence of the individual family had written in his ethnological 
notebooks,
In fact the monogamous family rests everywhere, in order
to have an independent isolated existence, upon a domestic
class which originally was direct slaves. (56)
The slavery inherent in the family is thus expressed in the acquisition 
of direct slaves.
These two factors deal the death blow to the matriarchal gens, and 
the overthrow of matriarchal principles which Engels called 'the world 
historical defeat of women 1 . On the one hand, the pairing family introduces 
the certainty of paternity. On the other hand the accumulation of wealth 
and in particular the form in which it is acquired lead to the men seeking 
to transmit their property to their own genetic offspring. This is 
because the sexual division of labour is such that property in the form of 
the domestication of animals is in the hands of men; as a consequence it 
is their property. It is this which lies behind the emergence of the 
patriarchal family, the absolute control vested in the hands of one 
patriarch, and the establishment of the patriarchal gens. At this stage
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the patriarchal family retains vestiges of the former collectivity of 
society. A conception of the patriarchal household taken from comparative 
jurisprudence furnishes evidence of collective possession; it is a 
collective economic unit in which absolute control is vested in the hands 
of the patriarch.
From this stage, it is a small step to the monogamous family, which 
^is 'based on the supremacy of the man, the express purpose to produce 
children of undisputed paternity'. (5?)
Monogamy arose from the concentration of considerable wealth 
in the hands of a single individual - a man - and from the need 
to bequeath this wealth to the children of that man and no other. 
For this purpose the monogamy of the woman was required, not that 
of the man, so this monogamy did not in any way interfere with open 
or concealed polygamy on the part of man' (58)
Thus far we can conclude certain things from this account of the 
emergence of the monogamous family, and its relation to the history of 
property. Obviously, it is steeped in the errors of speculative 
anthropology which assume a general and universal history of the family is 
possible. Further, it assumes a natural social division of labour in which 
men as the creators of property are also the owners of property. Additional 
presuppositions are made about the functioning and interests of the sexes. 
Women will abhor promiscuity; men on the other hand will pursue their 
promiscuous interest wherever possible. Men will inevitably seek to 
establish their genetic rights over 'their' offspring. only is it 
assumed that what is created is owned but also the acts of creation and 
ownership will be accompanied by the desire to transmit property exclusively 
to genetic offspring.
Engels' argument finally rests on a curious circularity resulting 
from the presupposition that pairing marriage is the unification of man and 
women for the purpose of procreation with a definite economic and leg^l 
relation. The collectivity -primitive communism- is 'proved' by the
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apparent prevalence of group marriage which apparently proves the absence 
of property rights. What is being presupposed is that pairing or 
monogamous marriage in and of itself entails a form of possession in 
the sense of possession of commodities. The exclusivity of sexual 
relations is therefore assumed to be a contract in which one human subject 
becomes the possession of another - in general the husband acquires the 
right to dispense with the labour power of the woman and her offspring. 
Lineage thus becomes a sign of the capacity to dispose of the labour power 
of others - and this as we will see later on is Engels' model for the first 
form of private property. But in order to prove that the original social 
forms did not entail private property, Engels has to presume that monogamous 
marriage always expresses possession when the aim of Origins is to 
demonstrate the particular history by which this in fact emerges. The 
absence of pairing marriage can then be taken as a sign of the absence of 
individualisation and private property. All share equal rights in marriage, 
they must therefore share equal rights to the product and control of labour. 
The 'authority 1 of the patriarch, put to use to guarantee a p^trticular form 
o'" accumulation becomes the model of ownership. It entails the capacity to 
dispose of others' labour-power. The relation of marriage however is 
a contract which permits this first form of private ownership. In this 
account then the individual family is both an effect of a mode of production 
but a social relation which makes a mode of production workable.
The history of the family however is by no means unilinear or isolated. 
Its history is integral both to the transformation of the 'governance' of 
the gens and the transformations in the mode of production. Its history 
therefore is inseparable from the history of the state. It is the 
individualised family which is a precondition for the emergence of the state; 
it is the individual family to which the state addresses itself.
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The dissolution of the gens and the emergence of the State 
The gens is as we have seen a distinct social group with distinct forms of 
social organisation which is not yet individualised. At first the gens is 
democratically organised; it elects representatives to wider confederacies, 
that is the phratries and the tribes.
And a wonderful constitution it is, this gentile constitution, 
in all its childlike simplicity! No soldiers, no gendarmes or 
police, no nobles, kings, regents, prefects or judges, no prison 
or lawsuits - and everything takes an orderly course. All quarrels 
and disputes are settled by the whole of the community affected, by 
the gens or the tribe, or by the gentes among themselves;... the 
household is maintained by a number of families in common and is 
communistic, the land belongs to the tribe, only the small gardens 
are alloted provisionally to the households - yet there is no need 
for even a trace of our complicated administrative apparatus with all 
its ramifications. (59)
Yet this social structure was doomed, Respite its "moral greatness". 
There was a lack of regulation between tribes which led to a state of constant 
warfare. Furthermore, the organisation was premised on an undeveloped state 
of production and an extremely sparse population;
Man's attitude to nature was therefore one of almost complete 
subjection to a strange incomprehensible power, as is reflected 
in his childish religious conceptions. Man was bounded by his tribe, 
both in relation to strangers from the outside of the tribe and to 
himself; the tribe, the gens, and their institutions were sacred 
and inviolable, a higher power established by nature to which the 
individual subjected himself unconditionally in feeling, thought 
and action. However impressive the people of this epoch appear 
to us, they are completely undifferentiated from one another; as 
Marx says, they are still attached to the navel string of the 
primitive community. (60)
Individualisation from the mass takes place through the emergence of the 
family from the gens. ' Engels is able to mark out a distinction between 
the family and the gens, arguing for the primacy of the later, precisely 
because he sees the family as the procreative grouping, identified as a 
unit distinct from all other similar procreative units. In fact neither 
gens nor totemic groupings would exclude the existence of quite distinctive 
households with rival interests. But for Engels, this procreative grouping
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is in antagonism with the gens; it is the very structure of individual 
interests since it provides a rationale for the developing modes of 
accumulation.
The transformation of the gens originally unified by social and 
collective considerations rather than the individualism of the family, 
takes place partly as a result of the natural history of the family, but 
also a result of distinctive economic conditions. Initially hunting 
society, with sparse population, is divided only according to primitive 
social division, that is the natural division between the sexes. This 
division, predictably, is the division around women's management of the 
home and men's involvement with hunting. Wealth initially is created by the 
men who "discover" agriculture and the domestication of animals. In this 
way the high status which women had originally enjoyed is destroyed. The 
power supposedly invested in their control of lineage and their exclusive 
involvement with the household is wrenched away from them. Instead, power 
now accrues to property and property accrues to those who create it. This 
development transforms the relative statuses of the sexes. Another consequence 
in this gradual development of the means of production is that it inaugurates 
the first great social division, between those tribes where pastoral forms 
are quickly instituted and those which continue in their former ways. The 
production of milk, meat, skins and even surpluses of these lays the 
foundations for exchange to take place. Thus the differentiation of 
pastoral tribes paves the way for exchange to become a regular institution.
It was the increase of production in all branches - cattle raising, 
agriculture, domestic handicrafts which gave human labour the capacity to 
produce more than was necessary for its maintenance. At the same time this 
required more intensive labour - a reason for the development of slavery. 
Thus the social division of groups produced the 'first great cleavage of 
society 1 into groups of masters and slaves, exploiters and exploited.
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These factors coincided to install the father as absolute master and 
patriarch, ruling despotically over not only his slaves but his family, 
enforcing monogamy and all this in order to accumulate and transmit 
to his genetic offspring.
The man now being actually supreme in the house, the last barrier 
to his absolute supremacy had fallen. This autocracy was confirmed 
and perpetuated by the overthrow of mother-right, the introduction 
of father-right, and the gradual transition of the pairing family 
into monogamy. But this tore a breach in the old gentile order; 
the single family became a power and its rise was a menace to the 
gens. (62)
The second great division of labour took place when with increased production 
and the accumulation of wealth, there was increased specialisation.
The result was the separation of handicrafts from agriculture, 
! ¥ith the splitting up of production into the two great main branches, 
agriculture and handicrafts, arises production directly for exchange, 
commodity production; with it came commerce, not only in the interior 
and on the tribal boundaries, but also already overseas.' The 
distinction between rich and poor appears beside that of slaves and masters. 
It results from inequalities of property arising from the dissolution of 
the collective families, and the appropriation of land etc. by individual 
heads of family - land which was previously the collective possession of the 
gens.
Furthermore the denser population necessitates closer consolidation 
of- internal and external action. The confederacy of tribes everywhere becomes 
a necessity, involving the gradual fusion of tribal territories, thus 
constituting the basis of the nation. Greater military efficiency ensues, 
a development soon turned to plunder and pillage. In turn this creates 
even greater sources of wealth and lays the foundation for the development 
of the hereditary monarchy on the basis of military prowess. Thus the free, 
self-ordering gens is gradually transformed into an organisation which plunders 
and oppresses its neighbours. This, however, is crucially premised on the
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fact that the unity of the interest of the gens has been dispersed, and 
the members of the gens divided into- rich and poor.
This is the stage at the threshold of civilisation, and civilisation 
consolidates and intensifies the emergent divisions of labour, and adds 
another, the merchant class. These conditions have now produced wealth 
in commodities and slaves, wealth in money and finally -yealth in land with 
the gradual establishment of hereditary property. Land could become a 
commodity once the ties with the gentile, constitution had been cut and 
money demonstrated this possibility. Thus citizens were increasingly 
divided into classes according to wealth.
With land expansion, money and usury, private property in 
land and mortgages, the concentration and centralisation 
of wealth in the hands of a small class rapidly advanced, 
accompanied by an increasing impoverishment of the masses 
and an increasing mass of impoverishment. (64)
Confronted with these new forces, gentile constitution became an 
anacronism. The gentile constitution had grown out of a society which 
knew no internal contradictions, and possessed no means of coercion except
public opinion.
It is in this context of disintegration that the state arises;
'the state arises on the ruins of the gentile constitution.'^ ' 
It is clear that in many ways, the theory of the dissolution of 
the gentile constitution gleaned from Morgan is added as substance to 
the philosophical ideas advanced by Marx in his very early writings.
The state is therefore by no means a power imposed on society from 
without; just as little is it "the reality of the moral idea", 
"the image and the reality of raason" as Hegel maintains. Rather 
it is the product of society at a particular stage of development; 
it is the admission that this society has involved itself in 
insoluble self-contradiction and cleft into irreconcilable 
antagonisms which it is powerless to exorcise. But in order that 
th^se antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, 
shall not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, a 
power, apparently standing above society, has become necessary to 
moderate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of 'order'; 
and this power, arisen out of society but placing itself above it 
and increasingly alienating itself from it, is the state. (66)
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The state is still the abstraction by which the general interests of 
private property are expressed over and above those of individuals.
This new force, the political level, is qualitatively different from
(67)
the forms of alliances which had characterised gentile society. The
state, for example, is based on territorial considerations; political 
society will be characterised by the implementation of public forces, such 
as the army. Finally, the state in this outline operates in the interests 
of the economically dominant class, although not in the interests of any 
one individual. Thus the economically dominant class is theorised as the 
politically dominant class.
As the state arose from the need to keep class antagonisms in 
check, but also arose in the thick of the fight between classes, 
it is normally the state of the most powerful, economically 
dominant class, which by its means becomes also the politically 
dominant class and so acquires new means of holding down and 
exploiting the oppressed class. (68)
In addition to this the state in most cases explicitly accords rights 
on a property basis:
...inmost historical states the rights conceeded to citizens 
are graded on a property basis whereby it is directly admitted 
that the state is an organisation for the protection of the 
possessing clasS against tLe non-possessing class. (69)
The state has the function of an abstract reprasentation, by which a 
society is unified and governed to the interests of the economically 
dominant class, thus constituting them also as the politically dominant 
class . The interests of the economically dominant class are represented 
but it should be noted that these interests are not the expression of 
individual interests; the activity of the political instance transforms 
these to an abstract representation of interests. It is at a definite 
stage of economic development that the cleavage of society into classes 
produces the necessity for the state; it is therefore formed in the 
process of class struggle.
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This account of the emergence and the function of the state differs 
little from that outlined by Marx in his early attack on Hegelian theory. 
Before going on to discuss the precise role of the family in the account 
of this political society, it is necessary to briefly summarise the 
causality suggested in the interrelation between family, gens, private 
property and the state. The history of human society is the history of 
the division of labour; the emergence of the individualised family with 
lineage in the male line is however theorised as an essential precondition 
for the emergence of class society. These two elements are not reducible 
to each other, even if it is the technical development of a mode of 
production which puts the familial forms of slavery on the agenda. The 
state ultimately emerges in the site of class conflict to regulate a 
society riven now by internal contradiction and individual interests; 
the object regulated by the state is the individualised family. Several 
questions pose themselves at this stage. What precisely is this family 
unit that it should play such a crucial role in the history of the 
emergence of class divided society and the emergence of the state? What 
are the politics which flow from this definition of the state and the 
family, politics that is both in relation to classes and the state and 
towards the family?
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The family as economic unit; monogamy and prostitution 
The decisive victory of monogamy is one of the signs that civilisation 
is beginning; 'It is based on the supremacy of the man, the express 
purpose being to produce children of undisputed paternity; such paternity 
is demanded because these children are later to come into their father's 
property - his natural heirs'. '
The monogamous family in this account is first and foremost an 
economic unit, the unit by which property is both accumulated and transmitted
/
in the interest of the private individual. A necessary concommitant of 
the monogamous family as economic unit is that the sexual relation involved 
in marriage always expresses its economic function. It is for this reason 
that prostitution in The Origins is simply the obverse of bourgeois marriage. 
Here the exchange of money expresses the true economic nature of the sexual 
relation in bourgeois society. Prostitution in fact acquires a privileged 
place in marxist writing on the family and the woman question. Prostitution 
expresses aloud the economic nature of the sexual relation in bourgeois 
society. The traffic in women (the title of finma Goldmann's tract on 
prostitution) was a theme which ran through all the writing on women at 
this time. Lenin referred with disgust to the "traffic in flesh', Bebel 
saw the rottenness of bourgeois society in the prevalence of prostitution. 
Kollontai, Eleanor Marx Avelingj all saw prostitution as expressing 
the "commercialism" of contemporary marriage. Par from bearing witness 
to marxism's entrenchment in Victorian morality and sexual repressiveness, 
the privileged site which prostitution occupied in marxist writing on 
women was a facet of the mode of explanation of sexual relations and the 
family in marxist theory.
The economic function of the monogamous family is made quite explicit 
in The Origins. Monogamy,
was not in any way the fruit of individual sex love, with which 
it had nothing whatever to do; marriage remained as before 
marriages of convenience. It was the first form of the family
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to be based not on natural but on economic conditions - 
on the victory of private property over primitive natural 
communal property. (?l)
itWhen monogamous marriage makes its first appearance in history, 
is far from a delightful reconciliation between men and women. Instead
it announces a struggle between the sexes unknown throughout the
prehistoric period. Where the German Ideology had suggested that the
first division of labour is that between man and woman for the propagation
of children 1 , now these divisions can be elaborated as laying the foundation
for the development of class society;
The first class opposition that appears in history coincides 
with the development of the antagonism between man and woman 
in monogamous marriage, and the first class oppression coincides 
with that of the female sex by the male. Monogamous marriage 
was a great historical step forward; nevertheless, together with 
slavery and private wealth, it opens the period that has lasted 
until today in which every step forward is also relatively a step 
backwards in which prosperity and development for some is won 
through the misery and frustration of others. It is the 
cellular form of civilised society in which the nature of the 
oppositions and contradictions fully active in society can be 
already studied. (72)
Here, the function of the family in marxist theory is fully expressed. 
The possibility of the accumulation of wealth may have arisen through the 
technical development of society, in particular the development of agriculture 
and the domestication of animals. It is this development which generates 
a rationale for slavery. This in turn provides the conditions for subjection 
in the family. Yet it is the pairing family which provides private property 
with a calculating agency, the monogamous family, with its supposed 
exigency of natural, that is genetic, inheritance. This alone provides 
the motor for the emergence of structures of private property, hence the 
division of labour which will institute class divisions. Thus the 
relation of domination of women by men is a model for the oppression 
entailed in class relations without becoming class relations themselves.
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Aspects of the theorisation of class and domination will be addressed 
later. Here it is sufficient to note that this is a theory of the 
accumulation and transmission of property along the lines of individual 
interest; it is a new version of the theory of individual acquisitiveness 
as the natural basis of society. It is the emergence of the monogamous 
family at the dawn of civilisation which constructs an economic unit of 
property which previously had not existed:
The transition to private property is gradually accomplished 
parallel with the transition of the pairing marriage into 
monogamy. The single family is becoming the economic unit of 
society. (73)
For Engels marriage is an economic relation. In particular the 
pairing family will necessarily mean transmission in the male line. We 
have already raised fundamental problems with this; it assumes a 
universal history of the 'family 1 , it assumes that marriage has the same 
function in all cultures; it neglects the fact the economic relations 
initiated by marriage may not be invested in the man and woman but in 
other kin; it suppresses the possibility of women as the locus of 
transmission of property; it neglects forms of holding property and 
structures of transmission which by-pass the procreative family. That 
Engels' theorisation should presuppose all these make his conclusions as 
to division of labour within the family and the relation of this to class 
division very suspect. Furthermore a natural level of division of labour 
between the sexes is presupposed, excluding consideration of this division 
itself as a construct.
Classes, Interests and Representations.
This examination of Engels' The Origins shows how, in a certain tradition 
of marxism, the conceptualisation of the family was integrally related to 
the theorisation of classes, class interests, agency of possession and
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political representations. Formed in the convergence of early marxist 
political theory and later ethnological theories, the concept of the 
family fulfilled several functions for Engels. It was seen as an economic 
unit, with an economic rationality under a system of private property. It 
thus functioned as a structure which took the problem of the human agency 
of the bourgeoisie back one stage. But this supposed attempt to provide 
a non-human account of the possessive agency of the bourgeoisie was in 
fact built on presuppositions about the relations between the sexes which 
have in fact made their theorisation difficult. These assumptions are; 
that of a natural division of labour between the sexes; that of a male 
psychologistic motivation to ensure transmission of property to genetic 
offspring; and finally that of the capacity and desire of the male to 
submit the female to these exigencies. Thus the account which sets out 
to demonstrate the emergence of the power relations of the 'modern family' 
provides this account by assuming certain features of that contemporary 
family, such as marriage entailing the subordination of women as chattel.
Several issues need to be sorted out before goin^ on to examine the 
specific treatment of the woman question. These relate to exactly how 
sexual division is theorised in relation to other social divisions, such 
as class; how and why class relations are given analytic priority over 
other social divisions; and how the human agency of possession relates to 
class. All these are implicitly answered in The Origins and it is 
important to understand them since in the following chapter it will be 
argued that the failure to confront the specifities of sexual division was 
largely conditioned by the political and analytical priorities set by the 
proposed interrelation of concepts. Three elements of the theory 
presented in The Origins will help clarify the way in which the concepts 
are interrelated: the treatment of social division in the notion of primitive 
communism; the question of why women do not constitute a class; finally
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the way in which familial relations are sometimes taken as a model 
for class relations.
Primitive Communism in The Origins
In The Origins, the gentile constitution is taken as a form of social 
organisation where there is a distribution of social surplus in a 
communistic fashion. This form of distribution can be more or less complex,
and the marxist tradition has sometimes taken kinship relations to be the
(74)mechanism of redistribution of the surplus in more or less complex forms.
The distinctive hierarchies which might be entailed in kinship networks, 
such as hierarchies between juniors and elders, and between the sexes, are 
not theorised as antagonistic contradictions. The gentile organisation 
is still thought to be a communistic, essentially democratic form of 
social organisation. Class contradiction is theorised as arising from 
differential relations to the means of production in terms of ownership. 
Thus we have a very delimited notion of antagonistic classes and interests; 
these are defined exclusively in tsrms of ownership of the social surplus. 
'Communistic 1 is clearly an economic designation of a very particular 
kind limited to a description of the redistribution of the surplus to the 
collective. It excludes, or at least minimalises, consideration of the 
forms of domination and subordination which accrue to other social divisions, 
for example sexual divisions. This designation has recently been submitted 
to the interogation of marxist feminists considering work on so-called 
'pre-capitalist' societies. Here it has been indicated how marxist
writing on whether or not class relations exist within pre-capitalist
(75) societies has not taken account of the social division of the sexes.^ 
Whether the consistent subordination of the female sex to the male sex 
should logically constitute women as a class is a complicated issue and must 
be treated with some caution.
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Why are the sexes not classes?
In The Origins, the sexes are not theorised as economic interest groups, 
that is, classes, even though all the likely conditions seem to be present 
in the designation of pre-capitalist modes of production. There is the 
presumption of an essential antagonism whereby men seek to wrest control 
of women's reproductive capacity to ensure genetic self-perpetuation. 
Women are not thought to be subject to the same psychologistic motivations. 
These factors constitute women as a radically different group from men. 
Their effect is to place women in a different relation to the relations 
of production. Firstly, women are excluded as normal loci for the 
transmission of lineage and wealth, if paternity is known. Secondly,'the 
natural division of labour between the sexes' is theorised as a division 
whose effects mean that men not only produce wealth but also therefore 
control it. Yet, curiously none of this is sufficient to constitute the 
sexes as interest groups. In classical marxist theory, interest groups 
are seen to arise through a structurally different relation to the means of 
production. In capitalism, for example, two groups are bound together 
through exchange - those able to initiate production of and to control 
surplus are differentially positioned from those who do not. Classes, then, 
are constructed as effects of relations of production, dependent on 
structurally different relations to the means of production.
Despite women's distinctive relation to the means of production, they 
do not appear as an interest group even though they are absolutely distinct 
in some pre-capitalist social formations in terms of wealth, labour, 
authority and control of lineage. Thus even though classes are defined in 
terms of differential relations within the means of production,women do 
not appear as a class with identifiable interests. There are two reasons 
for this: the treatment of family as economic unit and the contradictoriness 
of the theorisation of class agency.
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The first is that the family is theorised as an economic 
structure which unites the sexes; thus women are combined through 
marriage to the structural position of the husband or father. This 
combination of the sexes in an economic unit should alert us to other 
factors in the theorisation of classes and agency of possession. It is 
clear that it is the f amily which is seen as the economic subject of the 
bourgeoisie. The bourgeois class is not a group of individuals with 
identical relations to and interests in, the means of production - this 
much is clear from the idea of the state as abstract representation. Yet 
because classes are thought to arise out of economic interests, a form 
of agency is required. It is the family which, produced by marriage as 
an economic function (that is, providing the rational for accumulation 
and inheritance) provides this agency. The economic rationality of this 
agency is provided only, however, if the possibility of women as an interest 
group is suppressed. Thus a distinctive account emerges not only of 
economic, but also sexual, relations. Marriage is seen as an economic 
structure; it creates an economic unit and the structure of inheritance 
creates the possibility and motive for capital accumulation. The sexes 
therefore can no longer appear as sexes in terms of economic subjectivity. 
The sexual connection is thus theorised as a bond in which antagonistic 
contradiction disappears.
Social divisions and classes
There seems to be a certain level of arbitrariness in the way classes are 
designated in pre-capitalist modes of production, if women cannot be 
theorised as a class despite a radically different relation to the means 
of production. That the sexes should be combined in an economic unit, the 
family, does not seem sufficient grounds to deny that sexual division may be
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a potentially antagonistic social relation. The industrial enterprise 
is an economic unit, in competition with others, yet it is theorised in 
marxism as a unit in which antagonistic agents are combined. That there 
seems a certain logic in applying the marxist concept of class to women
has been demonstrated by the facility with which certain recent feminist
(76)theories could extend the marxist model of class to women.
What is clear is that, in Engels, the sexual and familial bond is 
thought to override class distinctions; it constitutes men and women as 
an economic unit in spite of the fact that the imagery used to describe this 
unit is one of the slave master and his slaves. It is clear that certain 
elisions have been made to avoid knotty problems. The ideological bond 
which constitutes marriage relations and constitutes them whereby men 
have definite privileges is not seen as constituting an antagonistic 
contradiction. This, it appears, can only arise from structural 
contradictions in the relations of production, positions which are only 
occupied by workers and their families or the bourgeois family, not by 
sexes. What begins to be apparent is that there is a hierarchy by which 
certain social divisions are designated antagonistic and others are not. 
Antagonistic divisions arise, it appears, exclusively from the production, 
distribution and control of surplus.
The reason why women are not theorised as a class in pre-capitalist 
society may perhaps be clarified by examining why they are not theorised 
as a class in capitalist society. Here it is explicit that the concept of 
class would not allow for sex differentiation. It is argued that the 
accumulation of wealth and the development of exchange relations in the 
form of exchange of commodities, result in the structure of capitalist 
appropriation of the surplus. It is argued that there is a necessity for 
'free labourers' bound to the means of production through the wage form.
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Only by this process is the labourer bound to the means of production 
in the form of commodities that is, wages. It is the wage form which 
produces surplus value, and lays the foundation for extensive capital 
accumulation.
This position insists that surplus value is extracted from what
Marx calls 'undifferentiated agents'; in other words capital is indifferent
(77) 
to the sex or social status of the wage labourer. x/ Capital seeks only
to maximise its surplus; differences in remuneration arise only from the 
differences in the amount of labour required for production^, Wages therefore 
are equal to the value of the necessities of the labour, or rather the 
necessities of the labourer and his family. Class division is constituted 
in relation to this process of extraction of surplus; either the control 
of surplus is given in the form of ownership or there is separation from 
the means of production.
Dating from the first appearance of Das Capital, various 7/riters
have raised fundamental problems with this theorisation of the extraction
(78) 
of surplus and its relation to the theorisation of class. ^ ' The
fundamental problem with a theory of value is that it does not take account 
of social and ideological divisions. First of all, labour is not the 
only thing that commodities have in common. Exchange is fixed by many 
categories; hence it is not necessarily the amount of labour time and the 
maximum surplus that will fix the exchange rate between commodities. What 
is more, as history has made abundantly clear, remuneration for labour is 
not decided by the cost of reproduction of the labourer's necessities; it 
can be fixed by the operations of monopolies; by trade union activity; 
by ideological divisions like the differences between the sexes« Thus even 
in the categories which are employed to designate the construction of 
two major classes, the questions of the effects of other social divisions
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appear as insufficiently theorised. It appears that these social divisions 
have arbitrarly been designated as subsidiary to economic class contradiction 
arising from the wage form and relations of production under capitalism.
It might perhaps be argued that the reason why social division other 
than economic class relations are assigned to a secondary place is because
a marxist analysis specifies class as an abstract concept, given by the
(79) 
relations of production, In other words, under capitalism, class
refers to the structural contradiction at the level of production between 
categories of separation from and possession of the means of production. 
Such indeed would be the Althusserian reading of marxist texts. However 
this chapter has already outlined a series of ways in which the family is 
brought in as a human agency of possession, being the embodiment of 
bourgeois economic rationality. This indicates how the status of agency 
of possession is rarely resolved as an abstraction. Another aspect of the 
treatment of the family demonstrates quite clearly that as often as not 
classes are theorised as relations between human subjects with certain 
capacitias. This is the mobilisation of the metaphor of paternal power.
Patriarchal power and the relations between classes
Despite the fact that the relations between the sexes are not inscribed 
as class relations, they are nevertheless taken as the model of the form 
of domination between classes. We have seen how in order for the family 
to become an effective economic unit, women must be subjected and defeated. 
This form of subjection installs the economic rationality of capital 
accumulation, the monogamous family. This form of subjection, that is 
domestic slavery, characterises all subsequent forms of subjection:
prosperity and development for some is won through the 
misery and frustration of others. It is the cellular form 
of civilised society in which the nature of the oppositions 
and contradictions fully active in that society can be already 
studied. (80)
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The quotation is revealing. It shows clearly the contradictoriness 
in the way the subject of economic interests is thought. At one level, 
as shown earlier, the operations of the state are presented as the 
abstract representations of the interests of private property. This 
functioning of the political level is the place where the interests of 
private property are expressed beyond the individual interests of the human 
agents which make up a society,, It is also the level of class struggle 
in a society where the classes do not just line up and confront each other 
but are crucially interdependent in the production process. Yet in spite 
of this theorisation of the mode of operation at the political level as 
a specific representational level in which interests are not theorised as 
the capacities of human agents, this "patriarchal" model indicates how the 
relation between the classes is sometimes thought in terms of inter- 
subjective dominance, along the lines of the patriarchal family drawn from 
comparative jurisprudence. Thus the relation between the classes is 
thought to be one where the outcome of the struggle between the classes 
is decided in advance by the capacities (power) of one human individual 
over another.
The theoretical limitations should be immediately apparent. The 
patriarchal family is simultaneously cause and effect of class relations. 
It is the development of social forces, like the accumulation of wealth, 
which is said to give rise to the patriarchal family, yet patriarchal power 
(desire and capacity to overthrow women and their offspring) is the 
capacity by which one class gains control over the means of production. 
Thus ownership and control is given a human agency, and that agency is 
a capacity accruing to the patriarch of a patriarchal family.
The effect of this way of thinking has been especially difficult 
for marxism. It suggests that the relationship between classes is a 
relationship between human individuals, invested with certain capacities
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and attributes. Like the capacity to put other's labour to work and 
to control lineage, attributed to the patriarch in Engels' account, it is 
often suggested that the bourgeoisie have the capacity to determine the 
outcome of struggle by means of their control over the means of production.
The mechanism by which this capacity is guaranteed is the state. Various
(8l) 
criticisms have been made of this account of class relations. Most
obviously, the capacity of possession, that is the ability to control and 
set the means of production in motion need not necessarily be invested in 
a human subject. Marx himself realised this when he studied the joint 
stock company which had all the attributes of a capitalist agency. Yet, 
significantly, he could not decide that the joint stock company was 
capitalist precisely because it lacked an agency of possession, the 
bourgeois man and family.
In addition, this conceptualisation of classes has had a reductive 
effect on the assessment of class struggle in relation to the state, or 
political level. It becomes a struggle whose outcome is decided in advance, 
decided by the intersubjective capacity of the bourgeoisie. Where the 
position is accepted it is usually moderated; the state necessarily 
reflects the interests of the ruling class since they have intersubjective 
capacities. However the state will be overcome through the inevitability 
of the collapse of capitalist social relations.
This account contradicts other aspects of the theorisation of class 
and political representation, other aspects found even in Engels' text. 
The notion of a capacity (power) of a human agent which has the potentiality 
to decide in advance the outcome of a struggle rather obviates the 
theorisation of the political level as a distinct practice with its own 
specifity, that is, as an abstraction of the interests of a class against
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the interests of any one individual. It seems fruitless to hold 
simultaneously to the idea of the specifity of the political level 
and its representations yet simultaneously to insist that these 
representations express the interests of a group as some kind of capacity, 
Moreover it is clear that the marxist analysis of concrete historical 
situations rarely falls into such reductions.
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Conclusion
These elements in marxist theory have been raised here for a 
specific purpose. They are to show how the family was mobilised as 
an interlinking concept in the theory of the totality, in particular 
in providing an account of economic subjectivity. The account has 
concentrated on the problem of sexual division, a concentration which has 
revealed the contradictory treatment of the problem of classes and interests 
At one level class is treated as an abstract concept, given by the
relations of production - hence it could not be applied to any 'observably
(82)
oppressed' group. At the same time class is theorised in terms of
human agencies with given capacities, a form of theorisation which
is especially difficult for the assessment of political representations
and their relation to class.
The revelation of the contradictoriness of the treatment of class 
does not exhaust the aims of this chapter. I hope to have shown that even 
where class is trsated as an abstract concept, given by the relations of 
production (as in the theory of capitalist relations of production), there 
is a problem about the arbitrary marginalisation of social divisions other 
than those given in simply economic terms. This points to the organisation 
of theoretical work to predict political forces. Marxism has aimed at 
producing a theory of the social totality which would both designate and 
activate the industrial working class as the prime motor of historical 
change in the development of socialist social relations. The analysis 
of social relations has been closely tied to this political objective.
It remains in the following chapter to look at early marxist thought 
where it dealt specifically with the woman question. In the work and 
politics of the European social democratic parties all the limitations
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of marxism's assessment of sexual and social divisions become apparent. 
Here is a movement for whom the question of the family and the position 
of women was crucial. The theorisation of the family was central in 
popularising texts of marxism; the woman question was never far from 
the movement's explicit political objectives. Yet the very centrality 
of the concept of the family, and its interlinking with other political 
objectives rendered problematic the specific treatment of sexual 
divisions.
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Introduction
It is clear from the previous chapter that the family far from being 
an absent concept in marxism was centrally related to other aspects of 
theorisation. For can marxism be reasonably accused of neglecting the 
specific question of women's position in society. However that very 
integration of the family, and under the family, sexual relations, to 
the theories of class and political representation meant that paradoxically 
the issue of women's social subordination found a too-easy place in marxist 
schemas. This theoretical presence has rarely been translated into 
political priorities and the evidence for this is two-fold. On the one 
hand there is the evidence of conservatism towards the family and sexual 
relations often encountered in socialist societies. On the other hand, 
there is the fact that attempts to change sexual relations have frequently 
been subordinated to other political priorities.
There appears to be a central paradox confronting any consideration 
of marxism1 s adequacy to deal with the position of women in society; why 
given the theoretical importance of these concerns were they rarely 
brought to the forefront in social and political programmes? Several 
issues need to be pursued arising from the previous chapter. The first 
is whether the marxist theorisation so far advanced has been coloured by 
ideological assumptions about women and the family which can be dispensed 
with and replaced by a more refined consideration of the women in the 
social relations of production? The second is whether 'the woman question' 
was central only in so far as the history of the family and the theoretical 
consideration of the status of women were the bearers of all other 
considerations on social relations as outlined in the first three chapters? 
Finally, was it the priority given to the idea of the working class party 
outlined in the previous chapter which meant thai: 'the woman question' 
rarely became more than a theoretical debate?
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Before considering any of these questions, it seems necessary 
to deal with certain simplistic criticisms that marxism naturally neglects 
women's politics because marxists are mainly men and that men as an interest 
group would not seek to further women's interests. This is an argument 
which ignores the evidence. It would be difficult to ignore the 
commitment which socialism almost above any other political philosophy 
has shown to challenging the subordinate position of women in society. 
It is sufficient only to recall the reactionary assumptions surrounding 
the family and the position of women at the time when marxist ideas were 
developed. A quotation from Gladstone indicates the extent to which 
other political positions regarded the position of women within the family 
as sacrosant and god-given. He describes women's suffrage as,
One of those questions that it would be intolerable to mix 
up with purely political and party debates. If there be a 
subject in the whole compass of human life and experience 
which is sacred, beyond all other subjects it is the character 
and position of women, (l)
It has already been shown in the previous chapter that far from 
considering such questions sacrosant, Engels insisted on the variability 
of familial forms. And such has been marxism's concern with the position 
of women in society that those societies in whose development marxist 
theory has been crucial often afford women's formal equality a significant 
place in their constitutions;
Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded equal rights with men in 
all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social, and political 
life .
The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured to 
women by granting them an equal right with men to work, 
payment for work, rest and leisure, social insurance, and 
education, by state protection of the interests of mother 
and child, by state aid to mothers of large families and 
unmarried mothers, prematernity and maternity leave with 
full pay, and the provision of a wide network of maternity 
homes, nurseries and kindergartens. (2)
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Who can doubt that the marxism which gave rise to such a constitution 
would in its history have been both a natural ally for feminism and 
indeed in some cases the point of origin for some forms of feminism? 
Both in the centrality which it gave to the concept of the family and 
in its offer of understanding forms of subordination in society in a 
'materialist' fashion, the question of the subordinate position of women 
in society has rarely been totally absent from marxism's concerns.
Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin all at some point considered the 
'woman question' . Lafarge the head of the French Communist party wrote 
a book considering the history of women's position in society. ' August 
Bebel leader of the German Social Democratic Party wrote Woman under
Socialism, a book which was to have enormous influence in social democratic
(4) politics. All believed that equality between the sexes was integrally
linked with a wholesale transformation of society into an egalitarian, 
that is socialist, society. This did not mean however that the specific 
struggle for equality between the sexes was neglected. Marx and Engels, for 
example, were responsible for such actions as an ammendment to the minimum 
programme of the French Worker's Party of 1880 where a legal measure was 
added there to the economic and political demands for women's emancipation;
'The abolition of all paragraphs of law which...put women in a subordinate
(5) position to men.'
Lenin was responsible for changes in marriage, divorce and abortion 
laws and frequently stressed the role of socialism in the 'emancipation'of
women;
Up to the prssent the position of women has been such that it 
is called a position of slavery. Women are crushed by their 
domestic drudgery, when ve shall pass from the small household 
economy to social economy and to social tilling of the soil. 
Only then will women be free and emancipated. (6)
In 1921, he celebrated International Women's Lay with an article in Pravda 
insisting on the need for the struggle against women's oppression to be 
joined to the cause of socialist construction;
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The main and fundamental thing in Bolshevism and in the 
Russian October Revolution is the drawing into politics of 
precisely those who were most oppressed under capitalism... 
And it is impossible to draw the masses into politics without 
also drawing in the women; for under capitalism, the female 
half of the human race suffers under a double yoke. The 
working woman and the peasant woman are oppressed by capital 
but in addition to that, even in the most democratic of 
bourgeois republics, they are, firstly, in an inferior position 
because the law denies them equality with men, and secondly... 
they are "in domestic slavery", they are "domestic slaves" 
crushed by the most petty, most menial, most arduous, and most 
stultifying work of the kitchen and by isolated domestic, 
amily economy in general. (?)f
A few years later, even Stalin is no less effusive in his insistence 
on the crucial role women have to play in advancing socialism.
The fate of the proletarian movement, the victory or defeat 
of proletarian power depends on whether or not the reserve 
of women will be for or against the working class. 
That is why the first task of the proletariat and its advance 
detachment, the Communist Party, is to engage in decisive 
struggle for the freeing of women workers and peasants from 
the influence of the bourgeoisie, for political education and 
organisation of women workers and peasants beneath the banner 
of the proletariat. (8)
Why is it then, with all this apparent concern for women's position in 
society, that the relationship between feminism and socialism has been at 
best stormy, and the record of socialist countries in achieving equality 
between the sexes and the liberation of women range j between: somewhat
limited to absolutely dire? It is not within the scope of this present
(Q)
work to attempt anything other than a schematic answer to these questions.
Continuing in the same vein as the previous chapter, this chapter limits 
itself to an account of the way in which political priorities have arisen 
within marxism which are difficult for feminism. In particular, it assesses 
the relation between the theorisation of the family and the position of 
women, and the political priorities which emerged.
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The family, the labour market and "true sex love"
The politics advanced towards the family in The Origins are characteristic 
of much subsequent marxist writing on the subject. The disintegration of 
the family is seen as a sign of the hypocricy of the bourgeoise who 
champion the family but who use women as a source of cheap labour, nevertheless 
women's increased role in production is welcomed by marxists because it 
simultaneously offers women freedom from economic dependence (and therefore 
slavery) and consequently destroys the economic basis for marriage, hence 
undermining a cornerstone of bourgeois society. It is only through the 
destruction of the economic basis of marriage that free and equal sexual 
relations will be achieved. For although, the proletariat had no economic 
motive for marriage, their marriages have nevertheless been inflected by 
the patriarchal ideology of bourgeois society, installing the father 
as absolute authority with the wife as little better than the chief 
servant. Once economic dependency has ceased to distort relations, all 
humans 7/ill be able to choose their mates in the same way as the proletariat, 
that is uninfluenced by uneconomic considerations and expressing 'true 
sex love' which for Engels is monogamous, heterosexual and permanent.
There are two elements in the political goals expressed here - 
two elements whose lack of necessary integration explain much of marxism's 
difficult relation with feminism. On the one hand there is the concern 
with increasing women's involvement in production and the destruction of 
the economic function of marriage. On the other hand, there is a concern 
that the quality of the relations between the sexes should be transformed, 
in other words, a transformation of moral and sexual relations.
The insistence on the need for women to become involved in production
is characteristic of much niarxist writing on the family. This is because it
/
is assumed that the family has an economic function which must be destroyed.
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This function is theorised not only as an effect of the structure of 
inheritance (as in Engels) but also a factor in the determination of 
wage levels and hence in the level of appropriation of surplus value. 
In Das Capital vol 1, Marx outlines this position;
In so far as machinery dispenses with muscular power, it becomes 
a means of employing labourers of slight muscular strength, and 
those whose bodily development is incomplete, but whose limps are 
more subtle. The labour of women and children was therefore the 
first thing sought for by capitalists who used machinery. That 
mighty substitute for labour and labourers was forthwith changed 
into a means for increasing the number of wage labourers by 
enrolling under the direct sway of capital, every member of the 
workman's family, without distinction of age or sex. Compulsory 
work for the capitalist usurped the place, not only of the 
children's play, but also of free labour at home within moderate 
limits for the support of the family.
The value of labour-power was determined, not only by the labour- 
time necessary to maintain the individual adult labourer, but also 
by that necessary to maintain his family. Machinery by throwing 
every member of the family on to the labour market, spreads the 
value of the man's labour power over his whole family. It thus 
depreciated his labour-power. To purchase the labour power of a 
family of four workers may, perhaps, cost more than it formerly 
did to purchase the labour power of the head of the family, but 
in return, four days 1 labour jbakes the place of one. In order 
that the family may live, four people must now not only labour 
but expend surplus labour for the capitalist. Thus we see that 
machinery while augmenting the human material that forms the 
principle object of capital's exploiting power, at the same time 
raises the degree of exploitation. (lO)
The argument here is quite complicated. Marx assumes a degree of 
inevitability of the increased role in production. 7/omen will necessarily 
be drawn into production, and therefore waged labour, in the logic of 
technical development. Although the capitalist ceases to have to pay a 
family wage, there are more workers available from whom surplus value can 
be extracted. The contradictory treatment of surplus-value by Marx, 
confronted with the problem of women, the family and women workers reveals 
levels of inconsistency in the theorisation of capitalist social relations. 
We saw earlier how I-larx insisted that surplus-value is extracted from 
'underdifferentiated' agents and how the wage is supposed to represent onl" the
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value of labour power and the creation of surplus, being indifferent to 
social categories of value. Here, however, Marx starts out with an 
original 'family 1 wage, adequate not just for the reproduction of the 
labourer but for the reproduction of wife and children as well. Thus 
destruction of the family unit will be a source of increased levels of 
exploitation; the capitalist may initially have to pay more but increased 
productivity will lead to higher profits. Increased exploitation will lead 
to increasing social contradictions and hence the eventual overthrow of 
capitalist social relations.
Lenin too stresses that the household with an economic function is 
an element of a mode of production which must be superceded. Two steps 
were necessary for Soviet Russia to take in order to move towards the 
emancipation of women. The first, he congratulated himself had already 
been effected. This was the removal of all traces of inequality before 
the law. But the critical step would be the second - the abolition of 
private property and the establishment of collective or social production;
The second and principal step was the abolition of 
the private ownership of the land, the factories, and mills. 
This and this alone, opens the way for the complete and real 
emancipation of women, their emancipation from "domestic slavery" 
by pssing from petty, individual, domestic economy to large-scale 
social economy. (ll)
It is this insistence that marriage has an economic function belonging
to a particular mode of production which resulted in the form of politics
advanced by Engels in the second half of his formulation - his moral
politics. For Engels, as for many subsequent marxists, it is the
(12)economic element which is seen as the source of oppression within marriage. 
Once this economic element has been removed, sexual morality will pursue
its 'true' course, which as already noted will be the course of heterosexual,
monogamous love.
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That marxists were prepared to consider sexual relations as subject 
to change and were ready to speculate on the nature of sexual relations 
under socialism opened marxism towards the emergent discourses of studies 
in sexual relations. Many socialists were interested in the question of 
sexual behaviour and many of the leading sexologists were also socialists. 
The example of Austro-marxism which will be mentioned later shows how 
socialist programmes could adopt quite radical perspectives on sexual 
relations. ' Yet in general where this question was raised v/ith any 
systematicity, for example by feminists like Stella Browne in England or 
Kollontai in Russia, marxism was unsympathetic to radical proposals aimed 
at improving women's position in marriage and society. One explanation for 
this is that these two elements of a marxist politics towards the family - 
destruction of its economic function and transformation of relations between 
the sexes - have been hegemonised by the first element. Thus it is 
deemed that the destruction of the economic function of marriage will be 
sufficient to deal with the problem of women's subordination.
Now the reason for this hegemonisation of one area by another begins 
to become apparent when we consider the common elements in the various 
approaches to the position of women. It relates crucially to the push 
7/ithin marxism to integrate - at the level of theoretical and political 
necessity - the struggle for socialism and the struggle for women's 
emancipation.
Relations of production and sexual relations
Par'from neglecting 'the woman question', marxism nevertheless insists 
on the socialist political priority of transforming economic antagonism. 
As the previous chapter has shown economic antagonisms are limited to a 
very particular definition, a definition which cannot encompass the social 
division between the sexes. Moreover, an insistence on the necessity
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for the transformation of the relations of production has been translated 
into a political assessment of which forces will effect this transformation, 
in which the problematic theorisation of class gives priority to struggles 
around the relations of production. The marxist conceptualisation of the 
family insists on a necessary relation between the relations of production 
and the oppressed condition of women, a relation mediated by the economic 
function of the family.
What this position in effect amounts to is an insistence that 
socialism must achieve the emancipation of women, and moreover that any 
true emancipation of women must entail socialism. For without collective 
possession of the means of production, certain groups will always be 
economically privileged over others. There are strengths in this position, 
strengths which account for the long history of engagement between marxism 
and feminism. The assertions have a resonance, no less pertinent for 
contemporary arguments; formal equality will never cut at the roots of 
discriminatory practices for all women unless there is a transformation of 
structural economic inequalities.
However, this assertion of the importance of one struggle for another 
is quite different from asserting the necessary interrelation between the 
two struggles - the struggle for socialism on the one hand, and the 
struggle for transforming social sexual relations on the other. The 
chapter entitled 'The Impasse on Kinship' has already showr that the 
suggestion made by marxist that the monogamous patriarchal family fulfilled 
a necessary function for capitalism was open to contradiction. There 
was evidence of other economic organisations where the monogamous family 
was equally violently enforced. Moreover it has been argued in the 
previous chapter that the integration effected between family as economic 
unit and relations of production, was effected only by suppressing the
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different positions given by sexual division within the family. 
In other words, the tradition of marxism which has so far been examined 
constructed a hierarchy of social divisions in which the differential 
effects of social relations on the sexes was suppressed, precisely by 
being assumed.
It was this suppression of the specificity of sexual division, 
and the insistence of the theoretical and political integration of 
sexual division to social division which characterised the writings on 
the woman question of the early niarxist left. It is this which accounts 
for the intense hostility to what was branded by the marxists as 'bourgeois 
feminism'. For this movement, or more correctly, these movements, which 
had begun to emerge in the second half of the nineteenth century had 
as their objectives the transformation of the relations between the 
sexes, regardless of class relations. Some involved extremely radical 
criticisms of traditional morality and existing social relations. 
Others were confined to campaigns against legal and political discrimination. 
Feminism, then, as now, was by no means a homogeneous political movement 
with a claar set of aims and objectives. 'Feminism 1 contained within 
it a multitude of tendencies. There were movements for legal and 
political reform gradually crystallising around the suffrage movement; 
agitation for sexual and moral reform; advocacy and opposition for 
birth control; sometimes agitation for the elevation of motherhood. 
Quite often 'feminism' was no more than a relatively spontaneous organisation
around disparate women's issues for example the campaign which surrounded
(14) the Contagious Diseases Act. ' The effects of such campaigns however was
sometimes to produce far ranging critiques of existing social relations.
A minimalist definition of the feminism encountered by the early 
marxist left was that it was concerned with the position of women in society.
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For that reason it was crossed by the various discourses on women and sex, 
women in society, and the family, that have been discussed earlier in this
thesis. The political positions were as multiple, fissured and contradictory 
as those other debates. Marxism, in the hands of Engels adopted a particularly
rigourous and deterministic account of sexual and familial relations,excluding 
a whole series of considerations, in order to produce a hierarchy of 
analytic and political priorities.
Influenced by such an assessment of priorities, the marxist response to
these heterogeneous movements for reform was to dismiss them as 'bourgeois
(15)feminism'. Marx's daughter, Eleanor Marx writing with E. Aveling v summed up
the marxist response; the movements were 'bourgeois' since the solutions they 
offered were purely individualistic and v/ould benefit only a small minority of 
middle class women. None of these issues, except perhaps the agitation around 
the Contagious Diseases Act had aimed at bettering the lot of all people and 
transforming social relations to the benefit of all people.
Yet for exactly the reasons that they were attacked, these movements 
were problematic for marxist theory. What feminist movements attacked 
were forms of oppression and discrimination whose relation with the 
economic relations of production was, at best tenuous. These forms 
of discrimination affected women of all classes, that is they affected 
woman as a sex. Changes in these rleations could provisionally be 
secured without any changes in the relations of production. Collectivisation 
of the means of production moreover need not intervene at the level of 
sexual discrimination.
In the debate and activities which took place around the woman question 
in European social democracy we can clearly see the issues at play between
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the way in which marxist priorities sometimes get constructed and the 
woman question. In the ensuing sections an examination of feminist 
responses to August Bebel's Woman under Socialism will attempt to 
uncover what were the sticking points between this tradition of marxism 
and feminism.
Woman under socialism
The period covered by this thesis, 1860-1930, was witness to the 
development of marxist political parties within Europe. Almost without 
exception, the 'Woman Question' was debated widely within these parties. 
The German Social Democratic Party (SPD) which came into existence in 1875 
was at the time taken as the showcase of a marxist political party. It 
was a party which quickly gained immense working class support and 
generated discussion of socialist strategy which was to be widely 
influential throughout Europe.
This is no less true of the consideration of the 'Woman Question'. 
Clara Zetkin, founder and leader of the International Socialist Women's 
was a leading member of the SPD. Her work was to be of importance 
both for socialist women in their struggle for women's emancipation 
during and after the Russian revolution. It was also to be influential 
on the policies pursued by the Austrian Social Democratic Party which in 
1926, even when the German party became increasingly indifferent to women's 
issues produced an unusually radical party programme to deal with the 
position of women. It
included a wide-ranging, integrated section on the position 
of women in society: in work, education, religion and family 
law. For the first time in any political party, a section on 
population policy advocated the legalisation and free availability 
of abortion as well as the free distribution of birth control 
information and contraceptive devices. (16)
240
It was in the context of the SPD that Bebel wrote Woman under 
Socialism which was to become the most influential marxist exposition of 
the position of women in society, being both an analysis of the sources 
of women's oppression and of strategies by which this could be changed. 
Kollontai referred to it as 'the woman's bible'. It would be difficult 
to overestimate the impact of Bebel's book; it was one of the principle 
factors which drew women in their thousands to the cause of social 
democratic politics, as Ottille Baader, a working class activist in the 
SPD described;
Life's bitter needs, overwork, and bourgeois family morality 
had destroyed all joy in me. I lived resigned and without 
hope...News came of a wonderful book that...Bebel...had written. 
Although I was not a Social Democrat I had friends who belonged 
to the party. Through them I got the precious work. I read 
it nights through. It was my fate and that of thousands of my 
sisters. Neither in the family nor in private life had I ever 
heard of all the pain the women must endure. One ignored her 
life. Bebel's book courageously
broke with the old secretiveness... I read the book not once but 
ten times . Because everything was so new, it took considerable 
effort to come to grips with Bebel's views. I had to break with 
so many things I had previously regarded as correct, (l?)
This reaction was typical and accounted for the strength of a feminist 
presence in the early years of the SPD, a presence which recognised that the 
SPD was the only German party to give any priority to the cause for women's 
emancipation,
Prom biographical material it is clear that an important motive 
in sustaining female membership was the perception of the SPD as 
the most consistent champion of women's equality in Imperial 
Germany. (l8)
Bebel's book first appeared when the anti-socialist laws were in
(19)force in Germany x yet it had reached fifty editions by the time of
Bebel's death in 1913, and had been translated into innumerable foreign 
languages. Like Engel's The Origins, it is often referred to as one of the 
most formative texts of social democratic thought. Both owe their \vide
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influence to the fact that they offer an outline of a general schema of 
marxist thought, dealing with the history of the family and the capitalist 
mode of production, suggesting the inevitability of its overthrow. But 
the texts were also influential not only because 'the family 1 and 'the 
position' of women occupied such crucial positions in the exposition of 
general accounts of social relations, but also because 'the woman question' 
was highly contentious in German politics. Issues of women's emancipation, 
the extension of francise and women's position in the labour market were all 
issues which were debated regularly and fiercely at the German Worker's 
Congresses. Yet this period where the 'woman question' was hotly debated 
saw little real advance in making the issues raised about changing the 
position of women in society central to the socialist programme as a whole.
Traditionally the question of women's emancipation had been treated 
sympathetically by socialists, the influence of saint-simonian thought 
being strong in Germany. There was however an equally strong and growing 
current of thought which violently opposed women's role in production and 
argued for the separate spheres of influence of men and women. Both 
tendencies called themselves feminist, and in the early days of German 
social democracy, both these strands of thought which later came to 
dominate the theorisation of the woman's question were strongly represented. 
Such was the case certainly at the third conference of the German Worker's 
Association. On the one hand, arguments were made against women's waged 
labour both on the grounds that women's proper sphere of influence was 
in the home, and also on the grounds that women's competition lowered the 
average male wage. Yet in spite of the strength with which the position 
was held, motions were carried which supported women's emancipation and 
insisted on the need for women's increased role in production, "teen 
should achieve independence and equal rights and statuses. These, it was
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argued, could only be achieved by women employed in serious work, equal 
with men at the work place. These two dominant positions corresponded 
to the division among social democrats between the followers of Lassalle 
on the one hand, and the followers of Leibkneckt and Bebel who were both 
more directly influenced by Marx on the other.
The Lassallean attitude was widespread among all the workers'
(2i) 
movements at that time. They argued that women should be excluded
from industrial production as this would increase male employment, reduce 
unemployment and increase the average male wage. Women should be remunerated 
for their work outside production, that is for their domestic labour. 
This attitude to female labour had been forcibly attacked by feminists. 
For example, Luise Otto-Peters, known for her advocacy of women's rights 
during and after the 1848 revolution had, always attacked the Lassallean 
attitude on the grounds that to make the improvement of women's position
dependent on that of men's, 'flew in the face of all humanity and
(22) civilisation. '^ 'In 1865 despite her profound sympathies with the labour
movement, she withdrew to found the General Association of German Women,
a group later characterised dismissively as 'mere suffragettes' by the
(23) Social Democrats. ' The emphasis which the Lassalleans put on the
radical distinction between the sexes by no means uncommon, corresponded 
closely to the emergent ideology of the constitutional difference between 
men and women where women are seen as bound by their reproductive capacity 
to domestic spheres of influence.
It is interesting to note that this ideology which became pronounced
(24)
-with the emergence of fascism in Germany, ' was by no means confined to
one political position. It ran from the radical saint-simonians who like 
Bachofen insisted on the female principle as the democratic and communistic 
principle across the political spectrum to fascist writers like Klages and
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(25)Baumler. ' in addition it is worth remembering that increased state
activity within medical and educational policy within Europe was 
constructing very definite notions of the domestic responsibilities of 
women.
Bebel and Leibkneckt argued against this, directly influenced by 
Marx's arguments from Das Capital; increased women's employment would be 
both the means to women's independence and an exacerbation of the 
contradictions between capital and labour since it would increase the level 
of exploitation. These two positions dominated the intellectual milieu 
in which the struggle over the women's question took place.
Although the conservative Lassallean position did not come to dominate, 
the positive attitude of the 1865 Conference was never again repeated. 
Indeed in 1866, the German section of the International Worker's Association 
published a document with the approval of Marx and Engels insisting on 
women's place within the family;
The rightful work of women and mothers is in the home and 
family caring for, supervising, and providing the first 
education for the children, which it is true presupposes that 
the women and children themselves receive an adequate training* 
Alongside the solemn duties of the man and father in public life 
and the family the woman and mother should stand for the cosiness 
and poetry of domestic life, bring grace and beauty to social 
relations and be an enobling influence on the increase of humanity's 
enjoyment of life. (26)
AH future attempts to discuss the woman question vacillat3d between these 
two positions * 'Feminism' was claimed either to ensure women's increased 
role in production or to ensure women an honourable status in society through 
her position in the home.
As the social democratic party programme was drawn up, the struggle 
between these two positions intensified around the question of women's 
suffrage. For example, in Eisenach in 1869 the marxist ammendment of
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'all citizens' to the proposal of 'universal, equal and direct suffrage' 
for men from the age of 20 was rejected. However the question of women's 
subordination did get on the agenda and many unions took up the issue later, 
with the emergence of definite commitment to greater unionisation amongst 
women as one solution to the lack of political attention to women's 
specific problems. The Unification Programme of 1875, by which the German 
Social Democratic Party was founded, resulted in the compromise of 'all
citizens over 20 years of age', and the prohibition of all female labour
(27) 
which is morally and physically detrimental. ' This later position
was elsewhere endorsed by Marx who advocated the exclusion of female labour
from 'branches of industry that are especially unhealthy for the female
28) 1 ^ 'body or objectionable morally for the female
ThSnnessen has noted that there was a significant gap between 
discussions and proposals within the party of equal suffrage and labour
 
restrictions, and the translation of these into measures demanded by the 
SDP in the political forum. For example, protection for women was not 
demanded until 1877, nor female suffrage until 1895. There was an even 
greater period of time between when the SPD first presented the demands 
and when they were actually realised through legislation.
The basic position of the party remained unchanged until 1889. It 
was characterised by imprecise demands for equal voting rights for both 
sexes and, in the economic sphere, support for female labour with 
rational, that is moral, restrictions. Like many of the issues raised 
within the party however, the women's question was overshadowed by the passing 
of the Exceptional laws in 1878. These were in force for twelve years 
and were laws banning the free assembly of socialists introduced by 
Bismarck who was frightened by the advances which the SPL were making 
as an electoral party.
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Yet it was in this context that Bebel wrote his T/bmen under Socialism 
which appeared first in 1878 under the title Women in the Past, Present 
and Future. It is a clear statement of the position which argued for 
the progressive function of women's increased role in production. Women's 
plight should be related to the general plight of the working class. Both 
have their source in economic oppression; both will be overcome when 
capitalist society is transformed into socialist society. Unlike Engels 
however, Bebel partially raises the question of women's oppression as sex 
and attempts to consider the social construction of sexual identity. As 
we will see however, this attempt was compromised by a unifying notion 
of economic oppression which prevents any real formulation of the problems.
Bebel insists that the source of all oppression is economic 
subordination. It is this which, despite the differences in the forms 
of oppression, means that both women and workers are subject to subordination. 
The common source of oppression of both workers and women in their economic 
dependency: 'All social dependency and oppression has its roots in the 
economic dependence of the oppressed'. Women are economically dependent 
because of marriage relation. Because of this, the oppression 01 women 
precedes that of workers; it is the first form of slavery.
However much in common the woman may be shown to have with 
the working man, she leads him in one thing - woman was the 
first human being to come into bondage: she was a slave 
before the male slave existed. (29)
That this has been the condition of women since the early days of human 
history has according to Bebel been proved by all recent investigations of 
prehistory. This uncovery of prehistory is important for two reasons. 
First of all, it is important to establish the prehistory of the relations 
between the sexes because
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it can thereby be proved that, seeing that these relations 
have materially changed in the previous course of human 
development, and that the changes have taken place in an even 
step with the existing system of production on the one hand 
and of the distribution of the product of labour on the other. 
It is natural and goes without saying that, along with further 
changes and revolutions in the system of production and distribution, 
the relations between the sexes are bound to change again. (30)
Secondly any analysis of oppression must trace the sources of oppression. 
Only this knowledge of the sources of oppression will provide the basis 
for a movement which seeks to abolish this oppression; 'The actual features 
of society, and of the laws that lie at the bottom of its development, had 
first to be known before a general movement could take place for the 
removal of conditions, recognised as oppressive and unjust'. 
Bebel's prehistory of the relations of the sexes is less structured 
around the history of private property and the emergence of the state than 
is Engels'. In subsequent editions, however,Bebel integrated the outline 
of the Origins into his first section, Women in the Past. Here under the 
influence of Bachofen, he argues for the primacy of mother-right societies, 
not through any commitment to the matriarchal gens as a theory of social 
organisation, but in order to demonstrate the mutations which the relations 
between the sexes have undergone. Having made this point against the 
eternal nature of women's subordination, Bebel sets out to show in 
Women in the Present, how the 'natural' relations between the sexes have 
been distorted. The sexes are constructed as antagonistic because the
sexual relation has been distorted and is no longer natural; 'antagonism
(32)is constructed bees/use one sex is raised as a slave of another.'^
Women in the present then is a text crossed by and formed by the various 
strands discussed in this thesis. The text asserts that in our society 
v/omen are oppressed as a sex. This oppression is based on the distortion 
of the 'natural relation' between the sexes as ,a result of economic 
considerations, in the modern world of private property. Bebel however
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starts from a very particular notion of what the "natural" relation between 
the sexes might be; 'marriage... should be a union that two persons enter 
into only out of mutual love, in order to accomplish their natural 
mission'^ ' but this mission is rarely achieved in its purity.
Bebel describes the way in which marriage in its distorted economic 
form subordinates women. It affects women as sexual beings for it imposes 
unhealthy abstinence (later marriages and even ideologies of repugnance with 
the sex act). Bebel argues that far from immoral, the sexual urge, defined 
as the urge to procreate, is a simple need which must be satisfied, otherwise 
there is danger of insanity and degeneracy; 'Marriage is, accordingly, the 
true fountain of youth for the female sex.' ^  ' These are indeed the 
natural requirements of the human species, but far from being satisfied 
by modern society, it is distorted by the economic considerations of 
bourgeois marriage. Interestingly Bebel sees these requirements as equally 
pressing for women as well as men, and employs evidence from Eraft-Ebing about 
the reality of women's sexual (procreative) instinct. But these requirements 
cannot be met in modern marriages;
Unquestionably monogamous marriage, which flows from the bourgeois 
system of production and prope.ty is one of the most important 
cornerstones of bourgeois or capitalist society: whether however 
such marriage is in accord with natural wants and with a healthy 
development of human society, is another question.. .marriage founded 
upon bourgeois property relations is more or less a marriage by 
compulsion, which leads numerous ills in its train, and which fails 
in its purpose quite extensively, if not altogether. (35)
Marriages and births are now completely dominated by unworthy economic 
considerations with the result that even though contemporaries may be too 
'civilised' to actually practice infanticide they certainly practice 
such oppressive relations that they as good as Mil. Bourgeois marriage 
is to Bebel a shameless trading, making a mockery of the notion of the 
'sanctity' of marriage. For the propertyless the practices make no sense 
whatsoever.
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Like all the other socialist writers on the position of women, Bebel 
sees prostitution, the trading in women, as an effect of the corruptions 
of bourgeois marriage. It is an effect of sexual deprivation of late 
marriages, itself the result of economic considerations. Again marriage 
and prostitution are the recto and verso of the same relation;
Marriage presents one side of the sexual life of the capitalist 
or bourgeois world; prostitution presents the other. Marriage 
is the obverse, prostitution the reverse of the medal.' (36)
Prostitution exemplifies the distorting effects of bourgeois marriage. 
It inverts the relations between the sexes, making women the seducers, a 
role which 'naturally 1 belongs to the men. Moreover, abstinence creates 
all sorts of'perversions | such as homosexuality and pornography. Thus 
there is a situation where on the one side there is excess, resulting 
from unnatural abstinence, on the other the horrors of the hard life of 
the proletariat whose family life is destroyed.
In the context of all these aspects of marriage, the increase of 
women's involvement in productive labour is to be welcomed. It is a social 
development which, in destroying the foundations of bourgeois marriage, 
points the way to the construction of newer and freer forms;
Yet... the social development, productive of such sad results, 
is progress-precisely such progress as the freedom to choose 
a trade, freedom of emigration, freedom to narry, and the 
removal of all other barriers, thus promoting the development of 
capitalism on a large scale, but thereby also giving the death-blow 
to the middle class and preparing its downfall. (3?)
Capitalist social relations dominate all aspects of life; they are the 
^rounds on which the wholes social and political superstructure has sprung 
up. Capital is the leading power of the State and society,and the state 
is inevitablty- in a society dominated by capital and private interests. It 
is only with the overthrow of these interests that antagonisms generated by 
the economic dependency of one group on another will disappear. The means 
to this is through the overthrow of the bourgeoisie by the '.vorking class 
party.
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Socialist women and the woman question
Bebel's position was supported and developed by Clara Zetkin whose 
pamphlet, "The Question of Women Workers and Women at the present Time", 
1889 summarised the various writings on the woman question from within 
socialism. Again, like Engels and Bebel she was convinced that the only 
route to women's emancipation was women's involvement in production and 
the overthrow of the capitalist system. The question of women's 
emancipation was never however developed as a political priority within 
German social democracy. iFrequently demands for the improvement of 
women's position in society were limited to demands for protective 
legislation. Some feminists resisted this on the grounds that it deprived 
women of complete equality in productive relations, thus slowing down
the inevitable collapse of capitalism. Despite the progressive programmes
(38)drawn up by the party after the repeal of the anti-socialist legislation,
in general the questions of women's social position received less attention 
in the years after the repeal of the anti-socialist law. It is interesting 
to see that Clara Zetkin sided with Rosa Luxemburg against what they saw 
to be the "revisionist" direction gradually taken by the social democratic 
party. Their philosophy on the transformation of the position of women was 
closely bound up with a classical marxist theory of the total overthrow 
of capitalist social relations. Thus the defeat of that version of 
marxism was also a defeat of the women's question in social democratic
politics.
While excuses could perhaps be made for the failure of the woman's 
question to become anything other than marginal to SPD policy ? Vfomen under 
Socialise had an enormous impact beyond Germany as well. The radical 
impact in the Austrian social democratic party has already been noted.In 
that country, the feminist platform had been strong enough to carry through 
radical measures designed to improve women's position. Alexandra Kollontai,
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active in the struggle for women's emancipation in Russia described the 
book as 'the woman's bible' and freely admitted that this book had 
inspired her as to the importance of the woman question. Yet, ultimately 
the priority given to transformation of the position of women was no greater 
in a country which had achieved a form of socialism. Much of Kollontai's 
writing > as a socialist profoundly concerned with the subordinate position 
of women, .is exemplary of the problems of attempting to formulate an analysis 
of women within marxism.
/
Kollontai was so violently antipathetic towards 'bourgeois' feminism 
and the suffrage movement, that she refused to call herself a feminist. 
Indeed much of her early political activity involved speaking at meetings 
against what she called the pernicious and diversionary effects of 
bourgeois feminism. Kollontai had early decided, like Zetkin, in favour 
of the orthodox marxists against the 'revisionists'. This expressed a 
commitment to the notion of the increasing contradiction in the relations 
of production and the inevitability of the collapse of capitalism. Her 
work is interesting because it is an expression of the theoretical and 
ideological position of marxism in respect of the family which had been pushed 
to its extreme. It has pushed to an extreme because of political difficulties 
encountered in formulating the specificity of women's position within 
orthodox marxism.
Kollontai's early work, The Social Basis of the Women's Question 
was written as an attempt to answer the feminist and suffragist movements 
from the perspective of marxism. It explored four thesus, 'the fight 
for the economic independence of women, marriage and the family problem, 
the protection of pregnant women and women in childbirth, and the 
struggle of women for political rights'. Again economic factors -/ere taken 
to be the root cause of women's subordination. The property-orientated
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monogamous family expressed these economic factors. It is therefore,
(39) 
'the essential basis of the social stability of the bourgeoisie. 1
Women's subordination cannot be resolved without a total transformation 
of the relations of production within capitalism;
There is no independent women's question, the women's question 
arose as an integral component of the social problem of our time. 
The thorough liberation of women as a member of society, a worker, 
an individual, a wife and mother is possible therefore only 
together with the fundamental transformation of the contemporary 
social order. (40)
Kollontai's treatment of the question of sexual relations is often 
more subtle than the reductionism of this statement night suggest. There
is now much work available on the context in which Kollontai was writing,
(41) work which is too detailed to do justice to here. ' It is however
clear that Kollontai's political experience, both in exile in Europe in 
the years preceding the first world war, and in Russia during the 
revolution and the ensuing civil war, raised a whole series of questions 
about strategy towards women and the family which went far beyond the 
analyses offered by either Bebel or Engels. Kollontai encountered the 
struggles of the SPD Women's Bureau, constantly fighting to keep 
women's issues on the agenda in Germany - she herself had to fight in 
Russia to establish the importance of work among women and for women; 
finally she experienced both male socialist's active resitance and the 
passive resistance of traditions and customs. All these contributed 
to the sense of the need to talk about the dynamic of sexual relations 
in their specificity. It was in this context that Kollontai, unlike 
many other marxists, was prepared to think about the work of the sexologists 
like Bavelock Ellis, and psychoanalysts like Freud, which she had encountered 
in exile in Europe. It was in this context too that she argued the need 
for "a psychology of love", a psychology which could explain the tenacity 
of old customary morality and sexual behaviour.
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Kollontai's attempt to develop a specific account of sexual 
relations, yet remain faithful to what she saw as orthodox marxism, 
are revealing in the context of this thesis. They show the convolutions 
necessitated by dealing with sexual relations in their specifity and with 
women in their specificty while arguing still for some necessary relation 
between sexual relations and relations of production. Kollontai claimed 
that the family was undergoing changes in response to the social and 
economic environment. The effect of changes in productive relations had been 
to change ideas about the role of women in social life and to undermine 
sexual morality. Yet different class groupings respond differently to 
these changes and the different responses are exemplary of the roles 
which the bourgeoisie and working class will play in socialist revolution.
Faced with changes, the response of some groups is simply to defend 
the old forms of the family. For other members of the bourgeoisie, the 
middle-class intelligensia, change is actively pursued - a more liberal 
sexual morality is sought and the traditional indissoluable marriages 
are replaced by freer, more-easily broken ties of civil marriage. Yet 
the ideology of these new forms of morality is extreme individualism and 
self-gratification. For the working class, it is a matter of passive 
adjustment to unfavourable circumstances - the old family forms destroyed 
by women's increased role in production, the proliferation of prostitution, 
extreme economic hardship etc. But in keeping with their role as 'the 
progressive class', the response of the working class is also active and 
creative. For the destruction of the old family life and its replacement 
by forms of socialised labour has also the effect of setting collective 
or community values above family and therefore above individual values. 
A worker, she argued, never puts his family before his class; he will 
never break strikes for the sake of his individual family. The 
bourgeois:man will however always put his family first. All acts of avarice
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and anti-social behaviour are justified in the name of protecting 
his family. Thus the working class response to changes in sexual 
morality as a result of social changes again demonstrates their mission 
as the progressive class, the class in whose interests the socialist 
revolution is carried out.
Kollontai became increasingly interested in the problem of the 
subordination of women as a sex, a problem which she related to the sexual 
roles imposed by monogamous marriage. Increasingly she looked to 
psychology for her critique of monogamy and attempted to develop questions 
of the dynamic of a monogamous relationship which went beyond the question 
of economic hardship. She argued for the need for psychic adjustment as 
well as social change to solve 'the sexual crisis'.
In this context she outlined three basic circumstances which distorted 
the modern psyche - "extreme egotism, the idea that married partners possess
each other, and the acceptance of the inequality of the sexes in terms of
(42) physical and emotional experience. In order to relate these
circumstances to her economistic account of the family, she suggests an 
analysis of ideological forms as themselves formed in the process of 
struggle;
it is worth saying something about 'proletarian ethics' or 
proletarian sexual morality in order to criticise the well-worn 
idea that proletarian sexual morality is no more than 'super- 
structure' and that there is no place for any change in this 
sphere until the economic base of society has been changed. As 
if the ideology of a certain class is formed only, when the 
breakdown in the socio-economic relations guaranteeing the 
dominance of that class has been completed! All the experience of 
history teaches us that a social group works out its ideology 
and consequently its sexual morality, in the process of struggle 
with hostile forces.' (43)
The limitations on Kollontai's ideas are all too apparent. Although she 
attempts to invest ideological relations with a degree of autonomy, she 
nevertheless sees psychic forms - possessiveness etc. - as an effect of 
a definite set of relations of production. Such an assumption ultimately
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rests on the idea that social structures generate certain definite 
ethical forms or forms of behaviour.
Kollontai's position is highly problematic in so far as it attributes 
to the classes different behavioural responses. It is a problematic position 
even in the terms of her own argument. How is it for example that psychic 
responses may vary between classes when these responses are said to 
arise within the monogamous family, an ideological structure shared by 
bourgeoisie and working class alike? How can a model of the psychic 
structures of the monogamous family be drawn if ultimately the relations 
of production condition differential behaviour responses from the different 
social classes? Kollontai is contradictory. She insists on the tenacity 
of ideological forms, the monogamous family structing emotions, needs and 
desires; at the same time she insists that the working class have a 
creatively different response because of their different relation to the 
relations of production.
The contradictory nature of Kollontai's arguments do indeed point 
to what appears to be a consistent problem within marzlst theory. In 
so far as marxism insists on the integral relation between relations of 
production and ideological forms like the family (where the relation is one 
of determination) an account of the latter can never properly be given. 
For if 'behaviour' or 'ideological' forms function for or reflect the 
requirements of the relations of production, however loosely their 
connection may be theorised, the structures which arise in those 
ideological practices are always reduced to reflections of the economic 
relations of production. It is not however simply a questioning 
theoretical inconsistency. Kollontai saw her ideas at first resisted 
and gradually rejected in the tightening up of family law and morality 
during the late 1920's and 30's. First she was witness to the defeat
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of her general political sympathies, expressed in the Worker's Opposition, 
a group which opposed Lenin's economic and social policies. Under Stalin 
however even the possibility of such opposition disappeared and Kollontai 
in fact recanted on her earlier positions, being the only Bolshevik of 
the first government who survived the purges. Par from having opened up 
the possibility of challenging women's subordination, increased conservatism 
towards both family and the position of women characterised the regime 
in the later years of Kollontai's life.
Women as sex
The grim instance of the failure of these issues to achieve any 
prominance in the building of socialism has given a certain historical 
justification to those feminists, branded by the socialist women as bourgeois
who criticised the attempt to develop a politics towards women based on
(44) marxist theoretical analysis. Alys Russell's v 'critical survey of the
treatment of the woman question within social democracy illustrates the 
terms of the hostility towards marxist feminism. The focus of her 
survey is the work of Bebel, in order to dispute his treatment of women as 
a sex. Russell argues that in so far as Bebel takes sexual relations as 
procreative relations in order to derive women's evils from economic 
dependency, women as a sex disappear. The problems she raises are 
still pertinent for those arguments which seek to derive a politics of 
feminism from a marxist analysis of the position of women, even 
though the terms of her criticism derive from a very distinctive and 
limited theoretical and political milieu.
The first point of disputation is the doctrine that all political 
movements will derive from class interest groups, and that all politics 
are the effect of a struggle between the classes.
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The attitude of SPD towards the women's movement is well 
illustrated by its criticism of the form which that movement 
has taken in England. It regrets that working women, owing 
to the activity of women in the upper classes, have failed 
to acquire any feeling of class consciousness, of solidarity, 
of confidence in their own powers...Perhaps nowhere so much 
as in their attitude to this question are we made to realise 
the Social democratic doctrine of Klassenkampf; or class 
warfare, the doctrine according to which every political 
party is the party of a class, and every political movement, 
the exclusive movement of a class. What in England and America 
has been the movement of a whole sex, has in GrSD been merged in 
the movement of the working class. Women are to have their rights 
not as a sex but as workers. (45)
Alys Russell argues that in England, at least, the tradition of feminism 
has largely arisen from within an individualist bourgeois mode; it has 
been concerned with the rights of women, all women as a sex, typified 
by the work of J.S. Mill and William Thompson.
There is no necessity, she argues, for the struggle for women's 
rights to be bound to the struggle for socialism, insisting that the 
subordination of women can still be found in so-called primitive 
communistic modes of production. She attacks the marxist hypothesis 
of the matriarchate. Par from implying communism or the high status of 
women, evidence from ma tri lineal societies often reveal a system of 
male political dominance; 'These facts hardly coincide with Bebel's 
statement that mother-right meant communism, the equality of all. 
In addition Alys Russell criticises the argument so beloved of socialist 
feminists of this period, that the capitalist system must necessarily 
be superceded because of the impossibility of its contradictions and 
antagonisms yet that it is this system which provides the conditions 
for its own supercession:
The underlying idea of ...women in the present, seem to be first 
that the recognition of women's equality with men is only a question 
of time, since women have already advanced so far and won so much for 
themselves; but secondly that they cannot attain this equality 
under existing social conditions.. It would seem that the first 
assertion rather destroys the second, and that Bebel in his desire
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to prove the capabilities of women, has stated that their 
success in attaining their ends so emphatically that the 
needs for a socialist society is but slightly felt. And 
certainly Bebel's main demands are capable of being satisfied 
under the present order of society. He really asks for no more 
than is demanded in countries by those advanced women who are 
not followers of Marx and whose suggestions are more practical 
than Bebel's. (4?)
Alys Russell points to examples of this contradiction which is a general 
contradiction of those theories which advance any inevitability to the 
logic of capitalism. For example she suggests that women's economic 
independence could theoretically be secured by Trade Unions for the 
unmarried, and endowments of motherhood. '
This latter though a socialist measure is, theoretically 
compatible with the private property. And the equal mental 
and physical training of the sexes, one of Bebel's chief demands 
is certainly possible in an individualist state of society. (49)
Although Alys Russell's perspective is Fabian, a^d the Fabian 
idea of a socialist strategy towards the family was to reinforce women's 
position in the family by various state endowments. However, Alys 
Russell's criticism undoubtedly isolates problems which have often 
worried feminists. As socialism is defined in terms of an upheaval 
of the relations of production between classes, there is no necessity 
that women's equality i^il! be advanced by this route and none other. 
Indeed the whole discourse of 'equality' is one that starts from notions 
of citizenship and legality. It is therefore, as Alys Russell points out 
correctly, profoundly individualistic.
In many ways, Russell's criticism does pinpoint central problems 
with marxist political analysis of that period. It pinpoints the 
difficulty of formulating strategy when analysis assumes that socialism 
will only be attained by a total transformation of capitalist relations 
of production. But since the conditions for this transformation are 
continuously produced by capitalism itself, it is not clear how best strategy
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can be formulated to produce the conditions for transformation. Over
(50) 
this issue, german social democracy itself was completely split.
The aim of a socialist party was clearly to achieve a socialist economy, 
but how could this be achieved? By participation in existing capitalist 
political forms? Or only by revolutionary activity? The problems and 
divisions all sprang from an unresolved problem in the heart of marxism. 
What was the status of 'capitalist relations of production' and how did 
this general structural designation of a particular society affect the 
other social relations of that society? Could the interests of the 
'progressive class' ever be advanced through the social forms which 
characterised capitalism? Where all were agreed however was that first 
and foremost socialism must be an expression of the interests of the 
working class, interests defined as collective possession of the means 
of production.
For Russell the problems which this position creates are political 
problems. Is it true that the interests of the working class, so defined, 
will advance women's interests? Surely the interests of women as a sex 
can be advanced through alliance with more middle class feminist groups? 
It is not at all apparent to her for example that the interest exhibited 
by some feminists in birth-control and the radical implications this might 
have for women's sexuality are compatible with the socialist analysis 
advanced by Bebel. She formulates the problem in characteristically 
Fabian terms, pointing to a contradiction between individual and "collective" 
interests, which expresses itself in socialists' talk of the 'natural' 
sexual requirements, and simultaneous disinterest in birth-control issues: 
'even Bebel does not say how a communistic society will reconcile the 
contradiction that must occasionally arise between natural instincts 
and duty as a citizen.' Unrestrained sexual satisfaction, she argues, 
can only be to the advantage of the male proletariat;
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Betel's is the psychology of the proletariat, and when 
he insists on the necessity for the satisfaction of 
natural wants, he has in mind the man of few pleasures 
and little imagination. (51)
For Alys Russell, deeply entrenched in eugenicist assumptions, Bebel's 
analysis presents a contradiction between individual/socialist state - 
the problem of the 'above averagely intelligent females' whose self- 
interest is not served by child-rearing. Yet, if scientific breeding 
of the race is to be cultivated by socialism (as she automatically 
assumes it should be) then surely these are the very individuals which 
socialism would most like to see as mothers;
Unless educated women are made to feel that child-bearing is
a duty to the State, to which they must if necessary make some
sacrifice of independence, and even happiness, it is difficult
to conceive how even 'the perfect Socialist State' will be
continued in the future without the deterioration of the race'. (52)
The argument is a curious one, crossed by so.jnany strands of thought - 
the ideology of individual interests as the spontaneous product of a free 
floating individual, the eugenicist belief in the necessity for scientific 
planning of the race, the distrust of the language of class warfare and 
class interests and the belief that provisional alliances can be made, 
e.g. between middle and working class women to achieve provisional 
objectives. At the same time it touches on some critical area of the 
relation between feminism and marxist socialism. Feminism has often been 
steeped in bourgeois notions of equality, rights of citizenship etc. 
Marxist socialism has just as often inscribed most traditional notions 
of the family and sexual relations into the heart of socialism. It is no 
more apparent now, than it was to Alys Russell, that the priorities 
developed by marxlst political parties will do anything to challenge 
sexual hierarchies and the social forms of oppression related to those 
sexual hierarchies. Everywhere in this exchange of positions, the need for 
a more radical conceputalisation of sexual relations is apparent. The
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marzist tradition embodied by Bebel insists on the integration of 
feminist and working class interests in the overall transformation of 
the economic structure of society. Thus more radical attempts to 
tackle sexual relations as specific and entailing distinct forms of 
subordination were either sacrificed by orthodox marxism to the 
politics expressed in The Origins or simply were unable to make themselves 
heard.
The integration of the family to the theorisation of class and 
political representation, meant that the issue of women's subordination 
found an all too easy place in marxist schemes. We have seen in the 
previous chapter that the concept of 'family' in fact belonged to a tradition 
of speculation on general social relations. Through a certain sleight of 
hand, Engels made the position of women synonymous with the family. It 
was this which gave the woman question both such a ready place within 
marxism but blocked any real theorisation of women or any real acceptance 
of the centrality of transforming sexual relations. Because of the 
particular function which the family fulfilled in Engels - as the 
place of individual interest, the family also was easily submerged by 
socialism to some notion of individualism. It becomes the realm of 
freedom to which the state addresses its activities, (it is interesting 
to reflect that there is a high coincidence between statist notions of 
socialism and their adherence to traditional forms of the family - as if 
the family were sufficient expression of individual freedom).
The bourgeois feminist approach correctly specifies on the one hand 
the non-reducibility of movements to transform the relations between the 
sexes to an economic (orthodox marxist) notion of socialism. At the 
same time elements of bourgeois feminism were able to stress the radical 
implications of birth-control for women in a way that marxism was unable 
or unwilling to do, hamstrung by the lack of space possible for the 
theorisation of the relations between the sexes. In this wav a more
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radical challenge was launched on the family from outside rather than 
inside marxism. At the same time however, this feminism which, in the 
past took a relatively technicist view of equality rather than striking 
at more fundamental inequalities, failed to see that the cause of all 
women cannot be bettered without a fundamental restructuring of social 
relations.
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Conclusion
We can conclude then that a certain tradition emerged within marxism, 
where the family was paradoxically, both to the forefront of political 
and theoretical concerns, and simultaneously, inadequately theorised. 
In so far as Engels' account of the family insisted on the analytic and 
political priority of the relations of production, the specific dynamic 
of relations between the sexes could not be adequately treated. For 
example, the insistence on the family as economic unit made it impossible 
to consider the differential effects of family relations on the sexes. 
Par from marriage binding the sexes together as an economic unit, marriage 
and the ideologies of sexual division put the sexes in radically different 
positions. They have different relations to the labour market, to child- 
bearing and child-care, and to the state. This tradition of marxism 
might argue that the state represents the interests of the bourgeoisie; 
it might equally well be argued that the state differently affects men 
and women, women constructed in a relationship of dependancy on men. 
This chapter has only briefly attempted to outline some of the 
arguments surrounding marxism and the woman question. Its aim has been 
both to demonstrate how analytic and political priorities have blocked the 
specific analysis of the sexual division as social division. Through this 
analysis it has been suggested that these priorities have constructed 
a hierarchy of social divisions, which if it remains in force will 
continue to block understanding of the specifities of sexual relations.
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE PATRIARCHAL FAMILY IN FREUDIAN THEORY
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Introduction
As with the history of early marzist thought, the development of psycho- 
analysis reveals itself to be profoundly influenced by the debates traced in 
the first part of this thesis. Theories of the history of the family, and 
especially the patriarchal family, appeared in psychoanalytic theory 
integrated into an account of the construction of individual sexual identity. 
Unlike the other discourses examined, however, psychoanalysis did not assume 
'sexuality 1 as an unproblematic category. Instead it is taken as a central 
object of interrogation. It has been demonstrated that various accounts of 
the family or the history of the family rely on a notion of the sexual drive 
as a given, which has as its aim, sexual reproduction. Concomitantly men 
and women are theorised as having radically different aims and pleasures; 
sex and sexuality are seen as the same thing, both deriving from absolute 
sexual difference in the service of reproduction.
In opposition to such theories, psychoanalysis proposes a radical 
re-examination of the concept of sexuality, questioning the centrality of 
sexual reproduction and the rigid distinction between men and women. Such 
is psychoanalysis' preoccupation with the study of sexual construction that 
it has often been accused of concentrating on sexual identity to the 
exclusion of the social context in which that identity might have been 
produced. The two following chapters attempt to explore what theory of 
the social determination of sexual identity is in fact proposed by psycho- 
analysis and why this theory is such a problem for other social sciences. 
It is at the point at which psychoanalysis attempts to elaborate an account 
of the social relations in which sexual identity is constructed that it 
turns to the debates outlined in the first three chapters of this thesis. 
The following chapters will discuss whether it is the effects of this legacy 
which have compromised psychoanalysis' more radical claims.
This assessment would seem to be timely since recently it has been 
suggested that Freud's account of sexual constraction is not in fact an
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account of a universal and timeless process which unfolds itself regardless 
of the culture or historical moment into which an individual is born a 
Instead it is seen as a theory of sexual construction within a historically 
finite period - a cultural period, loosely designated 'patriarchal'. 
As such it can be taken as an illuminating account of sexual construction 
within a delimited period. Grounds clearly exist in Freud's own writing 
to justify this interpretation since he goes to considerable lengths to 
place the taboo on incest and the castration complex - so important in his 
account of sexual construction - within the context of an actual history of 
the human family. Yet it is precisely this element of Freud's work which 
is steeped in presuppositions of earlier debates and the question needs ~o 
be asked whether a return to these elements is making most use of the radical 
aspects of Freudian theory. In the various re-examinations of this myth, 
Freud's own claim for the universality of his argument is either dismissed 
or re-interpreted. Where dismissed it is claimed that Freud was mistaken
in projecting a useful and accurate, but strictly delimited, account on to
(2) 
all societies. Where re-interpreted, universality is modified on the
grounds that, as yet, there have only been patriarchal societies in which
(3) 
women have been dominated as a result of their reproductive capacities. '
As a result, so the argument runs, although Freud's claim for universality 
is incorrect it is understandable since it reflects reality. A final 
element has been introduced in re-interpretations of Freud's hypothesis of 
the evolution of the human family. Structuralist re-readings ^ of Freud 
stress that the myth of the evolution of the human family from primal horde 
to patriarchal family is strictly metaphorical and must be seen in the context 
of Freud not having at his disposal the concepts necessary to dispense with 
an evolutionist schema.
The following two chapters, dealing with the theory and history of 
psychoanalysis, have several related goals arising out of these contemporary
265
usages of Freudian theory. One is to establish what was the precise 
relation between the concept of patriarchy and other aspects of Freudian 
theory. It is this study which will be able to tell us the extent to which 
the concept in psychoanalysis is usefully assimilated to a positivist notion 
or a historical or cultural phase, 'patriarchy'. It will be able to 
explore whether this interpretation of Freud's actual history of the human 
family in fact compromises the deconstruction of sexuality which is evident 
elsewhere in Freud's work. Tne subsequent chapter will be able to explore 
the effect of a theory of the actual history of the human family on 
psychoanalysis' relation with other social sciences. In particular it will 
discuss the problems entailed in attempts to reduce the significance of 
Freud*s account of the human family. These problems are acute for 
structuralist re-interpretations which, in suggesting that this element of 
Freud's work should be treated as metaphorical, have neglected the very real 
effects which the formulation has had in psychoanalysis' dealings with the 
social sciences. To neglect this effect deals neither fully with the 
ambivalences in psychoanalysis but perhaps more seriously it fails fully to 
challenge the terms in which the social science? have formulated their 
opposition to psychoanalysis.,
Phylogenesis: Freud's history of the human family
In 1920, the first edition of the International Year book of Psychoanalysis 
was published in England under the editorship of Ernest Jones. The impact 
of psychoanalysis was already widespread; in England and America it had 
bean championed for treatment of war trauma. With the defeat of Germany 
in the first world war, the editorial explained the inappropriateness of 
continuing publication using German as the international language. Until 
the war, the main organs of psychoanalysis had been Das Jahrbuch der 
Psychoanalyse and Imago. Under the careful editorship of Ernest Jones,
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the new international journal pursued a rigorous policy by which all books 
dealing with the interpretation of mental phenomena, were automatically 
reviewed. Into this category came all books published in the area of 
psychology and anthropology, which was clearly seen at this time as an area 
of the human sciences from which psychoanalysis had much to gain. During 
this period, the journal is characterised by an impressive orthodoxy: every 
relevant text is reviewed either collectively or by individuals in order to 
establish its actual or potential relationship to psychoanalysis. The 
systematic treatment of sociological and anthropological material reveals 
psychoanalysis' claim to be a science capable of explaining all cultural and 
social phenomena. Imago, still published in Germany, advanced this; the 
journal concentrated on the application of psychoanalysis to the mental 
sciences.
From a very early stage, psychoanalytic thought had established an 
interest in many of the same objects as those studied by the anthropological 
literature of the time (myths, sexual practices, rituals), a correspondence 
which will be dealt with nore systematically in the subsequent chapter. But 
psychoanalysis entered forcibly on the picture of anthropological debates 
when, in 1913> Freud published Totem and Taboo. Here he added his account 
of the history of the human family to the multitude of versions already in 
existence. From the hindsight of psychoanalysis' divergence from the social 
sciences, it is often suggested that psychoanalysis' contribution to the 
debate on the history of the family, was simply ignored. This is far from 
the truth. Although many anthropologists dismissed the psychoanalytic 
hypothesis, it did provoke extensive consideration. Within psychoanalysis 
itself, one effect was the instant proliferation of psychoanalytic inter- 
pretations of anthopological data. Within anthropology, writers like 
Malinowski, the Seligmanns and W.HoR.Rivers accepted the possibility 
that psychoanalytic methods might shed light on the interpretation of 
cultural forms.
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Before looking at these debates in more detail, the pressing question 
which confronts us is why Freud felt the need to relate his discoveries of 
various psychic (sexual) complexes in the individual to a hypothesised 
account of the history of the human race. During the years prior to the 
publication of Totem and Taboo, psychoanalysis had constituted itself as a 
radical intervention in medial discourses. Through its assessment and 
treatment of neuroses, a conception of sexuality and sexual behaviour had 
been advanced which cut across existing medical definitions.
Treatment of nervous diseases had previously insisted on constitutional
(7) derangements, such as the designation of hysteria as disorder of the
womb, or sexual problems as the effect of constitutional disorders, such as 
constitutional homosexuality. Psychoanalysis in opposition advanced an 
account of human development in which the divisions between 'neurotic' and 
'normal' people could scarcely be drawn. In this account it was the theory 
of sexuality which constituted such a radical departure for psychoanalysis 
from other medical discourses. Freud insisted that most 'neurotic' 
disturbances could be traced to the early sexual experiences of childhood, 
and that neurotic structures wer<= only a variation of those structures by 
which all humans acquired their sexual identity. From his clinical studies, 
he concluded 'that a disposition to perversions is an original and universal 
disposition of the human sexual instinct and that normal sexual behaviour is 
developed out of it as a result of organic changes and psychical inhibition
(s)
occurring in the course of maturation.'
In the course of elaborating this account of neuroses, psychoanalysis 
developed a theory of the construction of sexual identity which radically 
challenged virtually all other contemporary accounts. Instead of 
masculinity and femininity assumed as irradicably different somatic and 
psychic states, Freud advanced a non-essentialist theory of sexuality. He 
insisted that the sexual behaviour of children of both sexes was indistinguish-
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able. The infant is initially bisexual; there is no given object of the 
sexual drive. The child is in fact ! polymorphously perverse', seeking all 
forms of sensual gratification. Both girl and boy child initially pass 
through the same dominant phases of erotic stimulation. Sexuality 
exclusively in the service of reproduction, that is heterosexual genital 
sexuality which is so much taken for granted in other discourses, is 
probleniatised by psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis insisted that reproductive 
sexuality is .an outcome which had to be explained rather than the yardstick 
by which all other 'perversions' were to be measured:
Thus from the point of view of psychoanalysis the exclusive 
interest felt by men for women is also a problem that needs 
elucidating and is not a self-evident fact based on an 
attraction that is ultimately of a chemical nature. (9)
The prehistory of infantile sexuality uncovered by Freud was that of infantile 
incestuous wishes directed to the parent of the opposite sex and polymorphous 
perversity. Both of these had to be repressed in the construction of genital 
heterosexual attractions. It was the process of this construction which 
formed the conscious and unconscious mental activities of any individual. 
In this account, two complexes were specified as formative in infantile 
sexuality: the Oedipus complex and the castration complex.
In Totem and Taboo, Freud tries to relate his discoveries of the Oedipus 
complex and castration complex in the individual unconscious to a hypothesised 
account of the history of the human race. In the book, Freud turned to the 
two obsessive themes of contemporary anthropology; the study of totemism 
(that is, the revering of a plant or animal which is often the name of given 
tribe) and the prohibition on incest. He argued that the boy's fear of the 
father, which put an end to the boy's incestuous wishes on his mother and his 
consequently ambivalent relation to the father, were emotional structures 
which could be found at a more general cultural level - in the totemic structure 
of religion and the prohibition of sexual relations between members of the same 
totem clan 0 Freud was not prepared to leave this as a matter of coincidence
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or of parallels between individual and group: he went on to argue that 
the individual instance was precisely an effect of a racial prehistory.
The myth which Freud hypothesised was as follows. Following Darwin 
he sided with writers like Atkinson in suggesting that pre-cultural man 
lived in and roamed around with a horde under the dominance of one strong 
male. This strong male, or primal father, copulated at will, regardless 
of biological ties, punishing any of the other males who tried to usurp his 
privilege. In their common dissatisfaction, the sons gradually united and 
finally murdered the father. Then they ate him. After their action, the 
sons realised that their deed was awesome. The other side of their 
ambivalent relationship towards their father gained the upper hand: their 
feelings of affection and admiration, and because of this, of an intense 
guilt. Such guilt led to the restoration of the father's original 
prohibition against the sons enjoying their mother's and sisters. What 
had been previously prevented by the actual existence of the father was 
henceforth prohibited by the sons themselves.
They revoked their deed by forbidding the killing of the 
totem, the substitute for their father; and they renounced 
its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who had 
now been set free. Thus they created out of their filial 
sense of guilt the two fundamental taboos of totemism, 
which for that very reason inevitably corresponded to the 
two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. (10)
The two repressed wishes are for the father's murder and for sexual 
relations with the mother. Accordingly the sons became guilty of the two 
crimes which, Freud claims, are the only two which 'primitive society' 
takes seriously - incest and murder.
Freud suggests that a long period of time elapsed between the murder 
of the primal father and the restoration of his laws. During this period, 
as a result of the initial horror at the deed, the women of the tribe became 
central and, indeed, dominant. As a result of this, not only was descent 
organised through the mother, disavowing the role of the father, but this
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period was also characterised by the worship of mother-goddesses. The 
restoration of reverence for the father was accompanied by the recognition 
of paternity. The admittance of paternity to consciousness is described 
by Freud as the advance to culture, the advance which constitutes human 
civilisation,,
Freud 1 s hypothesis draws in several levels of concern. On the one 
hand it attempts to 'solve 1 anthropological problems with psychological data. 
On the other, it mobilises anthropological data as a solution to problems 
interior to psychoanalysis. A distinction is drawn between the agency of 
totemism and the prohibition of incest within the totem clan. Totemism is 
seen as a facet of the emotional relationship with the father - the product of 
the desire to restore to the father his former revered position once the 
irreversible deed of parricide had been accomplished. The taboo on incest, 
on the other hand, was also invested with strongly practical motives. Once 
the father had been removed and the sons were in a position to enjoy what 
had previously been the exclusive possession of the father, they immediately 
became competitors with each other. Each wanted to take the position of 
the father.
Thus the brothers had no alternative, if they were to 
live together, but - not, perhaps, until they had passed through 
many dangerous crises - to institute the law against incest, by 
which they all alike renounced the women whom they desired 
and who had been their chief motive for despatching their 
father. (11)
Freud's account is joined to the multitude of contesting definitions 
as to the 'meaning' of mother-right societies and the practices of exogamy 
and incest - taboo. Matrilineal societies are described as regressive 
stages following the trauma of the primal murder. The incest - taboo and 
the concomitant practice of exogamy are the re-instatement of the father's 
law, without, according to Freud, the father's tyranny. But Freud's 
hypothesis is also more than another version on the history of the family. 
The terms in which he couches his hypothesis are strikingly similar to the
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terms in which he accounts for the 'prehistory' of the infant which, 
before repression, requires the forgetting of infantile active sexuality* 
There is a stage of primitive promiscuity and incestuous activity before 
the intervention of civilisation. "Advance" is won at the cost of sexual 
renunciation and patriarchy is recognised. What Freud makes of these terms 
is something quite different but they indicate how much his schema was part 
of the intellectual current surrounding debates on the family and sexuality.
Innumerable objections to the Freudian hypothesis can be raised 0 These 
relate to both the theoretical and empirical level of his deductions. Of 
the former it is clear that such a hypothesis was subject to all the 
objections that were raised to a theory which attempts to explain a variety 
of social forms by reference to a unilinear evolutionary history. The 
Freudian evolutionary schema commits the additional crimes of ethnocentrism, 
attributing to different familial organisations, degrees of primitiveness. 
The objections at an empirical level are very numerous and relate primarily 
to the universal status which Freud attributes to totemism and to the 
relation of totemism to the sacrificial meal. The latter are by no means 
necessarily found together.
However it is not the disproving or proving of Freud's hypothesis 
which interests me here, but rather the need to understand its function in 
and effect on psychoanalytic theory. All of the obvious criticisms of
Freud's tinkerings with anthropology were raised at the time of the
(12) publication of Totem and Taboo. ' Some anthropologists disputed the
factual evidence, some challenged the crude evolutionism, others questioned 
the validity of using individual 'psychical' complexes as a base for making 
deductions about 'primitive' social organisations. Yet in spite of all 
these criticisms, Freud not only adhered to his theory of the 'real event' 
at the origin of social life but also returned with a vengeance to the theme 
in the last book he ever wrote, Moses and Monotheism.
Moses and Monotheism resumes the concluding theme of Totem and Taboo
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where Freud explains his compulsion to provide a phylogenetic account
of the structures of the individual unconscious, that is, an account based
on a history of the human race;
It is not accurate to say that obsessional neurotics, 
weighed down under the burden of excessive morality, are 
defending themselves only against psychical reality and 
are punishing themselves for impulses that were merely 
felt. Historical reality has a share in the matter as 
well. (13)
Here Freud summarises the compulsion, interior to psychoanalysis, to 
elaborate a history of the human race. It is in order to solve the 
problematic issue of whether or not unconscious structures are acquired 
through each individual's identical experience or whether psychic structures 
can be acquired without individual experience. This problem remained a 
crucial one throughout all Freud f s works though in some places he tackles 
it in a quite different way. The remainder of this chapter will attempt to 
clarify how the concept of the real event functions in Freud's work, in 
order to see whether the phylogenetic account is the only solution offered 
by Freud, The consideration of the status of the real event will be 
followed by a study of Moses and Monothesism where Freud returns to the 
theme of an actual history underlying individual and social psychic complexes. 
The problem is to establish whether radical conceptions of sexuality can be 
maintained with this solution.
Real event to primal fantasy :
(U) His early work with Breuer on hysteria had led to Freud's positing the
importance of early sexual experience in the determining of neuroses. At 
that time (1893-95)* however, Freud was maintaining that what his studies had 
shown was the frequency of a 'traumatic* event in childhoodo It seemed from 
his researches that countless so-called neurotics had been seduced or even 
raped in early childhood by parents and that neurotic and obsessional behaviour 
in adulthood could often be ascribed to such a traumatic event. It was not
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till later that Freud abandoned such an hypothesis, declaring that, either 
all fathers had to be deemed potential rapists, or the foundations of female 
hysteria and neurosis had to be looked for elsewhere. The real problem 
with the theory of infantile trauma was not merely the unlikelihood of the 
frequency of such occurrences and the concomitant difficulty of establishing 
whether or not the events actually took place. It was also the theoretical 
problem that a trauma, a disturbance of sexual development, necessarily 
entails a maturational account of sexuality in which too much sexuality too 
soon will have disastrous consequences. In response to these problems, 
Freud re-interpreted the data of primal trauma rather as the effect on 
primal fantasy: instead of the commonness of parental seduction it was 
necessary to posit the frequency of the fantasy of seduction. In 1914, in 
'History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', Freud gave the following account 
of the transformation of his theories:
If hysterical subjects trace back their symptoms to traumas 
that are fictitious, then the new fact which emerges is
precisely that this psychical reality requires to be 
taken into account alongside practical reality. This 
reflection was soon followed by the discovery that these 
fantasies were intended to cover up the autoerotic 
activity of the first years of childhood, to embellish 
it, and raise it to a higher plane. And now, from behind 
the fantasies, the whole range of the child's sexual life 
came to light. (15)
In the movement from traumatic event to fantasy of seduction, Freud 
re-inforced a notion of psychical reality, the effects of which could be 
just as violent as those resulting from an actual traumatic event. There 
were two assumptions inextricably linked with the idea of psychical reality. 
First is the relationship posited between the child's own sexual activity 
and sexual enquiry, and the production of fantasy. Second is the implication 
of the absolute status of psychical reality:
Whether we are to attribute reality to unconscious wishes 
I cannot say. It must be denied, of course, to any 
transitional and immediate thoughts. If we look at 
unconscious wishes reduced to their most fundamental and 
truest shape, we shall have to conclude no doubt that 
psychical reality is a particular form of existence which 
is not to be confused with material reality. (16)
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The notion of psychical reality was not without problems for 
psycho-analytic theory. Principally the commonness or typicality of the 
fantasy had to be accounted for in a way that did not just assume that, as 
an universal attribute, all individuals spontaneously fantasised similar 
fantasies. And, following on from that, there arose the critical problem 
of how to retain the absolute determinancy of the individual's history on 
her/his psychic life and unconscious formations, if the production of fan- 
tasies is not seen to be rigidly dependent on actual events.
Such problems almost certainly underlay the fact that Freud's 
theoretical shift from real event to primal fantasy was by no means as 
smooth as he seems to suggest in 'History of the Psychoanalytic Movement', 
where he represents the discovery of the Oedipus complex and the castration 
complex as the natural and easy successor to the preliminary idea of the 
parental seduction,. Instead of a real trauma, the Oedipus and castration 
complex could be seen as structures governing infantile fantasies. In 
fact, for some considerable time Freud worked with two parallel ideas: 
the first was the idea of a childhood sexuality which was ultimately 
rooted in biologism. It is possible to read 'Three Essays on Sexuality 1 
as having been written in this context. The second was the more subtle 
account of the Oedipus complex and castration initially established through 
Freud 1 s self-analysis, and featuring for the first time in any systematic 
way throughout 'The Interpretation of Dreams'. It was only gradually that 
the notion of psychic reality was established in a way where it was not 
just the reflection of the biological drives of infancy. Even the early 
accounts of the Oedipus complex can not be freed from the accusation of 
biologism. They posited that the Oedipus complex - the attraction to the 
parent of the opposite sex and the jealous hatred for the parent of the 
same sex - resulted from an essential attraction by one sex for the other, 
and a 'giveness 1 of sexual rivalry between members of the same sex. Much 
of Freud's writing must be seen as concerned with resolving the problem of the
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relationship between the actual experience of the child and the production 
of fantasy,
'The Wolf Man' and 'Totem and Taboo*:
Freud's case-study published under the title 'From the History of an 
Infantile Neurosis' (1918) sheds interesting light on the tension between 
the actual event and the role of fantasy in the individual history. Much
of the first half of this lengthy and detailed case-study is taken up with
(17)
'a detour through the prehistoric period of childhood' by way of the
available material, here the symptoms of neurotic behaviour and the material 
of an early dream. The analysis of the dream of the little boy is highly 
elaborate, tracing associations and so on to the point of being able to 
establish a precise date for the dream, the eve of his fourth birthday which 
was also Christinas Eve in Russia. From the wealth of material produced by 
the associations of this dream Freud constructs both the wishes underlying 
the dream - the wish for sexual satisfaction from his father - and the terror 
that the satisfaction of this wish would entail castration like his mother.
Of the wishes concerned in the formation of the dream the most 
powerful must have been the wish for the sexual satisfaction 
which he was at that time longing to obtain from his father. 
The strength of this wish made it possible to revive a long- 
forgotten trace in his memory of a scene which was able to show 
him what sexual satisfaction from his father was like; and the 
result was terror, horror at the fulfilment of the wish, the 
repression of the impulse which had manifested itself by 
means of a wish and consequently a flight from his father to 
his less-dangerous nurse. (18)
What the analysis entails at this point is that the child recalls an earlier 
experience where, at (according to Freud's calculation) one and a half year's 
old, the child had witnessed his parents making love, with the father behind 
the mother. The child makes sense of this observation when he is four, not 
when he is one and a half:
...His understanding of them was deferred but became 
possible at the time of the dream owing to his development, 
his sexual excitations and his sexual researches. (19)
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Freud is well aware of the possible criticisms of his deductions which 
centre on what possible sense a tiny baby could make of such a scene, whether 
at the actual time it took place or indeed retrospectively. He argues first 
that it must have been a reconstruction on logical grounds: a child of that 
age does not form such an understanding of events around it. Secondly, 
never in analysis is this 'event 1 produced as a recollection but always as 
a product of construction. Nevertheless, despite this doubt cast on the 
nature of the recollection, Freud insists that here he must retain his belief 
that 'It did take place as I suggest'. Yet, at the very moment of insistence 
on the actual occurrence of these events, Freud starts to offer another 
alternative:
There remains the possibility of taking yet another view of 
the primal scene underlying the dream - a view, moreover, 
which obviates to a large extent the conclusion that has 
been arrived at above and relieves us of many of our 
difficulties.' (20)
The alternative theory is that the child may not have actually witnessed 
the act of intercourse between mother and father, as Freud suggested,, He 
must have witnessed an act of intercourse, but not necessarily between his 
parents but perhaps between animals. Then the anxiety about castration 
emerges not from the actual sight of the mother during intercourse but as a 
result of the gradual registration of other elements of exposure to sexual 
difference and the threat of castration. (e.g, sight of his sister, and a 
threat of castration by one of the servants in response to the coy's sexual 
activity.)-
o.oowe cannot dispense with the assumption that the child 
observed a copulation, the sight of which gave him conviction 
that castration might be more than an empty threat. Moreover 
the significance which he subsequently came to attach to the 
postures of men and women in connection with the development 
of anxiety, on the one hand, and as a condition upon which his 
falling in love depended en the other hand, leaves us no 
choice but to conclude that it must have been a 'coitus a. tergo, 
more ferrarum'. But there is another factor which is not so 
irreplaceable and which may be dropped. Perhaps what the 
child observed was not copulation between his parents but 
copulation between animals, which he then displaced on to his 
parents, as though he had inferred that his parents did the same 
thing in the same way.' (21)
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Thus at the crucial moment of claiming the 'reality 1 of the child's 
observation of parental intercourse Freud turns away, offers an alternative 
solution in which the child combines various observations to produce a 
fantasy of the act of parental copulation. Here, because of the particularity 
of the child's experience, the fantasy is sufficient to generate intense 
anxiety - an anxiety which arises not from any observation, but from a form 
of understanding which is provoked in the fantasy. Thus the Wolf-Man raises 
centrally the question of the real event, and offers no definite position; 
the text hesitates between the deduction of an actual event and the dismissal 
of all that deduction on the grounds that the violence of the effect can be 
understood perfectly well even by supposing a fantasy of that event. 
Significantly, for the purposes of my argument, Freud dismisses the 
distinction between fantasy and real event by appealing to his phylogenetic 
schema:
I should myself be glad to know whether the primal scene 
in nry present patient's case was a fantasy or a real 
experience; but, taking all other similar cases into 
account, I must admit that the answer to the question 
is not in fact a matter of very great importance. 
These scenes of observing parental intercourse, of 
being seduced in childhood, and of being threatened 
with castration are unquestionably an inherited endowment, 
a phylogenetic heritage, but they may just as easily be 
acquired by personal experience.' (22)
He goes on to argue that 'experience's is not a vital element of the develop- 
ment of the individual, either of the so-called neurotic or of the so-called 
normal individual. Where experience fails, the gaps are supplied by 
phylogenetic data. What is evident from these passages is that Freud is 
working with a notion of 'reality' as that which is represented as having 
existed, and this can be supplied equally well by phylogenetic data as by 
actual experience. Thus, at a crucial moment, Freud appeals to the schema 
laid cut in 'Totem and Taboo', which text corresponds to precisely the same 
concerns - how is it that the individual's psychic life is structured despite 
his/her individual experience.
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The same problem already exists in the 'WoIf-Man 1 which will reappear 
in 'Moses and Monotheism', Freud's phylogenetic schema leaves him still 
puzzling how to account for the transmission of memory of the real event - 
and indeed over the problem that the real event is simply pushed further 
back into prehistory. Freud's discomfort with this solution is clearly 
demonstrated in the concluding passage of 'From the History of an Infantile 
Neurosis':
I am aware that expression has been given in many quarters 
to thoughts like these, which emphasise the hereditary, 
phylogenetically-acquired factor in mental life. In fact, 
I am of the opinion that people have been far too ready to 
find room for them and ascribe importance to them in 
psychoanalysis. I consider that they are only admissible 
when psychoanalysis strictly observes the correct order of 
precedence, and after forcing its way through the strata 
of what has been acquired by the individual, it comes at 
last upon the traces of what has been inherited.' (23)
He is certainly not happy with the solution of instinctual or archaic 
traces which remain in his schema being the only way of providing for the 
transmission of common structures of experience. Yet he can neither 
attribute the transmission to spontaneous production of identical fantasy, 
nor accept that each individual is radically and totally different according 
to that individual's experience.
From this examination of the notion of the real event as it features in 
Freud's study of individual neuroses, it has become clear that one can 
interpret Freud as grappling with a notion of 'reality' which is real in so 
far as it is represented as having existed. His appeal to phylogenesis 
had, further, a definite function within Freudian theory because it explained 
the determination of cultural structures, and, perhaps more importantly, 
because neither primal scene nor primal fantasy are taken to be other than 
a construct, produced through the work of analysis, (A consistent feature 
of Freud's work was the rejection of the status of recollection and an 
emphasis on the work of reconstruction in language.) Its significance will 
be discussed shortly. I hope to have demonstrated that the notion of
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phylogenesis must be understood in the context of fulfilling a definite 
and delimited function in Freudian theory, a function of which the effects 
cause Freud obvious uneasiness.
Castration and Representation
Two factors in Freud's work, developed in much of his later writing 
displace the notions of the real event and phylogenesis. These factors 
reveal Freud trying to elaborate an account of the general structures of 
the unconscious without resorting to a phylogenetic account. Freud 
insists on the unconscious in analytic practice as a structural field which 
can be reconstructed since it handles, decomposes and recomposes its elements 
according to certain laws. Increasingly he attempts to elaborate the status 
of these laws around two factors; infantile sexual theories and the 
castration complex,,
Infantile Sexual theories
As told by Sophocles, the original Oedipus myth provided indications of 
what became a central feature of Freud's account of infantile sexuality. 
Oedipus is asked to solve a riddle: 'What travels on four legs at dawn, 
two legs at midday, and three legs at dusk? 1 Oedipus was the first to 
provide the correct answer: 'Mankind'. His answer was fatal for that 
half-human, half-animal form, theSphinx, which had posed the question. 
Already in the strange centrality attributed to this question in the 
Oedipus myth is an indication of what is tragic in Oedipus. It is his 
'knowledge'. In the Oedipus myth Oedipus goes on to 'know' his mother in 
the carnal sense and therefore to know what, including the pleasure of his 
mother, is involved in the act of intercourse and his own conception.
The theme of sensual knowledge is not found only in this single instance 
in the mytho It is confirmed by the presence of Tiresias, the blind prophet, 
In Greek mythology Tiresias had become a woman as a result of his having seen
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two snakes in the act of copulation. Seven years later - only after 
having seen the snakes again - he had been restored to manhood,, While the 
Immortals, Jove and Hera, were as was their wont in argument about the 
relative pleasure obtained by men and women while love-making, they agreed 
to consult Tiresias, who, alone among mortals or Gods, was in a position to 
know the answer. Tiresias 1 s reply was that, if love had ten parts, then 
men had one part while women had nine. Hera was so incensed about the 
betrayal of the 'secrets 1 of womanhood that she caused Tiresias to become 
blind. Jove, though, in pity for the predicament of Tiresias, compensated 
him with the gift of prophecy.
What is symptomatically present in the Oedipus myth is not just an 
example of how a man may desire his mother and 'hate 1 his father, even if 
unconsciously. There are also the questions of female sexuality and 
pleasure and of the 'knowledge' of social categories of sexuality. It 
would be ludicrous to suppose that Freud founded a major aspect of his theory 
simply on the correspondence of this myth with an aspect of psychic life 
which he had uncovered. The myth of Oedipus is too much charged with 
other layers of resonance in Freudian theory to be interpreted in this 
The tragedy of Oedipus is that he goes on to find what man literally is; he 
literally knows the pleasure of his own conception, and the punishment is 
the symbolic castration of blindness. The 'tragedy' is not simply that 
of inevitable punishment for incestuous desires, and hatred of the parent 
of the opposite sex if it should be carried through, but rather is it the 
tragedy of the non-intervention of sociality, in the form of the recognition
of parental categories. There is absent the knowledge of paternity which, 
in the normal course of events, would put an end to the male's incestuous 
desire by the threat of castration. Desire cannot be structured. 
Oedipus's 'knowledge' of and his subsequent enquiry into his origins Freud 
finds paralleled in all children., With the normal child, so-called, acceptance
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of the social institution of paternity puts an end to the child's 
involvement with the mother and structures desire according to social 
exigencies.
In Freud's work it is possible to see a modification of the trauma 
theory as the source of the later effects of neurotic behaviour in favour 
of an interest in the relationship between the child's sexual and aggressive 
behaviour and the production of sexual theories. I have suggested that 
this was so in the 'Wolf Man 1 , but it is equally obvious in Freud's essays 
from 1908. In the essays, 'On the Sexual Theories of Children' (1908), 
'Family Romances' (1909), 'Some Psychical Consequences of the Anatomic 
Distinction between the Sexes' (1925), 'Fetishism' (192?), 'Female Sexuality' 
(l93l) and 'Femininity' (1933) the emphasis is increasingly laid on the 
sexual theories of children.
Our interest was engaged by the sexual researches of 
children; and from this we were able to recognise the 
far-reaching approximation of the final outcome of 
sexuality (in about the fifth year) to the definitive 
form taken in it by the adult. (24)
What becomes important is the concern with how a mythical history is 
constructed by which the individual advenes fo desire Increasingly, there 
is concern with theories about the importance of having or not having a 
penis; in other words, with castration and its implications in relation to 
feminine sexuality<>
An important point to register is that, in positing the importance of 
enquiry, and of theory, Freud was far from replacing an essentialist notion 
of biology by an essentialist notion of a thirst for understanding:
A child's knowledge on this point does not awaken 
spontaneously, prompted perhaps by some inborn need for 
established causes; it is aroused, under the goad of 
self-seeking instincts that dominate him. (25)
In 'The Sexual Theories of Children' Freud described these self-seeking 
instincts as aroused by fear and anxiety - for example, the birth of 
another child or, more significantly, by the anxiety provoked by the fact
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of anatomical distinction into narcissistic self-identification. Freud 
describes these provocations in identical terms with those used to describe 
his notion of primal trauma or fantasy^ Sezual theories are thus provoked 
by early injuries to the ego (narcissistic mortifications) and relate to the 
sexual and aggressive nature of the child.
Such a basis for infantile sexual theories, and their provocation for 
thought itself, is intimately linked with Freud's idea in the phylogenetic 
texts of the provocation which the social category of paternity provides 
for intellectual advance,, In the texts on infantile sexuality Freud makes 
it clear that the faculty of thought which takes its initial form as fantasy 
is never the result of any natural maturational process but is constructed 
by the fantasies themselves as a result of narcissistic injury. In so-called 
'normal 1 development the anxiety produced by the fact of anatomical difference 
would coincide with the threat of castration brought by the father, or, for 
the girl, with disappointments in the mother. With neuroses anxiety would 
set in process fantasies on sexual difference, remaining always in opposition 
to the predominating forms of sexuality. Thus Freud's analysis of male 
homosexuality devolves round the male child's initial and unshakeable fantasy 
that his mother has a penis, and, equally for fetishism, the structure of 
the latter is provided by the disavowal that the mother lacks a penis 0
Significant also is the fact that Freud does not stress the importance 
of such fantasies as separate from the text presented to the analyst - 
either the text of neurotic symptoms, or the text of dreams and their 
association, or indeed the text of this fantasy as it is presented to the 
analyst. Increasingly Freud comes to indicate the structuring function 
which castration plays - becoming the nodal point around which the 
distortions of the text arrange themselves. Hence, in an analysis, it is 
possible to describe certain definite forms the analysis will take, since 
the account of the individual's history has to be presented in and across 
language, and has therefore been submitted to the structuring effect of
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castration. Freud, in fact, hovers over equating representation itself 
with the emergence of sexual theories provoked by narcissistic injuries, 
relating to the problem of sexual differences as embodied in the castration 
complex.
The Castration Complex;
What is it that justifies the claim that, increasingly, it is castration - 
and castration as providing the conditions for thought/representation - 
that structures individual/group experience? It is possible to trace in 
Freud's work a progressive displacement of concern with the Oedipus complex 
by a concern with the castration complex as structuring of primal fantasy 
and, therefore, as provocation for thought in general.
In 1923 Freud's 'Interpolation into the theory of Sexuality', entitled 
'Infantile Genital Organisation*,added the importance of castration and of 
the phallic phase to his discovery of infantile sexuality. In that paper 
he acknowledges the shortcomings of original theories in 'Three Bssavs on 
Sexuality'. He does this not merely because of the lack of discussion of 
the phallic or genital phase. It is primarily a criticism for having 
failed to take into account the implication of his theory of bisexuality 
and of the identity of the sexual activities of boy and girl. This is the 
difference of infantile sexuality from its adult outcome: both boy and girl 
undergo the same processes, are subject to the same drives,aims and activities, 
Both have active sexuality which is auto-erotic, or bound up with the mother, 
and which seeks sexual satisfaction. The identity of development is not 
confined to oral and anal phases of interest,but extends to active genital 
interest, for boys in the phallus, for girls in the clitoris.
It should emerge from the above that it is not simply a general theory 
of sexuality which has undergone revision, but there has emerged the problem 
of female sexuality with its implications for a general theory of sexuality.
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It is no coincidence that in his later writings on sexuality Freud 
concentrates on the question of female sexuality»
Two very dramatic factors now emerge from following through the 
implications of bisexuality. The first is that the girl-child must 
undergo a very radical change in the form of her sexuality - from active to 
passive, from clitoral to vaginal. The second involves the assumption that 
the girl-child must experience the same desire as the boy-child for the 
mother: she must therefore undergo a very radical change to the ob.lect 
of her desire - from mother or woman to man. This is,then, the point of 
no return for biologism. No longer can theory retain any notion of the 
essential attraction of each sex for the other, or of the essential 
antagonism for the same sex«
One element clearly demonstrates the displacement of the Oedipus complex 
by the structuring function of castration on the final forms of sexuality 
in Freud 1 s theory. This element consists of the failure of Freud ever to 
solve the problem of non-symmetry between the Oedipus complexes of the boy 
and girl. The Oedipus complex for the boy is a growing but constant factoro 
As is the girl-child, the boy is bound up sensually with the mother, and, 
because active sexuality coincides with phallic activity, there emerge 
fantasies of sexual involvement with, or 'marriage' to the mother. Only 
the threat of castration brought in rivalry by the father against the child's 
sensual involvement, coincident with the child's realisation of anatomical 
differences, forces the child to renounce the mother. For the girl-child, 
however, the process is reversed. For her the castration complex has to 
be placed before the Oedipus complex since she too is linked sensually with 
the mother and undergoes an active development of phallic sensuality. Only 
with her discovery of anatomical distinction, threatening the girl's 
narcissistic image, does the girl-child renounce the mother and turn to the 
father. Increasingly it can be argued that it is castration which in
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Freud 1 s theory of sexuality structures desire producing the f final outcome' 
of reproductive sexuality. Thus it becomes possible to see castration as 
the point of organisation (or of disturbance of the text) by which the child 
represents its access to desire. Now from this it can be suggested that 
castration (the discovery of anatomical distinction) is synonymous with the 
possibility of representation. With the discovery of anatomical distinction 
and the elaboration of sexual theories, the child takes up a social position.
This rather cursory examination of aspects of Freudian theory has 
revealed two different but co-existent interpretations of the structural 
status of the unconscious. One insists that structures in the individual 
unconscious can be accounted for by a real event, and general structures can 
be accounted for by a 'real event 1 in human prehistory,, The other suggested 
that the real event becomes real in so far as it is represented as being real. 
Increasingly we see Freud struggling with the idea that representation or 
thought was synonymous with the discovery of castration and it is this which 
structures conscious and unconscious identity. The structuralist re-reading 
of Freud has insisted that the notion of the real event should be interpreted 
in the light of the second series of preoccupations, castration and representa- 
tion<> Writers like Levi-Strauss and Lacan insist that the phylogenetic 
hypothesis was elaborated because Freud did not have available the concepts 
necessary to formulate a theory of culture as signification. According to 
Lacan such a theory would provide an account of the structural nature of the 
unconscious without having to resort to either of two impossible alternatives. 
On the one hand there would have been idealism, with the idea that all 
individuals somehow spontaneously produce the same phantasy<> On the other 
hand was the option which Freud was forced to take - the phylogenetic 
hypothesise Indeed it is this consistent refusal in Freud to attribute the 
cause of neuroses and mental disorders to any biological or genetic 
predisposition that is taken as an element of his radicalism; it breaks 
totally with any idealist understanding of the mind.
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Lacan suggests that what Freud's account is concerned with is, in 
fact, the problem of anatomical difference and its relationship to the 
horizon of culture and signification. Because such concepts were not 
available to Freud he was forced to fall back on a mythical history of 
the race, unconsciously remembered by all human beings. Both Lacan and 
Levi-Strauss suggest that Freud, unlike many of his contemporaries, had 
realised that the prohibition of incest and the requirement of exogamy 
were inseparable movements, in some way fundamental, and the very structures 
which determine the construction of sexual identity and the unconscious. 
Unhappily Freud's own writings do not sit at all easily as structuralist 
writings waiting to get out. For not only does Freud hold to the phylo- 
genetic account but at the end of his life he wrote Moses and Monotheism, 
taking the phylogenetic account further by attempting to relate this 
prehistory to the actual history of the Jewish race,.
Freud had always argued that religion and forms of religious behaviour - 
whether 'primitive' religion in the form of totemism or the religion of 
advanced 'cultures' such as Jewish or Christian monotheisms - exhibited 
structures which directly parallel the structures of behaviour revealed by 
individual neurotics. In his early writings, however, he had tended to 
concentrate on the consideration of religion as a form of collective neurosis, 
as the projection of the infant's early overestimation of the father on to 
the outside world. For example, in 'The Psycho-pathology of Everyday Life' 
(1904) Freud asserted:
I believe that a great part of the mythological view of the 
world, which reaches far into modern religions, is nothing 
other than the psychological processes projected on to the 
outer world (26)
and in 1910, in the 'Leonardo da Vinci' paper:
Psychoanalysis has made us aware of the intimate connection 
between the father complex and the belief in God, and has 
taught us that the personal God, is nothing other than a 
magnified father.. 0 .We thus recognise the roots of religious 
need as lying in the parental complex. (2?)
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In future of an'Illusion 1 (l92?) and 'Civilisation and its Discontents' 
(1930) Freud continued with this emphasis,describing religious ideas as 
patently infant!lie and at odds with reality, and attacking the social 
institutions of religion as 'the forcible imposition of mental infantilism 1 , 
inducing mass-delusion and preventing the structures from appearing as 
individual neuroses. Religious doctrines carried with them the stamp of 
the time in which they originated; that is, in the ignorant childhood 
days of the race.
While such positions on religion were clearly based on and including the 
account of the 'real event 1 , religion's function was largely one of mythical 
horizon. In 'Moses and Monotheism',however, Freud seeks not only to establish 
the link between religious behaviour and the structures of individual neuroses 
with the history of the race, but he adds a further element. This latter is 
an attempt to articulate the former concerns with the actual history of 
Judaism - that is, with real 'historical' events which produced and determined 
the particularity of Jewish monotheism. Unlike in his earlier analyses of 
religious structures, Freud admits that he has been forced to acknowledge 
1 the historical truth' of the Jewish religion.
It is this apparent attempt to give an account of historical events 
underlying the structures of both monotheism and of paternally-dominated 
religion that has opened the gates for some theorists to assume that it is 
possible to equate the sexual/cultural forms that Freud describes with an 
actual historical period. Thus we find Julia Kristeva's 'On Chinese Women' 
setting out to demonstrate how sexual division and organisation will be 
different in a culture in which the social and kinship organisations have 
not produced patriarchal monotheism. In what follows I shall examine the 
notion of history in 'Moses and Monotheism' and discuss whether it can be 
combined with a positivist interpretation of history, as an account of 
"patriarchy".
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History in 'Moses and Monotheism':
In 1934 the first draft of this book was published under the title 
'The Man Moses, a Historical Novel*  This definition of his work as an 
historical novel, and comments made elsewhere by Freud, should serve as an 
initial warning as to the status of the reference to history in 'Moses and 
Monotheism 1 , Ernest Jones reports how dissatisfied Freud felt with his 
account of the life and social origins of Moses and of the origin of the 
Jewish 'tribes':
Experts would find it easy to discredit me as an outsider...» 
It won't stand up to my own criticism. I need more certainty 
and I should not like to endanger the final formula of the 
whole book which I regard as valuable,by appearing to found 
the motivation on a basis of clay. (28)
At this point Freud decided temporarily to abandon the project, making 
the significant comment that f I am no good at historical romances'. It 
should be noted that the final formula of the book was concerned with the 
reiteration and development of the theses of 'Totem and Taboo 1 , emphasising 
again the coincidence of individual neuroses, religious practices and the 
hypothesised 'origin' of society,, In this section, too, Freud discusses 
how the violence of the effect of Jewish religion cannot be understood in 
terms of the particular history of the Jews. It is this particularity 
which Freud claims produced the conditions for an 'advance 1 to monotheism 
and patriarchy simultaneously. In other words, the history of the Jewish 
religion is argued in terms of 'over-determination 1 ; the point of its 
emergence being a structure of coincidences, repetition of the act at the 
origin of culture, and definite material circumstances,.
Before discussing the status of history in more detail, it is necessary 
to outline what exactly is "the actual history" which Freud claims to have 
uncovered under the Jewish religion. The hypothesis which Freud suggests 
for the history of the Jewish race and religion can be summarised as follows, 
Freud starts with the 'outrageous' claim that Moses was an Egyptian and not,
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in fact, a Jew as Biblical and scriptural history and tradition would 
have it. The religion which Moses brought with him was external to the 
Jewish people a In fact, Freud deduces, it was the religion of worship of 
the Egyptian sun-god, Aten, which had become a monotheistic religion for 
a very brief period under the Egyptian pharoah, Akhnaten, Moses perhaps 
had been a noble or priest from the exiled Akhnaten regime who formed an 
alliance with the oppressed Semites. He became their leader but in the 
course of political rivalries, he was murdered by the Semites. The 
Semites formed an alliance with other nomadic or dispossessed tribes, (the 
meeting at Canaan). The religion of Aten was at first subsumed to the 
religion of the worship of Tahwe, a fierce Volcano god. After a period 
of latency the original forms of the Egyptian religion were restored. 
These forms were monotheism, rejection of the after-life, and the taboo 
of any representation of the god. All these forms Freud claims bear 
startling resemblances to the short lived appearance of monotheism in 
Egypt. The pre-condition by which these forms re-emerged was provided by 
a historical co-incidence. Another leader, son-in-law to the Midianiie 
Jethro, emerged: he happened to be called Moses as well.
Freud argues that there are a series of historical accidents by which 
the history of the Jewish peoples replay the events at the origin of human 
culture - the murder of the primal father. The effect of such a repetition 
is to provide a means of working through, and thereby resolving, the guilt
at the original murder. An 'advance' in what he calls GEISTIGKEIT
(29) (spirituality or intellectuality) is then secured. ' This advance is
both the recognition of the social category of paternity and permanent 
establishment of a single father-deity. Patriarchal monotheistic cultures 
are thus brought closer to the truth of the original traumatic deed, and 
therefore to a greater degree of neurotic resolution. From the perspective 
of the rest of this thesis, it will be clear that for a hierarchy of degrees 
of primitivity, Freud has substituted or so it appears a hierarchy of degrees
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of neurotic resolution. However we have already seen that Freud mobilises 
this notion of advance in his outline of individual development to account 
for the acceptance of the social categories of desire,
What is the status of this specific history of the Jewish people which 
Freud is so at pains to establish? Can his account of the development of 
the rigidly patriarchal and monotheistic culture on which our own is based 
be taken as occupying the same status of a positivist history of the 
development of patriarchal cultural forms? Positivist history interprets the 
representations found in texts by means of rules and procedures intended to 
determine the veracity of the record. It aims to eliminate distortion and 
to read back through the record to the real conditions of which it is the 
representation. In this case it would seek to find a historical social 
formation characterised by paternal rule and dominance. Freud's methods 
are indeed a very long way away from such a positivist method of historical 
investigation. Several elements in the text of Moses and Monotheism 
demonstrate how Freud proceeds to his historical account. They reinforce 
the conclusions which I have begun to draw as to the status of the real 
event in Freudian theory.
Textual Distortion
Thus almost everywhere noticeable gaps, disturbing 
repetitions and obvious contradictions have come about - 
indications which reveal things to us which it was not 
intended to communicate. In its implications the 
distortion of a text resembles a murder: the difficulty 
is not in perpetrating the deed, but in getting rid of 
its traceso We might well lend the word E3TSTELL7NG ("d-is- 
tortion) the double meaning to which it has a claim but 
of which today it makes no use. It should mean not 
only "to change the appearance of something 1 but also 
'to put something in another place, to displace,' (30)
My emphasis
Unlike positivist history which sets out to eliminate distortion by some
appeal to a higher truth - oral accounts, statistics, economic conditions
etc. - this procedure treats the text as the analyst treats the speech of
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the patient. It expects to find the meaning of the text, within the text, 
not outside the text, as positivist history would expect. This is not 
however to expect transparency as if 'the text represents what really 
happened 1   Instead, it seeks to reconstruct the meaning through processes 
of association, through displacements, through contradictions and repetitions. 
Analytic procedure accepts the patient's text always as already re-presentation 
going on to investigate the structures determining the representations through 
displacements and distortions occurring in the text. It seeks neither to 
eliminate the distortion, nor correlatively to read back to the original 
event, but to construct the phantasy/event in the discourse addressed to the 
analyst. As the quotation above indicates, what is displaced at one point 
will appear in another place in the text.
Freud accordingly takes the evidence of the Scriptures neither as 
historical truth nor as the total fiction of mythology:
Biblical narrative contains precious and invaluable 
historical data which have been distorted by the influence 
of powerful and tendencioijis purposes and embellished by 
the products of poetic invention.'
He claims that these distorting purposes can be deduced largely from 
the texts themselves, since quite often what has been suppressed or disavowed 
will appear elsewhere in the text.
Two examples indicate how Freud employs the notion of distortion. 
The texts of the Hexateuch emphasise how Tahweh had insisted to Abraham on 
circumcision as part of the distinctiveness of the chosen people. As Freud 
shows, however, the mark of distinctiveness is a somewhat awkward one since 
circumcision was also regularly practised by the Egyptians. Here Freud 
argues that the Egyptian connection is suppressed by an insistence that 
circumcision is found as an original characteristic of Jewish tradition. 
This insistence however suggests disavowal. Another example of textual 
distortion is found in the very notion of the 'chosen people'. Freud 
indicates how completely different from any other religious mythology is
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such an account of a God's choosing his people, particularly in choosing 
a people after a long period in which the god appeared inactive. Freud 
here deduces another distortion resulting from the strange formation of 
Judaism by an Egyptian, a distortion intelligible if it is pre-supposed 
that Moses the Egyptian chose the Semites when he set out to escape Egyptian 
persecution,,
Freud will not leave the notion of distortion at the level of the 
intrusion of political motives in historical representation. He supposes 
further both that the Scriptures are a combination of historical and 
political evidence with mythological structures, and that, as myths, they 
may be assumed to possess elements of the typical mytho
The Distortion of the Typical Text;
The initial historical postulate that Moses was an aristocratic Egyptian 
derives from the deviation of the hero-myth of Moses from other myths of 
heroes. It is, in other words, a deviation from the average legend, the
outline of which Freud derived from Rank's 'Myth of the Birth of the Hero',
("52^ (1909). This is thought to have profound links with the psychic life
of the child: it has obvious parallels with the 'family romance 1 by which 
through phantasy the child embellishes its origins,,
Freud accepts Rank's account of the typical legend, claiming that it 
is related to the problem of paternity,, The hero is born against his 
father's will, is often cast out and returns to overcome the father, A 
classic version of the legend involves the exposure of the hero, often in a 
casket, from which he is rescued to be brought up by humble parents in place 
of his natural ones. Freud does not omit to emphasise the recurrent 
symbolism of birth which adheres to stories about casting out on to the 
water. In 'Family Romances' (l909)he argues that the typical myth or legend 
has direct parallels in the psychic life of the child. Here in phantasy the
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child often assumes that his/her real parents are only adoptive, he/she 
being descended from royal or noble blood. In fact, when the child 
realises the irrefutability of maternity, there is attributed to the mother 
a rich sexual life in order to replace the real father. Freud suggests that 
these infantile explanations or theories are the embodiment of, and to some 
extent, the resolution of contradictory impulses towards its parents<. 
A typical example of such contradiction is the early over-estimation of the 
father which gives place to disappointment and, quite often, fearor rivalry. 
The child's 'fabrication' of royal descent, by which the natural father becomes 
a foster-parent, corresponds according to Freud with the complex of over- 
estimation/disappointment and rivalry 0
In contrast to this typical structure, the legend of Moses reveals 
striking dissimilarities and reversals. Moses is born of humble parents 
and rescued from the water by the aristocracy,, Freud attributes to these 
dissimilarities the status of distortions of a typical text. Such 
distortions can be accounted for as being the eruption of certain features 
of a historical nature which, for political reasons, have undergone trans- 
formation. What is here being suppressed is the Egyptian origin of Moses. 
Under the pressures of nationalism the 'false 1 parents are made out to be 
Egyptian: hence the distortions to the usual form of the story a
Already we are confronted by a somewhat unusual assumption about the 
historical event. Family romances were thought by Freud to be located 
predominantly in the relations of desire within the family. Yet he uses the 
distortions operated on the typical romance as the evidence of historical 
events. The historical narrative has to be seen, in this case, as a 
re-construction - a combination of typical structures, political forces and 
material circumstances,
The Analogy between the Individual and the Group;
As he does with much of the so-called historical evidence in 'Moses and
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Monotheism', Freud justifies his appeal to 'typical legends', etc. on the 
ground that religious observances, myths, religious practices all have 
their bases in the same structures which underlie individual neuroses; in 
other words, religious observances are said to correspond with the complexes 
accruing round parent/child relations, castration anxiety, and events of a 
sexual nature in just the same way that these can be found almost invariably 
in individual neurotics.
This supposition running through all of Freud's work premises that 
religion is a collective neurosis, the bases of which may be found in the 
very structures underlying individual neuroses. The parallelism between 
individual and group neuroses in fact provides the whole 'flesh' of 
'Moses and Monotheism', leading Freud often into areas of speculation in 
which he seems uncomfortable. In 'Moses and Monotheism', for example, 
Freud attempts not only to locate religion in the same structures as the 
complexes determining individual construction, but he attempts also from 
this analogy to adduce and describe an historical process,, Freud therefore 
uses the analogy to account for the puzzling fact that, if you were to 
accept the Egyptian hypothesis, a long period passed between Moses's exile 
from Egypt and the final establishment of Jewish monotheism. What the 
analogy suggests is that there was a period of latency followed by, and 
replaced by, the outbreak of aeurotic or compulsive behaviour. Thus Freud 
is able to hypothesise an event, at the origins of Jewish religion, parallel 
to the traumatic event at the origins of sociality. Freud's argument for 
the murder of Moses is based on such an hypothesis, together with inexplicable 
references to the Semites' disobedience towards, and rebellion against, Moses 
throughout the Scriptures. Because of the murder of the great man or 
father-figure of Moses Judaism 'advanced' towards monotheism* Repetition 
of that first deed, and also the repetition of other conditions, of the 
name Moses, etc. allow a partial return of the repressed and the reinstiga- 
tion of reverence for the father.
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In 'Moses and Monotheism', the analogy of individual neuroses and 
religious structures is provided by the phylogenetic account; this 
analogy created innumerable problems and contradictions with the text., 
In that book Freud reiterates how all individual neuroses - obsessive 
behaviour, religious mania, animal phobias, etc. - have their bases in 
'the history of the race 1 . It is a position which, though present in 
most of Freud's work, is spelled out again really only in 'Totem and Taboo' 
and in 'Group Psychology and Analysis of the E.go 1 . ^' In the rest Freud 
tended to emphasise parallelism, or the fact that religion had its origin 
in the same complexes that dominate the construction of the child's sexual 
life. Yet both in 'Moses and Monotheism' and in 'Totem and Taboo' Freud 
attempts to deal with this parallelism in terms of both conditions - 
individual neuroses and collective neuroses - having their roots in an 
early trauma undergone at the beginnings of society.
As elsewhere, Freud worries how to account for the generality or 
typicality of structures without falling into thoughtless claims for the
universality and identity of human experience, remarking that '¥e find
(34) ourselves in the realm of group psychology where we do not feel at home.'
However, since he has posed the whole analysis in terms of an original event, 
much of the latter part of 'Moses and Monotheism' is taken up with puzzling 
how knowledge of an event can be passed from one generation to another. 
Freud talks loosely of 'tradition 1 , sometimes equated with oral records 
which preserve the memory of an event when written records disavow it. The 
notion, however, can neither explain the colossal lapse of time between the 
murder and the establishment of monotheism, nor can it account for the 
far-distant memory of the primal-murder. Freud is found trying to 
establish a notion of tradition understood as unconscious memory traces, 
just as the individual preserves memory traces of an event which he/she 
could never recall,, On occasions such as understanding of the notion of
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tradition as 'archaic traces' hovers on a biologistic account of the 
transmission of human culture, so much so that Freud's less intelligent 
American critics proudly later announce the inadequacy of his theories 
since no evidence exists within Genetics that memories can be passed down 
from one generation to another, Such a response, if nothing else, 
serves to illustrate just how much Freud is at points open to misinter- 
pretation. Further Freud persisted with his ideas even after they had 
been taken to task during the 1920s, by anthropologists like Kroeber and 
Malinowski:
...anthropologists can clearly indicate what is the 
medium in which the experiences of each generation are 
deposited and stored up by successive generations, 
The medium is that body of material objects, traditions 
and stereotyped mental processes that we call culture. 
It is supra-individual but not psychological,
(35)
Freud instead insisted that, to account for the trans-individual, if not 
to say cultural, response which seemed to characterise the individual life, 
it was necessary to resort to an evolutionary schema in which memories of 
early acts are somehow passed on from one generation to another, playing a 
part in the formation of the individual's psychic life:
At the time we have no stronger evidence for the 
presence of memory traces in the archaic heritage 
than the residual phenomenon of the work of analysis 
which calls for phylogenetic derivation. (3?)
The reason for Freud's persistence with the notion of archaic heritage 
related to his refusal of two opposed theories. One is that of Malinowski's 
culturalism; the other extreme is that of supposing that an individual 
spontaneously fantasises complexes and mythical formations, and then to 
account for the similarities between individual fantasies and complexes 
by suggesting that human experience was timeless and universal, Freud 
wanted to avoid tailing up either of these positions: the first, because 
it could not account for the tenacity of an individual's complexes or, 
indeed, for their waywardness in relation to material circumstances; the
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second because it would contradict precisely the greatest discoveries
of the unconscious, the effect of the 'pre-history of the individual' on
the psychic life of the adult through the agency of the unconscious,
Most importantly, perhaps, it was the phylogenetic account which saved
Freud from the awesome problems of empirical refutation of his thesis -
from the empiricism which questions whether each individual has 'to see
the other sex's genitals', or whether each has'to hate and fear his father'.
The reactions to early traumas are often not individual but "fit in 
better with a model of a phylogenetic event".. a
The behaviour of neurotic children towards their 
parents in the Oedipus complex and in the castration 
complex abound in such reactions - which are intelligible 
only phylogenetically 8 (38)
It is,however, necessary to note that, whatever the motive for Freud's 
adherence to the theoretically-dubious notion of phylogenesis, the use of 
parallelism between individual and group psychology is hardly a basis for 
the deduction of 'real historical events' according to the positivist 
historical schema.
Perhaps more significant, too, is Freud's own contradictoriness in the 
use of the notion of tradition. It is rut limited to the two meanings 
outlined but includes a further dimension related to tantalising hints 
about the relationship between the Jewish religion and historical writing* 
Such a position is anticipated in 'Totem and Taboo', though equally 
unsubstantiated there,. The issues are first raised in a discussion of the 
prohibition on the names of dead members of the tribe, as several tribes 
practise:
The dread of uttering a dead person's name extends to 
an avoidance of the mention of anything in which the 
dead man played a part; and an important consequence 
of this process of suppression is that these peoples 
possess no tradition and no historical memory, (39)
In 'Moses and Monotheism 1 Freud hesitates about equating the construction
of the Jewish people and of their tradition with the production of historical
writing - that 'the Jewish race' or religion is precisely the moment at
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which the various political compromises and suppressions can be represented 
in a narrative - the faniily romance, the compromise of various purposes 
and influences. Such an idea again re-emerges in the notion that it is 
the 'writings' which hold the race together through various political 
crises:
It was the Holy Writ and intellectual concern which held 
the people together. (40)
Freud equates intellectual concern with the intellectual advance achieved 
by the establishment of a paternalistic monotheism. Nevertheless he 
hesitates about making this synonymous with the writing/representation 
of their history,, What emerges from the discussion of Freud's use of 
the notion of tradition in the analogy between the group and the individual 
is that, even at an explicit level, the notion is contradictory. It even 
opens on to an idea that the structures of the Jewish religion which are 
analogous to individual structures and complexes are simultaneous with the 
moment of a group's writing its history,
The position of the father and the advance in Intellectuality: the Freudian 
notion of Patriarchy;
Perhaps more obviously than most one contradiction stands out in a generally- 
confused text. It is that if monotheism emerged as a political factor, 
the condition for unity in a disparate empire, emerged in Egypt under
T
Akhnaten, why should the emergence of Jewish monotheism necessarily be tied 
up with the repetition of events of a pre-history; that is, the murder of 
Moses, the father-figure? The answer relates to Freud's conception of an 
 advance in intellectuality/spirituality' and to the institution of 
patriarchy. While Egyptian monotheism was a temporary phenomenon, arising 
perhaps from political expediency, Freud attributed to Jewish monotheism 
the status of a permanent 'advance', established as the result of the 
overdetermination of circumstances by a series of repetitions, of which the
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principal repetitions were the repetition of the murder of the father and 
of the name of Moses 0
According to Freud, these repetitions permitted a part return of the 
repressed - of those events which had existed only in 'tradition', in 
archaic memory-traces:
Fate brought the great deed and misdeed of primeval 
days, the killing of the father, closer to the Jewish 
people by causing them to repeat it on the person of 
Moses, an outstanding father-figure. It was a case of 
'acting out 1 , instead of 'remembering 1 , as so often 
happens with neurotics during the work of analysis, (4l)
Freud argues not only the origin of monotheism in patriarchy through the 
institution of a monotheism entailing a lasting 'advance' paralleled, if 
not produced, by paternity as a social institution. Moses does not simply 
reawaken the childish image of the father, but his murder and gradual 
reinstatement make possible the other side of that ambivalent love/hatred 
relationship of which the 'hate' side led to the original murder of the 
primal father.
Freud's conception is, however, invariably more complicated and 
interesting that this banal account of religion as the projection of 
infantile desires and anxieties. Interest attaches to the conception of 
patriarchy which is employed, where Freud relates his notion of advance, 
to the recognition of paternity as a social institution. Though motherhood 
is provable by the senses, paternity is always uncertain. It can never 
be more than an hypotheses or a premise. As did many of his contemporaries 
and forebears in early anthropology, Freud claims that the recognition of 
the father's role in procreation, and therefore of the father-place, marks 
society's advance from pre-history. In Freud's evolutionary scheme this 
advance is equated with the reinstatement of the original father's desires 
and prohibitions. Reverence for the father's desires is gradually recognised 
in the form of totemism. The point at which patriarchy is reinstigated, 
nevertheless under the exigency of the exoganic exchange of women, is what 
constitutes the advance to sociality itself 9
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Reference is made here to the advance from pre-history to history, 
just as Freud could write of the child's pre-history before he acquired 
consciousness. In 'Moses and Monotheism 1 the analogy is explicit where 
Freud speaks of the identity of the words for conscious/conscience in both 
French and German. He claims that such identity bears witness to the 
identity between the acquisition of consciousness and the development of 
conscience or guilt at the moment of the original act of parricide,, The 
identical recognition of paternity which provoked the category of thought 
was, in other words, inextricably bound up with guilt and 'religious 
feelings' ascribed by Freud to the complexes related to the primal father 
and his murder,,
The conception of 'advance' is linked not so much with any notion of 
progress, or of higher forms of society, but more with the process of how 
the child acquires a place in sociality through a capacity for thought 
provoked by the father's position and, therefore, by the categories of 
marriage relations. The evolutionary schema of 'Moses and Monotheism' 
generalises this constantly repeated process to an original event - 
phylogenetic account - so that it will not appear as a spontaneous and 
given product of the human child. What is significant is the symbol of 
fatherhood and its relation to abstract thought, rather than the literal 
father.
One aspect of 'Moses and Monotheism' does indeed belie the aim of a 
phylogenetic account. This is the argument's circularity. Freud asserts 
that intellectual/spiritual advance is achieved in the establishment of a 
patriarchal culture. Now it becomes possible in part to remember and 
reverence the original father. Logically, however, no such decisive 
emergence of patriarchy can occur, since the dominance of the father's 
control of marriage relations was 'originally' always present: it had 
simply been in abeyance following the act of parricide, Malinowski
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adequately sums up the problems of circularity haunting Freud's schema:
This is the original act of human culture and yet in the 
middle of the description the author speaks of 'some 
advances in culture', of 'the use of a new weapon', and 
thus equips his pre-cultural animals with a substantial 
store of cultural goods and implements. No material 
culture is imaginable without the concomitant existence 
of morality and religion... 0 the theory of Freud and 
Jones tries to explain the origin of culture by a 
process which implies the previous existence of culture 
and hence involves a circular argument. (42)
More particularly Malinowski's arguments can be applied to the schema of 
the origins of patriarchy: the origin of patriarchy is presumably explained 
by presupposing the existence of patriarchy originally! In perhaps the 
most significant sentence from 'Moses and Monotheism' Freud himself comes 
to recognise the problem:
In the case of some advances in intellectuality, for 
example in the case of the victory of patriarchy, we 
cannot point to the authority which lays down the 
standard which is to be regarded as higher. It cannot 
in this case be the father since he is only elevated 
into being the authority by the advance itself, (43)
The above brief comment fundamentally undermines the whole evolutionary 
schema outlined at such pains in the rest of Freud's text« Although this 
contradiction would not lead necessarily to Malinowski's culturalism, it 
does certainly indicate that the category of paternity is being invoked in 
a more complex relationship with kinship, castration and the sexual theories 
of children than would be apparent from the phylogenetic account. What is 
important about the fundamental contradiction in the account of the emergence 
of patriarchy is the light it throws on the category of paternity. First 
it reveals that, at the basis of the advance to human culture, it is not 
the dominance of the fathers as a political group that signifies,, What 
is significant is a prohibition on incest and an exhortation to exogamy. 
In other words, Freud' evolutionary account, unlike those of some of his 
contemporaries, was to show neither the inevitability of patriarchy nor 
the 'primitiveness' of matrilineal society. It was to demonstrate the 
fundamental importance of incest-prohibition and of exogamy,,
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Levi-Strauss has laid claim to this account in Freud as in fact 
describing the structural nature of human culture. The status of these 
structures was first elaborated by him in his Elementary Structures of 
Kinship. 1949. In this book, Levi-Strauss takes issues with the so-called 
functionists who refused to examine kinship as a system. Functionalists 
as we have seen concentrated on only the functions of particular institutions 
and on beliefs in particular societies. Levi-Strauss, opposing them, argues 
that kinship does possess a systematicity. It consists of the apparent 
universality of prohibitions and of prescriptions for categories of 
marriageability. Nor is it just that all societies observe rules of some 
kind. Rules always involve some prohibitions against marriage within the 
clan or group and a prescription for marriage outside that group. Thus in 
all societies - matrilineal or patrilineal - it is possible to distinguish 
certain regularities. Women are exchanged according to a certain order, 
marriages being permitted with certain kin or with certain members of the 
same tribe or neighbouring tribes, being forbidden with other kin or other 
members of the same or neighbouring tribes. Faced with this apparent 
systematicity, Levi-Strauss suggests the analogy between kinship relations 
and linguistic relations, as described by structural linguistics. They are 
made up of the same elements: systems of difference, signs, relations of 
exchange. In other words, Levi-Strauss conceives of kinship as a system 
of communication guaranteeing the possibility of reciprocity and,therefore, 
of integration between self and others. In such a system women are 
exchanged as signs.
Levi-Strauss correctly suggests that Freud's phylogenetic account is 
so contradictory precisely because it cannot produce these terras. Paternity 
is not about forms of subordination on the basis of sex - legal, political 
or intersubjective. It features so irreducibly because, for Freud, kinship 
relations (incest prohibition and exogamy) were the forms of fundamental 
classification. They were synonymous with thought itself. Thus the
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conceptualisation is premised on a primary conceptualisation - that of the 
social rules of marriage which, after all, is premised on the recognition 
of the father's role. Thus I have indicated several areas which in 
^oses and Monotheism' warn us not only against equating Freud's account 
with a positivist notion of history, but also wamus against interpreting 
Freud's account as describing patriarchy as it is usually defined - that 
is, as the political, legal and intersubjective dominance of men as a sex.
In the preceding chapter I have indicated the innumerable problems of 
and contraditions in Freud's phylogenetic text, Moses and Monotheism. These 
have clearly demonstrated that problems arise insuperably from equating the 
condition described by Freud with a condition supposed by positivist history, 
a condition in which patriarchal social organisations resulted in patriarchal 
religions and ideologies and determined the form of sexual relations.
On the other hand I hope I have demonstrated that Freud's insistence 
on phylogenesis and 'the real event 1 at the origin of sociality is no 
minor feature in his work. An examination of the status of the real event 
has shown that it is possible to produce another reading of Freud which 
deconstructs this notion, and replaces it with an account of the structural 
status of the unconscious. Lacan has been able to illuminate the structural 
status of the unconscious, thereby dispensing with Freud's evolutionary schema 
without falling into the idea that the unconscious simply mirrors biological 
dispositions or the vagaries of the human soul. However, as the following 
chapter will show, there are problems with this structuralist rereading,, 
For one thing it suppresses a problem with which Moses and Monotheism is 
clearly preoccupied. This is the problem of what is the relationship 
between ideological forces, like religion and particular determinate 
historical periods. It therefore neglects much which is radical in the 
psychoanalytic approach to the interpretation of symbols and representation. 
Secondly, any attempt to reread Freud as describing conditions of represent-
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ability, dismissing the phylogenetic account but retaining the role 
of paternity in the castration complex, is bound to accept a timeless 
dominance of the father. Finally to neglect the phylogenetic account 
also neglects the fact that the idea of a historical real event had very 
real effects on subsequent developments of psychoanalytic theory. In 
particular it affected psychoanalysis' relation other theories of familial 
forms. To dismiss the notion of the real event in favour of a structuralist 
reading neither addresses the particularity of social forms/psychic 
organisations which Freud began to touch on, nor does it possess any way of 
accounting for and challenging effects that have accrued to this conception 
in psychoanalysis' engagement with the social sciences,,
CHAPTER EIGHT
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND ANTHROPOLOGY: 
THE INTERPRETATION OF SOCIAL 
PRACTICES
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Introduction
Freud, as we have seen, refused to abandon his phylogenetic theory of the 
general structures of the unconscious. Even though the lack of teleology 
in his evolutionary scheme and the circularity of the arguments justify a 
reading of this account as a metaphor for the structural status of the incest 
taboo and castration, Freud adhered to 'the time-honoured heirlooms of 
evolutionary anthropology'. He shared the equation of patriarchy with 
civilisation. He postulated a stage of maternal dominance, corresponding 
to the dominance of the sensual before the triumph of intellectuality. He 
insisted, too, an a unilinear history of the family. What is more, he 
persisted in these assumptions despite early chastisement from anthropologists 
for neglecting the criticisms to which evolutionary theory had been submitted; 
'there really is a great deal of ethnology not at all represented by the 
authors who Freud discussed.' '
Yet in spite of the all-too-obvious limitations of Freud's theory, it 
was to be psychoanalysis above all other psychological theories 
which had an impact on some developments of anthropological studies of the 
family. Writing on the impact of psychiatry 1 on American Anthropology, in 1944, 
one commentator insisted that it was psychoanalysis alone which had made any 
systematic impression:
certainly from the study of anthropological literature one gets 
an overwhelming impression that it is only psychoanalytic writers 
who are extensively read by anthropologists in this country. One 
would be hard pressed to discover five citations to nonanalytic 
psychiatrists. (2)
It might be expected from some of the claims made in the previous 
chapter for the radicalism of psychoanalytic theories of sexuality, to find 
that psychoanalysis' impact was a radical challenge to assumptions about the 
nature of sexual relations. This, however, was far from the case. Its 
influence was especially great in the development of studies of behaviour 
and personality within American anthropology. This influence is seen 
clearl/ in the writings of the 'culture and personality' school. ?or nany.
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particularly for Marxists, this influence has been seen as a deeply regressive 
one. It has produced an emphasis on a universal psychology and on studies of 
behaviour as opposed to the social and economic structures of any given 
society. Psychoanalysis is seen by its opponents as applying a universalising 
account of the family and sexuality crudely to any cultural form. Especially 
as it has appeared within anthropology psychoanalysis has reinforced the 
significance of the biological family as repository of individual emotions, 
instincts and psychology. From the point of any interrogation of the social 
construction of sexuality, psychoanalysis can hardly be seen to offer a 
radical perspective.
Rather than generating a radical interrogation of sexuality, the 
legacy of psychoanalysis has been a long and sterile debate over the 
universal applicability of its findings about the human family. Positions 
have polarised around whether 'typical' emotional complexes like the 
Oedipus complex are universal, or whether emotional structures and obligations 
vary within different cultures. This impact within studies of the family 
suggest the need to look at several areas. Most obvious is the history of 
the exchange between psychoanalysis and anthropology. ¥hat were the points 
that seemed to make an exchange possible and profitable? ¥hat happened in 
those debates which had determined an outcome so sterile for any understanding 
of sexual relations in society? These questions are pressing if any claim 
for the radicalism of psychoanalysis is being made.
The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences 
"The Significance of Psychoanalysis for the Mental Sciences' was a highly 
influential monograph by Rank and Sachs published in 1913. It bears 
witness to the claim made by psychoanalysis itself for its applicability to 
the objects traditionally studied by the social sciences. But this claim 
was made not only by psychoanalysis but also by the social sciences. Fron
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the publication of Totem and Taboo until the Second World War, there was a 
long period of exchange between psychoanalysis and the social sciences. 
Psychoanalysis was frequently cited as the discipline which, developed in 
conjunction with the traditional social sciences, could constitute a genuinely 
'human science'. The position was found surprisingly often among marxist 
writers of the period. ' Given the impact of psychoanalysis in the 
social sciences, this aspiration now seems startling.
The phylogenetic texts were so central in the development of psycho- 
analytic theory because of the possibility of a 'human science' involving
psychoanalysis. The claim made in Totem and Taboo that the 'beginnings of
(5) 
religion, ethics, society and art meet in the Oedipus complex' stood in
the background of psychoanalytic interpretations of social practices and 
ultimately was the claim on which a psychoanalytic orthodoxy was founded 0 
Freud himself had already established an interest in analysis of myth and 
cultural form, primarily through his work on religion, but, apart from the 
phylogenetic texts, he did not deal directly with anthropological data. 
It was left to his followers who were quick to extend his discoveries to a 
whole range of issues within the social sciences. Yet, these applications 
did not occur 1.1 a haphazard fashion. They occurred in the same period in 
which the orthodoxy of the psychoanalytic institute was formed; it was the 
orthodoxy characterised by the early years of the International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis. Freud's rivalries and allegiances were formative in the 
development of an orthodoxy and, contrary to the structuralist re-reading, 
Freud clearly gave his support to some of the more literal interpretations 
of the phylogenetic account.
It was for this reason that, rather than move out of the debates 
around the emergence of the biological family, psychoanalysis remained with 
then and indeed emerged with a more systematic commitment to the significance 
of the biological family. Interestingly, the only real disputation which 
took place with the orthodox interpretation cf sexual relations was around 
the question of female sexuality and not around the claims made by
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psychoanalysis for the significance of sexual formations in the interpre- 
tation of cultural phenomena. Freudian psychoanalysis emerged with a deeper 
commitment to the universality of the Oedipus complex as the complex of 
typical emotions underlying human culture. Until the writing of Levi- 
Strauss there was no suggestion that thephy .logenetic account should be 
taken as metaphor for the structural relations of kinship. Many of the 
formative divergencies both within psychoanalysis and between psychoanalysis 
and other disciplines had their origins in the impossibilities generated by 
by the insistence on the universality of the typical emotions of the 
Oedipus complex. The debate between Ernest Jones and Bronislaw Malinowski 
was especially formative for the relation between psychoanalysis and the 
social sciences. This took place over the significance of mother right 
societies and whether these societies shared the same emotional complexes 
as 'patriarchal 1 societies. It is a debate which shows up the severe 
limitations of both sides in their conception of sexuality and the social 
formations. The arguments advanced against psychoanalysis mobilised 
schemas of determination which were radically incompatible with psycho- 
analysis and no more helpful for any future reconstruction of theories of 
sexual relations.
Dreams and Myths
(the teachings of Freud) not only help us to understand the dreams 
themselves but also show their symbolism and close relationship with 
all psychic phenomena in general, especially with daydreams or 
fantasies, with artistic creativeness and with certain disturbances 
of the normal psychic function. (?)
Quite apart from psychoanalysis' own claims that its discoveries applied 
to the terrain of the social sciences, it T/ras immediately apparent that 
there was a certain coincidence of objects of study between psychoanalysis 
and the anthropology of that time. This was startling true of psychoanalysis' 
systematic approach to the question of symbolism of myths. In its study of
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mythical representations, it is possible to see quite clearly the two 
contradictory aspects of the psychoanalytic project. On the one hand the 
approach undermines many of the assumptions of previous interpretations 
of symbolism. On the other hand there is a crude interpretation of symbolism 
in terms of universal schemas of human sexual development.
The fundamental interlinked discoveries of psychoanalysis - infantile 
sexuality and the unconscious - had been made through a notion of indirect 
representation which underlay the interpretation of symbols. It was through 
the analysis of symbolic processes like dreams, that regular confirmation of 
the unconscious had been provided. Dreams are, as Freud himself claims, 
the 'royal road to the unconscious'. Like neurotic symptoms, jokes, puns 
and dreams regularly demonstrate another modality of signification, that of 
the unconscious thoughts. Their existence cuts through any differentiation 
between normal and abnormal mental processes.
In The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud had challenged previous 
interpretations of dream symbolism. He argued that those phenomena like 
dreams, jokes, neurotic symptoms previously consigned to the unknown and 
therefore unknovrable, were in fact meaningful phenomena. They are in a 
direct relation to waking thought. The difference lies primarily in a 
modality of signification; the unconscious processes exploit the plurality 
of language, making connections which evade conscious thought, in order to 
avoid censorship. Dreams have both manifest and latent content. The 
manifest content of the dream are the images, words, sounds which can be 
fairly instantly recalled on waking, often having their origin in the 
dreamer's experience of the previous day. These are a series of seemingly 
arbitrary signs, sounds and images whose totality has the character of a 
rebus. Yet beyond the apparent arbitrariness and strangeness, analysis is 
able to induce the associations which will lead to the latent concerns of 
the dream.
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From this process it was possible for Freud to deduce certain 
characteristics of dreaming and therefore of the relation between conscious 
and unconscious thought. The unconscious is a modality of signification 
which is characterised by distortion. The manifest content is seen as the 
product of the dream work, distorting the complex of the dreams concerns 
into something acceptable to the conscious self. There are two means by 
which this distortion is effected; the activities of condensation and 
displacement. Both these activities are available because of the 
structure cf representation itself. Because representation is itself 
only a process of differentiation, new relations can constantly be constructed, 
The activities of the dream work are seen to be the effect cf two funda- 
mental features of dreaming: the imaginary satisfaction of desires which 
would be unacceptable to the conscious mind, and the process of censorship 
which prohibits that desire from expression which would be recognised by 
conscious thought.
In the same way, previously unintelligible forms of behaviour like 
obsessional or neurotic behaviour become explicable as systems of 
displaced signs by which the individual produces a compromise fc nation 
between desire and its prohibition. Freud himself set the scene for 
suggesting an identity between these individual forms and general social 
forms, particularly in his analysis of religion as neurosis. In asserting 
that sociality was achieved only through the painful process of renunciation 
and repression, Freud's discoveries were extended tc a general deduction 
about social forms. In the phylogenetic account, psychoanalysis suggests 
that certain social institutions and practices bear witness to these 
traumatic processes at a general social level.
Rank and Sachs insist that what constitutes psychoanalysis' special 
claim in the interpretation of cultural forms is this treatment of the
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symbol. The symbol they argue can be seen as a social expression of 
repressed material. It is a 'special kind of indirect representation', 
especially suitable fcr disguising unconscious material. The symbol combines 
the forms of a series of related figures of speech, such as simile, metaphor, 
allegory or allusion:
the symbol represents an ideal union of all these means of 
expression: it is a representative pictorial substitute 
expression for something hidden, with which it has perceptible 
characteristics in common or is associatively joined by internal 
connections. Its essence consists in the possession of two or 
more meanings, as it has itself also arisen by a kind of 
condensation, an ammalgamation of individual characteristic 
elements. (8)
The symbol for this argument is essentially unconscious but is a compromise 
formation with the requirements of culture, therefore it 'lacks in no way
the conscious determinants which condition in various degrees symbol
(a)
formation and symbol interpretation'. Discussing this article Ernest
Jones adds that 'true symbolism', being a compromise formation between 
unconscious desires, and social determinants would always entail shock in 
its decipherment. From this perspective a whole series of social practices 
become valid objects for psychoanalytic investigation. Myths, legends, 
religion, art, philosophy, ethics, law, all become forms of expression 
of the unconscious. These processes of representation are united by their 
cccunon structure of phantasy, determined by sexual preoccupations:
Freud came to consider these apparently heterogeneous products 
of man's psyche from a common viewpoint. They all have in common 
the relation to the unconscious, to the psychic life of childhood, 
and to sexuality: they have in common the tendency to represent 
a wish of the individual as fulfilled* in common are the means 
of representation, which serve this end. (ll)
The impact of such claims was instantaneous, not just within 
psychoanalysis, where Freud's ideas were readily applied tc ethnographic 
data, but also within anthropology. W. H. R. Rivers, initially a psychologist, 
who came to specialise in ethnology, wrote in 1918, on Dreams and Primitive 
Culture. Here he seeks to extend further the comparisons which had
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already been made between dreams and myths. All the processes, he 
claimed which Freud lays out as the processes of dream work correspond 
closely to the representational processes found in myths of 'primitive' 
societies. They share the same processes: dramatisation, the condensation 
of ideas in symbols, rituals as displaced expression. They share the same 
functions of disguise and censorship compromised with wish-fulfillment. 
Finally, they share the same content, an expression of sexual concerns. 
Rivers, though highly critical of evolutionary assumptions about primitive 
social organisations, is still happy to base his analysis on 'mental 
infantilism' of some groups. Their cultures more readily express themselves 
in this 'concrete' form due to their primitive mentality. So typical of 
the work stimulated by psychoanalysis, the unity between disparate social 
practices could be accounted for by the hypothesis that some social forms, 
and therefore some cultures, more readily express 'the remnants of 
infantile ideation'. '
The possibility of viewing 'these apparently heterogeneous products
(H)
of man's psyche from a common viewpoint 1 threw open a whole field for
psychoanalytic interpretation. Freud's pleasure in welcoming Rank, into 
the early psychoanalytic circle is revealing. He welcomed someone without 
a medical background who could bring a wide cultural knowledge to psycho- 
analysis. The followers were not slow to carry out the intentions of the 
master.
The Symbolism of Myths
As soon as psychoanalysis began to attract a following, publications appeared 
applying Freudian theory to the material of myth and ritual. Rank wrote 
the Myth of the Birth of the Hero; Abraham tackled the Prometheus myth in 
Dreams and Myths; Jones wrote several articles on symbolism in myths: 
Silberer's Problems of Mysticism and its Symbolism appeared in
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1917 : books by Reik, Money-Kyrle, and Roheim appeared not long after.
All these books and articles turned around a similar problem; what 
was the relation between individual and collective unconscious representations? 
Abraham suggested that myth is the dream of the people and a dream is the 
myth of an individual. 'The dream is a piece of superceded infantile
mental life' and 'the myth is a piece of superceded infantile mental life
(17) 
of a people 1 . Rank sees myths as images intermediate between collective
dreams and collective poems:
For as in the individual the dream or poem is destined to draw 
off unconscious emotions that are repressed in the course of the 
evolution of civilisation, so in mythical or religious phantasies 
a whole people liberates itself for the maintenance of its 
psychic soundness from those primal impulses that are refractory 
to culture ... while at the same time it creates ... a 
collective symptom for taking up all repressed emotion. (18)
In The Myth of the Birth of the Hero, Rank turned his attention to the 
hero legends in a number of different cultures. The typical legend, he 
claims, is a structure of symbols by which various repressed primal impulses 
are expressed. Only this, he claims would explain how hero legends so 
frequently appear as variants on the following outline:
The hero is the child of most distinguished parents, usually the 
son of a king. His origin is preceeded by difficulties, such 
as continence, or prolonged barreness, or secret intercourse 
of the parents due to external prohibition or obstacles. 
During or before the pregnancy, there is a prophecy, in the form 
of a dream or oracle, cautioning against his birth, and usually 
threatening danger to his father (or his representative). 
As a rule he is surrendered to the water, in a box. He is then 
saved by animals or lowly people (shepherds) and is suckled 
by a female animal or by a humble woman. After he has grown 
up, he finds his distinguished parents in a highly versatile 
fashion. He takes his revenge on his father, on the one hand, 
and is acknowledged on the other. Finally he achieves rank and 
honour. (19)
Rank suggests that these legends are the symbolic expression of a series 
of preoccupations which have a direct correspondence with the phantasies 
of small children and neurotics. The determinants are: early over- 
estimation of the parents, followed by rapid disillusionment; sexual 
rivalry in which hostility felt towards the parents is represented as
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aggression by them through a process of projection; phantasies about 
the birth-process; and finally wish-fulfillment whereby the father, as 
sexual-rival can be killed. These determinants often condense in one 
symbol. Thus the recurrent theme of exposure on the water is an 
overdetermined symbol, condensing infantile speculation on the process of 
birth with fears of the parents' hostile intentions. The symbol of 
exposure embodies the fear of a hostility so powerful that the hero's 
birth itself will be fraught with danger.
Using the notion of symbol as indirect representation, artistic 
representation can also be brought within the same frame of reference. 
The symbols used in art, correspond to those of myth, arising in the 
same structure of phantasy. Ernest Jones carried out this analysis on 
symbolism in Christian art, turning his attention to the recurrent 
symbolism of the Madonna's conception through the ear. This is the 
representation of the immaculate conception as the breath of the Holy 
Ghost entering the Virgin Mary's ear and causing her to become pregnant. 
For Jones, this is a symbol which requires interrogation: why is breath 
so strangely endowed with significance? There are several elements which 
recur in the variations of this symbolism; to the forefront are the 
representations of the message by which conception occurs as a dove, the 
offer of a lily, or a stream of air to the Madonna's ear. In these 
elements he finds the displaced or inverted representation of certain 
obsessions, primarily infantile anal obsessions. The displacement has taken 
place through connotative chains because of their privileged position in 
suggesting excretory preoccupations. Warmth, sound, odour are constantly 
connoted through notions of breath, air, mouth. These connotations can 
also be produced as the inversion of what is represented; the pure lily, 
the odourless flower suggests the inversion of strong smells. The 
preoccupations with breath suggest the mou.th and processes of introjection
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like eating. They also reveal their inversion- evacuation. The combination 
of these connotative chains suggests an overdetermined symbol, and Jones 
takes this as a symbol in which are condensed various infantile 
scatalogical preoccupations producing a phantasy of birth as shitting. 
The mother eats food, her stomach swells, something is passed from her 
body through her anus.
Such phantasies are repressed by the adult consciousness but remain 
as sources of excitement and stimulation in the unconscious. Symbols of 
compromise formation allow the phantasy to be represented but in a form 
acceptable to the conscious mind. Thus the satisfaction obtained from 
religious and artistic forms is a sublimated .satisfaction. Jones points 
to the final process of evasion by which these preoccupations are 
transformed into acceptable material. Both religion and art are conceived 
as the highest expression of human mind. Again this can be seen as an 
inversion: what they deal with are preoccupations which the socialised 
mind regards as the 'lowest' and most disgusting:
If we regard the theme as a whole, we cannot but be impressed 
by the ingenuity and fine feeling with which an idea so repellent 
to the adult mind has been transformed into a conception not 
merely tolerable but lofty in its grandeur. In the endeavour to 
represent the purest and least sensual form of procreation that 
can be imagined, the one most benefitting to the Creator himself, 
the mind worked surely on the soundest lines by reaching for its 
basis to the crudest and grossest idea obtainable. (21)
Jones' treatment of symbolism is at its most subtle here. In many places
he falls back into a notion of symbolism as mimetic substitution, such as
(22) evident in his analysis uf the meaning of salt, as representing semen.
Here, however he is dealing with symbolic representation as indirect 
representation, complexly overdetermined, in which representation employs 
all means to evade censorship. It is this aspect of psychoanalytic 
studies of symbolism as complexly overdetermined which constitute the more 
radical end of its impact.
- 316 -
Applied to th= social practices of so-called primitive peoples, 
the psychoanalytic interpretation is no less ingenious though equally 
problematic. Instantly, the psychoanalytic approach to the hoary old 
'problems' of evolutionary anthropology overturns the assumptions that 
rites and symbolic practices can be explained by a unilinear history or 
as a direct expression of a social function. Evolutionary anthropology 
had insisted on treating the couvade as a rite masking the transition
from mother-right to father-right whereby the father claimed rights to the
(23)
child. Reik in Ritual examined the variety of practices which have
come under the title, the couvade. These include not only the simulation 
of labour pains, but also elaborate rituals carried out by men supposedly 
to protect women in child-birth. The latter include precise food taboos 
as to what the father may or may not eat during the pregnancy. Reik 
ignored anti-evolutionary attention to the diversity of these practices. 
He justifies a search for common principles. All the rituals connected 
with child-birth performed by men are expressions of unconscious processes, 
compromises by which men can express fears and antagonism in a socially 
acceptrble fashion.
In Ritual. Reik interprets the meaning of some couvade rituals 
through what psychoanalysis has been able to uncover about demonic repre- 
sentations in religious thought. Here psychoanalysis has b=en able to 
demonstrate the process of projection at work. While 'God the Father' 
is clearly a projection of infantile overestimation of the father, that 
overestimation is never the only aspect of a child's feeling. The male 
child is also profoundly antagonistic towards the father who is cexual 
rival and potential threat. Clinical psychoanalysis had shown how 
'neurotics' frequently attributed to other people antagonistic impulses 
which they themselves feel. This is often at the basis of persecution 
complexes and paranoia, where the individual, unable to admit ar^res
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feelings in the conscious mind projects them outwards as hostility 
directed against her/himself. Neurotics frequently feel intense bodily 
pain which is neither simulated or false. It is real in the sense that 
it is imagined as real. Again these pains can often be traced to 
compromise formation between severe hostility felt towards another and 
intense guilt at these phantasies of violence. The imagined pain is 
turned against the subject her or himself« The contradictory impulses 
are thus deprived of their gravity and tension if the unconscious part of 
the impulses (usually the hostile tendencies) can be projected outwards 
from inner perception to the external world. In the case of religious 
representations, it is not the individual but the demons who are invested 
with wicked intentions on the father. The individual's intentions and 
feelings are left then as the 'pure* ones protecting the father from 
external threat. The common coincidence of couvade practices with ideas 
about protection from demons lead Reik to speculate on a similar origin:
If therefore we look upon demons as the projection of a person's 
latent hostility, we must conclude that in this heightened fear 
of demons among many people, lie reactive feelings of 
punishment and remorse which conceal and over-compensate wicked 
wishes directed against the lying-in woman. (24)
This process of projection becomes critical in soire customs, like a 
Turkish practice where the man spreads a ring of fire around the hut to
ward off evil spirits, an act where 'the confined women become seriously
(25) alarmed' . The almost open hostility which accompanies these acts can
readily be found in many other couvade rituals. There is the placing of 
swords and other weapons under the beds of the labouring women or the 
practice of shooting arrows over the hut of the labouring women. Practices 
influenced by introjection of the intention to harm the women are those 
where the men dress in the women's clothing and writhe around simulating 
the pains of child-birth. For Reik this clearly is an internalisation 
of the pain wished on the woman, which the man experiences pleasurably as 
pain against himself.
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Finally the dietetic couvade can also ce understood in just this 
way. Again, this can be illuminated by the study of neurotics. Here 
elaborate rituals and taboos on certain foods or eating habits, are often 
justified on the grounds that if they are not observed a certain person 
will come to harnu They bear witness to repressed aggressive impulses 
towards that person. The couvade practices ultimately, howeyer, bear 
witness to the triumph of tender feelings towards the woman and child:
Having assumed that malevolent wishes of a sadistic nature are 
awakened in the husband, it follows that the suppression of these 
wishes will bring about a relatively increased intensity of the 
masochistic instinctual components. In the play of forces 
between sadistic and masochistic tendencies, and in the struggle 
between hostile and tender impulses, the latter which alone 
could become conscious, have obtained the victory. (26)
The question for Reik's analysis is what is the source of thic aggression 
felt towards the child and towards the mother for bringing the child into 
the world? The answer lies in the fear of retaliation. For the birth of 
the child, particularly the first child, reawakens the father's feelings 
of hostility to his own father, feelings of sexual jealousy, rivalry 
and hatred so great that it included a desire for the father's death. It 
is fear that these feelings will in turn be directed against himself 
that causes the father's hostility towards his offspring. At this point 
Reik turns again to the phylogenetic account, offering an amplification of 
the primal horde hypothesis:
After the murder of the father, which was the most important 
event of primitive development, perhaps of human development 
the brother clan was formed. After successful detachment from 
incestuous objects ... each of the brothers took one or more 
wives. The child who resulted from this new union awakened 
its father's memory of that outrage, since the child was a 
result of a breach in the paternal prohibition and made the 
son himself the father. His guilty conscience was changed into 
the fear of retaliation. The memory of the father found its 
primitive expression in the belief that the neviy arrived 
child was the father himself, who had come to take revenge on 
his murderer. (2?)
But for these reasons the hostility is always more than fear of retaliation, 
It is also fear of the small child's incestuous feelings on his mother.
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incestuous feelings which the father had to abandon. Thus the rites of 
pregnancy and pain performed by the father are overdetermined by also 
being a denial of the mother's role in childbirth, a very different 
notion of displacement of birth-rights from mother to father. The 
'real meaning' has nothing to do with this transition. It corresponds 
to the father's phantasy of having given birth to the child and is a
>
nullification of the mother's role in the child's birth:
The affective basis of this phantasy lies in the unconscious 
incestuous fixation of the child on the mother which was created 
by the birth; and on this basis also rests the father's striving 
to detach this libido fixation from its object, and to transfer 
to. himself the. child's love.. (.28)
Thus social rituals are understood as symptoms which are 'complexly 
overdetermined'. A series of events like the birth of a child or its 
reaching puberty may provoke a 'return of the repressed'. This return
is accomplished in a distorted form as 'structures in the nature of a
(2Qj
compromise between the repressed ideas and the repressing ones',
Crucial in this production of social rituals is sexuality - incestuous 
desires, sexual rivalry and anxiety.
This outline of three psychoanalytic interpretations of myths, 
artistic representations and social rituals has attempted to isolate 
what is distinctive about the psychoanalytic interpretation of social 
practices. This distinctiveness reveals both strengths and weaknesses. 
On the one hand it reveals a radical approach to the notions of represent- 
ation and sexuality. Symbols are indirect representations, complexly 
overdetermined by a series of sexual preoccupation which seek compromise 
formations with social forces. For this reason the idea of representation 
challenges that on which so many of the other theories examined in this 
thesis are based. It posies a notion of representation where the 
activity of the means of representation is not _re_d_uced to service of
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other social functions. It is rigorously anti-functionalist, resisting 
the idea that symbolic practices simply reflect other social practices. 
Furthermore these psychoanalytic interpretations insist on the importance 
of sexual anxieties and relations underlying some social practices, 
privileged as bearers of these concerns. Unlike other theories examined 
here, the psychoanalytic interpretation does not present an 'unproblematic' 
theory of sexuality. The acquisition of sexual identity is problematic; 
phantasies of pre-genital sexuality and desire are ever present forces on 
which society is precariously perched.
However, these interpretations also reveal all the elements which 
have made psychoanalysis such a distrusted discourse. Here is a commitment 
to the worst kind of evolutionism translated into a comparison between 
adult and infantile mode of thought, in which 'primitives' represent 
infantile thought and western capitalism represents adult thought. 
Of course, given the psychoanalytic logic of the ever-presence of 
repressed infantile wishes, then these divisions are sometimes dissolved, 
as Jones bears witness:
the two modes of thought that for the present purposes may be 
called infantile and adult respectively - corresponding roughly 
with unconscious and conscious thinking - differ from each other 
very profoundly indeed, far more so than might ordinarily be 
imagined: but on the other hand ... children and adults manifest 
the two modes of thought in no very dissimilar measure. Thus 
there is more of the infant in the adult than is commonly 
recognised, and also more of the adult in the child. Or to 
put it another way, there are enormous differences, but these 
are not so much between child and adult as between modes of thinking 
which are present in both. (30)
In general however the practice of interpretation of mythologies and 
symbolic practices according to their variation on a typical structure 
necessarily leads tc a hierarchy; some cultures have 'resolved 1 sexual 
anxiety and rivalry to a more successfiil degree than others. However 
much the theory may be contradictory, it pulls towards a correspondence 
with theories of the 'mental infantilism of savages'.
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Finally, these psychoanalytic interpretations rest on an adherence 
to a universalistic account of sexual preoccupations. They neglect the 
specif ity of cultures. Even though there is a place in the theories for 
a notion of the particularity of each culture - after all, compromise 
formation takes place as a result of social exigencies - this perspective 
tends to give precedence to universalising theory of sexual constructions. 
Specific social forms may be the forces by which certain wishes are 
repressed, yet social forms themselves are frequently posited as the 
result of compromise formations. It is both sociality which entails 
certain wishes to repressed, while at the same time social symptoms are 
themselves the product of compromises with these wishes. There is in 
other words, a necessity posited to the outcome of development. This 
tension between the necessity of sexual development ani the spedificity 
of cultures came to the surface in the tension between phylogenetic and 
ontogenetic interpretations of culture which will be dealt with later in 
the chapter.
A number of writers quickly recognised that psychoanalysis was 
advancing a rigorously deterministic account of social forms. ¥.H. R. Rivers, 
for example, noted that psychoanalysis' theory of individual development 
exactly paralled the rigorously historical approach to social forms of 
modern anthropology:
Wholly independent of one another, two groups of students 
concerned with widely different aspects of human behaviour 
have been led by the facts to adopt an almost identical stand- 
point and closely similar methods of enquiry. Both agree in 
basing their studies on a thorough- going determinism according 
to which it is held that every detail of the phenomena they 
study, whether it is to be the apparently fantastic or absurd 
incident of a dream or to our eyes the equally fantastic and 
ridiculous rite or custom of the savage, has its definite 
historical antecedents and is only the final and highly 
condensed product of a long and complex chain of events.
That psychoanalysis insisted on this rigorous determination of all social 
forms by the sexual history, either of the race or of the individual, was
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simultaneously psychoanalysis' distinctive 'discovery 1 and the reason 
for major splits within the movement. The splits with both Adler and Jung 
had their origins in Freud's insistence that accounts of individual conscious 
and unconscious could only be explained by a rigorously deterministic account 
of sexual history.
Sexuality as far as Jung was concerned was 'only one of the biological
(32) instincts', not the privileged instance in the determination of human
psychic life. For Jung this psychic life is constituted of a complex of 
forces. That Freud and his followers should privilege sexuality is,
according to Jung, more a fact of their own 'neurotic and sick 1 preoccupations,
(33) and especially their 'unresolved father-complexes',, For Jung, religious
beliefs and practices could not be approached as the product of sexual 
preoccupations. Instead they bore witness to the human mind grappling 
with complex and universal forces. The ways in which these forces are
dealt with are universal, not personal, hence Jung's claim for 'constellated
(34) archetypes'  This proposition was radically antagonistic to the
Freudian proposal that religious beliefs and practices shared a similar 
structure to that of neurosis, their common source lying in the sexual 
experiences of childhood. In opposition, Jung affirms religion's own 
claim that religious sentiment is fundamentally a product of human awe:
For my part I prefer to look at man in the lignt of 
what is healthy and sound, and to free the sick man 
from just that kind of psychology which colours every 
page that Freud has written. My attitude to all 
religions is therefore a positive one. In their 
symbolism I recognise those figures which I have met 
with in the dreams and phantasies of my patients 0 
In their moral teachings I see efforts that are the 
same or similar to those made by my patients when 
guided by their own insight or inspiration, they seek 
the right way to deal with the forces of psychic life» 
Ceremonial ritual, initiation rites and ascetic 
practices.. ..interest me profoundly as so many techniques 
for bringing about a proper relation to these forces. (35)
This 'life of the spirit' can be seen as the universal aspirations of the 
human being to overcome 'the spell that binds us to the cycle of biological 
events.' Doubtless, it was this commitment to what is 'healthy and sound'
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which lead to Jung's Nazi sympathies. His split with Freud however 
took place much earlier, and is described here to indicate the role played 
by a notion of determinism, arising from an account of sexual histories 
of the race and individual in the construction of Freudian orthodoxies,
But the problem with psychoanalytic interpretations was neither the 
claim of a general theory nor the claim for the primacy of sexual history 
in the determination of certain signifying practices. After all, it has 
been argued in the previous chapter that the general conception of 
sexuality in psychoanalysis could be taken as non-essentialist, whereby 
presuppositions about the nature of the sexual drive are suspended. The 
problem is the particular form taken by the Freudian championing of sexual 
determinacy.
The Conflation between Sexuality and the history of the Family. 
It will already be apparent from the preceding description of psychoanalytic 
interpretation of some symbols that orthodox psychoanalysis expressed a 
commitment to Freud's phylogenetic hypothesis,. In some cases the commitment 
was to the scheme as literal; for others it was more ambivalent. The 
ambiguity in these interpretations reflects the unresolved status of the 
complex. It has been argued that Freud's retention of the hypothesis 
reflects a commitment to the "family" as objectification of complexes and 
not instincts; it represents a commitment to the priority of culture over 
instincts or nature. Yet as we will see, the orthodoxy which emerged 
stressed precisely the opposite - the priority of a necessary history of 
the instincts in a given familial form over the cultural complex. The 
orthodoxy arose partly as a result of the particular form in which Freud 
resolved the cultural referent of complexes, that is, the phylogenetic 
account. By this solution it became possible to interpret the complex 
as primarily emotions connected with a real history of the family - that 
is, transitions in the procreative unit. It is for this reason that
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psychoanalysis has such a hopeless reputation for universal!sing 
generalisations as to the human family and its complexes. Partly however 
the emergence of a crude orthodoxy was in response to the crudeness of the 
critics of psychoanalysis, a point which will be dealt with more thoroughly 
later.
Flu'gel's The Psychoanalytic Study of the Family ' demonstrates quite 
clearly how easily the psychoanalytic notion of complexes could be inter- 
preted as describing complexes of typical emotions arising from the family. 
The scope of the book is described by the author as a study of
the growth within the individual mind of some of the more 
important of those feelings and tendencies which owe their 
origin and development to the relations of the individual and 
to other members of his family. <,   these feelings are of 
fundamental importance in the fonaation of the individual 
character and..ohave also exercised a vast influence on 
social life and social institutions, (3?)
Argued here is the fatality for the human psyche of emotional conflicts 
generated by actual conflicts and rivalries within the procreative family<, 
These emotional complexes can be reduced to two fundamental impulses and
their conflicts; 'the two principal poles of emotions, love and hate which
(38) 
coalesce in the Oedipus complex. ! These typical emotions of the human
family, and the various ways in which they are resolved, are thought by 
Flugel to structure all social institutions, beliefs and activities: puberty 
rites, men's clubs and secret societies of 'savage' societies can also be 
interpreted as social reconciliations of desire and prohibition, a
'reconciliation based on the renunciation of incestuous desire and on the
(39) establishment of common love and interest between those of the same sex.' '
Lack of resolution of conflicting impulses result in various forms of 
'anti-social' behaviour and at this point, psychoanalysis appeals even to 
the reactionary LOG psychologist Cyril Burt:
rr<Thus, as Mr. Burt has suggested to me, the influence 
of displaced father-hatred is probably in large measure 
responsible for the fact that strikes and other crude 
forms of rebellion against authority in industry occur
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principally among the working class where the tyranny of the 
father is often of a primitive and repressive type. For 
the same reason the number of delinquents from these classes 
is almost certainly relatively larger than that from the 
upper to middle classes, quite apart from educational 
factors. (40)
It does not require a close analysis to reveal a theoretical slide has 
occurred: it is no longer the effect of sexuality on representation, but 
a question of the emotions generated by sexual drives., These are no 
longer without content but rather are universalised from an account of the 
nuclear family. Finally these emotions and practices are pushed back 
beyond social institutions and practices as the very explanation of those 
practiceso
Flugel was something of a populariser; Westermarck, so hostile 
towards psychoanalysis, referred to him with approval as a 'moderate 
Freudian 1   As such, the orthodox psychoanalysts maintained a distance 
from him. Jones for example commenting on another publication by the 
'prolific' Flugel remarked that it was written in the usual Flugelese. 
It would be easy to present Flugel's interpretation as marginal. But 
this obscures some interesting facts. Flugel's book was one whose success 
gave stimulus to the publication of psychoanalytic material. As Leonard 
Woolf records, its appearance within the Institute of Psychoanalysis' 
Psycho-Analytic Library was a publishing success for the Hogarth Press, 
who financed the appearance of Freudian thought in England:
Publishing the Psycho-Analytic Library for the Institute 
was always a very pleasant and very interesting experience. 
In the next 40 years we published nearly 70 volumes in 
it. In the process I learnt a good many curious things 
about the art of publishing. For instance we had in the 
Library a book by Professor Flugel called The Psychoanalytic 
Study of the Family 0 I do not believe that any publisher 
who saw this book in manuscript or in print in our list in 
1924 would have thought that it had the slightest chance 
of being a best seller, and I feel sure that very few of 
my readers in 196? have ever heard of ito Yet this book 
has been a steady seller for over 40 years, selling hundreds 
of copies yearly. It has practically never been advertised 
and no advertising would have materially influenced its 
sale. Its aggregate sale must be considerably greater
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than that of nine out of ten of the much-advertised 
best-sellers that it has long outlived. It is an 
original book, an almost unknown classic in its own 
peculiar field, a publisher's dream. It sold steadily 
in Britain year after year, and year after year, there 
came a large order from an American bookseller, because 
it was a 'set book' in an American college, (42)
The account of the financial success of Flugel's book indicates that its 
interpretation should not be ignored as a marginal product<> There are 
other aspects in the history of psychoanalysis indicating this was far 
from the case. On the one hand, similar interpretations could be 
proliferated. On the other, this approach was not lamented within the 
Institute. Freud himself not only refrained from criticism of such 
interpretations but elsewhere endorsed those who worked from the position 
that the family, the nuclear procreative family is the referent underlying 
all social formso
Of especial significance here is the fact that it was this aspect of 
psychoanalysis' trajectory which attracted attention from the social sciences*. 
Chapter Four has already shown the interest which Malinowski and Seligmann 
began to take in the dynamic of the 'basic family'. Where anthropologists 
took an interest in psychoanalysis, it was for an account of the way in 
which emotional complexes arise in different cultural forms, and the way 
in which wider cultural values are transmitted through the basic family. 
In other words, it was on a terrain not unlike that which took the complex 
to describe an emotional complex. Malinowski's attempt to apply psycho- 
analytic concepts to anthropological investigation attracted particular 
attention,, The debate which took place as a result of Malinowski's work 
was extremely important for the history of the relationship between 
psychoanalysis and anthropology. To each side, it was a debate which 
revealed the weakness of the other's position. For many, especially from 
the side of anthropology, it marked the point of no return for an integration 
between the two. For all, it marked a polarisation between so-called
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universalising and so-called culturalist explanation which has haunted 
the social sciences since.
The Universality of the Oedipus Complex; The Jones/Malinowski debate 
In the early twenties, Malinowski published a series of articles about 
the Trobriand Island, where he had made a study of matrilineal social 
organisations. In these articles he attempted to modify psychoanalysis 
as a means of discussing the collective sentiments at the basis of
Trobriand society«> In 1925, Ernest Jones replied to this modification
(43) in the article 'Mother-right and the Sexual Ignorance of Savages'.
Malinowski answered Jones, together with a reprint of the original 
articles, in Sez and Repression in Savage Society Cl926). After the 
exchange with Jones,Malinowski's attitude to psychoanalysis hardened 
irretrievably. He declared himself to 'be no longer impressed with the 
claims of psychoanalysis':
As my reading advanced,! found myself less and less inclined 
to accept in a wholesale manner the conclusions of Freud, 
still less of every brand and sub-brand of psychoanalysis..., 
That my misgivings are justified I have been able to convince 
myself by a careful scrutiny of Freud's Totem and Taboo, of 
his Group Psychology and Analysis of the Ego, of Australian 
Totemism by Roheim, and of the anthropological works of Reik, 
Rank and Jones . (44)
Jones' reply had convinced Malinowski that psychoanalysis was in fact 
incompatible with anthropological investigation. The debate drove a wedge 
between psychoanalysis and anti-speculative/anti-evolutionary theories which 
proves almost impossible to dislodge. Taking as its central object the 
complex of typical emotions and the possibility of their variation in non- 
European cultures, the positions polarised between cultural relativism and 
the universality of emotional forms
In the original essays, Malinowski's sympathy for psychoanalysis can 
probably be traced to his interest in the collective sentiments of social 
groups. Influenced by a growing Durkheimian tradition, Malinowski's 
writings at this point were concerned not only with a detailed empirical study
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of a given society, but also with the problem of 'collective representations' 
which provide the basis for a society's cohesion. This tradition took 
'collective representations' such as religion as a valid entry point into 
the interpretation of social forms and behaviour. Malinowski's position 
is not reducible to Durkheim's. His The Family Among Australian 
Aborigines (1913) had already outlined a decisive rejection of some of 
the themes and ideas of nineteenth-century ethnology. He is no longer 
concerned with 'the primitive' versus 'civilisation'; nor is he preoccupied 
with 'transitions' from mother-right to father-right societies as explaining 
certain features of human evolution; in short, he is no longer concerned with 
the exposition of 'origins' of an institution as an exhaustive explanation 
of that institution. It is 'sociology 1 which can demonstrate the material 
nature and function of culture, a sociology which pays proper attention to 
the differences between cultures:
It is undoubtedly one of the most valuable discoveries 
arrived at by modern sociological science that each 
institution varies in accordance with the social environ- 
ment in which it is found. A given institution or social 
form (like the family, the state, the nation, the church) 
appears under various forms in different societies. (45)
While Malinowski argues that the heterogeneous elements of material 
culture are to be understood as institutions and systems with definite 
functions, he nevertheless suggests that it is not sufficient to analyse 
culture and the transmission of culture purely by reference to its 
institutions. It is necessary to utilise the 'valuable methodological 
standpoint' of Durkheim to demonstrate that the cohesion of these 
institutions depends on the presence of collective feelings. These
exist in a certain society, and are transmitted from 
generation to generation; they impose themselves on the 
individual mind, and possess the character of necessity; 
they are deeply connected with certain social institutions; 
in fact they stand to them in a relation of functional 
dependence (in the mathematical sense). (46)
Institutions produce certain sentiments which are transmitted through 
culture and form an integral part of that culture. It is from this
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perspective that Malinowski seeks to appropriate psychoanalysis.
Initially he praises the potential of psychoanalysis for providing 
the link between psychological and biological sciences and sociologyo 
Though the most developed part of psychoanalysis may as yet be the science 
of the individual mind, this should by no means preclude a reconciliation 
with sociology. According to Malinowski, 'Psychoanalytic doctrine is 
essentially a theory of the influence of family life on the human mind' 
where we are shown 'how the passions, stresses and conflicts of the child 
in relation to its father, mother, brother or sister result in the formation 
of certain permanent mental attitudes or sentiments towards them.' * ' 
From this it should be possible to elaborate on the sociological nature of 
family influence and to understand the consequences of the complexes, 
inaugurated in the family, for society as a whole.
For Malinowski, the issues are simple. He is indebted to psycho- 
analysis 'for the discovery that there exists a typical configuration of 
sentiments in our society and for a partial explanation, mainly concerned 
with sex, as to why such a complex should exist.' However, the family 
is not the same in every society; its 'constitution varies greatly with the
level of development and with the character of the civilisation of the
(49) people, and it is not the same in the different strata of the same society*o
In fact, the organisation of reproduction, the relations of descent and power 
invested in these relations differs so fundamentally in both form and 
function that we can only ever talk of families:
There are differences depending on the distribution of 
power which, vested in varying degrees in the father, give 
the several forms of patriarchy, or vested in the mother, 
the various sub-divisions of mother-right. There are 
considerable divergences in the methods of co-anting and 
regarding descent - matriliny based on ignorance of 
fatherhood and patriliny in spite of this ignorance, 
patriliny due to power, patriliny due to economic reasons<, 
Moreover, differences in settlement, housing, sources of 
food supply, division of labour and so on, greatly alter 
the constitution of the human family among the various races 
and peoples of mankind. (50)
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Such diversity can only mean one thing: the sentiments produced 
by family life must also vary. Freud's account of the complexes 
produced by the human family must only apply to a society organised along 
patriarchal lines, where fear of the father would produce forms of anxiety 0 
The emotions described by Freud surely cannot apply to a society like the 
Trobrianders, where 'we have the independent mother, and her husband, who 
has nothing to do with the procreation of children, and is not the bread- 
winner and who cannot leave his possession to the children, and has no
(51 ) established authority over them.' ^ 
Malinowski proceeds to a detailed description of Trobriand society, 
looking for the differences in the emotional development of children 
resulting from the different social structures. The society is matrilineal. 
Paternity is either not recognised or of no great social significance in 
terms of entitling the subject to power, authority or social standingo 
Descent is reckoned through the mother's kin. When the father dies, 
his property passes not to his biological children but to his sister's 
offspring. In accordance with this form of descent, the greatest social 
authority for the children is not their father but their maternal uncle. 
Finally the taboo on incest is not a bilineal taboo, entailing prohibitions 
on any biological relative, but a unilineal taboo. In this context, the 
greatest object of prohibition is between those in the same descent group, 
not between parents and children. Accordingly, Malinowski argues that the 
typical complexes which are found in Trobriand children and adolescents is 
fear of the maternal uncle, who is after all the source of authority, and a 
prohibition on incest which is strongest between brother and sister. He
claims to have established 'a deep correlation between the type of society
(52)
and the nuclear complex found there.' Such a conclusion points to
the mutual assistance which anthropology and psychoanalysis should be able 
to give each other. Psychoanalysis is to be modified. The aim is not to
seek for 'the universal existence of the Oedipus complex which pertains to
-, , (53) it.
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Ernest Jones replied promptly, disputing Malinowski 1 s 'findings' as 
a distortion of psychoanalysis. He argues that it is not possible to 
limit Freud's discoveries to one culture only - Western culture. Jones 
bases his defence of the universality of the Oedipus complex on the issue 
of knowledge of paternity in Trobriand society. Jones accepts a more 
cautious approach to questions of authority, power and descent, than 
assuming that matrilinearity resulted only from ignorance of procreation. 
At the same time, he shares with the earlier evolutionary anthropologists 
a concern to understand the implications of indifference to paternity. 
Such a phenomenon is regarded as so strange that it must offer some 
explanation of that society as a whole»
After a careful summary of the debates so far, Jones agrees on the 
need to break up any easy conflation between authority, inheritance, 
succession and residence. Moreover, it is easy to acknowledge that there 
is no correspondence between mother-right societies and ignorance of 
paternity. But Jones uses the available material to demonstrate that 
there is plenty of evidence of a form of knowledge of procreation - 
hints, statements, forms of symbolism which all betray an awareness of the 
act of procreation and its biological significance. The knowledge is 
similar to that of a child:
This is exactly in accord with what we find in the 
analysis of the infantile mental life, where instinctive 
intuition plays a considerable part in dividing the main 
outline at least of sexual knowledge. If a child of 
two years old can frame an image of genital coitus, 
and in a year or so later connect it with the birth of 
another child, then the feat should certainly not be 
beyond the mentality of any adult savage. (54)
Theories of conception of spirits are taken by Jones as theories which 
displace knowledge of the father's role in procreation for a specific purpose, 
The psychoanalytic interpretation of mother-right suggests that this social 
organisation and its system of beliefs operate to repress knowledge of 
fatherhood* The function of this repression is to displace the conflict -
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the Oedipal conflict - felt between the boy and his father. Aggression 
actually directed at the father is displaced to the maternal uncle who 
is invested with power. By this displacement the biological father can 
become a dear friend:
...this way of treating the father does appear to 
achieve its aim of bringing about a far more intimate and 
friendly relationship between father and child than is 
usual in patrilineal societies. Among the Trobrianders 
where the father has of course no authority whatever 
over his children, the society being matrilineal and 
the potestas devolving on the uncle, the father is 
described as being a "beloved" benevolent friend... (55)
This process is seen as a form of 'decomposition 1 , similar to that 
found in psychoneuroses where various attributes can become detached from 
the original figure and incorporated into another one which then personifies 
thos attributes; 'the process serves the function of unloading affect in a 
relationship where it might have unpleasant consequences and depositing it 
at a safer distance. 1 ^ ' Thus in the case of mother-right societies,
there is a decomposition of 'primal father into a kind and lenient father
(57) on one hand, and a stern moral uncle on the other.' Nor is it chance
that it is the maternal uncle who is set up as father substitute. He, 
after all, was the object of the mother's early incestuous desires and is 
already therefore a sexual rival of the son. Jones directly contests 
that the incest taboo exists between different subjects because of 
differential relations of power, that is, the incest taboo does not serve 
as a function of descent groups and their hierarchies of authority. 
According to Jones this is a travesty of the Freudian position which he 
claims places familial emotions at the basis of all social institutions:
(Freud) regards the relationship between father, mother 
and son as the prototype from which other more complicated 
relationships are derived. Malinowski on the contrary 
puts forward the idea that the nuclear family complex 
varies according to the particular family structure 
existing in any community. According to him a matri- 
lineal family system arises for unknown social and 
economic reasons, and then the repressed nuclear complex 
consists of brother and sister attraction, with nephew
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and uncle hatred; when this system is replaced by a 
patrilineal one, the nuclear complex becomes the 
familiar Oedipus one. (58)
The problem with Malinowski's sociologism, according to Jones, is 
its inability to explain the origins of social forms; the emergence of 
matrilineality is apparently an arbitrary master which equally arbitrarily 
produces a series of emotional complexes bound up with power and authority 
rather than sexuality:
...in my opinion...the matrilineal system with its avunculate 
complex arose...as a mode of defence against the primordial 
Oedipus tendencies (rather than) for unknown sociological 
reasons with the avunculate complex as a necessary consequence 
and the Oedipus complex appearing only when the patrilineal 
system was subsequently introduced. The forbidden and 
unconsciously loved sister is only a substitute for the 
mother, as the uncle is for the father. On Malinowski's 
hypothesis the Oedipus complex would be a late product; 
for the psychoanalyst it was the fons et origo. (58)
This position was to become inextricably tied up with psychoanalysis: 
it stresses the genetic aspects of the family against the social issues; 
it insists that all societies will share some version of the same complexes; 
finally, it argues that the mode of resolution of these complexes will 
determine the forms of social organisation. This was a totally literal 
interpretation of Totem and Taboo  All societies are seen to bear the mark 
of the original murder, the guilt and the structuring function of the father's 
desire. That is why Jones can see the establishment of patriarchy as a 
'real advance 1 bearing witness to a partial remembering and reconciliation 
of guilto It is this which underlies his extraordinary and offensive 
conclusion:
The patriarchal system as we know it, betokens acknowledging 
the supremacy of the father and yet the ability of accept 
this even with affection, without having to have recourse 
to a system either of mother-right or of complicated 
taboos. It means the taming of man, the gradual 
assimilation of the Oedipus complex. At last man 
could face his real father and live with him. Well 
might Freud say that the recognition of the father's 
place in the family signified the most important progress 
in cultural development. (60)
The obvious criticisms of Jones have all been made already - the 
assumption of the eternal nuclear family, the determination of social
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institutions by family structures, the 'geneticism' which assumes the 
biological is more important than the social, and finally an evolutionism 
which assumes that Western patriarchal forms are the highest form of 
society. Such have been the justified responses within anthropology and 
they form the basis of a history of hostility between psychoanalysis and 
anthropology,.
But beneath the limitations of Jones 1 position and his adherence to 
the nuclear family as the referent behind all psychic structures, there 
are more interesting issues at stake. First is Jones 1 adherence to the 
idea that certain social relations entail sexual anxieties and their 
resolutions; sexual relations are not seen as always the effect of some 
other real 'material 1 relations, which is the essence of culturalist 
arguments. Moreover, in keeping with the psychoanalytic attention to 
symbolic forms, it is not the case in Jones' argument that symbolic 
practices mirror the 'real' social relations, nor of their being some 
obscuring mythification. Instead symbols are 'overdeterinined 1 ; they 
are the effect of condensations or displacements of other concerns, 
embodied in such a way as to escape censorshipo
Secondly, Jones' arguments unlike so many other examined in this 
thesis evades crass 'rationalist' explanations. Even the more radical 
writers like Engels and Havelock Ellis had used notions of sex-antagonism 
exacerbated by economic requirements to account for mother-right forms. 
Jones, though steeped in evolutionary prejudice insists that sexual 
relations are neither "givens" nor reducible to being effects of other 
social relations. Sexual identity is a problem; its resolution is a 
work basic to any given culture.
These however are no more than charitable implications for Jones' 
work. He remained committed to a crude evolutionary account of the 
procreative family as the referent underlying all cultural forms. And 
what is interesting about this fact is its inevitability given Freud's
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adherence to a phylogenetic account. Freud insisted on this history 
precisely in order to maintain that the complex was the point of sociality 
itself. But the terms in which it was elaborated committed psychoanalysis 
to a thoughtless theoretical position with regard to the family. 
Malinowski's culturalism is clearly problematic for an account which lays 
claim to discovering the mechanisms by which human sociality is achieved., 
Psychoanalysis cannot just abandon this claim confronted with the function- 
alism and cultural relativism which annihilates any systematicity to 
structural complexes 
Yet the extraordinary literalness and ethnocentrism of Jones makes 
him an easy target for Malinowski who, in his reply, gives the psychoanalytic 
theory of culture more systematic attention. There are several aspects of 
the thesis advanced in Totem and Taboo which Malinowski challenges as 
incompatible with any progressive anthropology. It is only ignorance which 
leads analysts to prioritise the biological relations over the social 
relations. He also challenges the fundamental assumption of the primal 
horde, arguing against Darwin that humans and apes cannot be conflated* 
More seriously he disputes the idea of a collective mind or race memory and 
finally, he points out the impossible circularity of Freud's arguments^ 
Malinowski's ideas about the possibility of a mass psyche changed in these 
later essays. He became adamant in his refusal of such a concept. None 
of Freud's sources, he argues, ever resorted to such a notion:
As a point of fact, no competent anthropologist now makes 
any such assumption of "mass psyche", of the inheritance 
of acquired "psychic dispositions" or of any "psychic 
continuity", transcending the limits of the individual 
soul. On the other hand, anthropologists can clearly 
indicate what the medium is in which the experiences 
of each generation are deposited and stores up by 
successive generations. The medium is that body of 
material objects, traditions and stereotyped mental 
processes that we call culture. It is supra-individual 
but not psychological. (61 )
While Malinowski's picture is a little rosy, it is certainly true
that anthropology as he understood it opposed such reactionary notions and 
argued for the detailed examination of different cultures and the functions
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of institutions and beliefs within those cultures. In spite of the 
problems with functionalism outlined earlier, Malinowski's point is valid 
in this instance. Freud himself wavered and hesitated between tradition 
on the one hand, and race memory on the other, not fully prepared to accept 
the implications of either. As Jones takes it up, there is no room for 
equivocation. He commits himself firmly to a reading of Totem and Taboo 
where racial memory of the original deed forms an integral part of the 
interpretation of social institutions»
But even if we abandon the theoretical premise of racial memory, the 
myth of the primal horde itself is of very little use. Apart from its 
breaking with certain evolutionary hypotheses, the transition from primitive 
promiscuity to mother-right to father-right (a hypothesis which Malinowski 
also finds unacceptable), it offers only impossible contradictions:
To the psychoanalyst, the Oedipus complex is, as we know, 
the foundation of all culture. This must mean to them 
that the complex governs all cultural phenomena but also 
that it preceded them temporarily. The complex is the fons 
et origo out of which there has grown the totemic order, the 
first elements of law, the beginnings of ritual, the 
institution of mother-right, everything in fact which to 
the general anthropologist and to the psychoanalyst counts 
as the first elements of culture. Dr. Jones objects.,,, 
to my attempt at tracing any cultural causes of the Oedipus 
complex just because this complex antedates all culture,, 
But it is obvious that if the complex has preceded all 
cultural phenomena, then a fortiori the totemic crime, 
which is the cause of the complex, must be placed still 
further back. (61)
Malinowski picks up on the problem of the logical impossibility of the 
'primal' father which Freud himself questioned in Moses and Monotheism; 
Sex and Repression thus represents an effective and systematic dismissal 
of the literal level of Totem and Taboo 0 It is interesting that Malinowski 
concludes his engagement with psychoanalysis with a reappraisal of the 
debate on matrilineality versus patrilineality, disassociating himself 
finally from the evolutionist concerns of how and why patrilineality 
emerged out of matrilineality<, Malinowski instead asserts that both are
equally valid modes of reckoning descent with certain advantages accruing
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to them; in fact, contrary to popular belief, Malinowski asserts 
that, on balance, the matrilineal system has certain advantages..
The debate between Malinowski and Jones, then, had, a significance 
beyond that of a minor exchange of articles. Both had a grasp of the 
issues involved in the question of matrilineal society, which went 
beyond that of many of their contemporaries. Both, in different ways, 
broke with dominant evolutionist theories of society, both cut across the 
notions of sex antagonism and the 'interests' of sexed groups. And 
because both were intelligent exponents of their particular ideas, they 
were to exercise an influence on the future development of their disciplines,. 
The position taken by each exposed the limitations of the other in the debate, 
After it, Malinowski rejected his initial sympathy with psychoanalysis and 
apologised for his misguided enthusiasm. Indeed Sex and Repression in 
Savage Society marks a definitive turning-away from all the grandiose claims 
of evolutionary anthropology towards the demand for detailed empirical 
study of different societies and the functions performed by institutions 
within those cultures. Psychoanalysis, unimpressed by the attempt to 
reduce the unconscious as a structural field to an effect of culture, 
rejected Malinowski's position and held out for the irreconcilability of 
the typical complex*
Phylogenesis to Ontogenesis
Jones and Malinowski held antagonistic and mutually exclusive positions 
but they were opposite poles of a similar concern.. Because for both, 
it is a question of what is the external social referrent for the production 
of individual emotional complexes. Jones properly defends psychoanalysis' 
claim to have discovered the structural field of the unconscious and in 
order to make this claim, he must adhere to the general necessity for 
repression. Yet he attributes this necessity to the universality of the 
nuclear family, in which conflicts between the biological father, mother and
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child generate the structural complexes of the unconscious. No wonder 
Malinowski and functionalist anthropology should chide psychoanalysis for 
its ignorance of the variety of form and function of the family,. No 
wonder a wedge should have been driven between psychoanalysis and those 
branches of anthropology seeking to provide an account of human relations 
which do not assume those human relations a priori, but looked at them 
in the context of the other social relations in which they occurred. 
These culturalist versus universalist arguments have been replayed with 
equal lack of resolution on countless occasions, within and outside 
psychoanalysis o
The divisions they produced were such as to engender some of the most 
violent splits and allegiances within psychoanalysis. Reich and Fromm 
both insisted that the Freudian account was strictly delimited. What it 
in fact described was the structure of emotions within a patriarchal 
cultureo Reich in pursuit of his themes of 'happiness' insisted that 
repression and neuroses were only present in patriarchal societies 0 
Patriarchy was seen as vital to upholding an authoritarian class structure 
and it was in the service of this structure that sexual repression was 
effected. It was a point on which Fromm agreed. Reich used 
Malinowski in The Invasion of Compulsory Sex Morality to argue that 
the natural state is one of libidinal satisfaction; only patriarchy 
induces repression and this is an effect of social and economic forces 0 
He sides with Malinowski to insist that sexual conditions flow from the 
social and economic organisation of a given society,.
Both Reich and Fromm suggest that the economic motive for patriarchy 
is the existence of class-relations; these are exacerbated in capitalism 
but present since the origins of private property. In capitalism, the 
state plays the role of the authoritative father, and has dealings with 
authoritative fathers at the heads of patriarchal nuclear families. The 
ideology of capitalism is that of repression of the libidinal economy.
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Both Reich and Fromm insist on the image of the matriachate, benevolent 
and democratic - an altruistic love based on a community of interest rather 
than individual appropriation,, These ideas .were to form a powerful 
current in German marxism before and during the war. Under the impulsion 
to interrogate fascism, German marxism was shot through with themes of 
maternal democracy upheld against the repressive authoritarianism of 
patriarchy. Until Reich's expulsion from the KPD in 1932 even the more 
orthodox end of Communism had time for such theories. They were to 
have a lasting effect on the history of marxism through their impact on 
the Frankfurt school, whose quest for a marxist psychology is deeply 
embedded in the themes from these debates. Much remains of importance 
in these debates, in which theories of patriarchy are brought forward as 
an integral part of analysing contemporary capitalism. Moreover many 
of the criticisms of Freud made by someone like Fromm remain enormously 
important. His analysis both of Freud's interpretation of the Oedipus 
myth and the little Hans case ' are exemplary counter-readings, 
both exposing the uncritically 'patriarchal assumptions' of Freudian 
analysis.
However given what has been said earlier, it will be obvious already 
that in many ways these arguments are equally problematic. There is an 
uncritical slide between repression and oppression which allows the hypo- 
thesis that sexual repression is the product of a particular epoch. We 
have seen from Freud's arguments, that this is radically incompatible with 
the psychoanalytic interpretation of the structural status of the 
unconscious. Moreover, these positions replay the problems of culturalism; 
the commitment to cultural relativism minimalises the points of conflict
/
and lack of resolution in any individual. From a culturalist perspective, 
individual complexes are always the end product of the overall intention 
of a social structure which seeks to reproduce itself. Moreover by these 
means, a division between individual and society is reinforced.
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While Freud's own writings were often more ambiguous than some 
of the exponents of the universality of the patriarchal family, it must 
be admitted that orthodox Freudianism partly defined itself in a response 
to these criticisms<, Freud gave his full endorsement and financial 
assistance to Geza Roheim, the Hungarian analyst who gave over his work 
to research in the field. Roheim 1 s writings serve as a monument to the 
reductionism implicit in the psychoanalytic interpretation of social 
practices. His work carried out what Reich called l a catastrophic use 1 
of psychoanalytic data in ethnology,, Roheim's work is of importance for 
several reasons; one was his position as the ethnologer of Freudian 
orthodoxy; another is his 'solution 1 to the status of phylogenesis; 
finally there is his impact on American anthropology.
Of the first, Roheim was heralded by psychoanalysts as the practical 
anthropologist and analyst who would make up psychoanalysis' embarrassing 
lack of empirical data. He produced several enormous tomes on Australian 
society and his field trips were financed by Freud in collaboration with 
Marie Bonaparte who also wrote psychoanalytic interpretations of
ethnological data. ' A special edition of the International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis was given over to his 'findings' in 1932o
Australian Toteniism 1924 is a quite extraordinary and unreadable book, 
revealing an uncompromising and literal adherence to the Freudian hypothesis, 
All symbolic practices of the Australian natives are to be interpreted as
expressions of sexual concerns; they are 'a result of a compromise between
(68) the libido and repression,,' Roheim went on to classify social groups
according to the degree of successful resolution of compromises between 
antagonistic impulses - those conflicts marking all elements of social 
Iife 0 From his study he can conclude that Australia was peopled by two 
waves of immigration., The first is typified by a 'negative form of 
Toteniism 1 , witness to a successful resolution of the Oedipus Complex. 
The second has a positive form of Toteraisni and is characterised by the
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return of repressed elements. Roheim asserts the existence of the primal 
horde and primal murder with extraordinary literalness; 'there is no 
doubt as to it having happened.' ' So literal in fact is his 
interpretation that in Australian Totemism he can add to Freud's account 
the fact that the primitive father must have been killed with stones since 
most primitive peoples use stones as their principal implements But 
his discussion of the event also sets the scene for its removal. Answering 
Malinowski's derision, Roheim suggests that:
the Freudian picture is intended to be compressed and 
dramatic representation of the facts* The 'father' 
stands for generations of fathers and 'the brothers' 
for generations of brothers (?0)
What Roheim argues is that the murder of the father was a frequently 
repeated event, further that its traumatic effects were felt not by the 
brothers but by their children who witnessed the murder:
Thus the primal battle becomes a very comprehensible 
trauma; for, among higher apes, the child clings to 
the mother in terror and is often squashed in the 
fighto According to Zuckerman, the primal fight and the 
primal scene immediately succeed each other» The young 
in the ape horde are treated as sexual objects from the 
beginning. There is no shortage of traumatic experiences, 
both real and libidinalo We have assumed that damages 
had occurred in the observers by the repression of 
infantile experiences<, (71 )
As far as Roheim is concerned the phylogenetic account is virtually 
interchangeable with an ontogenetic one; the repeated primal scene whose 
successful repression constitutes the dawn of sociality is also the history 
of the individual. Here the protracted infancy and dependency sets the 
scene for premature sexual trauma such as witnessed in the primal scene 1 . 
Thus the phylogenetic account is only a generalised representation of the 
ontogenetic account. In fact by 1943 in The Origin and Function of Culture 
Roheim has entirely abandoned phylogeny for ontogeny,
Such an argument reinforces an idea of a universal constitution of the 
human being. From this perspective, the difference between social structures
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can be explained as the product of a frequently repeated infantile 
trauma. Thus in the case of some Australians, the practice of the 
mother of sleeping across her child would produce a particular complex of 
sexual feelings and conflicts,. However these cultural differences could 
be premised on a basic unity to human psyche life; 'It would seem». 0
that the psychic unity of mankind is more than a working hypothesis, it is
(72) 
so obvious that it hardly needs proof. 1 It is a small step from this
to discarding any reference to actual events at the origins of human 
culture: recurrent complexes can be explained by assuming common responses 
to different cultural conditions. What has moved to the centre of the 
stage is an account of the different personalities resulting from the 
differential structuring of the complex, premised on a basic unity to 
human responses.
The responses within anthropology to psychoanalysis were varied. 
In England, the interest taken by Malinowski, W. H. R* Rivers and the 
Seligmann's did much to establish an early exchange between the two 
emergent disciplines. As a result however of the sort of exchange 
embodied by the Jones/Malinowski debate and the hegemony of structural 
functionalist approaches, psychoanalysis ceased to have any real credibility 
within English anthropology. In America, however, it was a different story<> 
The interest in psychoanalysis came later, with cautious endorsements from
Kroeber and Boas who asserted that *some of the ideas underlying Freud's
(73) psychoanalytic studies may be fruitfully applied to ethnological problems.'
It was however with Roheim ? s "solution" to the phylogenetic account that 
psychoanalysis began to appear with some systemacity, being a formative 
influence in the Culture and Personality theories within anthropology 
It was writers like Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead,Edward Sapir 
who were at the forefront of developing these interests  An interest in 
biographical accounts had already emerged as a valid methodology within 
American anthropology, and under the influence of writers like Roheiin this
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was transformed into an interest in recording personality types produced 
within different cultures. The approach was and is in many ways an 
unhappy combination of what is worse in all approaches. On the one 
hand there is an emphasis on extreme cultural relativism - in which at 
best anthropology can only be descriptive of psychological forms. On 
the other hand it relies on a notion of a universal human psychology: 
psychoanalysis is employed as a universal!sing account of the emotions 
generated by the basic human family 0 Cora Du Bois, commenting on the 
relations between anthropology andpsydlo.analysis, isolated this problem of 
explanation imposed by ontogenetic accounts of human culture:
Are we to assume that the psychological change preceded 
the cultural change? Or is it necessary to assume the 
priority of one or the other<> If we assume the priority 
of cultural change, then psychological interpretations 
of culture are purely descriptive and not explanatory. 
If we assume the priority of psychological changes, we 
are faced with the problem of accounting for their 
origin. (74)
This quotation neatly summarises the problems which cannot be resolved 
within an approach which simultaneously stresses cultural relativism but 
the universality of psycho sexual complexes. In general, anthropologists 
opted for the theory as the basis of 'descriptive 1 accounts in which 
speculation as to the origin of psychological forces was suspended. And 
in this guise the work gained strength within anthropology. Despite the 
contribution which writings like Margaret Mead's have made to stressing 
cultural relativism, particularly within the question of sex roles, in 
general the work cannot be seen as providing a particularly radical 
contribution to the theorisation of social relations. What has been 
accomplished in this theoretical perspective is a stress on psychological 
factors at the cost of understanding the social and economic dynamic of a 
given cultureo More particularly however it has reinforced a .theoretical 
split between individual and society, in which the individual is synonymous 
with the family and the organisation of the sexual instincto
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Conclusion
The two chapters have demonstrated that the structuralist re-reading 
of Freud neglects the impact of how Freud formulated his theories on the 
history of psychoanalytic thought  They have shown that the terms in 
which Freud was compelled to formulate his cultural theory - culled from 
debates on the family, discussed in this thesis - compromised the radical 
conceptions of sexuality and the unconscious within Freudian theory. In 
so far as social sciences have found a place for psychoanalysis it has 
been in seeking a universal account of individual behavioural development, 
in which sexuality is seen as synonymous with the natural and instinctual
In these accounts, it is combined with a crude culturalism producing a 
sterile discussion of the relative influences of universal natural forces 
and the impact of cultural differences,.
In the previous chapter, it was argued that Freud elaborated his 
phylogenetic account precisely in order to stress that the psychological 
complex must be understood at the level of culture. The complex would 
be the instinct duplicated at the level of culture whereby it would be 
impossible and unnecessary to speculate on the original form of the 
instinct. The fact of the complex would annihilate the distinction 
between individual/instinctual behaviour and cultural forms. However, 
the radical implications of this approach particularly for an analysis of 
the problem of sexual division has never been developed. This is partly 
an effect of the history of psychoanalysis' relation with the social 
sciences, partly as an effect of the form in which the structuralist 
re-reading of Freud has been advanced. The problems with the structuralist 
theory will be discussed in the following discussion of the theorisation 
of sexuality 0
CONCLUSION
SEX AND SOCIAL RELATIONS
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This conclusion does not attempt an exhaustive summary of the thesis. 
Instead it draws out some of the problematic areas which still determine 
contemporary discussions of sexuality. The thesis itself is, in many ways, 
extremely limited. It is not an exhaustive study of the history of the 
social sciences, nor, for that matter, an exhaustive account of the ways 
in which sexuality has been studied. Much has been omitted in 
order to isolate a series of problems which still run through the ways in 
which we think about sex and social relations. The conclusion therefore 
concentrates on dominant modes of conceptualisation which have been 
implicit throughout; the conceptual separation between individual and 
society; the implications of disciplines for one another; the question 
of 'determination'; and the problem of developing a non-essentialist 
account of sexuality.
The thesis has looked at the history of those discourses which are 
now championed by feminism as starting points for understanding sexual 
relations in society,. The history has shown the development of dominant 
modes of explanation and the development of incompatibilities between 
explanations. Claims have been made by each of the discourses which seem 
to have inescapable importance for any understanding of society, and 
especially the place of sexual regulation in society,, Anthropology has 
proved conclusively that there is no natural law making the procreative 
family a universal social institution. Marxism has indicated the 
importance of understanding the social formation in terms of the economic 
relations which constitute that society,, Psychoanalysis has demonstrated 
that hetero-sexual reproductive identity is not a 'given' but is only 
acquired. All these assertions would seem to have enormous importance 
for understanding the relation between sexual division and other aspects of 
the social formation. Yet there is no easy relation between these 
assertions.
The thesis has shown how under different imperatives, there was a
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division of attention between different discourses; all these discourses 
had a place - often an important place - for an explanation of sexual 
relations and social forms. Yet the place ascribed frequently varies 
with the different discourses. The outcome of this division of attentions 
is that none of the questions asked, let alone the answers given, seem 
adequate to a question of how oppression is constructed on sexual division 
or through sexual relations.
It has been shown how under the imperative of the deconstruction of 
evolutionary anthropology, a distinct form of the study of kinship evolved. 
On the one hand the study had important implications for understanding 
sexual relations, in so far as they appeared in family relations; on the 
other hand it abdicated the means by which any more radical questioning 
of relations of dominance or the construction of sexual identity could be 
asked. The reaction against unilinear explanations of the family was 
important in making it clear that there are numerous different types of 
familial organisation resulting from marriage relations. The criticisms 
of unilinear explanations still remain important for they show how variable 
kinship relations are: kinship relations are not just variations on one 
basic form but are different relations entailing different obligations and 
meaning different things to different cultures.
Important though these claims are, the form in which they were first 
made engendered a form of argument which seems rather sterile from a contempor- 
ary feminist perspective. The refusal of any explicit account of determination, 
in favour of a detailed account of the necessary interrelation of all 
elements of a culture retarded particular ways of interrogating power 
and dominance. A series of issues were not raised - issues about the 
basis of unequal power between the sexes as sexed groups; issues about how 
kinship relations might reproduce or construct sexual inequalities; the 
role of kinship in structuring reproduction.
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One of the factors contributing to the absence of such questioning 
was ironically the consolidation of a distinctive notion of the procreative 
family. Kinship had been recognised as a variable. It was not to be 
understood as the same basic institution - the family - evolving at 
different rates in different societies; instead it has to be recognised 
as a multitude of structures fulfilling different functions within 
different societies. However the procreative family assumed a new 
significance in these theories. No longer the referent behind all 
kinship forms, the procreative family was nevertheless invested with a 
certain significance. This significance arose from the fact that the 
relationships around procreation were seen as the arena in which the 
'individual 1 elements of human behaviour found expression. Thus while 
speculation on the procreative family was largely suspended, assumptions 
about the procreative family continued to be made. These were assumptions 
that the processes which 'properly 1 belonged to the individual - instincts, 
behaviours, needs - were processes whose primary expression was in the 
relationships of the procreative group 0
The account given in chapter four of a small number of theorists is 
important because it demonstrated one of the ways in which non-essentialist 
theories of sexuality were blocked. It showed the way in which, while 
opposing theories of the original family and challenging universalising 
explanations, a space was left for theorising the individual as separate 
from society. In this way, even those positions which rigorously opposed 
psychologism, laid themselves open to those 'sciences' which started from 
the individual as a pool or reservoir of behaviours, needs, and instincts., 
This is especially significant in determining the outcome of the place 
ascribed to sexual relations. Sexuality in all its manifestations was 
consigned to the realm of the individual - the realm of the instincts, needs,
behavioural tendencies. It was therefore open to those explanations which 
started from universalising and essentialising forms of explanation.
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Accounts of sexual relations were however no more adequate from 
those disciplines which superficially appeared to avoid the problems of 
the position outlined above. On the one hand marxism offered a rigorous 
account of the way in which relations of domination and subordination 
were determined; they were to be explained as effects of the economic 
relations of production,. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, offered a 
non-essentialist theory of sexuality. Both these theories, however, 
have been shown to be extremely limited in their explanations of the 
relationship between sexual arrangement and social formation. Marxism's 
insistence on the analytical and political priority of economic social 
divisions rendered its theory of sexual relations open to essentialising 
accounts. Psychoanalysis concentrated on a detailed account of the 
construction of sexual identity in sexual regulation but adhered to a 
universalising account of the familial determination of sexual forms.
Both marxism and psychoanalysis claimed totalising explanations for 
the form taken by sexual regulations. Neither paid attention to the 
emergent criticism of unilinear theories of the family. This blindness 
reveals the place occupied by a universal history of the family in both 
theories. The universal history of the family was made necessary by 
other aspects in the theories; they were mobilised as specific theoretical 
solutions, to provide totalising accounts of elements within the social 
formation.
Within marxism it was', paradoxically, the central!ty of the conception 
of the family which in fact blocked any systematic understanding of the
family from the perspective of sexual division. In the study of marxism 1 s 
treatment of the woman question, it became apparent that there was a 
requirement for the conception of the family to fit in with an overall 
conception of the interrelation between elements within the social 
formation. This conception of the totality of social arrangements was
seen to emerge from a series of political priorities specified by the theory,
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political priorities which appeared in their full inadequacy 
when confronted with the woman question,
For psychoanalysis, the family was conceptualised in a 
particular way in order to theorise the relationship between the 
instinct, the complex and society. There emerged an account of 
the history of the family and the universality of the emotions 
within the procreative family. The account compromised other more 
radical conceptualisations of sexuality within the theory. In so 
far as orthodox psychoanalysis offered an account of social relations 
it was taken to describe a complex of emotions resulting from a real 
nuclear family. This position was at the basis of some of the 
formative divergencies within psychoanalysis, divergencies which 
simultaneously reveal the proximity of the discourses under scrutiny 
and their divergence through different forms of attention.
Within orthodox psychoanalysis, the result was that the 
radical non-essentialist notion of sexuality gained only a very 
limited place in accounts of the relationship between sexuality and 
social forms. Initial bisexuality was posited as the precursor 
of the final reproductive outcome of sexual construction, and a source 
of subversion of that reproductive outcome. Far from embracing the 
precariousness of sexual identity as a constant element within social 
relations, orthodox psychoanalysis returned to the idea of universal 
history of the family which had determined the reproductive outcome of 
sexual identity.
The critics of this orthodox psychoanalytic history of the family also 
failed to develop the implication of initial bixexuality. The critics of
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the orthodox position on the family compromised the idea of the structural 
status of the unconscious through their espousal of 'culturalist' argumentso 
These arguments were subject to the same problem as those found within 
marxism. In other words they fell prey to implicit forms of essentialism, 
either by presupposing that anatomical difference was a sufficient basis 
for a coherent adoption of social roles or by failing to take account of 
the tenacity of sexual construction within the social formation.
In the exchanges which took place between the discourses traced here, 
several elements are striking. One is the extent to which all these 
discourses were limited by the terms set by the earlier discussions of the 
family. Anthropology alone attempted to deconstruct the general theories 
of these earlier debates but left untouched any critique of the concept- 
ualisation of sexuality. Cause or effect of social relations, heterosexual 
reproductive sexual identity tended to be presupposed at the heart of its 
studies.
What is also striking in the history of these discourses is the way 
in which the division of attentions affected in the emergence of different 
discourses meant that some investigations disappeared altogether. Psycho- 
analysis tried to investigate the construction of sexuality as process 
and contradiction. This however has no place in the social sciences. 
Sociology rarely explores sexual relations at all. The typical object of 
study is the household - an institution assumed to function unproblemati- 
cally on reproductive sexual relations. An amorphous commitment to the 
idea of determination of sexual relations by other social forms tended 
to be offered as sufficient explanation Anthropology has paid endless 
attention to the variety of sexual organisations but has rarely addressed 
the radical implications of psychoanalytic theories of sexuality. Where 
psychoanalytic theories appeared, they appeared either under the regime of 
culturalism or under the regime of a universalising psychology. Marxism
has an attention to the construction of social identity and to detailing
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historical circumstances, but it has constructed a theory where under 
the importance of the family, the social contradiction between men and 
women disappears in anything other than essentialising terms.
Divergencies and divisions;___the determination of social life 
There are important lessons to be learned both from the division of attention 
between different discourses and from the violent divisions between 
discourses. The division of attentions has made remote any chance of 
explanations of certain phenomena. It becomes difficult to explain 
hierarchies between the sexes, the cause of different statuses, the 
determination of different familial forms and their effect on sexual 
behaviour while delivering an historically specific account. Some 
discourses have concentrated on sexuality in isolation from society; some 
have simply taken sexuality for granted as the reproductive instinct. 
Various discourses have offered various proofs and forms of explanation 
as to what is specific about women as a sex; how a society constructs 
sexual division; and what are the determinants on the forms taken by 
sexual division. Yet all these various proofs are compromised; they do 
not deliver an historically specific account of these processes. The 
reason underlying this compromise is that all these discourses, apart 
from psychoanalysis, rely on a notion of sexual identity, (and therefore 
sexual regulation) as pre-giveno
Wherever a theory functions with a given notion of sexual organisation, 
it necessarily implies something eternal about the differences between men 
and women. This implication makes it virtually impossible to provide an 
account of how sexual status and division is produced within a given 
historical moment. Even with a rigourous cultural!sm, which insists on 
the variability of sexual identity and relations, there is a problem of 
pre-supposing sexual characteristics. For even where the individual is 
taken to be a tabula rasa onto which sexual identity is written, there is
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a problem where men and women are assumed to take up coherent roles. 
For here, too, it is suggested that anatomical difference guarantees 
the roles required by different arrangements of the social,, Despite 
this apparently common limitation, there have been violent divisions 
between modes of explanation. Within the social sciences for example 
there is division as to how social forms, like marriage, the family, 
beliefs and so on are determined. It is a debate as to whether social 
phenomena are adequately accounted for by reference to the interdependence 
of social institutions or whether those social institutions can themselves 
be explained by the characteristics of individuals, that is by the needs, 
instincts and forms of behaviour of individuals. ^ ' The theorisation of 
social phenomena involving sexual behaviour has been plagued by this 
division and there is good reason for this.
The thesis has shown how, in the development of studies of the 
family, sexual regulations were taken as regulations on the borderline 
between nature and culture. It has been argued that the resolution of 
the place of sexuality in the social sciences was achieved through the 
agreement that sexual regulations were on the borderline between nature 
and culture. As such they came under two major arguments between modes 
of explanation within the social sciences. On the one hand is the 
division between explanations which take their starting point either as 
the individual or society. On the other hand, there is the concomitant 
discussion as to how social phenomena are determined, that is, either by 
the characteristics of an individual or by reference to the interrelation 
of social institutions.
These dominant discussions under which sexual regulations have been 
treated in the social sciences frequently polarise around a series of 
sterile divisions, divisions exemplified by the Jones/Malinowski debate. 
The problem is presented in terms of whether patterns of sexual behaviour 
are derived from a universal human imperative or whether they are
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conditioned by the interaction of elements with, a particular culture. 
Posed in another way, it is the question as to whether sexual behaviour 
is natural (instinctual) or socially conditioned,,
It is to be hoped that this thesis has shown that these options 
were structured by dominant ideological principles. Under the theoretical 
division between individual and society, sexual behaviour has been consigned 
to the realm of the individual. Sex has been taken as belonging to the 
realm of the behavioural, the emotions, biology. This consigning has 
taken place primarily because the heterosexual reproductive instinct has 
rarely been questioned. Sexuality and the "reproductive" instinct are 
often taken to be synonymous. It would not be an exaggeration to say 
that virtually all social phenomena entailing sexuality - marriage, the 
family, the household - have been assumed to operate on the basis of this 
so-called fundamental instinct. A conceptual separation then becomes 
possible on the grounds of a division consolidated in the social sciences 
between the so-called social and the so-called individual realms.
This conceptual division has structured the debates within the social 
sciences. In general it would be correct to say that there has been a 
division between discourses which start from those areas deemed, the 
individual, and those which start from the social. Such a division itself 
points to the assumptions as to what is usually taken to be a social science 9 
It is a discourse whose primary object of attention is the interaction of 
social elements. However, it is apparent from the argument made here that 
while this might be the primary object of interrogation, there is an 
unresolved space whereby explanations from the so-called individual sciences 
can and do creep in. This is precisely the division between individual 
and society, and between two dominant modes of explanation. Thus even 
within discourses like sociology or anthropology there is still division as 
to whether the individual should be explained as a substantive to be
accounted for by the sciences treating emotions, instincts and behaviours,
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or whether these phenomena should be explained by the particularities of 
a given culture.
Whichever side of the division is espoused marks a failure. Amorphous, 
or rigorous, determination, leaves a space which can be filled by one of two 
options. Either nothing is said about sexuality except society determines 
the social manifestations of sexual relations, in which case the objects to 
be studied are the so-called determinant forms. Or, ironically, biological 
and psychological capacities are presupposed but not discussed explicity. 
Thoas theories which start from the realm, designated the individual, and 
refuse the assumptions of determination (like psychoanalysis) appear to 
be falling into universalising and naturalising claims.
These divisions around the question of sex have a dull note of 
familiarity. They are none other than the divisions between nature and 
culture, the individual and society* It is the old nature versus nurture 
debate and it encompasses our understanding of sex because sexual behaviour 
has been consigned to the realm of the individual. Thus the two modes of 
integration of sexual behaviour in some discourses of the social sciences are 
in fact witness to the non-theorisation of sex. The fact that there has 
been no substantial theorisation of sexual construction, sexual relations 
and sexual hierarchies is the result of this classification and the 
conceptual division between individual and society.
Two points should be made if there is to be any advance in our 
understanding of sexual relations within society. The first is that 
sex cannot be consigned to the realm of the individual. Secondly, that 
the division between individual and society is purely conceptual. It is a 
conceptual division which must be displaced if we are to develop an under- 
standing of how sexual division can be the basis for oppressive relations.
Sex; Individual or social? 
The division between individual and society is a theoretical division, based
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on the way in which areas of investigation have been carved up between 
different discourses. On the one side there are a number of phenomena 
which are deemed to be individual - instincts, behaviour, needs, emotions, 
desires, fantasies. These phenomena are usually thought to be found in 
the so-called primary situation or procreative group.. On the other side 
are the phenomena deemed to be social - the economy, ideological (collective) 
beliefs, institutions and customary social forms. Sexuality has in general 
been consigned to the side of the individual, whether it is taken as cause 
or effect of social practices. However even if one accepts this conceptual 
division it would be difficult to confine sexuality to this area.
Sexuality does not only concern forms of behaviour and personal 
desires. Everywhere sexuality is defined publicly. Most obviously, 
sexuality appears in public customs, like marriage. It also appears in 
a number of discourses and practices in a less obvious way* Governmental 
policies on housing, population, and education all in a variety of ways, 
concern the definition and regulation of aspects of sexual behaviour. One
has only to mention the kinds of houses made and provisions for families
(4)within housing policy, or the sex segregation within education to
realise that public policies are constantly engaged in the task of 
defining and redefining sexual behaviour.
Even the areas, such as the economy, carefully detailed as the 
social, crucially involve sexual definitions. Within contemporary western 
society, the wage paid for male labour is a family wage regardless of 
the marital status of the recipient. This has important correspondences 
with other aspects of the economy; it constitutes women as a low-paid 
group; it marks out sexually-ghettoised areas of employment; and it 
constructs relations of economic dependence of women and children on men 0 
There is no way in which any study of the economic relations of contemporary 
society could afford to neglect the sexual division and sexual organisation 
which provides its logic 
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How sexuality is talked about, displayed and organised is a
central feature of social existence. Moreover there are many forms of
behaviour and desire which cannot be attributed to an 'individual 1
conceptually separated from society. Pornography for example while it
may address a hypothesised individual, is an aspect of public arousal of
(5)desire.
Psychoanalysis has even undermined the idea that what we think of 
as the most personal and intimate aspects of behaviour can be attributed 
to the spontaneous production of any individual. Even that most individual 
form of behaviour, that is, fantasy, is taken by psychoanalysis to be a 
form of hallucinated sexual satisfaction which cannot evade reference to the 
complexes by which sexuality enters social existence.
The function of these brief points is to indicate that sex, separated 
into the realm of the individual behaviour cannot be confined there. 
Sexual division and definition is a crucial element in our contemporary 
social organisation. Moreover even those elements of the 'individual 1 are 
seen by psychoanalysis to be pre-structured by the social complex. The 
instinctual, in other words, cannot be abstracted from the complex.
Yet more extensive criticism could however be made of the conceptual 
division between individual and society, and these criticisms are important 
for clearing away major obstacles to developing non-essentialising notions 
of sexual relations.
Why the division between individual and society is a problem 
One immediate problem which strikes us confronted with the division between 
individual and society is that a theoretical space has been constructed in 
which elements like behaviour, desire, fantasy can be thought as somehow 
separate from society. It becomes possible to think of the individual as 
somehow outside society 0
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It is clear that to think about it in this way constructs a false 
problem. In so far as we talk about the human we refer to a living 
creature, existing in society. Even the unborn child has a place 
decreed to it. The generalised habit in our society of taking the 
father's surname is an example of this. There is nothing in the child f s 
first engagement with the world that is somehow outside society, everything 
that occurs is part of a social structure: the practices of child care; 
the ways in which affection is displayed; who cares for the child; and 
in what way care is given. The statement seems like a truism and would 
certainly be received as such by the majority of social sciences, yet a 
separation is still affected. Certain elements of human and social 
behaviour are thought to be subject to forms of explanation, which start 
from this hypothesised individual. For as long as this separation is 
maintained the endless tedium about the relative determination of nature 
and nurture will roll on.
Recent attempts to explain all of culture by reference to biological 
explanations have been rather successful. This indicates the extent to 
which the social sciences, despite their commitment to social determination, 
have left open a space into which smggly fit psychological and biological 
explanations, with their universal!sing and reductionist views.
Both the claims and the counter-claims share one assumption on which 
the conceptual division is operative. Both the idea of individual as 
tabula rasa, whose behaviour, emotions, desires are conditioned by social 
forces; and the idea of individual instincts, drives and needs which are 
expressed in social forms* are operative on one condition. The condition 
is that a homogeneous individual is supposed to exist, in other words that 
that there is such a thing as a coherent individual which can be accounted 
for either in terms of an identity, a social role, a sum total of behaviour, 
or an instinctual disposition. Agent of social roles or perpetrator of the 
selfish gene, it assumes a coherent subject as outcome or origin,.
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But if psychoanalytic theory has taught us anything, it is that 
such a proposition cannot bear scrutiny. It has shown how the idea of 
a coherent subject is a fantasy. For in bringing to light unconscious 
processes, it has demonstrated that conscious or public identity is only 
a tip of an iceberg., Symptoms, dreams, modes of expression like jokes, 
all bear witness to other modalities of desire, repressed perhaps but in 
a continuous relationship with conscious representation, disrupting, 
displacing, seeking satisfaction or expression. There are several points 
of importance in this account. One is that not only is identity a construct, 
but that it is continuously and precariously reconstructed. Any aspect of 
behaviour or desire will only ever be a moment in a process; the exact 
opposite can frequently be revealed co-existing in the unconscious. In 
addition, as has been demonstrated earlier, psychoanalysis has undermined 
essentialist notions of the instincts. In stressing that the complex 
must take precedence over the instinct, Freud has demonstrated that 
'instinctual' behaviour never has pure expression. The variability of 
the object through which instinctual satisfaction is sought clearly 
demonstrates the inseparability of instinct from the object by which it 
finds satisfaction,, Such a distinction clearly places the instinct under 
the primacy of sociality. There is never any activity which 'expresses' 
instinctual behaviour. Sociality and its renunciations confront us only 
with the instinct displaced and fluid, defined in the object through which 
it seeks satisfaction.
The conceptual division between individual and society assumes that 
on the one hand the elements under the term individual are somehow 
presocial, and on the other, that the individual is a coherent and homo- 
geneous entity. This is presupposed by biological explanations, by 
psychological explanations and even by explanations which assert that the 
individual is culturally conditioned, (For this too assumes a presocial 
empty space filled up with coherent social roles)» Attention to the
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discourse of the unconscious however reveals contradiction and conflict,. 
This is an important discovery from the point of view of conceptualisation 
of sexual relations, for it undermines the possibility that any sexual 
practice could be the expression of any one pregiven instinctual drive, for 
example, the expression of reproductive interests. Freud has shown much 
too clearly that the acquisition of reproductive, heterosexual positions 
is a painful process whose outcome is extremely precarious* Psycho- 
analysis has demonstrated that there is nothing essential about the sexual 
drive of male and female,,
The reason why challenging the notion of the centred subject 
produced in the individual/society division is important is because it is 
on this notion that essentialist notions of sex operate. The fantasy of 
a coherent individual - behaviour, instinctual disposition, social role or 
whatever - allows for an idea of sex as a consistent, coherent feature 
which unilaterally affects men in one way, women in another.. This is 
self-evident in biological and psychological explanations. But even the 
idea of cultural conditioning productive of roles presupposes something 
essential; it suggests that men and women are constructed differentially 
by a given society<> Superficially this argument would not appear to 
support essentialist notions of men and women but in fact it does. For 
how is it that a society unilaterally affects anatomical women in one way, 
and anatomical men in another way? And what is it about that anatomical 
state which guarantees that anatomical men and women will consistently take 
up these roles, as social men and women?
Against this, the psychoanalytic hypothesis has very radical implications 
It would seem to suggest that any analysis which implied a homogeneous 
subject, however theorised, will ultimately lead to a reductionist notion 
of sexuality. This suggestion presents a serious problem for some of the 
recent attempts to advance the understanding of sexual relations in society 
Aware of the inadequacies of previous approaches, recent writings on the
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construction of sexual identities and hierarchies have suggested the 
need to 'integrate' various aspects from various disciplines in order to 
produce an adequate understanding 0
Recent proposals for theoretical integration bear witness to how 
widespread is the sense of inadequacy about the accounts of sexual relations 
in society given by discrete disciplines. A plethora of proposed mergers 
could be detailedo Sociology casts a greedy eye from the confines of the 
household to anthropology's study of kinship. Anthropologists look to 
marxism, sometimes even to psychoanalysis to restore the possibility of 
general explanations of the forms taken by sexual relations. Marxism 
looks to psychoanalysis to compensate for its own inattention to the 
question of social and sexual identity.
Tet when examined closely these theoretical mergers do not seem to 
avoid the pitfalls of the dominant interpretations of sexual relations
Neither do they challenge the theoretical distinction between individual 
and society, nor do they challenge the presuppositions of some of the 
central terms mobilised in particular discourses. Thus the legacy accruing 
to certain conceptions within disciplines threatens constantly to compromise 
the desire for new interpretations. These problems raise the whole question 
of the implications which discourses hold for one another if the aim is not 
the impossible one of integrating their various objects of attention.,
The -psychology of sexuality under capitalism
It has been suggested that a merger between the theories of Marx and Freud
could do much for advancing our understanding of how sexuality is constructed
under capitalism. It has been suggested that sexual construction occurs
in the ideological level of society, and that this ideological level is 
relatively autonomous from the economic and political instances of a given 
society» The proposed merger of Freud and Marx is offered here as a 
solution to that phenomenon so puzzling for marxism; that sexual behaviour
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and practices do not seem to correspond directly with the economic
mode of production.
A number of very real problems present themselves to this attempted 
merger of concepts drawn from both marxist and psychoanalytic writings. 
The assertion that the merger assists understanding of sexual relations in 
society works on certain assumptions. Sez is again consigned to the realm 
of the individual, and therefore the psychological. While this is a 
large element in sexual behaviour, it has already been argued that the 
psychological or individual does not exhaust the realm of the sexual  
It neglects the centrality of sexual preoccupations in a series of govern- 
mental, political and economic concerns.
The attempt to make marxism 'more adequate' by importing a number of 
psychoanalytic observations runs the risk of constructing the individual/ 
society division anew." Marxism will provide the account of how the economic 
and political level function; Freudian theory will illuminate the process 
by which individual identity is acquired in this social formation.
The history of psychoanalysis and marxism has been witness to several
(9) similar projects, which have been briefly mentioned in this thesis*
While these did not deal specifically with the issue of sexual identity, 
their problems are still illuminating in the context of current endeavours 0 
In these earlier theories, psychoanalysis was reduced to an account of 
personality types, explicitly so in some theoretical developments<> 
Within such a trajectory the idea of the unconscious is reduced to being 
simply a repository of anti-social elements, repressed in the construction 
of a definite personality by a particular social formation What is 
again presupposed is the idea of a coherent subject, lacking in contradiction 
with fized identity, in recent cases, a fized sexual identity*.
There are further problems arising from the attempt to integrate 
marxism and psychoanalysis across the terrain of the relative- autonomy of 
the ideological level. Usually this form of argument suggests that the
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relative autonomy of the ideological level can be attributed to a 
structure of kinship relations which have been superseded but which 
continue to impose a pattern on the form taken by sexual identity, that 
is the pattern of patriarchal monogamy,, Given what has been said however 
about the division between individual and society around sexuality, there 
is surely a problem about assuming that identity is acquired almost 
exclusively through the family, when sexuality is being constantly 
constructed and reconstructed in a number of social practices? Why, in 
other words, should it be assumed that the family is relatively autonomous 
from the rest of society, when examination reveals that these other social 
practices crucially rely on familial and sexual definitions. Sexuality 
is clearly not confined to the family; it is constructed and addressed in 
a number of different ways, including by national economic and political 
strategyo Why therefore should identity be acquired only through the 
family?
Reservations can also be raised about the notion of determinacy
(11)
at play here, a problem which will be dealt with only cursorily here*
The problem here is how the capitalist mode of production can be ultimately 
determining if sexual identity is produced within the context of a familial 
ideology whose actual structures have long since been superseded. This 
proposition is problematic again for its reliance on the individual/society 
division. The family is posited as a separate site which is the place 
where individual identity is acquired. For even though the economy is 
said to be ultimately determining on all forms taken by social life, the 
familial ideology is relatively autonomous from this determination and the 
space where individual identity is formed. It seems almost impossible to 
specify in what way the economic mode of production might be determinant, 
if sexual identity and desire arise within a realm obedient to its own 
logic. Such a perspective of course means that we do not properly challenge 
the conception of social division which is operative within marxism. Sexual
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division is attributed to a different logic, a logic which is frequently 
left unexplained.
In this way, a number of limitations are encapsulated in the proposal 
of a merger between Marx and Freud across the idea of the relative autonomy 
of the ideological instance. There is the problem of the supposition of a 
homogeneous identity; there is the problem of a rigorously deterministic 
theory which cannot account for the non-correspondence between sexual and 
familial forms and the economic mode of production and there is the 
concomitant problem of not being able to account for the relation between 
economic mode of production and social forms through the concept of relative 
autonomy. If sexuality is not confined to the family or individual behaviour, 
how is it that sexual identity is only produced within the family? Similar 
reservations can be raised to the other principal theoretical mergers which 
have been proposed.
Patriarchy or the Relations of Human Reproduction
The concepts of relations of human reproduction and patriarchy are once 
more beginning to dominate attempts to theorise sexual relations in society. 
Both have emerged as solutions to problems within marxist theory. In general 
they are offered as possible explanations or descriptions of the 'relative 
autonomy 1 of human sexual relations from the economic mode of production. 
Concentration on the relations of reproduction appears as a response to 
two things. One is quite simply the inescapable evidence of a very definite 
relation between women's subordinate position and the role of child-bearer 
and child-carer. Assumptions about women's child-bearing and child-rearing 
capacity seem to underlie practices like the family wage; hence they 
underpin women's economic dependency and oppression as well as the 
ghettoisation of women in low-paid work.
Confronted with the seemingly unavoidable relation between many social 
practices and women's role as reproducer, it has seemed logical that reproduc-
tion should be a primary site of investigation. But there is another 
reason which should be apparent from the rest of the thesis; the emphasis 
on this is already present within marxism and the social sciences. Such 
an interpretation fits readily into existing schemas.
On the surface, this theoretical approach appears to meet the 
requirement of escaping the reductionism sometimes encountered within 
marxism. It insists on a distinct theory of social relations as they 
affect women specifically; it refuses to look at the subordination of 
women as the effect of somehow 'more basic' social relations such as 
private property. It is, therefore, open to accounts from psychoanalysis 
and anthropology 0 Simultaneously, by offering itself as analgous to the 
marxist concept of the relations of production, it appears to remain firmly 
within marxism - a commitment sought both because of sympathy with marxism^
analytic specification of structural economic contradiction and principled
(12) 
anti-naturalism. At the same time, as the thesis has shown, the
concept is by no means a challenge to the theoretical tenets of marxism; 
both the concepts of patriarchy and the specificity of human relations of 
production are crucially interlinked with existing marxist priorities.
Two primary positions associated with the way in which the concept has 
been taken up demonstrate the possible limitations with the idea of a speci- 
fic level, that of 'the human relations of reproduction 1 . One of these is
the way in which it sometimes appears as indistinguishable from biological
(13)
essentialisnu It is by virtue of women's -reproductive capacity that
they are controlled or subordinated. Yet whatever the cause is said to 
be for this control - demographic factors or the requirements of private
property - what it does not explain is why women should be controlled by
(14)
men. These arguments regularly make the assumption that men always
control women and draw on underlying assumptions about a universal male 
psychology or inherent female capacities..
The second way in which the concept has been used has been a sort of
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doubling over of other implications of the term, reproduction,within 
marxism. There are, for example, attempts to incorporate women's
biological reproductive capacity into the idea of women's specific contri-
(15) bution to the reproduction of the economy. The family is organised
as a site of reproduction of labour power in the form of children. In 
addition, the labourer is reproduced outside the costs of capital, through 
the performance of domestic labour. These accounts all fail to explain 
sexual division. In a mode of argument reminiscent of those outlined in 
chapters five and six, they presuppose sexual division. It is a natural 
division which is utilised by the capitalist economy,. These arguments 
have been extremely important in drawing attention to the differential 
relationship between men and women to the economy, a direction which is 
now being more usefully pursued.
Other, apparently less reductionist,accounts have run into similar
problems. For example, the suggestion that the family might be the site
(17) of ideological reproduction of the capitalist mode of production no
less assumes the functionality of the family for capitalism, again 
ultimately depriving it of any specificity 0 It offers no account of why 
or how sexual division arises, and ultimately reduces the family to being 
a function of capital<,
Patriarchy
The most insistent analysis of the specificity of the relations of human
(1 8) 
reproduction has been in terms of patriarchyo In fact the revival of
various patriarchal theories has been a major contribution to the endeavour 
to produce an adequate analysis of the position of women. However, like 
discussions of the specificity of relations of human reproduction, the 
accounts of patriarchy tend to be similarly characterised by a surprising 
lack of attention to what patriarchal relations are and how they operate. 
Variously, patriarchal relations describe the oppression of all women
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by all men (what is often also referred to as sexism) , a particular ±:ind 
of kinship structure, or finally a residual ideology of male dominance. 
This latter is thought to have arisen from a kinship organisation which 
has since been superseded.
Patriarchy has a loose currency. It is generally employed to 
designate a problem - a contradiction between men and women, the recogni- 
tion of a specific problem around gender division which implies power 
and demands explanation. There can be no doubt as to the political 
importance of this insistence; it has given a theoretical basis for 
arguing for the specificity of women's oppression. It has been a powerful 
tool in arguing this against traditional marzist analyses, for exampleo
But this thesis has made a series of related arguments which have 
indicated that there are aspects of the patriarchal theory which should be 
treated with cautiono ¥e have seen in fact that the notion of the patriarchal 
family as it appears within both marxism and psychoanalysis is, if anything, 
a stumbling block to the development of an understanding of the construction 
of sexual division in historically specific terms. Within marxism, the 
integral relation between the patriarchal family and other concepts led to 
a mode of theorisation where the specificity of sexual division within the 
family did not appearo Within psychoanalysis, it was the conceptualisation 
of the patriarchal family which constantly pulled back the radical implica- 
tions of psychoanalytic theory, committing psychoanalysis to a universal! sing 
account of the procreative family 0
There are two points which must be made in relation to the term 
patriarchy.. The first is that if the term is to be developed at ail 
rigorously as describing a real structure of social relations, it appears 
to be limited in crucial ways. For one thing, the arrangement of the 
contemporary family retains few of the features of a classic patriarchal 
structure o Changes in family law have slowly begun to undermine the 
conception of father as absolute head of the family, financially, legally
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and politically responsible for his wife as a dependent. Descent is 
neither reckoned nor controlled exclusively by the father; our culture has 
no strict laws of residence. Historically there have been definite 
transitions in family forms and we need ways of describing rigorously 
the forms taken by familial arrangements at particular historical moments  
It is the same problem as that facing the anthropologist. The application 
of the term 'patriarchal' to aspects of male control and dominance can 
obscure the differences between familial forms, differences which are 
vitally important if any understanding of sexual relations is to be 
constructedo We need ways of talking about shifts from male dominance 
within the patriarchal family tc male dominance outside the familyo
In addition, the term 'patriarchal' describes a form of power which 
does not do justice to the complexity of the problem of sexual division and 
society,. It limits what can be said in terms of the production and 
redefinition of sexual identities in a number of forms. It does not do 
justice to the subtle workings of discrimination. For the term 'patriarchal 1 
implies a model of power as interpersonal domination, a model where all men 
have forms of literal, legal and political power over all women. Yet many 
of the aspects of women's oppression are constructed diffusely, in 
representational practices, in forms of speech, in sexual practices. This 
oppression is rarely carried out through the literal overpowering of a woman 
by a man.
The point of these criticisms is to indicate that the concept of 
patriarchy has to be treated with caution; it does not deal sufficiently 
with the diffused workings of power in relation to sexuality, for example 
in representational structures.. Nor does the term allow sufficient space 
for the contradictory effects of practices. There is for example no 
homogeneous relationship between the state and the patriarchal family as 
is sometimes suggested under this concept 0 As a result of determinate
social conditions practices often construct contradictory notions of the
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(19)family and act according: to these different categories.)
The previous three points have dealt with some of the limitations 
involved in the attempt to 'merge' disciplines to produce an adequate 
understanding of sexual relations in society. These three points 
have shown how none of these mergers fulfil the requirements of a non- 
essentialist historically specific account of sexual regulations<> At the 
same time they do insist on the need for a definite account of oppression 
entailed in sexual division a
Structuralism and Patriarchy
It mi; "it be thought at this stage that these criticisms have been raised 
from a position where some of the problems have already been solved» 
Perhaps the concluding chapters of the thesis gave the impression that a 
structuralist rereading of psychoanalysis might lay the foundation of an 
account of patriarchal relations which did not rely on essentialising 
notions of sex.
It is certainly true that there are some important implications for 
understanding sexuality within structuralist interpretations of psycho- 
analysis. On the one hand, the idea of a pre-given sexual disposition has 
been displaced by Freud's theory of sexual construction; on the other hand, 
the structuralist interpretation of phylogenetic theory apparently abolished 
the need for psychoanalysis' universal history of the family. Instead it 
argued that Freud was trying to deal with the fact that kinship itself was 
made up to relations of difference like language. Levi-Strauss suggested 
that it was these systems of classification and difference which underlay 
kinship systems. He argued for an analogy to be drawn between kinship 
and linguistic relations, as described by structural linguistics. They 
are made up of the same elements: systems of difference, signs, relations 
of exchange.
In this way both Levi-Strauss and Lacan insist that the universals
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described by Freud are the universais of differentiation, constitutive of 
culture. They are not the universais of emotions but an outline of the 
primacy of the complex, that is culture, over the instinctual. The question 
is whether the emphasis on the fact of the systematicity of kinship rules - 
so valuable in arguing against functionalisin ^ - is in fact useful for 
understanding sexual relations in society..
There are serious flaws within the structuralist approach as it now 
stands. In stressing the systematicity of kinship, Levi-Strauss described 
it as a system of communication. It guaranteed the possibility of 
reciprocity and therefore integration between self and others. In this 
system of communication, women are exchanged as signs. It is on this 
element that many feminists have attempted to reintegrate an explanation 
for the subordination of women. They say that it is the fact that women 
are exchanged by men in the kinship system which explains their universal 
subordination.
The way in which Levi-Strauss explains that it is women who are 
exchanged needs to be carefully scrutinised. He assumes a natural 
promiscuity of men and an inevitable shortage of "desirable" women; this 
makes women the most "valuable" possession of the group. However there 
is no theoretical necessity in his argument that it should be women who 
are exchanged. Nor does he assume that the exchange of women entails 
forms of subordination - legal, political, economic or intersubjective. 
This assumption has been added by the subsequent feminist interpretations.
Levi-Strauss' argument is problematic in several ways. First of all, 
anthropological evidence disputes his universalising generalisation that all 
marriage customs involve the exchange of women; secondly, it will be 
apparent that the assumptions of kinship as intellectual systems are 
assumptions deeply entrenched in philosophical anthropology. Joined with 
the Freudian account of the necessity for sexual renunciation, Levi-Strauss' 
becomes an especially poignant variant of the negative critique of cultureo
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Finally, it can be argued that Levi-Strauss' hypothesis of value
undermines his reliance on Saussurean linguistics. Saussurean linguistics
(22)argues that language is simply a system of differences. There is no
pre-given meaning which is free floating and freely apprehended by the 
individualo Language is simply signifiers (sound-images) whose differen- 
tial arrangements construct signifieds(the concept); the relationship 
between signifier and signified is arbitrary, agreed through social 
convention 0 In such a system there is no room for presupposing elements 
as valuable. The relations of difference the signifying system of a 
culture,construct how elements signify as valuable. The construction of 
value takes place within a socially signifying system 0
Levi-Strauss 1 own claim that culture is analagous to signification 
can be subverted by his own proposition. For to insist on the primacy of 
signifying systems means no element can be given a value pre-existing a 
social signifying system. To assume pre-existent value commits structuralism 
to the same kinds of universalising assumptions about the function of 
sexual division which already presuppose the categories of men and women. 
The attempt to develop structuralism as a description of patriarchy is 
therefore no less problematic» It assumes that the exchange of women can 
be equated with a form of political control of women. It is men who 
initiate relations between groups and women are circulated between them as 
signs. Again this presupposes sexual division where men are in a position 
to control and dominate women; it therefore obliterates the construction 
of sexual identity as process and problem. Given these reservations, what 
value can be attributed to the structuralist rereading of Freud? This 
question relates to the wider one; what are the implications of one theory for 
another if they cannot simply be added to one another?
The structuralist rereading of Freud is important on several frontSo 
It delivers an account of sexual construction which insists that maleness
and femaleness are constructs, not consequences of anatomical division.
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It also draws attention to the systematic!ty of kinship relations, and 
therefore to a certain systematic!ty in the way in which sexuality is 
governed* This systematicity is not however a universal fern of sexuality. 
Thus it insists on the primacy of the social over the instinct,without 
falling into the pitfalls of culturalism. Finally it relies on a theory 
of representation which has significance for the way in which social 
phenomena are interpreted. Instead of reliance on an idea that a certain 
group of social phenomena express or reflect other social practices in a 
simple relationship, the structuralist re-reading of psychoanalysis insists 
that representational practices have a complex relation with other social 
practices. It emphasises the activity of the means of representation, 
rather than suggesting that representations simply reflect some more 
'material 1 practice.
Yet the contemporary mobilisation of psychoanalysis frequently 
compromises these vital elements of the theory. They end up presupposing 
aspects of sexual division and identity that structuralism has fundamentally 
challenged. This indicates that adequate questions relating to sexuality 
cannot be asked either from within existing discourses or by simply adding 
elements from other discourses. These discourses have mutually exclusive 
ways of defining sexual relations and sexual division, definitions which 
are crucial to other aspects of the theories. Thus in mergers, it is 
almost invariably the case that radical challenges to conceptions of 
sexuality disappear,,
Does this mean that these discourses are doomed to remain in 
splendid isolation? Does it mean that nothing can be usefully exchanged 
between theories? That nothing can be exchanged between discourses other 
than criticisms? The point is that these discourses do have important 
implications for one another but not by supplying missing elements 0 
The implications are that they displace the possibility of certain forms
of arguments and therefore demand drastic changes in how the problems are
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formulated and considered. Thus the Freudian insistence on initial 
bisexuality and the construction of hetero-sexual identity cannot be 
accepted as a possible element of a theory which otherwise depends on 
assumptions of essential sexual division. The Freudian hypothesis if 
it is taken seriously must leave no room for theories which take sexuality 
as a given. It must displace any argument where sexual identity or sexual 
behaviour is thought to arise out of a sexual predisposition.
The implications of structuralism and psychoanalysis can be made yet 
more searching. They can substantiate a displacement of those forms of 
thought which deprive the consideration of sexual division of its specifi- 
city. This displacement of so-called reduction! t arguments would seem 
to be necessary if understanding of sexual relations is to be advanced.
This displacement arises from the theory of representation on which much
(23)
contemporary structuralist writing is based. The theory of representa- 
tion has been a precondition for challenges which have been made of 
simplistic theories of the way in which cultural practices express or 
reflect a general principle of the social formation. For example within 
marxism, it is sometimes assumed that cultural practices express a general 
principle of economic arrangement of a given society- The theory of 
representation on which contemporary work within structuralism relies, 
suggests that it is the activity of the means of representation (signifiers) 
which produces what is represented. What is represented does not therefore 
necessarily reflect any pre-given external condition. Although represent- 
ational practices occur in determinate social conditions it does not express 
any of those conditions. The tradition within marxism which argues that 
all levels of cultural relations represent the general features of the 
mode of production in which they occur cannot stand up to these arguments. 
There seem pressing reasons why the criticisms made of this version of 
marxism should be allowed to displace the assumptions about expressive 
totalities altogether,some of which have been seen in the earlier discussion
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of marxism.
The effect of this iisplacement is not to reduce the significance 
of the marxist analysis of the economy,, On the contrary there emerges a 
possible approach to the organisation of the economy and social life 
which encompasses issues arising from sexual division. Marxism is a 
varied tradition under which a variety of analyses of the organisation 
of the economy have been made.. It is the one tradition which has always 
correctly insisted on social antagonism built into the organisation of the 
capitalist economy. However, the tradition which insists that all aspects 
of society are structured by and reflect a general abstract principle has 
limited any specific attention to sexual division in the economy and has 
become a sterile dogma. The displacement of a marxism which insists on 
the structuring of all aspects of society through a general principle 
allows for an approach to contemporary society, not as the effect of 
abstract principles working on undifferentiated agents but as a society 
structured around sexual division and hierarchy. These divisions have immense 
significance within the economy; they are not secondary to an abstract 
general principle of class division, nor are they somehow less antagonistic 
divisions than those of class. The structural contradictions of capitalism 
occur in a society which is structured around sexual hierarchies. The 
only way in which marxism can be helpful to an understanding of the place 
of sexual relations within society is if it is liberated as a tradition of 
attention to class and structural contradiction within an economy and is 
not championed as a series of rigid principles by which society is under- 
stood in abstract.
The implications then of recent developments within psychoanalysis are 
not simply that it gives insights to the structures of sexuality, but also 
because they make impossible and irrelevant certain arguments. Psycho- 
analytic -understandings of both sexual construction and the process of
representation reveal that some versions of marxism as expressive totality
will never be able to understand sexuality in anything other than 
essentialist terras.
Sexuality ar.d discourse
Recently arguments have been made about the study of sexuality which do
in fact start out from a critique of reductionism. In considering sexuality
and social relations it is important to understand what kind of advance, if
any, these studies might constitute. Recently the work of Foucault has
been promoted as offering a form of analysis which does not appear to
commit the theoretical errors of reductionism. As one of his recent
works is on the history of sexuality, ' it would seem useful to assess
whether this theoretical position, in avoiding reductionism really does
advance us in a theoretical direction useful for feminist politics.
Foucault refuses the division, outlined earlier, between individual 
and society. He addresses himself only to the discursive construction of 
sexuality; that is what is said about and done in the name of sexual 
regulation, control, direction etc. As far as Foucault 's argument is 
concerned, the problem of the psychology or instinct of the individual is 
outside the scope of any argument which seeks to avoid epistemological 
reasoning. According to this argument only the discourses and representa- 
tions delivered to us by history are the only proper objects of analysis in 
any attempt to understand the history of sexuality. It is in these 
discourses that the construction of subjectivity can be understood. This 
process of construction entails the modes of subjectivity constructed in 
discourse; conseqaently these modes are multiple and any individual would 
be subject to the workings of any number of discursive constructions. The 
object to be interrogated for Foucault is not the individual as substantive 
but the possibilities for individualisation, or subjection in discourse. 
Foucault then refuses the traditional complex of concerns which has come
under the term, the individual, that is, questions of behaviour, identity, 
needs, biology.
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Many aspects of Foucault's work would appear to offer important 
perspectives for any assessment of the construction of sexual identities 
in history. Already the perspective has been employed to undermine a 
dominant mythology about the course taken by sexual relations in the last 
century. On the one hand, he has demonstrated that contrary to popular 
mythology, the Victorian era was not a period marked by sexual repression 
from which we are only now beginning to recover. He makes this assertion 
on the strength of two related ideas. Firstly, contrary to customary 
mythology, the last two centuries are witness to a discursive explosion 
around the issue of sexuality. He is able to make this assertion on the 
b .sis of the second argument that the family is not the exclusive guardian 
of sexuality. A number of discourses which we would not normally associate 
with sexuality can be seen to be concerned with the production of sexual 
definitions; education, legal definitions, etc. Even though these 
discourses may be articulated around a central prohibition of sex or its 
negation, nevertheless they are concerned with the production of definitions 
of sez. (25)
Foucault's analysis is useful in many respects. It does indeed begin 
to produce a history where essentialist definitions of the sexes are avoided. 
Moreover, it begins to produce an account of the history of social relations 
where the production of sexual categories is no longer marginalised as the 
effect of 'superstruetural' relations but is a crucial element in the 
definitions of the social, practices addressed to the social, and indeed the 
operations of 'governmental!ty', as he calls ito His work has been followed 
by a more detailed analysis of the discursive construction of the family in
the same period in France, drawing attention to the construction of definite
(26) 
relations between e.g= mother and doctor, in the supervision of sexuality 0
These new relations it is argued are at the basis of new statuses ascribed 
to women through the course of the nineteenth century <>
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But this approach has multiple limitations especially considered 
from the perspective of feminism. It is to these limitations that the 
following remarks will be addressed since currently there is a plethora 
of more or less interesting general critiques of Foucault's arguments.
The strengths of Foucault's arguments are also a source of weakness. 
He concentrates on discourses in order to show the means by which 
individualisation is effected without falling into speculation on individual 
behavioural patterns. However this focus means that what is presented is 
a description of texts. While this description may avoid a whole series 
of epistemological presuppositions about the relationship between individual 
and social conditions, it is no more useful as an approach in terms of 
illuminating problems around the question of sexual relations.
One immediate problem related to the difficulty connected with this 
approach is assessing how representative a text might be. Because Foucault 
refuses to consider the relationship between discourses and reality as one 
of reflection, he suspends the question of what text might represent what 
approach, interest group or tendency.' Any tezt might be considered 
representative of the particular period in which it appears and there are 
small means offered for assessing the relationship between tezts and social 
forces.
An example of the problems which this raises are exemplified by Jacques 
Donzelot's The Policing of Families. Using the same approach as Foucault, 
he traces the history of discourses surrounding the family over the last 
century. One of his arguments concerns the way in which there was increased 
intervention in the family and the regulation of sexuality through a number 
of discourses - educational, medical and political. He argues that these 
interventions constructed a new status for motherhood, through out the 
nineteenth century. Mothers were invested with a series of investigative, 
punitative, and guardian roles. Because Donzelot discovers the literature 
of nineteenth century feminism to be steeped in the language of moral and
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physical health, he goes on to assert that it was this discursive 
transformation of the status of women which underlay the emergence of the 
feminist movement. While Donzelot has usefully demonstrated the discursive 
construction of the family and motherhood, his assertions about the birth 
of feminism are extremely limited. The observation that nineteenth 
century feminism is steeped in the language and aims of moral and physical 
reform, and is quite often addressed to improving women's lot within the 
family, neither exhausts nor explains nineteenth century feminism. This 
thesis has already argued that early feminism was crossed by numerous 
political and social discourses; it was by no means a homogeneous movement. 
As much as feminism was about bettering the family, it was equally possible 
to find far reaching critiques of the family. More seriously, Donzelot's 
argument neglects the historical and social oppression of women. All 
discourses or practices clearly have social conditions of existence. In 
the case of nineteenth century feminism, medical, educational and governmental 
discourses would provide some of the terms in which problems were thought,. 
However that does not exhaust the problem of politicisation; it neglects 
the power relations between men and women which would motivate, in diverse 
ways, the various attempts to reformulate women's position.
The inadequacies of concentration on texts do not end here. There 
are two further insuperable problems with this approach. First of all, 
because areas which are traditionally designated under the term 'the 
individual' frequently lead to theoretical reductionism, does not mean that 
they can simply be ignored. To mention behavioural practices, sexual 
practices, fantasy, immediately indicates what crucial areas are being 
neglected. It is precisely areas such as these that have been interrogated 
by contemporary feminism in order to understand the dynamic of sexual 
relations. Interestingly, they are the areas, traditionally by-passed by 
the social sciences, areas left to the 'natural' or individual sciences,,
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Foucault's perspective simply reinforces this division. Instead of 
producing a perspective where these areas can be questioned they are 
simply abdicated.
A further problem presents itself in relation to this textual 
concentration. Because it suspends the questions of the external referent 
of a text, it deprives itself of the means of assessing the representation 
which a text gives of itself. This is in fact a feature of all reactionary 
social sciences; they accept what a discourse says of itself, without 
analysing the relationship between representations, and between representa- 
tions and other social practices. Thus a legal representation of 'equal 1 
but 'differentiated' sexual status would be accepted as truly representing 
'equal 1 but 'differentiated' social status. On the contrary, feminism has 
amply demonstrated that what is said in one representation interacts with 
others and with social practices. Thus the sex discrimination act may 
insist of equality of treatment and opportunity in the letter but this can 
be rendered almost meaningless given the structural inequalities determined 
by familial organisation and patterns of labour. Indeed if one lesson 
can confidently be claimed by contemporary feminism it is that formal and 
legal statements may make representations of themselves and ascribe statuses 
which do not intervene in the dynamic of sexual relationships. Legislation 
may not have anything to say about the sexual hierarchies in which they 
exist. Thus legislation on pornography might declare that it harms no-one, 
whereas the organisation of dominant modes of representing women's sesraality 
may be a major enforcement of hierarchies built on sexual differentiation.
Concentration on what discourses say of themselves neglect the social 
practices which surround them. Forms of expression, sexual practices, 
familial organisations are all practices which effect social subordination. 
Focussing on discursive constructions cannot engage in the dynamic of sexual 
subordination which has its tenacity precisely because it is rooted in
practices of speech, representation and behaviour as much as it is in legal,
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economic and political decisions. Indeed it is precisely these areas, 
hived off under characteristics of the 'individual' which constantly 
escape legislation. They are the realm of freedom, or personal identity, 
which our society so cherishes., resisting any legislative intervention in 
this realm. Yet it is in these areas that sexual oppression is so potent.
Finally the insistence on the particularities of discursive construction 
in the production of the individual, is often accompanied by an emphasis on 
the separation of discourses. As Foucault's work has been taken up by 
some feminists in England, its effect has been to suggest that there are 
no general categories of 'men 1 and 'women'. This is offered as a solution 
to the problem of universalising and therefore essentialising sexual 
relations. It stresses that the categories of men and women are produced 
differently in different practices. In its initial moments this tendency 
rightly drew attention to the fact there is no homogeneity of sex roles. 
Even in the mass-media, often berated for its reproduction of stereotypes, 
dominant stereotypes of women differ quite considerably; the glamourous 
sensuality presented one minute is often followed by the efficient, all- 
beneficient mother, or the fiendish mother-in-law. Different conceptions 
of women are indeed presented in different discourses, conceptions of women 
with or without children, married or unmarried etc. But, and this is the 
crux of the matter, this plurality of representations, does not mean that 
general categories of men and women are not operative. To suggest this 
is to be blind to the fact that the general categories themselves may be 
operative and significant. Such blindness has been parodied by Borges 
whose character Funes, having fallen from his horse, loses his memory and 
begins to perceive everything as new and different:
He was...almost incapable of general platonic ideas. It
was not only difficult for him to understand that the
generic term dog embraced so many unlike specimens of
differing sizes and forms; he was disturbed by the fact
that a dog at three-fourteen (seen in profile) should have
the same name as the dog at three-fifteen (seen from the front). (2?)
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In our society, sexual difference is ascribed with a significance,. 
Anatomical men and women are ascribed different places, however nuch 
different discourses might produce different categories of men and women, 
however feminine men may be, or masculine women may be. Sexual difference 
is perhaps the primary difference in our society; forms of hierarchy and 
symbolism are constructed on this difference. Whatever we might want to 
say about the deconstruction of sexual identity within the individual, 
there comes, as Lacan suggests, 'the moment of truth of the toilet door'. 
Anatomical men are recognised in one way, anatomical women in other. 
The categories of male and female are constantly recognised in all discourses, 
however differently.
We are confronted with an inescapable fact. Our society is pre- 
o.ccapied with anatomical difference. On this difference, a whole series 
of symbolic differences are constructed,, A number of practices reveal 
that anatomic distinction is a problem and preoccupation. Attempts "to 
redefine sexual relations based on symbolic anatomical differences are 
rarely met with neutrality; they disturb and upset; they meet with 
opposition. Some uses of psychoanalysis have pointed the way towards 
understanding social practices as involving attempts at sexual definition,.
Several points can be made briefly in conclusion. They are made from 
the perspective of the implications of psychoanalysis for the study of 
sexuality within society. The discovery of 'bisexuality' and the construction 
of reproductive sexuality is irreducible. It disallows those theories which 
assume any given-ness to sexual behaviour or sexual instincto Psychoanalysis 
also suggests that the whole notion of the instinct is problematic. The 
instinct is always overdetermined by the complex, and therefore by sociality- 
In addition, psychoanalysis criticises the idea of a homogeneous or coherent 
individual, and exposes the area of the unconscious as contradictory process. 
The implications of both these points - the primacy of the social over the 
instinct and the displacement of the coherent subject - are critical for the
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idea of the individual which operates in so many studies of sexual 
behaviour. The implications of these points render as useless the 
traditional notion of the individual as reservoir of behavioural and 
instinctual phenomena; hence psychoanalysis rules out arguments that 
start from biological or psychological givens.
However far from turning its back on the phenomena of traditionally 
treated under the term, "the individual" psychoanalysis provides us with a 
series of insights into the way in which behaviour is structured. Despite 
the very severe limitations of psychoanalysis, it is still a theoretical 
approach which renders us a great service in the study of sexuality. For 
it delivers to us an account of what is at stake in sexual behaviours and
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practices, even if its theory of determination of sexual forms is ultimately 
reductive. It gives insight to the anxieties and complexes which frequently 
underly fantasies, sexual behaviour, and sexual practices in society, and 
without such insight our interpretation of sexual division will constantly 
return to theoretical approaches which reduce the significance of sexual 
division.
Psychoanalysis is not offered here as a theory which can fulfill the 
theoretical or political requirements of feminism. The discussion of the 
psychoanalytic theory of patriarchy has made it clear that such a position 
would answer no questions. It has been offered as an example of the 
challenge which a non-essentialist theory of sexuality presents to dominant 
explanations within the social sciences. The aim of this thesis has been 
to account for these dominant explanations and to hang on tenaciously to 
criticisms which have been and can be made of the assumptions about sexual 
division. At this stage such tenacity can only deliver limited rewards. 
It indicates decisively that our conceptions of sexuality must be rethoughto 
We can no longer assume that all practices involving sexuality - the family, 
marriage, sexual behaviour and representations - operate on a common 
sexual factor such as a reproductive instinct. At the same time it hints
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at an analytic approach which could give insight to the dynamic within 
these practices. This insight to sexual dynamic, and the processes of 
representation associated with it, have fundamentally challenged the 
sufficiency of those social sciences which seek to explain a given social 
phenomenon simply by reference to the interaction of social institutions 
and practices in which it occurs. It has therefore levelled a challenge 
to dominant explanations of sexuality within the social sciences, despite 
its own limited foundations. A delicate future awaits the study of sexual 
relations within society. It requires the critical revaluation of the 
notion of the complex. It requires a rear-guard fight against the return 
of essentialising explanations. Finally it requires the development of 
social theories like marxism. This development must be in the direction 
which opposes reductive dogmas and treats them as traditions of attention 
to forces such as class, whose conceptualisation must now be submitted to 
the problem of sexual relationso
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1. The study of how sex has been studied is now being pioneered by 
Jeffrey Weeks in England.
2. Two important areas have been somewhat arbitrarily neglected. There 
has been no attempt to deal with either sexology or social psychology, 
even though there are important overlaps between these areas and those 
examined in the thesis. Nor has there been any attempt to follow up 
developments within the study of kinship subsequent to those outlined 
in Chapter Four. Both of these may appear as serious absences 
especially as recent developments within anthropology have attempted to 
raise similar questions to those raised in the conclusion to this thesis. 
See, for example, articles in Critique of Anthropology, where there are 
signs that work on how to specify regularities and correspondences in 
different social and sexual organisations is now underway.
3. An example of the divisions between these explanations can be found in
the collection of essays on Rationality, ed. Wilson, B., Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford, 1979.
4. Foucault's History of Sexuality, Alien Lane, 1978 has drawn attention to 
the ways in which there was increased intervention around the issue of 
sexuality in the last century.
5. The first criticisms of this wage form were raised in the domestic
labour debate. For a summary of this see Kaluzynska, E., "Wiping the 
Floor with Theory', in Feminist Review, no. 6, 1980. Recently the 
criticism of the family wage have become more extensive, see Hilary 
Land, ' The Family Wage ! , in Feminist Review, No. 6, 1980. 
Campbell, B., 'Divided we Fall' in Red Rag7l980.
6. See Ellis, J., On Pornography, Screen, Vol. 21, No. 1, 1980.
7. See Mitchell, J., Psychoanalysis and Feminism, Alien Lane, 1974*
8. This is discussed in chapters 5 and 6. Briefly the problem of non- 
correspondence has forced itself on the attention of marxists with the 
development of socialism in a number of countries. It has become all 
too painfully obvious in the case of the U.S.S.R. that collective owner- 
ship of the means of production means neither democracy nor changes in 
the organisation of familial and sexual organisation. Both China and 
Cuba have acknowledged the difficulty of effecting sexual and familial 
transformations and have recognised the need to intervene specifically 
and separately within family organisation if any real changes are to 
be effected.
9. These attempts to join Marx and Freud have been mentioned briefly in 
chapter 8.
10. This is the case in the so-called neo-Freudians, like Fromm and Erikson, 
who have attempted to develop a theory of the personality types of 
various social formations.
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11. A theoretical discussion of the notion of determination in marxism
can be found in Cutler, Hindess, Hirst and Hussein in Marx's Capital 
and Capitalism Today, 2 vols, op. cit.
12. This principle, anti-naturalism, has been an integral part of marxist 
philosophy arising from the tenet, 'social being determines social 
consciousness.'
13. An example of this would be Meillasoux, c  ? Pennies, Greniers, Cardtaux 
Maspero, 1975.
14- This point has been made by Harris, 0., Edholm, F., and Young, K., 
in 'Conceptualising Women', Critique of Anthropology, No. 9/10.
15. This position is characteristic of the domestic labour debate. For 
references, see Kaluzynska, E., op. cit.
16. This presupposition becomes glaringly obvious when it is realised
that in its early stages the domestic labour debate frequently had to 
presume that the waged labourer was male and the domestic labourere 
an unwaged female.
17. See, for example, Wilson, E., Women and the Welfare State, Tavistock, 
1977.
18. A spate of recent writings have discussed the issue of patriarchy.
Briefly these can be found in the debate over patriarchy between Sheila 
Rowbotham on one side and Barbara Taylor and Sally Alexander on the 
other in the New Statesman, 1979/80.
Veronica Bee chey provides a summary of recent uses of the term in 
'On Patriarchy', Feminist Review, no. 3, 1979.
Diana Adlam's "Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism' in M/F, No. 
3, 1979, criticises the use of the term patriarchy in contemporary 
debates.
19. For an examination of the relation between the state and the family from 
this perspective see, Bennet, F., Keys, R., Coward, R., "The limitations 
to Financial and Legal Independence" in Politics and Power, No. 1, R.K.P, 
1980.
20. See the opening section of Levi-Strauss, The Elementary Structures of 
Kinship, Eyre and Spottiswoode, London 1969.
21. See Rubin, G., 'The Traffic in Women' in ed. Reiter. R., Towards an 
Anthropology of Women, Monthly Review Press, 1975.
22. This is best exemplified by Saussure himself in his Course in G-eneral 
Linguistics, 1906, printed by Fontana, 1974. 
Here he argues;
"Language is a system of independent terms in which the value of 
each term results from the simultaneous presence of others."
The argument has been made by Cowie, E., in 'Women as Sign', in M/F, 
No. 1, 
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23. This theory is summarised in Coward, R., and Ellis, J., Language and 
Materialism, R.K.P., 1977.
24. Foucault, M 0 , The History of Sexuality, op. cit.
25. A summary of Foucault' s argument can be found in Coward, R., 
"Sexual Liberation and the Family", M/F. Ho. 1, 1978.
26. Donzelot, J., The Policing of the Family, Hutchinson, London, I960.
27. Borges, L., Funes, the memorious 1967, p. 35.
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